his head upon them; and to mention those apt metaphors taken from burning paper, or from light entering water, or to note the comparison of the vague appearance of the spirits in the moon to a pearl shining on a white forehead. Dante's vigorous intellect also manifests itself in the symmetry of the poem, in the way he has made it an epitome of the science, history, philosophy, and theology of his times. Its moral tone is, besides, of the highest. His ideals are noble and pure, nothing less than the reform of the world. No other book leaves the reader so impressed with the reality of the spiritual realm, or so strong to fight against the false and mean in life. Indeed, what merit of the poet does Dante not possess? As Ruskin uses Turner to exemplify the best qualities of painting, so one could write a long disquisition on poetry with the "Divine Comedy" as a book of illustrations. Dante's preeminence as one of the three greatest of the world's poets is now assured. And we may find in him peace and consolation in hours of sorrow. Longfellow, in a series of sonnets that are among his best, has compared the "Divine Comedy" to a vast cathedral, with dim aisles and perfumed air, whose unseen choirs Sing the old Latin hymns of peace and love And benedictions of the Holy Ghost.. Into this great cathedral the laborer, "pausing in the dust and heat," comes to kneel and repeat his paternosters: So, as I enter here from day to day, And leave my burden at this minster gate, To inarticulate murmurs dies away, While the eternal ages watch and wait. L. Oscar Kuhns. ART. VII. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE METHODIST EPISCOPAL CHURCH. No matter now engaging the attention of the Methodist Episcopal Church nearly equals in importance the question of her constitution. There are at present more adults in her membership than there were in all the colonies when the independence of the United States was acknowledged. The interests of the Church are varied; its properties are vast; territorially it girdles the globe, and the attrition of its ideas is frequent and sometimes sharp. That the condition of the body should be such as to warrant the language of the bishops with reference to the framework of its government in their address to the General Conference of 1888 is scarcely less than startling. They said: "Another question has arisen which is of paramount importance. It has reference to what constitutes the organic law of the General Conference. Have we any such thing as a constitution? If so, what paragraphs of the Discipline are included in it?" Well might they add, "It is scarcely possible to think of this as an open question;" but they asserted, "Yet it does exist." The subject being thus forcibly brought to the attention of the General Conference, there resulted the appointment of a constitutional commission, consisting of three bishops, seven ministers, and seven laymen. The instructions given them were to prepare paragraphs to take the place of ¶¶ 63, 64, in the chapter on the General Conference; and, seeing the organic law of the Church, and especially the constitution of the General Conference, needed to be accurately defined and determined, they were to carefully consider and report thereon; also, the method to be pursued in the organization of the General Conference should be precisely and explicitly stated. They were instructed to state of whom the General Conference shall be composed, "to declare what shall be the powers thereof and in what manner they shall be exercised, and to provide the process by which the constitution or any part thereof shall be amended, and report to the General Conference of 1892." Unfortunately, under the last clause of these instructions the commission considered itself precluded from allowing the Church to have access to their report until it was first laid before the General Conference. To study a subject so intricate and important as this there is needed time, and care, and quiet research, where choice libraries are accessible. To attempt such a thing amid the rush of General Conference business is sheer folly; hence it was wise indeed in the Conference of 1892 to decline, under the circumstances, to determine the momentous questions involved. The report of the commission to the General Conference of 1892, after what may be styled its preamble, was in four parts. The first was "As to the definition of The Constitution of the General Conference," " meaning thereby what is now in the Discipline and should be regarded as the constitution of the General Conference. The second part designated the things now in the Discipline which they wished to have determined to be "The Organic Law of the Methodist Episcopal Church.” The third part of their report suggested an orderly collation and rearrangement of the matter now in the Discipline and which they had designated as included in Parts I and II. The fourth part proposed new paragraphs for the Discipline, entitled, "Constitution and Powers of the General Conference," and recommended that its adoption be submitted to the restrictive rule process. The Conference ordered that the report should be considered part by part, and taking up the first part spent three days in its discussion. At the end of that time the Conference had adopted a substitute for the entire part under consideration, and as they were planning for a time when the report should be further discussed, suddenly a motion was sprung to indefinitely postpone the whole matter, print it in the Church papers, and refer it to the next General Conference. This motion was adopted, and the General Conference had relieved itself of an incubus. The substitute by Dr. Goucher, which had been accepted and adopted instead of the first part as presented by the committee, of course went over with the remainder of the report under the indefinite postponement of the whole matter. With all respect for the honored author of the substitute, it is now seen clearly that it is well that it was not finally adopted. This summary disposition of so great a report was scarcely short of a fiasco; nevertheless, the action had the great advan tage of saving the Church from precipitate action on fundamental matters and gave her a quadrennium for the discussion of the subject and for the maturing of a better result than was then possible. This famous report had many excellences that undoubtedly will be of great service in the formulating of the document which will finally, and we hope soon, be adopted. So great is our respect for the distinguished men of that commission that it is with utmost hesitation we criticise adversely their report. But we are compelled to submit that every one of the four parts is, in our opinion, seriously at fault, either by embracing too much or too little. The first part had unsupported historical statements, an ambiguous definition of a constitution, and, above all, a contradictory statement of what is now the constitution of the General Conference. The second part, "As to the Organic Law of the Methodist Episcopal Church," is so brief that it can be given in full. It reads, "The organic law of the Methodist Episcopal Church includes and is limited to the Articles of Religion, the General Rules of the United Societies, and that which we have already defined as the constitution of the General Conference." Is not this seriously defective in that it does not define the fundamental framework of the polity of the Church, nor mention the name of the organization, its terms of membership, or its officers? Neither is the doctrinal basis there given true to Methodist history, relating to "our present existing and established standards of doctrine." The proposed new constitution of the General Conference, notwithstanding some new provisions of great value, altogether fails to provide the necessary readjustment of our confessedly defective plan for lay delegation. The Quarterly Conference, instead of the entire adult membership, would continue to elect the members of the Lay Electoral Conference; the Lay Conference would still be compelled to meet at the seat of the Ministerial Conference, and at the same time; the inequality, in number of representatives, between ministers and laymen would continue; division into two houses, even though it should be obviously desirable, would be impossible; and the inherent rights of the respective orders would continue in a promiscuous jumble. Its provision that no change shall be made in the Discipline without the concurrent vote of the ministers and laymen is good; but its provision for a separate vote" on any other question" should add that to adopt a measure on a separate vote there should be the same proportionate vote in each order as would have been necessary to its adoption in the undivided house. Humiliating experience has shown the Church the imperative need of efficient safeguards against hasty legislation. That this single provision in that direction will be adequate to meet the demands of the case is more than doubted. Furthermore, this proposed constitution of the General Conference does not, in the light of current discussions, sufficiently define the qualifications of its members. But, in addition to its defects, it proposes to add some dangerous provisions. It says: "The General Conference shall possess supreme legislative, executive, and judicial powers for the government of the Church, subject to the provisions of this constitution and under the following limitations and restrictions." Then follow the restrictive rules. But, under this provision, what body shall judicially interpret "the provisions of this constitution," or whether a proposed measure is in violation of the restrictive rules? The General Conference only. This would practically prevent the possibility of stability in any part of the constitution, seeing the General Conference could by a simple majority vote make perforce constitutional the most unconstitutional decisions, seeing its last judicial decision would of necessity be the law of the Church. "The king can do no wrong." It can never be other than dangerous to allow any body of men to pass judicially on their own legislative acts. Where the legislature is a delegated body, acting under the provisions of a written constitution, beyond doubt the judicial function should not be placed in its hands. The disciplinary language granting to the General Conference "full power to make rules and regulations for our Church" has, especially since 1844, been construed to mean practical ecclesiastical omnipotence; and we have seen, in not a few instances, its deplorable results. As a matter of fact, there has not been from the beginning anything in the Discipline to prevent the organization of a court with jurisdiction over the acts of the General Conference. But the proposed constitution would explicitly |