as may be in its power, between the parties before it. And there is a third class, whose interests in the subject-matter of the suit, and in the relief sought, are so bound up with that of the other parties, that their legal presence as parties to the proceeding is an absolute necessity, without which the court can not proceed. In such cases the court refuses to entertain the suit, when these parties can not be subjected to its jurisdiction. This class can not be better described than in the language of this court, in Shields v. Barrow, in which a very able and satisfactory discussion of the whole subject is had. They are there said to be "persons who not only have an interest in the controversy, but an interest of such a nature, that a final decree can not be made without either affecting that interest, or leaving the controversy in such a condition that its final determination may be wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience." This language aptly describes the character of the interest of the Ridgelys, in the land of which partition is sought in this suit, and in the account which is asked for, of rents and profits. If a decree is made, which is intended to bind them, it is manifestly unjust to do this when they are not parties to the suit, and have no opportunity to be heard. But as the decree can not bind them, the court can not for that very reason afford the relief asked, to the other parties. If, for instance, the decree should partition the land and state an account, the particular pieces of land allotted to the parties before the court, would still be undivided as to these parties, whose interest in each piece would remain as before the partition. And they could at any time apply to the proper court, and ask a repartition of the whole tract, unaffected by the decree in this case, because they can be bound by no decree to which they are not parties. The same observations apply to any account stated by the court of rents and profits, and to any decree settling the amount due on that score. We are, therefore, of opinion that the circuit court could render no decree on the merits of this case, without having rightfully before it some person representing the interest of the Ridgelys. Additional discussion may be found to same general effect in Russell v. Clarke's Executors, 7 Cr. 69, 98; Mallow v. Hinde, 12 Wh. 193; California v. Sou. Pac. Co., 157 U. S. 229, at pp. 249, 250. See, also, Rules of Practice in Equity, Rules Nos. 37 to 40; and Judicial Code, 1911, Section 50. 13. SUIT AGAINST A STATE BY A CITIZEN. See Constitution, Article III, Section 2. CHISHOLM v. GEORGIA. Reported in 2 Dallas, 419. On the THIS action was instituted in August term, 1792. 11th of July, 1792, the marshal for the district of Georgia made the following return: "Executed as within commanded, that is to say, served a copy thereof on his excellency Edward Telfair, Esq., governor of the state of Georgia, and one other copy on Thomas P. Carnes, Esq., the attorney general of said state. Robert Forsythe, marshal." Upon which, Mr. Randolph, the attorney general of the United States, as counsel for the plaintiff, made the following motion, on the 11th day of August, 1792: "That unless the state of Georgia, shall, after reasonable previous notice of this motion, cause an appearance to be entered, in behalf of the said state, on the fourth day of the next term, or shall then show cause to the contrary, judgment shall be entered against the said state, and a writ of inquiry of damages shall be awarded." But to avoid. every appearance of precipitaney, and to give the state time to deliberate on the measures she ought to adopt, on motion of Mr. Randolph, it was ordered by the court, that the consideration of this motion should be postponed to the present term. JAY, Chief Justice: * The question now before us renders it necessary to pay particular attention to that part of the second section, which extends the judicial power "to controversies between a state and citizens of another state." It is contended, that this ought to be construed to reach none of these controversies, excepting those in which a state may be plaintiff. The ordinary rules for construction will early decide, whether those words are to be understood in that limited sense. This extension of power is remedial, because it is to settle controversies. It is, therefore, to be construed liberally. It is politic, wise and good, that, not only the controversies in which a state is plaintiff, but also those in which a state is defendant, should be settled; both cases, therefore, are within the reason of the remedy; and ought to be so adjudged, unless the obvious, plain and literal sense of the words forbid it. If we attend to the words, we find them to be express, positive, free from ambiguity, and without room for such implied expressions: "The judicial power of the United States shall extend to controversies between a state and citizens of another state." If the constitution really meant to extend these powers only to those controversies in which a state might be plaintiff, to the exclusion of those in which citizens had demands against a state, it is inconceivable, that it should have attempted to convey that meaning in words, not only so incompetent, but also repugnant to it; if it meant to exclude a certain class of these controversies, why were they not expressly excepted; on the contrary, not even an intimation of such intention appears in any part of the constitution. It can not be pretended, that where citizens urge and insist upon demands against a state, which the state refuses to admit and comply with, that there is no controversy between them. If it is a controversy between them, then it clearly falls not only within the spirit, but the very words of the constitution. What is it to the cause of justice, and how can it affect the definition of the word controversy, whether the demands which cause the dispute, are made by a state against citizens of another state, or by the latter against the former? When power is thus extended to a controversy it necessarily, as to all judicial purposes, is also extended to those between whom it subsists. The exception contended for, would contradict and do violence to the great and leading principles of a free and equal national government, one of the great objects of which is, to insure justice to all: to the few against the many, as well as to the many against the few. It would be strange, indeed, that the joint and equal sovereigns of this country, should, in the very constitution by which they professed to establish justice, so far deviate from the plain path of equality and impartiality as to give to the collective citizens of one state, a right of suing individual citizens of another state, and yet deny to those citizens a right of suing them. We find the same general and comprehensive manner of expressing the same ideas, in a subsequent clause, in which the constitution ordains, that "in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party, the supreme court shall have original jurisdiction." Did it mean here party-plaintiff? If that only was meant, it would have been easy to have found words to express it. Words are to be understood in their ordinary and common acceptation, and the word party being, in common usage, applicable both to plaintiff and defendant, we can not limit it to one of them, in the present case. We find the legislature of the United States expressing themselves in the like general and comprehensive manner; they speak in the thirteenth section of the Judicial Act, of controversies where a state is a party, and as they do not impliedly or expressly, apply that term to either of the litigants, in particular, we are to understand them as speaking of both. In the same section, they distinguish the cases where ambassadors are plaintiffs, from those in which ambassadors are defendants, and make different provisions respecting those cases; and it is not unnatural to suppose, that they would, in like manner, have distinguished between cases where a state was plaintiff, and where a state was defendant, if they had intended to make any difference between them; or if they had apprehended that the constitution had made any difference between them. I perceive, and therefore candor urges me to mention, a circumstance, which seems to favor the opposite side of the question. It is this: The same section of the constitution which extends the judicial power to controversies "between a state and the citizens of another state," does also extend that power to controversies to which the United States are a party. Now, it may be said, if the word party comprehends both plaintiff and defendant, it follows that the United States may be sued by any citizen between whom and them there may be a controversy. This appears to me to be fair reasoning: but the same principles of candor which urge me to mention this objection, also urge me to suggest an important difference between the two cases. It is this: In all cases of actions against states or individual citizens, the national courts are supported in all their legal and constitutional proceedings and judgments, by the arm of the executive power of the United States; but in cases of actions against the United States, there is no power which the courts can call to their aid. From this distinction, important conclusions are deducible, and they place the case of a state, and the case of the United States, in very different points of view. I wish the state of society was so far improved, and the science of government advanced to such a degree of perfection, as that the whole nation could, in the peaceable course of law, be compelled to do justice, and be sued by individual citizens. Whether that is, or is not, now the case, ought not to be thus collaterally and incidentally decided: I leave it a question. As this opinion, though deliberately formed, has been hastily reduced to writing, between the intervals of the daily adjournments, and while my mind was occupied and wearied by the business of the day, I fear, it is less concise and connected than it might otherwise have been. I have made no references to cases, because I know of none that are not distinguishable from this case; nor does it appear to me necessary to show that the sentiments of the best writers on government and the rights of men, harmonize with the principles which direct my judgment on the present question. The acts of the former congresses, and the acts of many of the state conventions, are replete with similar ideas; and to the honor of the United States, it may be observed, that in no other country are subjects of this kind better, if so well, understood. The attention and attachment of the constitution to the equal rights of the people are discernible in almost every sentence of it; and it is to be regretted that the provision in it which we have been considering, has not, in every instance, received the approbation and acquiescence which it merits. Georgia has, in strong language, advocated the cause of republican equality: and there is reason to hope, that the people of that state will yet perceive that it would not have been consistent with that equality, to have exempted the body of her citizens from that suability, which they are at this moment exercising against citizens of another state. For my own part, I am convinced, that the sense in which I understand and have explained the words "controversies be |