Opinion Per Curiam.

that the final order is the last order, that there is no limitation of time for filing an application for rehearing, and that action by the commission refusing to grant such rehearing is their last order, travels in a circle, and if adopted would completely wipe out any and all limitations upon time for appeal.

It can readily be seen, as urged upon the hearing, that if the rule of the commission could have the effect of indefinitely extending the time for filing an appeal, it would become necessary for the commission to amend its rules so that there could be no application for a rehearing filed subsequent to thirty days, thus working an injury instead of conferring a benefit upon those in whose interest the workmen's compensation act was passed.

In our opinion the Industrial Commission, by the adoption of such rules, attempted to afford the widest latitude possible for a fair and full investigation of every claim, and that is commendable, but it has not the power to extend the time for appeal expressly fixed by statute; nor has this court such power. The limitation has been fixed by a legislative provision which is clear and explicit, and if the time for appeal so prescribed is too short the legislature should so amend the law as to afford a proper period for such purpose. That limitation as fixed by the statute in force is thirty days. The application in this case was filed nearly two years after the order of the commission disallowing the claim. The common pleas court did not have jurisdiction to entertain the appeal.

Syllabus.

This view requires the reversal of the judgment of the court of appeals; and proceeding to render the judgment which the court of appeals should have rendered the judgment of the common pleas court is reversed and on the undisputed facts judgment is rendered for the plaintiff in error.

Judgment reversed, and judgment for plaintiff in

error.

NICHOLS, C. J., JONES, MATTHIAS, JOHNSON and ROBINSON, JJ., concur.

HOUGH, J., not participating.

THE STATE, EX REL. THE EUROPEAN ACCIDENT INSURANCE Co., v. TOMLINSON, SUPERINTENDENT OF INSURANCE.

Insurance - Foreign corporations - Deposits with superintendent of insurance Section 9510 (2), General Code - License to contract casualty and bonding insurance — Reinsurance of indemnity contracts prohibited, when-Section 665, General CodeRevocation or cancellation of license-Section 617, General Code Reinsurance contracts executed in foreign state.

1. Without depositing the sum of $50,000 in bonds with the Superintendent of Insurance, as required by Section 9510 (2), General Code, an alien insurance company made a contract in a foreign state with a foreign insurance company which had authority to make liability insurance, whereby such alien company engaged to reinsure a portion of the liability risks of such foreign company incurred in this state. Such contract of reinsurance was not authorized by any law of this state, but was prohibited by Section 665, General Code, which forbids such contracts unless the law requiring such deposit has been complied with.

Statement of the Case.

2. If such alien insurance company has been licensed by the Superintendent of Insurance to do general casualty and bonding business, and it is discovered that it has made such contracts for liability reinsurance, the license so issued becomes subject to cancellation by the state.

3. Section 617, General Code, imposes continuing powers upon the Superintendent of Insurance, requiring him to see that the insurance laws are enforced. And if he discovers that a licensee is contracting reinsurance without having made the deposit required by Section 9510 (2), General Code, the superintendent, under authority of the former section, has power to revoke the license.

(No. 16619-Decided December 21, 1920.)

IN MANDAMUS.

The relator is a British corporation authorized to make all kinds of insurance and has its head office in the city of New York. This corporation since December 28, 1911, had fully complied with and been duly licensed by the Superintendent of Insurance of Ohio to transact certain insurance business in this state and maintained therein the deposits required by law to be made with the Superintendent of Insurance for the security of its policyholders. It had likewise complied with the law of the state of New York, wherein its head office was located, in that respect. It was therefore duly licensed by the Superintendent of Insurance to transact business continuously until the year 1920 when it desired a renewal of its license.

In January, 1920, it again filed with the Superintendent of Insurance a statement of its condition as required by law, and otherwise fully complied with all the requirements of law necessary for the issuance of a license to transact certain classes of

Statement of the Case.

insurance business in this state. It did not then nor thereafter deposit with the Superintendent of Insurance the sum of $50,000 in bonds required of insurance companies of another state or country which are admitted to transact the business of indemnifying employers and others under Section 9510, General Code. The license obtained by the relator from the Superintendent of Insurance on March 1, 1920, gave authority to the relator to transact general casualty insurance and bonding business in the state but not to transact liabilty insurance. By stipulation it appears that certain other foreign insurance companies admitted to do liability business in this state, including the Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company of Connecticut, have entered into insurance treaties or contracts with relator, whereby the relator reinsured certain portions of the liabilities of those companies that might arise from policies issued in Ohio to residents of Ohio. None of these insurance companies are mutual companies and the contracts of reinsurance were made in the state of New York. Upon disclosure of the facts relating to the reinsurance contracts, the Superintendent of Insurance of Ohio, on April 23, 1920, revoked the license of the relator to transact casualty insurance and bonding business in Ohio for the sole reason that the relator had made and was making reinsurance contracts in the state of New York, whereby said relator reinsured portions of the liabilities of such foreign companies which had been admitted to do liability business in Ohio by indemnifying employers and others against loss or

Opinion, per JONES, J.

damage to persons for injury or death resulting by accident to employes and others, but not including workmen's compensation insurance.

The foregoing facts are set forth in the petition of the relator for a writ of mandamus, commanding the Superintendent of Insurance to issue a license to it authorizing it to make the insurance so authorized in said license which was revoked by the Superintendent of Insurance. The defendant challenged the sufficiency of the petition by a general demurrer.

Messrs. Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, for relator.

Mr. John G. Price, attorney general, and Mr. B. W. Gearheart, for respondent.

JONES, J. Section 9510 (2), General Code, authorizes insurance companies to do various kinds of insurance business as provided in that section; among others it is provided that they may "make insurance to indemnify employers against loss or damage for personal injury or death resulting from accidents to employes or persons other than employes and to indemnify persons and corporations other than employers against loss or damage for personal injury or death resulting from accidents to other persons or corporations. But a company of another state, territory, district or country admitted to transact the business of indemnifying employers and others, in addition to any other deposit required by other laws of the state, shall deposit with the superintendent of insurance for