United States shall be deprived of the lawful duties or any portion thereof, accruing upon the merchandise, or any portion thereof, embraced or referred to in such invoice, affidavit, letter, paper, or statement, or affected by such act or omission, such merchandise or the value thereof, to be recovered from the person making the entry, shall be forfeited, which forfeiture shall only apply to the whole of the merchandise or the value thereof in the case or package containing the particular arti476] cle or articles of merchandise to *which such fraud or false paper or statement relates; and such person shall, upon conviction, be fined for each offense a sum not exceeding $5,000, or be imprisoned for a time not exceeding two years, or both, in the discretion of the court." 26 Stat. at L. 131, 135, § 9. The present action was brought to recover from the defendants the sum of $346.02 as the value of certain merchandise originally be longing to them and alleged to have been forfeited to the United States under the above statute. with the witnesses" against them. 2. That the constitutional right of the defendants to be confronted with the witnesses against them is not secured by giving them notice of the execution of letters rogatory in France, and that their failure to attend on such occasion at a place 3,000 miles from the place of trial, out of the district and in a foreign country, does not operate as a waiver of their constitutional right, if it can be waived." In answer to questions propounded by the court, the defendants admitted that the evidence was material, and placed their objection to it upon the grounds just stated. The court thereupon sustained the objection and excluded the evidence, to which action the government excepted. The United States having no other evidence to offer, the jury, by direction of the court, returned a verdict for the defendants, and the action was thereupon dismissed. The only question presented for our decision is whether the court below erred in excluding the deposition which the government took in Paris, France, and the materiality of which is conceded by the defendant. The sole ground of objection to the deposi tion, as we have seen, was that, in this action to recover the value of merchandise alleged to have been forfeited to the United States under the 9th section of the act of June 10, 1890, chap. 407, no deposition, wherever taken, could be read against the defendants, without their consent, but the witness must testify in person, before the court, during the progress The complaint, which is in the form prescribed by the New York Code of Civil Procedure, alleged that, on or about December 14, 1891, certain described merchandise was imported into the United States, at the port of New York, and when so imported was subject to the payment of duties; that the defendants, the owners, importers, and consignees of such merchandise, entered the same at the office of the collector, to whom was produced a duly certified invoice, purporting to show the actual cost of the merchandise, and also a declara-of the trial. tion, which entry and declaration were signed and verified in the manner and form required by law; that said entry, invoice, affidavit, and paper were false and fraudulent, as the defendants well knew, in that the actual cost of such merchandise was greater than the amount stated therein; and that the defendants wilfully and wrongfully concealed the actual cost of such merchandise, whereby the United States had been deprived of the lawful duties, or a portion thereof, accruing upon the same. The defendants made a general denial of each allegation of the plaintiff. As separate defenses they pleaded: 1. That the merchandise mentioned in the complaint was not forfeited. 2. That the action was not brought against the person making the entry of the merchandise in the complaint specified. 3. That the duties on all goods imported by them during the times specified in the complaint had been liquidated and paid by them, and such merchandise delivered to them as the owners thereof, all without fraud, and that more than one year had elapsed since the date of the entry referred to by the United States. 477] *At the trial below, the government, to sustain the issues on its part, offered to read in evidence a deposition that had been duly taken in Paris, France, and was properly authenticated and certified under letters rogatory, properly issued and returned. The defendants objected to the admission of this testimony upon the following grounds: 1. That this action, though civil in form, was in substance a criminal case, and, under the Constitution of the United States, the defendants were entitled on the trial "to be confronted This objection is supposed to be sustained by the 6th *Amendment of the Constitution, [478 which provides that "in all criminal prosecu tions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense." In support of their contention the defendants cite Coffey v. United States, 116 U. S. 436. 443 [29: 684, 686]; Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 634 [29: 746. 752], and Lees v. United States, 150 U. S. 476 [37: 1150]. Coffey v. United States was a civil information on behalf of the United States against certain property that had been seized by an internal revenue officer as forfeited to the United States on account of the alleged violations of certain provisions of the Revised Statutes relating to internal revenue. U. S. Rev. Stat. SS 3257, 3450, 3453. Coffey intervened and claimed the property. One of the defenses was that a criminal information had been filed against him in respect of the mat ters set forth in one or more of the counts of the declaration, and that upon a trial he had been acquitted. The principal question presented in the civil case was as to the effect of the trial, verdict, and judgment of acquittal in the criminal case. This court, after observing that the proceeding to enforce the forfeiture against the res named must be a pro ceeding in rem and a civil action, while that | unreasonable search and seizure, within the to impose upon the offender the fine and im- meaning of the 4th Amendment. Though the prisonment prescribed by statute must be a proceeding in question is devested of many of criminal proceeding, said: "Yet, where an the aggravating incidents of actual search and issue raised as to the existence of the act or seizure, yet, as before said, it contains their fact denounced has been tried in a criminal substance and essence, and effects their subproceeding, instituted by the United States, stantial purpose." and a judgment of acquittal has been rendered in favor of a particular person, that judgment is conclusive in favor of such person on the subsequent trial of a suit in rem by the United States, where, as against him, the existence of the same act or fact is the matter in issue, as a cause for the forfeiture of the property prosecuted in such suit in rem." That case is an authority for the proposition 479] that if the *present defendants had been proceeded against criminally on account of the same acts and facts that must be shown in order to sustain this action under the statute of 1890, and had been acquitted, the verdict and judgment of acquittal would have barred a subsequent civil proceeding, based on the same acts and facts, and instituted to enforce a forfeiture or to recover the value of the merchandise forfeited. The principles announced in the Boyd Case have no application whatever to the present case. Neither the constitutional provision which protects the people in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, nor the provision that a person shall not be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, has any bearing whatever upon the inquiry whether the right of an accused, in a criminal prosecution, "to be confronted with the witnesses against him," is infringed by permitting a deposition of a living witness to be read against him in an action brought to recover the value of merchandise forfeited to the United States by reason of his acts in violation of law. This is so manifest that it is impossible, by any argument, to make it clearer. Equally inapplicable to the present inquiry is the case of Lees v. United States, 150 U. S. 476 [37: 1150]. That was a civil action to recover a penalty imposed by the act of Febru ary 26, 1885 (23 Stat. at L. 332, chap. 164), for importing an alien under a contract to perform labor. Our attention has been called to that part of the opinion in that case in which it was declared, upon the authority of Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 634 [29: 746, 752], that although the proceeding against Lees was civil in form, it was unquestionably criminal in its nature, and in such a case a de fendant cannot be compelled to be a witness against himself." But that principle is not in. volved in the present case. Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 634 [29: 746, 752], was an information, in a cause of seizure and forfeiture of property, against certain merchandise seized as forfeited to the United States under the 12th section of the customs act of June 22, 1874 (18 Stat. at L. 186, 188, chap. 391). Boyd intervened and claimed the goods. On the trial it became important to show the quantity and value of the merchandise contained in certain cases previously imported. The court, on motion of the district attorney, made an order, under the 5th section of the above act, requiring the claimant to produce the invoice of those cases. The order was obeyed, the claimant, however, objecting to its validity, as well as to the con- No case has been cited which sustains the stitutionality of the statute. When the in-contention of the defendants. And we are voice was offered by the government as evi-unaware of any such case in England where dence, Boyd objected to its reception on the the constitutional principle embodied in the ground that, in a suit for forfeiture, the claim- 6th Amendment, and here involved, is recogant himself could not be compelled to produce nized as part of the law of the land. evidence, and that the statute, in that particu- *The 6th Amendment relates to a prose-[481 lar, was invalid. This court said: "As show-cution of an accused person which is technically ing the close relation between the civil and criminal proceedings on the same statute in such cases, we may refer to the recent case of Coffey v. United States, 116 U. S. 436, 443 [29: 684, 686], in which we decided that an acquittal on a criminal information was a good plea in bar to a civil information for the forfeiture of goods arising upon the same acts. As, therefore, suits for penalties and forfeitures incurred by the commission of offenses against the law are of this quasi-criminal nature, we think that they are within the reason of criminal proceedings for all the purposes of the 4th Amendinent of the Constitution, and of that portion of the 5th Amendment which declares that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself; and we are further of opinion that a compulsory production of the private books and papers of the 480]owner of goods sought to be forfeited in such a suit is compelling him to be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the 5th Amendment to the Constitution, and is the equivalent of a search and seizure, and an criminal in its nature. In such a proceeding, the person accused is entitled to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of the state, as well as of a district previously ascertained by law in which the crime charged against him shall have been committed; whereas an action in which a judgment for money only is sought even if, in some aspects, it is one of a penal nature, may be brought wherever the defendant is found and is served with process, unless some statute requires it to be brought in a particular jurisdiction. The words in the 6th Amendment, "to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation," obviously refer to a person accused of crime, whether a felony or misdemeanor, for which he is prosecuted by indictment or presentment, or in some other authorized mode which may involve his personal security. So the clause declaring that the accused, in a criminal prosecution, is entitled "to be confronted with the witnesses against him," has no reference to any proceeding (although the evidence therein may disclose, of necessity, the commission of a public v. WILLIAM F. VILAS. (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 483-499.) Payments to claimants-action against Postmaster General-liability. 1. offense) which is not directly against a person | HARVEY SPALDING, Piff. in Err., [483 who is accused, and upon whom a fine or imprisonment or both may be imposed. A witness who proves facts entitling the plaintiff in a proceeding in a court of the United States, even if the plaintiff be the government, to a judgment for money only, and not to a judgment which directly involves the personal safety of the defendant, is not, within the meaning of the 6th Amendment, a witness against an "accused" in a criminal prosecution; and his evidence may be brought before the jury, in the form of a deposition, taken as prescribed by the statutes regulating the mode in which depositions to be used in the courts of the United States may be taken. The defendant in such a case is no more entitled to be confronted at the trial with the witnesses of the plaintiff than he would be in a case where the evidence related to a claim for money that could be established without disclosing any facts tending to show the commission of crime. In Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547, 562 [35:1110, 1113], 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 816, it was held that the provision in the 5th Amend482]ment that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself" covered, but was not limited to, criminal prosecutions; that its object was "to insure that a person should not be compelled, when acting as a witness in any investigation, to give testimony which might tend to show that he himself had committed a crime." In the argument of that case reference was made to the 6th Amendment in support of the proposition that an investigation before a grand jury was not a criminal case, within the meaning of the 5th Amendment, and was solely for Congress may provide that any sums ascertained to be due from the government to claimants shall be paid directly to them, and shall not pass through the hands of agents or attorneys. 2. A circular by the Postmaster General accompanying warrants for claims due to postmasters, calling attention to an enactment providing for payment directly to them, and stating that no attorney's services were necessary, and that Congress desired the proceeds to reach the person really entitled thereto, and that such claims were adjusted from the books and papers in the department without further evidence, and also to the statute making any transfer of the claim or power of attorney for receiving payment of such warrants null and void,-cannot be made the basis of a private action against him on the ground that it is unauthorized by law and beyond the scope of his official duties, even if it worked injury to an attorney for such claimants. 3. The heal of an executive department cannot be held liable to a civil suit for damages on ac- the purpose of finding out whether a crime Argued November 21, 1895. Decided March 2, had been committed. But this court said that a criminal prosecution, within the meaning of the 6th Amendment, was one against a person who was accused and who was to be tried by a petit jury; that "a criminal prosecution under article 6 of the amendments is much narrower than a criminal case under article 5 of the amendments." Of course, if the government had elected to prosecute the present defendants criminally for the offense defined in the 9th section of the act of 1890, a verdict and judgment of acquittal could have been pleaded in bar of an action to recover the value of the merchandise. Coffey v. United States, 116 U. S. 436. 443 [29: 684, 686]. But it does not follow that the defendants can demand of right, in this civil action, not directly involving their personal security, that they shall be confronted, at the trial, with the witnesses who testify in behalf of the government. The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded with directions to set aside the verdict and judgment, and for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion. Reversed. 1896. District of Columbia to review a judgment ERROR to the Supreme Court of the of that court affirming a final order in the same court in special term sustaining a demurrer to the declaration in an action by Henry Spalding against Wm. F. Vilas and dismissing the plaintiff's action. Affirmed. The facts are stated in the opinion. NOTE. As to ministerial officer protected in the execution of regular process, see note to Erskine v. Hohnbach, 20:745. As to when officer liable for error in judgment; for neglect or refusal to perform judicial or ministerial duty; for tort or breach of trust,—see note to Kendall v. Stokes, 11: 506. As to judge not liable for error of judgment, though intentional; liability of officer on contract made by him,-see note to Jones v. Le Tombe, 1: 647. As to presumption of regularity of officer's appointment and due qualification, and that he acted within his jurisdiction; certificate evidence of authority, -see note to Fenwick v. Sears, 2: 101. As to when injunction to restrain acts of public officers will be granted, see note to Mississippi v. Johnson, 18: 437. As to liability of sureties on official bonds, see note to United States v. Giles, 8: 709. As to liability of sureties on postmaster's bonds, see note to Postmaster General v. Early, 6: 577. As to postmaster's liability for loss and detention of letters and papers, see note to Dunlop v. Munroe, 8: 329. 161 U. S. Mr. W. Willoughby for plaintiff in error. | March 3, 1883, requiring the Postmaster GenMessrs. J. M. Dickinson, Assistant Attorney General, and Judson Harmon, Attorney General, for defendant in error. 484] *Mr. Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of the court: This writ of error brings up for review a judgment of the supreme court of the District of Columbia in general term, which affirmed a final order in the same court in special term, sustaining a demurrer to the declaration filed by the plaintiff in error Spalding against the defendant Vilas, and dismissing the plaintiff's action. The question presented for determination is whether the plaintiff's declaration stated a valid cause of action against the defendant. The plaintiff alleged that he was a citizen of the District of Columbia, and had been for more than twenty years an attorney at law, practising his profession in the city of Washington, and that the defendant, from March 4, 1885, until January 16, 1888, was the Postmaster General of the United States; eral of the United States, upon proper presentation of such claims, to compute and pay the sanie; an act of Congress of July 7, 1884, making appropriations for the payment of such claims; a further act of Congress of March 3, 1885, making a like appropriation; and a similar act of Congress of August 4, 1886, making further appropriations therefor, all of which acts were brought about in consequence of the continual and persistent efforts of the plaintiff, under which acts the plaintiff proceeded to make out papers and proofs for the presentation of such claims in behalf of his clients, and filed the same, with powers of attorney to him, as aforesaid, in the said Postoffice Department, and commenced the collection of the same, a large number said claims prior to March, 1885, and which were good and valid, being, however, repudiated by the Postoffice Department, and the prosecution of such claims being made more difficult by great hostility of the persons managing such department to the collection of this class of claims." That "in or about the year 1871, he, the The declaration also alleged that "soon after said plaintiff, was employed by a considerable the 3d day of March, 1885, the plaintiff made number of persons who were and had been application to the defendant, in his capacity postmasters at different postoffices in the of Postmaster General of the United States, to United States, to obtain a review and read-adjust and pay the said claims which had been justment of their salaries, in accordance with the provisions of the act of Congress of June 12, 1866, relating thereto, and which enacted that when the quarterly returns of the post masters of the 3d, 4th, and 5th classes, men tioned therein, showed that the salary allowed is 10 per cent less than it would be on the basis of commissions under the act of June 22, 1854, fixing their compensation, they were entitled to have their compensation reviewed and readjusted under the provisions of said act of 1854, by reason of which a large number of such postmasters had just and valid claims against the United States arising from such readjustment, and a large number of them entered into written contracts with the plaintiff, employing him, and providing a reasonable compensation to him for procuring the same, and gave to him written powers of attorney to act for them in the prosecution of said claims and to receive the drafts which might be issued in payment thereof;" and, disallowed, and also to review and readjust claims of the same character *which had[486 not before been presented, which applications were refused, and an acrimonious controversy arose between the said defendant and this plaintiff in relation thereto, the said defendant, among other things, endeavoring to obtain legislation by Congress to impair and destroy the rights of the plaintiff under the said contracts, in which, however, he failed; but to further harass the plaintiff, and to injure him in his good name and in his business, without any good reason therefor, and with malicious intent, the said defendant interposed all possible obstacles to the collection of said claims, and undertook to induce the clients of the plaintiff to repudiate the contracts they had made, and for such purpose, and with such malicious intent, caused the drafts for the payment of such claims to be sent directly to the claimants, and for the malicious purpose of causing the claimants to disregard the That upon making and filing applications at contracts they had made with the plaintiff for 485]the Postoffice *Department in behalf of fees, and to cause them to believe that the his clients for such readjustment and review, same were null and void, and that plaintiff the same was denied, notwithstanding such act had rendered them no service, and that he was of Congress, whereupon the plaintiff took attempting falsely to claim for valuable servmeasures to procure mandatory legislation by ices rendered under said contracts, falsely Congress and appropriations necessary, press- claimed to be valid, and using his official char ing such legislation by all lawful means in his acter for such purpose, thus placing the plainpower in the different Congresses from 1871 tiff before the country as a common swindler; to 1886, giving to such efforts a great amount and to bring him into public scandal, infamy, of his time, and in the meantime procuring and disgrace, and to injure his business, with similar contracts and applications and powers each letter of transmittal of drafts to said of attorney from several thousands of post- claimants caused to be issued and sent to them, masters of the said classes throughout different between September, 1886, and January 17, 1888, parts of the United States, and filing in the to a great number, to wit, four thousand of postoffice department such applications and the said claimants, clients of the plaintiff, repowers of attorney, and expending a good siding in the states of New York, North Caromany thousands of dollars in building up a lina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Isbusiness in the collection of such claims, rely-land, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, ing upon the justice thereof, and finally ob- Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, taining the passage of the acts of Congress of and the territories of Utah, Washington, and 161 U. S. U. S., Book 40. 49 781 Wyoming, the circular, of which the follow-not required by law, and was maliciously ining is a copy, the same being dated and ad- tended to cause the claimants to believe that dressed to each claimant, respectively, stating the plaintiff's claim for valuable services was the sum transmitted and the name and post- false and fraudulent, and the same Was office of such claimant, respectively, and hav. inserted for no other purpose." ing added thereto, in print, & 8 of the act of August 4, 1886, and U. S. Rev. Stat. § 3477, to wit: 487] *Postoffice Department, Office of the Third Assistant Postmaster General, The declaration further alleged that "the reference to § 3477 in said circular and the printing of the whole of said section was for the malicious purpose only of causing the claimants to believe that the said contracts for fees, before suggested in said circular, were null and void according to a pretended official ruling of the Postoffice Department; while in truth and in fact the said section had no refwar-erence to any contracts of the kind, nor to which contracts of the character hereinbefore deis in full liquidation of your claim for the bal-scribed as made by the plaintiff with such ance unpaid of the readjusted salary of Division of Finance, Washington, D. C., 188-. SIR: Herewith inclosed you will find rant payable to your order for $ In transmitting it I am directed by the Postmaster General to advise you that in the act of 1883, which provided for readjustments of salary, the Congress directed that all checks or warrants should be made payable to the claimants and transmitted direct to them, and that in the appropriation and enactment on this subject by Congress, a copy of which is printed at the foot of this note, the direction was repeated. This was done because no attorney's services were necessary to the presentation of the claim before the department, and the Congress desired all the proceeds to reach the person really entitled thereto. After a claim of this character is filed in the department its examination and the readjustment of the salary, if found proper, are made directly from the books and papers in the department by its officers, and without further evidence. You are further advised that by U. S. Rev. Stat. § 3477, a copy of which is also printed at the foot of this note, any transfer of this claim or power of attorney for receiving payment of this warrant is null and void. Yours respectfully, J. H. Harris, See statutes referred to on next leaf. claimants;" that "all of said false statements or irrelevant references and printing of said U. S. Rev. Stat. § 3477, were unnecessary, malicious, and without reasonable or probable cause, and intended to deceive the claimants, and to thereby induce them to repudiate the contracts they had made with the plaintiff, and they understood said circular as meant and intended, as herein stated, of and concerning the plaintiff; and they were deceived, and did repudiate their said contracts by reason thereof, to the great injury of the good name of the plaintiff and to his business, and for no other purpose;" and that "soon after commencing to issue such circulars the attention of the defendant was called by the plaintiff to the fact that the issuing of such circulars produced great injury to his business and was unjust towards him; but the said *defendant, [489 notwithstanding, maliciously continued the said issue, so long as he held the position of Postmaster General of the United States, to all the claimants he could reach, and to the number of four thousand, as aforesaid, for no other purpose than to continue the said injury to this plaintiff." In consequence of the alleged acts of the defendant the plaintiff claimed to have been put to great trouble and expense in enforcing the said contracts, had lost the benefit of many of them, at an expense and loss of $25,000; and, besides, had suffered injury to his good name and reputation to the amount of $75,000. He prayed judgment for $100,000, besides costs and disbursements. It was alleged that the said circular was intended to deceive and did deceive the said claimants, who believed what the defendant U. S. Rev. Stat. § 3477, referred to in the meant and intended, as herein before stated, of circular made part of the declaration is as foland concerning the plaintiff, and was false in the lows: "All transfers and assignments made of following respects, to wit: (1) that "in the act any claim upon the United States, or of any of 1883, which provided for readjustments of part or share thereof, or interest therein, 488] salary, the Congress directed that all whether absolute or conditional, and whatever checks or warrants should be transmitted direct may be the consideration therefor, and all to the claimants, and that such direction was powers of attorney, orders, or other authorities repeated in the act of 1886;" (2) that "this was for receiving payment of any such claim, or of done because no attorney's services were any part or share thereof, shall be absolutely necessary to the presentation of the claim be- null and void, unless they are freely made and fore the department;" (3) that "this was done executed in the presence of at least two attestbecause the Congress desired all the proceeds ing witnesses, after the allowance of such a to reach the person really entitled thereto;" (4) claim, the ascertainment of the amount due that "the statement that claims of this char- and the issuing of a warrant for the payment acter, after being filed in the department, were thereof. Such transfers, assignments, and examined and readjusted directly from the powers of attorney must recite the warrant for books and papers in the department, without payment, and must be acknowledged by the further evidence, besides being untrue, in person making them before an officer having many cases was unnecessary to protect the in-authority to take acknowledgments of deeds, terests of the government or the claimant, was and shall be certified by the officer: and it |