having its own law upon the subject. But in ments of foreign tribunals shall be rendered the German cantons, and in some of the other executory according to the rules established by cantons, foreign judgments are executed ac- reciprocal treaties and conventions," and, cording to the rule of reciprocity only. Con- where no rules have been established by such stant, 193-204; Pigott. Foreign Judgments, 505-treaties, are to be "put in execution in the 516; Clunet, 1887, p. 762; Westlake, ubi supra. Empire, only after authorization granted by The law upon this subject has been clearly the courts of the Empire:" and "in deciding stated by Brocher, president of the court of cas upon demands of this kind, the courts do not sation of Geneva, and professor of law in the uni examine into the foundation of the dispute ad220] versity there. In his Nouveau *Traité judged by the foreign tribunals, but decide de Droit International Privé (1876) S 174, only whether the judgment does not contain treating of the question whether "it might not dispositions which are contrary to the public be convenient that states should execute, with order, or which are not permitted by the laws out reviewing their merits, judgments rendered of the Empire." Constant, 183-185. Yet a on the territory of each of them respectively," chamber of the senate of St. Petersburg, sithe says: "It would certainly be advanta-ting as a court of cassation and the highest geous for the parties interested to avoid the de- judicial tribunal of the Empire in civil ma: lays, the conflicts, the differences of opinion, ters, has declined to execute a French judg and the expenses resulting from the necessity ment, upon the grounds that, by the settled of obtaining a new judgment in each locality law of Russia, "it is a principle in the Russian where they should seek execution. There Empire that only the decisions of the authormight thence arise, for each sovereignty, a ities to whom jurisdiction has been delegated judicial or moral obligation to lend a strong by the sovereign power have legal value by hand to foreign judgments. But would not themselves and of full right;" and that "in all such an advantage be counterbalanced, and questions of international law, reciprocity often surpassed, by the dangers that might must be observed and maintained as a fundaarise from that mode of proceeding? There is mental principle." Adam v. Schipoff, Clunet, here, we believe, a question of reciprocal ap- 1884, pp. 45, 46, 134. And Professor Englepreciation and confidence. One must, at the mann, of the Russian University of Dorpat, in outset, inquire whether the administration of an able essay, explaining that and other Rusthe foreign judiciary whose judgments it is sian decisions, takes the following view of sought to execute without verifying their them: "The execution of a treaty is not the merits presents sufficient guaranties. If the only proof of reciprocity. . . . It is necessary propriety of such an execution be admitted, to commit the ascertainment of the existence there is ground for making it the object of dip of reciprocity to the judicial tribunals for the lomatic treaties. That form alone can guar- same reasons for which there is conferred upon antee the realization of a proper reciprocity; it them the right to settle all questions incident furnishes, moreover, to each state the means of to the cause to be adjudged. The existence of acting upon the judicial organization and pro reciprocity *between two states ought to [222 cedure of other states." In an article in the be proved in the same manner as all the positive Journal, after a review of the Swiss decisions, facts of the case. It is true that the prinbe recognizes and asserts that "it comes within ciple of reciprocity is a principle, not of right, the competency of each canton to do what but of policy, yet the basis of the principle of seems to it proper in such matters." Clunet, all regular and real policy is also the funda 1879, pp. 88, 94. And in a later treatise, he mental principle of right, and the point of desays: "We cannot admit that the recognition parture of all legal order-the suum cuique. of a state as sovereign ought necessarily to have This last principle comprehends right, reciprocias a consequence the obligation of respecting ty, utility; and reciprocity is the application and executing the judicial decision rendered of right to policy. . . . Let this principle be ap. by its tribunals; in strict right, the authority of plied wherever there is the least guaranty, or such acts does not extend beyond the frontier. even a probability of reciprocity, and the cogEach sovereignty possesses in particular, and nizance of this question be committed to the more or less in private, the territory subject to judicial tribunals, and one will arrive at imits power. No other can exercise there an act portant results which, on their side, will touch of its authority. This territorial independence the desired end, international accord. But finds itself, in principle, directly included in for this it is indispensable that the application the very act by which one nation recognizes of this principle should be entrusted to judicial a foreign state as sovereign; but there cannot tribunals accustomed to decide affairs accordresult therefrom a promise to adopt, and to ing to right, and not to administrative authorcause to be executed upon the national territory, ities, which look above all to utility, and are 221] judgments rendered by *the officials of accustomed to be moved by political reasons, the foreign state, whoever they may be. That intentions. and even passions. Clunet, 1884, would be an abdication of its own sovereignty, pp. 120-122. But it would seem that no for and would bind it in such sort as to make it an eign judgment will be executed in Russia, unaccomplice in acts often injurious, and in some less reciprocity is secured by treaty. Clunet, cases even criminal. Such obligations sup- 1884, pp. 46, 113, 139, 140, 602. pose a reciprocal confidence; they are not un In Poland, the provisions of the Russiau dertaken, moreover, except upon certain condi- Code are in force; and the court of appeal of tions and by means of a system of regulations Warsaw has decided that, where there is no intended to prevent or to lessen the dangers treaty the judgments of a foreign country which might result from them." 3 Cours de cannot be executed, because, "in admitting a Droit International Privé (1885) 126, 127. contrary conclusion, there would be impugned In Russia, by the Code of 1864, "the judg-one of the cardinal principles of international relations, namely, the principle of reciprocity, | amines (a) if the judgment has been proaccording to which each state recognizes ju- nounced by a competent judicial authority; (b) ridical rights and relations originating or es- if it has been pronounced, the parties being tablished in another country, only in the regularly cited; (c) if the parties have been measure in which the latter, in its turn, does legally represented or legally defaulted; (d) if not disregard the rights and relations existing the judgment contains dispositions contrary to in the former." Clunet, 1884, pp. 494, 495. public order or to the internal public law of the In Roumania, it is provided by code that "ju- realm." Constant, 157. In 1874, the court of dicial decisions rendered in foreign countries cassation of Turin, "considering that in intercannot be executed in Roumania, except in national relations is admitted the principle of the same manner in which Roumanian judg- reciprocity, as that which has its foundation in ments are executed in the country in question, the natural reason of equality of treatment, and provided that they are declared executory and, in default thereof, opens the way to the by competent Roumanian judges;" and this exercise of the right of retaliation;" and that article seems to be held to require legislative the French courts examine the merits of Ital223] reciprocity. *Moreau, no. 219; Clunet, ian judgments before allowing their execution 1879, p. 351; Clunet, 1885. p. 537; Clunet, in France,-decided that the Italian courts of 1891, p. 452; Pigott, Foreign Judgments, 495. appeal, when asked to execute a French judg In Bulgaria, by a resolution of the supreme ment, ought not only to inquire into the comcourt in 1881, the Bulgarian judges should, petency of the foreign court, but also to review as a general rule, abstain from entering upon the merits and the justice of the controversy. the merits of the foreign judgment; they ought Levi v. Pitre, in Rossi, Esecuzione delle Senonly to inquire whether the judgment sub- tenze Straniere (1st ed. 1875) 70, 284; and in mitted to them does not contain dispositions Clunet, 1879, p. 295. Some commentators, contrary to the public order, and to the Bul- however, while admitting that decision to be garian laws." Constant, 129, 130; Clunet, most authoritative, have insisted that it is un1886, p. 570. This resolution closely follows sound and opposed to other Italian decisions the terms of the Russian Code, which, as has to which we have not access. Rossi, ubi supra been seen, has not precluded applying the (2d ed. 1890) 92; Fiore, 142, 143; Clunet, 1878, principle of reciprocity. p. 237; Clunet, 1879. pp. 296, 305: Pigott, Foreign Judgments, 483; Constant, 161. In Austria, the rule of reciprocity does not rest upon any treaty or legislative enactment, but has been long established, by imperial de crees and judicial decisions, upon general principles of jurisprudence. Foelix, no. 331; Constant, 100-108; Moreau, no. 185: Weiss, Traité de Droit International (1886) 980; Clunet, 1891, p. 1003; Clunet, 1894, p. 908; Pigott, Foreign Judgments, 434. In Hungary, the same principles were always followed as in Austria, and reciprocity has been made a condition by a law of 1880. Constant, 109; Moreau, no. 186 and note; Pigott, Foreign Judgments, 436; Weiss, ubi supra. In the principality of Monaco, foreign judg ments are not executory, except by virtue of a special ordinance of the Prince, upon a report of the advocate general. Constant, 169; Pigott, Foreign Judgments, 488. In Spain, formerly, foreign judgments do not appear to have been executed at all. Foelix, no. 398; Moreau, no. 197: Silvela, in Clunet, 1881, p. 20. But by the Code of 1855, revised in 1881 without change in this respect, “judgments pronounced in foreign countries shall have in Spain the force that the respective treaties give them; if there are no special In Italy, before it was united into one king- treaties with the nation in which they have dom, each state had its own rules. In Tus- been rendered, they shall have the same [225 cany and in Modena, in the absence of treaty, force that is given by the laws of that nation to the whole merits were reviewed. In Parma, Spanish executory judgments; if the judg as by the French ordinance of 1629, the for ment to be executed proceeds from a nation eign judgment was subject to fundamental re- by whose jurisprudence effect is not given to vision if against a subject of Parma. In the judgments pronounced by Spanish triNaples, the Code and the decisions followed bunals, it shall have no force in Spain;" and those of France. In Sardinia, the written an "application for the execution of judg laws required above all the condition of reci- ments pronounced in foreign countries shall procity, and, if that condition was not fulfilled, be made to the supreme tribunal of justice, the foreign judgment was re-examinable in all which, after examining an authorized translarespects. Fiore, Effetti Internazionali delle tion of the foreign judgment, and after hearSentenze (1875) 40-44; Moreau, no. 204. In ing the party to whom it is directed and the the papal states, by a decree of the Pope in public minister, shall decide whether it ought 1820, the exequatur shall not be granted, ex- or ought not to be executed." Constant, 141, cept so far as the judgments rendered in the 142: Pigott, Foreign Judgments, 499, 500. A States of his Holiness shall enjoy the same case in which the supreme court of Spain in favor in the foreign countries; this reciprocity 1880 ordered execution of a French judgment, is presumed if there is no particular reason to after reviewing its merits, is reported in Clunet, doubt it." Toullier, Droit Civil, lib. 3, tit. 3. 1881, p. 365. In another case in 1888, the chap. 6, § 3, no. 93. And see Foelix, no. 343; same court, after hearing the parties and the Westlake, Private International Law,ubi supra. public minister, ordered execution of a Mexi224 In the Kingdom of Italy, *by the Code can judgment. The public minister, in bis of Procedure of 1865, "executory force is given demand for its execution, said: "Our law of to the judgments of foreign judicial authorities civil procedure, inspired to a certain point by by the court of appeal in whose jurisdiction the modern theories of international taw, they are to be executed, by obtaining a judg- which, recognizing among civilized nations a ment on an exequatur in which the court ex-true community of right, and considering mankind as a whole in which nations occupy | decisions in correct form, and also reserving the a position identical with that of individuals general principle of reciprocity." Clunet, 1889, towards society, gives authority in Spain to p. 135; Constant, 131, *132. In Brazil, (227 executory judgments rendered by foreign tri- foreign judgments are not executed, unless bebunals, even in the absence of special treaty, cause of the country in which they were renprovided that those countries do not proscribe dered admitting the principle of reciprocity, or the execution there of our judgments, and un- because of a placet of the government of Brazil, der certain conditions which, if they limit the which may be awarded according to the cirprinciple, are inspired by the wish of protect- cumstances of the case. Constant, 124 and ing our sovereignty and by the supreme ex-note; Moreau, no. 192; Pigott, Foreign Judgigencies of justice. When nothing appears, ments, 543-546; Westlake, ubi supra. In the either for or against, as to the authority of the Argentine Republic, the principle of reciproci judgments of our courts in the foreign county was maintained by the courts, and was aftry, one should not put an obstacle to the ful-firmed by the Code of 1878, as a condition filment, in our country, of judgments emanat | sine qua non of the execution of foreign judg ing from other nations, especially when the question is of a country which, by its historic origin, its language, its literature, and by almost the identity of its customs, its usages, and its social institutions, has so great a connection with our own, which obliges us to main tain with it the most intimate relations of friendship and courtesy." And he pointed out that Mexico, by its Code, had adopted reciprocity as a fundamental principle. Among 226] *the reasons assigned by the court for ordering the Mexican judgment to be executed was that "there exists in Mexico no prece dent of jurisprudence which refuses execution to judgments rendered by the Spanish tribunals. Clunet, 1891, pp. 288-292. In Portugal, foreign judgments, whether against a Portuguese or against a foreigner, are held to be reviewable upon the merits before granting execution thereof. Foelix, no. 399; Clunet, 1875, pp. 54, 448; Moreau, no. 217; Constant, 176-180; Westlake, ubi supra. In Greece, by the provisions of the Code of 1834, foreign judgments, both parties to which are foreigners, are enforced without examination of their merits; but if one of the parties is a Greek, they are not enforced if found contradictory to the facts proved, or if they are contrary to the prohibitive laws of Greece, Foelix, no. 396; Constant, 151, 152; Moreau, no. 202; Saripolos, in Clunet, 1880, p. 173; Pigott, Foreign Judgments, 475. In Egypt, under the influence of European jurisprudence, the Code of Civil Procedure has made reciprocity a condition upon which for eign judgments are executed. Constant, 136; Clunet, 1887, pp. 98, 228; Clunet, 1889, p. 322. In Cuba and Porto Rico, the Codes of Civil Procedure are based upon the Spanish Code of 1855. Pigott, Foreign Judgments, 435, 503. In Hayti, the Code re enacts the provisions of the French Code. Constant, 153; Moreau, no. 203; Pigott, Foreign Judgments, 460. ments, but has perhaps been modified by later legislation. Moreau, no. 218; Palomeque, in Clunet, 1887, pp. 539–558. It appears, therefore, that there is hardly a civilized nation on either continent, which, by its general law. allows conclusive effect to an executory foreign judgment for the recovery of money. In France, and in a few smaller states-Norway, Portugal, Greece, Monaco, and Hayti-the merits of the controversy are reviewed as of course, allowing to the foreign judgment,at the most, no more effect than of be ing prima facie evidence of the justice of the claim. In the great majority of the countries on the continent of Europe-in Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Sweden, Germany, in many cantons of Switzerland, in Russia and Poland, in Roumania, in Austria and Hungary (perhaps in Italy) and in Spain-as well as in Egypt, in Mexico, and in a great part of South America, the judgment rendered in a foreign country is allowed the same effect only as the courts of that country allow to the judgments of the country in which the judgment in question is sought to be executed. The prediction of Mr. Justice Story (in S 618 of his Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws, already cited) has thus been fulfilled, and the rule of reciprocity has worked itself firmly into the structure of international jurisprudence. The reasonable, if not the necessary, conclusion appears to us to be that judgments rendered in France, or in any other foreign country by the laws of which our own judgments are reviewable upon the merits, are not entitled to full credit and conclusive effect when sued upon in this country, but are prima facie evidence only of the justice of the plaintiff's claim. *In holding such a judgment, for want [228 of reciprocity, not to be conclusive evidence of the merits of the claim, we do not proceed upon any theory of retaliation upon one per In Mexico, the system of reciprocity has been adopted by the Code of 1884 as the gov-son by reason of injustice done to another, erning principle. Constant, 168; Clunet, 1891, p. 290. but upon the broad ground that international law is founded upon mutuality and reciprocity, and that by the principles of international law recognized in most civilized nations, and by the comity of our own country, which it is our judicial duty to know and to declare, the judgment is not entitled to be considered conclusive. The rule of reciprocity likewise appears to have generally prevailed in South America. In Peru, foreign judgments do not appear to be executed without examining the merits, unless when reciprocity is secured by treaty. Clunet, 1879, pp. 266, 267; Pigott, Foreign Judgments, 548. In Chili, there appears to By our law at the time of the adoption of have been no legislation upon the subject, but the Constitution, a foreign judgment was conaccording to a decision of the supreme court sidered as prima facie evidence, and not conof Santiago in 1886, the Chilian tribunals clusive. There is no statute of the United should not award an exequatur, except upon | States, and no treaty of the United States with France or with any other nation, which has | in personam which is not open to question on changed that law, or has made any provision upon the subject. It is not to be supposed that, if any statute or treaty had been or should be made, it would recognize as conclusive the judgments of any country which did not give like effect to our own judgments. In the absence of statute or treaty, it appears to us equally unwarrantable to assume that the comity of the United States requires anything more. 229] *For these reasons, in the action at law the judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded to the circuit court, with directions to set aside the verdict and to order a new trial. For the same reasons, in the suit in equity between these parties the foreign judgment is not a bar, and therefore the decree dismissing the bill is reversed, the plea adjudged bad, and the cause remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. the ground of want of jurisdiction, either in- The principle that requires litigation to be treated as terminated by final judgment properly rendered is as applicable to a judgment proceeded on in such an action as to any other, and forbids the allowance to the judgment debtor of a retrial of the original cause of action as of right, in disregard of the obliga tion to pay arising on the judgment, and of the rights acquired by the judgment creditor thereby. If we should hold this judgment to be conclusive, we should allow it an effect to which, supposing the defendant's offers to be sustained by actual proof, it would, in the absence of a special treaty, be entitled in hardly any other country in Christendom, except the country in which it was rendered. If the judgment had been rendered in this country, or in any other outside of the jurisdiction of France, the French courts would not have executed or enforced it, except after examining That any other conclusion is inadmissible is into its merits. The very judgment now sued forcibly illustrated by the case in hand. Plainon would be held inconclusive in almost any tiffs in error were trading copartners in Paris other country than France. In England, and as well as in New York, and had a place of in the colonies subject to the law of England, business in Paris at the time of these transthe fraud alleged in its procurement would be actions and of the commencement of the suit a sufficient ground for disregarding it. In the against them in France. The subjects of the courts of nearly every other nation, it would suit were commercial transactions having their be subject to re-examination, either merely be- origin and partly performed in France, under cause it was a foreign judgment, or because a contract there made, and alleged to be modijudgments of that nation would be re-examin-fied by the dealings of the parties there; and able in the courts of France. one of the claims against them was for goods sold to them there. They appeared generally in the case, without protest, and by counterclaims relating to the same general course of business, a part of them only connected with the claims against them, became actors in the suit and submitted to the courts their own claims for affirmative relief, as well as the claims against them. The courts were competent and they took the chances of a decision in their favor. As traders in France they were under the protection of its laws and were bound by its laws, its commercial usages, and its rules of procedure. The fact that they were Americans and the opposite parties were citizens of France is immaterial, and there is no suggestion on the record that those courts proceeded on any other ground than that all litigants, whatever their nationality, were entitled to equal justice therein. If plaintiffs in error had succeeded in their cross suit and recovered judgment against defendants in error, and had sued them here on that judgment, defendants in error would not have been permitted to say that the judgment in France was not conclusive against them.[231 As it was, defendants in error recovered, and I think plaintiffs in error are not entitled to try their fortune anew before the courts of this country on the same matters voluntarily submitted by them to the decision of the foreign tribunal. We are dealing with the judgment of a court of a civilized country whose laws and systems of justice recognize the general rules in respect to property and rights between man and man prevailing among all civilized peoples. Obviously the last persons who should be heard to complain are those who identified themselves with the business of that country, knowing that all their transactions there would be subject to the local laws and modes of doing business. The French courts Mr. Chief Justice Fuller dissenting: Plaintiffs brought their action on a judg ment recovered by them against the defendants in the courts of France, which courts had jurisdiction over person and subject matter, and in respect of which judgment no fraud was alleged, except in particulars contested in and considered by the French courts. The question is whether under these circumstances, and in the absence of a treaty or act of Congress, the judgment is re-examinable upon the merits. This question I regard as one to be determined by the ordinary and settled rule in respect of allowing a party who has had an opportunity to prove his case in a competent court to retry it on the merits; and it seems to me that the doctrine of res judicata applicable to domestic judgments should be applied to foreign judgments as well, and rests on the same general ground of public policy that there should be an end of litigation. This application of the doctrine is in accordance with our own jurisprudence, and it is not necessary that we should hold it to be required by some rule of international law. The fundamental principle concerning judgments is that disputes are finally determined by them, and I am unable to perceive why a judgment appear to bave acted “judicially, honestly, and with the intention to arrive at the right conclusion;" and a result thus reached ought not to be disturbed. observing in the present case, as in that the whole of the facts appear to have been inquired into by the French courts, judicially, honestly, and with the intention to arrive at the right conclusion, and having heard the facts as stated before them, they came to a conclusion which justified them in France in deciding as they did decide.' .. Indeed, it is diffi pleading is consistent with any notion that the judgment was only evidence. If that were so. every count on a *foreign judgment must [233 be demurrable on that ground. The mode of pleading shows that the judgment was considered, not as merely prima facie evidence of that cause of action for which the judgment was given, but as itself giving rise, at least prima facie, to a legal obligation to obey that judgment and pay the sum adjudged. This may seem a technical mode of dealing with the question, but in truth it goes to the root of the matter. For if the judgment were merely considered as evidence of the original cause of action, it must be open to meet it by any counter evidence negativing the existence of that original cause of action. If, on the other hand, there is a prima facie obligation to obey the judgment of a tribunal having jurisdiction over the party and the cause, and to pay the sum decreed, the question would be, whether it was open to the unsuccessful party to try the cause over again in a court, not sitting as a court of appeal from that which gave the judgment. It is quite clear that this could not be done where the action is brought on the judgment of an English tribunal; and, on principle, it seems the same rule should apply, where it is brought on that of a foreign tribunal." The following view of the rule in England was expressed by Lord Herschell in Nouvion v. Freeman, L. R. 15 App. Cas. 1, 9, quoted in the principal opinion: "The principle upon which I think our enforcement of foreign judg-cult to understand how the common course of ments must proceed is this: that in a court of competent jurisdiction, where according to its established procedure the whole merits of the case were open, at all events, to the parties, however much they may have failed to take advantage of them, or may have waived any of their rights, a final adjudication has been given that a debt or obligation exists which cannot thereafter in that court be disputed, and can only be questioned in an appeal to a higher tribunal. In such a case it may well be said that giving credit to the court of another country we are prepared to take the fact that such adjudication has been made as establishing the existence of a debt or obligation." But in that connection the observations made by Mr. Justice Blackburn in Godard v. Gray, L. R. 6 Q. B. 139, 148, and often referred to with approval, may usefully again be quoted: "It is not an admitted principle of the law of nations that a state is bound to enforce within its territories the judgments of a foreign tribunal. Several of the continental nations (including France) do not enforce the judg 232] ments of other countries, *unless where there are reciprocal treaties to that effect. But in England and in those states which are governed by the common law, such judgments are enforced, not by virtue of any treaty nor by virtue of any statute, but upon a principle very well stated by Parke, B., in Williams v. Jones, 13 Mees. & W. 633: Where a court of competent jurisdiction had adjudicated a certain sum to be due from one person to an other, a legal obligation arises to pay that sum, on which an action of debt to enforce the judgment may be maintained. It is in this way that the judgments of foreign and colonial courts are supported and enforced.' And taking this as the principle, it seems to follow that anything which negatives the existence of that legal obligation, or excuses the defendar: from a performance of it, must form a good defense to the action. It must be open, therefore, to the defendant to show that the court which pronounced the judgment had not jurisdiction to pronounce it, either because they exceeded the jurisdiction given to them by the foreign law, or because he, the defendant, was not subject to that jurisdiction; and so far the foreign judgment must be examinable. Proba bly the defendant may show that the judgment was obtained by the fraud of the plaintiff, for that would show that the defendant was excused from the performance of an obligation thus obtained; and it may be that where the foreign court has knowingly and perversely disregarded the rights given to an English subject by English law, that forms a valid excuse for disregarding the obligation thus imposed on him; but we prefer to imitate the caution of the present Lord Chancellor in Castrique v. Imrie, L. R. 4 H. L. 445, and to leave those questions to be decided when they arise, only In any aspect, it is difficult to see why rights acquired under foreign judgments do not belong to the category of private rights acquired under foreign laws. Now the rule is univer sal in this country that private rights acquired under the laws of foreign states will be respected and enforced in our courts unless contrary to the policy or prejudicial to the inter ests of the state where this is sought to be done; and although the source of this rule may have been the comity char cterizing the intercourse between nations, it prevails to-day by its own strength, and the right to the application of the law to which the particular transaction is subject is a juridical right. And, without going into the refinements of the publicists on the subject, it appears to me that that law finds authoritative expression in the judgments of courts of competent jurisdiction over parties and subject-matter. It is held by the majority of the court that defendants cannot be permitted to contest the validity and effect of this judgment on the general ground that it was erroneous in law or in fact; and the special grounds relied on[234 are seriatim rejected. In respect of the last of these, that of fraud, it is said that it is unneces sary in this case to decide whether certain decisions cited in regard to impeaching foreign judgments for fraud could be followed con sistently with our own decisions as to impeaching domestic judgments for that reason, “because there is a distinct and independent ground upon which we are satisfied that the |