Opinion, per MERRELL, J. resentative of this company shall have power to waive any provision or condition of this policy except such as by the terms of this policy may be the subject of agreement endorsed hereon or added hereto, and as to such provisions and conditions no officer, agent, or representatives shall have such power or be deemed or held to have waived such provisions or conditions unless such waiver, if any, shall be written upon or attached hereto, * * * "" A third defense alleged the plaintiff's loss of title, possession and control of the property by the appointment of a receiver therefor prior to the fire, and pleaded a further stipulation of the policy declaring the same void "if any change * * * take place in the interest, title, or possession of the subject of insurance." A jury being waived, the case was tried to the court, which found against the plaintiff on the issue of reformation, but in favor of the plaintiff upon the legal issues. The court of appeals reversed the latter finding of the common pleas, and entered judgment for the defendant, but, finding its own judgment in conflict with a judgment of the court of appeals of Portage county, certified the record to this court. Messrs. Kline, Niman, Buss & Holliday, for plaintiff in error. Mr. J. W. Mooney; Mr. R. M. Edmonds and Messrs. Orgill, Maschke & Mellen, for defendant in error. MERRELL, J. At the trial an issue of fact was raised as to whether one Grigor, claimed by the Opinion, per MERRELL, J. plaintiff to have been defendant's agent in obtaining and placing the insurance in question, was or was not such agent. It is conceded that Grigor knew the nature and extent of plaintiff's title before and at the time the policy was issued. The facts, so far as uncontroverted, are that Grigor at the time the policy was written was secretary of The Union Loan & Savings Company, which held a mortgage on plaintiff's property. At that time, and for some period before, Grigor held a license as agent for defendant company, issued at the latter's instance by the state insurance authorities. Agent's commissions for insurance effected upon property in which The Union Loan & Savings Company had a mortgage interest, the placing of which insurance that company in practice controlled, were nominally paid to Grigor as agent for the defendant company, and by Grigor turned over to the loan company. Grigor seems never to have written up or countersigned a policy in his company, the actual preparation of policies, including the one in suit, having been done by the insurance agency of The Leonard Parks Company, of the same city. The ordinary course of such business was thus described by Grigor: "The Leonard Parks Company each month would call us up and ask us for the renewals; they kept a schedule of the renewals that we had, and they would call us up and ask us which ones we still had loans on, and those we didn't have loans on they would see them themselves; the others they asked us if they were still in force, and they would write out the policies and send them to us." Opinion, per MERRELL, J. Grigor did not recall having telephoned himself to The Leonard Parks Company with reference to the policy in suit, and the evidence tends to establish that another employe of The Union Loan & Savings Company actually did so. It is not claimed that this other employe, or The Leonard Parks Company, had any actual knowledge of plaintiff's title. It is therefore contended on behalf of defendant that Grigor had no part in the transaction concerning the insurance in question, and that his personal knowledge as to plaintiff's title could by no possibility and upon no theory be imputed to defendant company. The point is well taken if the inference of fact is sound. Although there was no finding of facts by the trial court, its judgment implies of necessity a finding, first, as a matter of fact, that Grigor was the agent of defendant in placing this insurance, and, second, as a matter of law, that Grigor's knowledge of plaintiff's title is to be imputed to defendant. This court cannot weigh conflicting evidence, and its sole province with respect to the issue of fact is to determine whether there was any evidence in support of the finding. Such evidence appears clearly upon a glance at the situation viewed in its entirety. The defendant company obtained contracts of insurance upon the properties of the clients of The Union Loan & Savings Company by appointing an officer of the latter company its agent, thus securing to such officer or the loan company a sufficient financial in Opinion, per MERRELL, J. ducement by way of agent's commissions. Grigor's agency was the procuring cause of the insurance issued upon plaintiff's property. His agency was entitled to the commissions customarily paid therefor, and his agency carried whatever responsibility inheres in the office of agent, either personal to himself or cast by operation of law upon his principal. In this view it matters little whether the agent performed personally the business of the agency or suffered it to be performed by another in his name and under his responsibility. If it mattered at all, the defendant is not in position to urge the point, since the appointment of Grigor as agent was obviously for the sole purpose of controlling the insurance of which the loan company had the disposition. It follows that the undisputed evidence was ample to support the conclusion of fact that Grigor is to be taken as the defendant's agent in procuring the insurance contract with reference to plaintiff's property. This conclusion is fortified by the provisions of Section 9586, General Code: "A person who solicits insurance and procures the application therefor, shall be held to be the agent of the party, company or association, thereafter issuing a policy upon such application or a renewal thereof, anything in the application or the policy to the contrary notwithstanding. We are thus brought to the fundamental issue in the case, namely, the responsibility of an insurance company under a policy of fire insurance procured by its agent with full knowledge of the actual title of the insured, a leasehold, where the policy itself provides that the same shall be void "if the Opinion, per MERRELL, J. subject of insurance be a building on ground not owned by the insured in fee simple," and that "no officer, agent or other representative of this company shall have power to waive any provision or condition of this policy except * * * by * *** agreement endorsed hereon or added hereto." The issue thus stated arises upon the undisputed evidence in the case, that the insured until after the loss had occurred did not in fact know that either of the stipulations just quoted were contained in the policy, which did not come into his possession until after the fire. The court of appeals, whose decision is now under review, felt that the question was determined in favor of the defendant company by a prior decision of this court, The Ohio Farmers' Insurance Co. v. Titus, 82 Ohio St., 161. In argument, the defense relied chiefly upon that case and Northern Assurance Co. v. Grand View Bldg. Assn., 183 U. S., 308. It cannot be doubted that the doctrine of the case last referred to, a case altogether analogous upon the facts to the instant case, would, if followed, dispose of the present issue, whether or not our own previous holdings have that effect. In either case the question involved is of sufficient importance to justify an examination in the light of principle. It is settled in this state that the knowledge of the agent with reference to the subject-matter concerning which he acts in pursuance of authority from his principal is the knowledge of the principal. (Massachusetts Life Ins. Co. v. Eshelman |