should be made

In cases of ambi- gular use to compare a word or sentence, whenever the language guity, reference of a statutory provision is ambiguous, equivocal or intricate.(39) Thus the preamble is often called in to help the construction of an act of parliament(r).(40)

to the context.

Of the same nature and use is the comparison of a law with other laws made by the same legislator, which have some affinity with the subject, or which

(r)" But," says Lord Bacon, " though the intent and mind of the law may be sometimes drawn from the preambles, yet its latitude and extent should by no means be de rived from them; for the preamble frequently fixes upon a few of the more plausible and special particulars by way of example, whilst the law contains many more; or, on the contrary, the law restrains and limits many things, the reason whereof it were not necessary to insert in the preamble. Wherefore the extent of the law is to be derived from the body of the law, the preamble often exceeding or falling short of this extent."

In R. v. Pierce, 3 M. & S. 66, Lord Ellenborrough said: "It cannot by any means be regarded as a universal rule that large and comprehensive words in the enacting clause of a statute are to be restrained by the preamble. In a vast number of acts of parlia ment, although a particular mischief is recited in the preamble, yet the legislative provisions extend far beyond the mischief recited. And whether the words shall be restrained or not must depend on a fair exposition of the particular statute in each particular case, and not upon any universal rule of construction." See also Salkeld v. Johnson, 1 Hare, 196, 207.

(39) Where the meaning of a statute is doubtful or ambiguous; where the clauses are confused and contradictory, and the word such as to admit of two senses; the court will adopt that construction which will best carry into effect the just and reasonable intention of the legislature. And if any part of a statute is intricate, obscure or doubtful, the true way to discover the intent is to consider the other parts of the act; for the words and meaning of one part of a statute frequently lead to the sense of another, and in the construction of one part of a statute, every other part ought to be taken into consideration. Magruder v. Carroll, 4 Md. 335; James v. Dubois, 1 Harr. 285; United States v. Freeman, 3 How. (U. S.) 556, 565.

In a case of doubtful meaning, the intention of the legislature may be ascertained by a resort to the usage and practice under the statute. Kernion v. Hills, 1 La. Ann. 419; Attorney-General v. Bank of Cape Fear, 5 Ired. Eq. 71; Love v. Hinckley, 1 Abb. Adm. 436. But proof of usage is not admissible to aid in the construction of a statute which, upon its face, is not doubtful as to its meaning. Bailey v. Rolfe, 16 N. H. 247.

(40) Anciently, titles were not prefixed to statutes; and afterward, when they came to be introduced, they were usually prefixed by the clerk of the house in which the bill first passed. At the present day, the constitutions of some of the states require that the title shall correctly indicate the purpose of the law; and, therefore, the title now possesses an importance formerly unknown.

The general rule, irrespective of the constitutional provision mentioned, is, that where the body of the statute appears ambiguous or doubtful, the title may be resorted to as a guide to the intent of the legislature. Cohen v. Barrett, 5 Cal. 195; Bradford v. Jones, 1 Md. 351; United States v. Webster, Daveis, 38; State v. Stephenson, 2 Bailey, 334; Burgett v. Burgett, 1 Ham. 469; United States v. Palmer, 3 Wheat. 610; Eastman v. McAlpin, 1 Kelly, 157; Bristol v. Barker, 14 Johns. 205.

The title is no part of an act, and can be resorted to only when there is doubt as to the meaning of the enacting words. Commonwealth v. Slifer, 53 Penn. St. 71; Connecticut, etc., Ins. Co. v. Albert, 39 Mo. 181; Eastman v. McAlpin, 1 Kelly, 157.

The title of an act cannot be used to extend or to restrain any of the provisions contained in the body of the act. Goodrich v. Russell, 42 N. Y. (3 Hand) 184; Hadden v. The Collector, 5 Wall. (U. S.) 107; United States v. Briggs, 9 How. (U. S.) 351; Blue v. McDuffie, Busbee's Law (N. C.), 131.

The preamble may be resorted to in case the body of the statute is doubtful or ambiguous. People v. Utica Ins. Co., 15 Johns. 357, 390; Jackson v. Gilchrist, id. 89; Edwards v. Pope, 3 Scam. 465; Holbrook v. Holbrook, 1 Pick. 250; Flynn v. Abbott, 16 Cal. 358; Constantine v. Van Winkle, 6 Hill, 177, 184; United States v. Webster, Daveis, 38.

expressly relate to the same point(s).(41) And when the written law of England declares that "whosoever shall be convicted of murder shall suffer death as a felon "(t), we must resort *to the customary law of England to learn what murder is, because the statute which affixes a punishment to the crime of murder abstains from defining it.

of a particular interpretation may be considered.

[ *98]

4. The effects and consequence which will ensue if a particular meaning be put upon statutory words, may be regarded; so that where words literally The consequence understood bear either a very absurd signification, or none at all, we may a little deviate from the received sense of them, if by so doing effect can be given to the apparent or presumable intention of the legislature. (42) Therefore the Bolognian law, mentioned by Puffendorf(u), which enacted, "that whoever drew blood in the streets should be punished with the utmost severity," was held after a long debate not to extend to the surgeon who opened the vein of a person who fell down in the street in a fit. The rule under our notice has been thus stated(x) :-"Words which are plain

(8) Per Bayley, J., 9 B. & C. 835. If one statute prohibit certain acts, and another statute be afterwards made inflicting penalties on persons who do those acts, both must be construed together. Plowd. 206; 1 Price, 182.

(t) 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, s. 1.

the statute (1 Ed. 2) De frangentibus prisonam enacts that a prisoner who breaks prison is guilty of felony; but if the prison be on fire, this is not so, "for he is not to be hanged because he would not stay to be burnt." Plowd. 13.

(a) Per Parke, B., Miller v. Salomons, (u) Law of N. and N., 1. 5, c. 12, s. 8. So Exch. 546; 8 Id. 778.

(41) As one part of a statute is sometimes considered in construing another part of it, so a comparison of one law with other laws made by the same legislature, or upon the same subject, or relating to the same point, is frequently made with advantage. And, it is to be inferred, that a code of statutes relating to one subject is governed by one spirit and policy, and is intended to be consistent and harmonious in its several parts and provisions.

It is, therefore, an established rule of law that all statutes in pari materia are to be taken together, as if they were one law; and they are required to be compared together in the construction of statutes, because they are considered as framed upon one system, and as having one object in view. Patterson v. Winn, 11 Wheat. 385; Schooner v. Harriet, 1 Story, 251; Le Roy v. Chabolla, 2 Abb. U. S. 448; Green v. Commonwealth, 12 Allen, 155; Billingslea v. Baldwin, 23 Md. 85; Robbins v. Omnibus R. R. Co., 32 Cal. 472; United States v. Collier, 3 Blatchf. C. C. 325; McLaughlin v. Hoover, 1 Oregon, 31; McIntyre v. Ingraham, 35 Miss. (6 George) 25; Fort v. Burch, 6 Barb. 60, 74; Henry v. Tilson, 17 Vt. 479; Mendon v. Worcester Co., 10 Pick. 235; Frink v. King, 3 Scam. 144; Hayes v. Hanson, 12 N. H. 284; Manuel v. Manuel, 13 Ohio St. 458. But, although statutes relating to the same subject are to be construed together, this rule does not go to the extent of controlling the language of subsequent statutes by any supposed policy of previous ones. Goodrich v. Russell, 42 N. Y. (3 Hand) 177.

(42) Considerations of evil and hardship may properly exert an influence in giving construction to a statute, when its language is ambiguous; but not when it is plain and explicit. Collins v. Carman, 5 Md. 503. When the language of a statute is doubtful, an argument from inconvenience will have weight, but not otherwise. Langdon v. Potter, 3 Mass. 215, 221; Gore v. Brazier, id. 523, 539; Ayres v. Knox, 7 id. 306; Putnam v. Longley, 11 Pick. 487, 490; Rogers v. Goodwin, 2 Mass. 475; Pitman v. Flint, 10 Pick. 506; Henry v. Tilson, 17 Vt. 479; State v. Mayhew, 2 Gill. 487; Essex Co. v. Pacific Mills, 14 Allen, 389; Isaacs v. Steele, 3 Scam. 97; Chesnut v. Shane's Lessee, 16 Ohio, 599; Britton v. Ferry, 14 Mich. 53, 66; Plummer v. Plummer, 37 Miss. 185; Moers v. Reading, 21 Penn. St. 188; Union Ins. Co. v. Hoge, 21 How. (U. S.) 35, 66.

It is only when all other means of ascertaining the legislative intention fail that a court may look to the effects of a law; and, then, their interpretation becomes a sort of practical legislation. Dudley v. Reynolds, 1 Kan. 285, 289.

enough in their ordinary sense may, when they would involve any absurdity or inconsistency, or repugnance to the clear intention of the legislature, to be collected from the whole of the act or acts in pari materia to be construed with it, or other legitimate grounds of interpretation, be modified or altered so as to avoid that absurdity, inconvenience, or repugnance, but no further, for then we may predicate that the words never could have been used by the framers of the law in such a sense."

5. A saving, totally repugnant to the body of the act, is void.(43) If therefore an act of parliament vests land in the king and his heirs, saving the right A saving repug- of all persons whatsoever; or vests the land of A. in the king, nant to the body of an act is void. saving the right of A.: in either of these cases the saving is totally *repugnant to the body of the statute, and (if good) would ren[*99] der the statute of no effect or operation; and therefore the saving is void, and the land vests absolutely in the king(y).

The subject

6. Statutory words are always to be understood as having regard to the subject-matter; for that is supposed to be in the eye of the legislator, and all his expressions are to be read as if directed to that end.(44) Thus, when a law of Edward III.(2) forbids all ecclesiastical persons to purchase "provisions" at Rome, it might seem to prohibit the buying of grain and other victuals there; but when we consider that the statute was made to

matter.

(43) The office of a proviso, generally, is either to except something from the enacting clause or to qualify or restrain its generality, or to exclude some possible ground of misinterpretation of it, as to extending to cases not intended by the legislature to be brought within its purview. Minis v. United States, 15 Pet. 423, 445; Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1, 30.

A proviso is a limitation of power, and amounts to a negation of all authority, beyond its prescribed and clearly defined limits. Commissioners of Kensington v. Keith, 2 Penn. St. 218, 220.

If the proviso in a statute be contrary to the purview, the proviso is valid, and not the purview. Townsend v. Brown, 4 Zabr. 80, 86, 89. In interpreting a section of a statute which remains in force, resort may be had to a proviso to it, although the proviso is repealed. Bank for Savings v. The Collector, 3 Wall. (U. S.) 495, 513.

A statute which has a saving clause as to certain rights existing at the time of its passage, relates to the time when the statute takes effect, and not to the time of its enactment. Rogers v. Vass, 6 Clarke (Iowa), 405, 408.

A statute which makes a change in school districts, but saves rights in favor of parties holding contracts, obligations, rights or liens upon such districts or their property, will save a right of action against a district which, before such change, committed a trespass by taking a third person's dwelling-house. Gould v. Sub-District No. 3 of Eagle Creek School District, 7 Minn. 203, 214.

(44) See note 36 for the cases relating to this rule. Courts cannot supply defective enactments by an attempt to carry out fully the purposes which may be supposed to have occasioned those enactments. Swift v. Luce, 27 Me. 285. It is the subject matter of a statute which furnishes the means of construction. Ezekiel v. Dixon, 3 Kelly, 146; Barker v. Esty, 19 Vt. 131.

repress the usurpations of the papal see, and that the nominations to benefices by the pope were called "provisions," we shall see that the restraint is intended to be laid upon such provisions only.

Statutes treating

7. A statute, which treats of things or persons of an inferior rank, is not by general words to be extended to those of a superior degree(a).(45) For instance, a statute treating of "deans, prebendaries, parsons, vicars, and of inferiors are others having spiritual promotion," is held not to extend to ed to superiors. bishops, though they have spiritual promotion; deans being the highest persons named, and bishops being of a still higher order().

not to be extend

8. A most effectual way of discovering the true meaning of a law, when the words are dubious, is by considering the reason and spirit of it; or the cause The reason and *which moved the legislature to enact it.(46) For when [*100] spirit of the law this reason ceases, the law itself ought likewise to cease with it. An instance of this is given in a case put by Cicero (c).

must be considered.

(a) Vide per Pollock, C. B., Lyndon v. Stanbridge, 2 H. & N. 51.

(b) 2 Rep. 46.

(c) De Rhet. 1. 1, c. 11.

(45) It will not be assumed that a state has stripped itself of any portion of its sovereignty by an act of the legislature, unless the language is too clear to admit of doubt. Gilman v. Sheboygan, 2 Black. (U. S.) 510, 513.

A state is not bound by the general provisions of a statute by which any of its preroga. tives, rights, titles or interests would be devested, unless the statute be made by express words to extend to and include the state in its provisions. State v. Kinne, 41 N. H. 238. A state is a "person," within the meaning of a statute, which punishes the fraudulent alteration of a public record, "with intent that any person may be defrauded." Martin v. State, 24 Tex. 61.

General words in a statute do not include nor bind the sovereign power; it is bound only by express terms or necessary implication. United States v. Hewes, Crabbe, 307; State v. Milburn, 9 Gill. 379; State v. Garland, 7 Ired. 48.

A statute, enumerating things or persons of an inferior dignity, shall not be construed to extend to those of a superior dignity. Woodworth v. Paine, Breese, 294, 374; Lyndon v. Standbridge, 2 Hurlst. & Norm. 45, 51.

Ordinarily, a statute which, in general terms, speaks of plaintiffs and.defendants, applies to persons only, and not to states, counties and municipal corporations. Schuyler Co. v. Mercer Co., 4 Gilm. 20. The rule that the government is not bound by a law unless expressly named does not apply to acts of legislation which lay down general rules of procedure in civil actions. Green v. United States, 9 Wall. (U. S.) 655; Attorney-General v. Radloff, 10 Exch. 84. A law, general in its nature, binds minors and married women, although they are not specially named. Warfield v. Fox, 53 Penn. St. 382.

(46) The great fundamental rule in construing statutes is to ascertain the intention of the legislature; and, to attain this object, every part of a statute must be viewed in connection with the whole, so as to make all the parts harmonize, if practicable, and to give a sensible and intelligent effect to each; and, then, so to construe it as to accomplish the end which the legislature had in view, and not so as to defeat it. State v. Blair, 32 Ind. 313; Ogden v. Strong, 2 Paine's C. C. 584; State v. King, 44 Mo. 283; George v. Board of Education, 33 Ga. 344; Horton v. Mobile School Commissioners, 43 Ala. 598; Bingham v. Supervisors, 8 Minn. 441; Jersey Co. v. Davison, 5 Dutch. (N. J.) 415; Watervliet Turnpike Co. v. McKean, 6 Hill, 616, 619; Shrewsbury v. Boylston, 1 Pick. 105; Simonds v. Powers, 28 Vt. 354; Ingraham v. Speed, 30 Miss. (1 George) 410; Staniels v. Raymond, 4 Cush. 314.

If a statute is susceptible of two different constructions, by one of which it would be constitutional, and by the other unconstitutional, the preference will be that the statute is constitutional. People v. Supervisors of Orange, 17 N. Y. (3 Smith) 235, 241 ; Clarke v. City of Rochester, 24 Barb. 446, 471; Dow v. Norris, 4 N. H. 17; Newland v. Marsh, 19 Ill. 384; Neal v. Roberts, 1 Dev. & Batt. 81 ; Blair v. Ridgely, 41 Mo. 63; Inkster v. Carver, 16 Mich. 481; Taylor v. Flint, 35 Ga. 124; Newell v. People, 7 N. Y. (3 Seld.) 9, 109.

There was a law, that those who in a storm forsook the ship, should forfeit all property therein; and that the ship and lading should belong entirely to those who staid in it. In a dangerous tempest all the mariners forsook the ship, except only one sick passenger, who by reason of his disease was unable to get out and escape. By chance the ship came safe to port. The sick man kept possession, and claimed the benefit of the law. Now here all the learned agree, that the sick man is not within the reason of the law; for the reason of making it was, to give encouragement to such as should venture their lives to save the vessel: but this is a merit which he could never pretend to, who neither staid in the ship upon that account, nor contributed anything to its preservation.

of a statute."

From this method of interpreting laws, by the reason of them, arises what we call the equity of a statute; equity being generally defined by Grotius(d)— The "equity of "the correction of that, wherein the law (by reason of its universality) is deficient."(47) In accordance, however, with remarks before made(e), recourse must not be had to this method of construction unless where effect can thus only be given to the intent of the enactment (ƒ). 9. There are three points to be considered in the construction of all [*101] remedial statutes; the old law, the *mischief, and the remedy: that is In remedial stat- how the common law stood at the making of the act; what the utes the mis- mischief was for which the common law did not provide; and suppressed and what remedy the parliament has provided to cure this mischief. to be advanced. And it is the business of the judges so to construe the act as to suppress the mischief and advance the remedy (g).(48) To exemplify this by

chief is to be

the remedy

(d) De Equitate, s. 3. (e) Ante, p. 96.

(f) "It is, in my opinion, so important for the court, in construing modern statutes, to act upon the principle of giving full effect to their language, and of declining to mould that language in order to meet either an alleged convenience or an alleged equity, upon doubtful evidence of intention, that nothing will induce me to withdraw a case from the operation of a section which is within its words, but clear and unambiguous evidence that so to do is to fulfil the general intent of the statute; and also that to adhere to the literal interpretation, is to decide inconsistently with other and overruling provisions of the same statute." Per Coleridge, J., R. v. St. Pancras, 6 A. & E. 7.

(g) Heydon's Case, 3 Rep. 7, where the judges resolved: -"that in all statutes, be

they penal or beneficial, restricting or enlarging of the common law, four things are to be discerned and considered, riz.- (1) What was the common law before the making of the act? (2) What was the mischief and defect against which the common law did not provide? (3) What remedy the parliament hath resolved and applied to cure the disease of the commonwealth? and (4) the true reason of the remedy.

"It was then held to be the duty of the judges at all times, to make such construction as should suppress the mischief and advance the remedy, putting down all subtle inventions and evasions for continuance of the mischief et pro privato commodo, and adding force and life to the cure and remedy, according to the true intent of the makers of the act pro bono publico.”

(47) In law, all cases cannot be foreseen or expressed; and the object of interpreting laws by what is called equity, is to supply this deficiency as far as possible, by a recurrence to natural principles of justice. Statutes in derogation of the common law are not extended by an equitable construction. Rue v. Alter, 5 Denio, 119; Allen v. Cook, 26 Barb. 374, 382; Smith v. Brackett, 36 id. 571; Sharp v. Speir, 4 Hill, 76; Cruger v. Dougherty, 43 N. Y. (4 Hand) 107, 122; Wilbur v. Crane, 13 Pick. 284; Lock v. Miller, 3 Stew. & Port. 13.

(48) A remedial act should be so construed as most effectually to meet the beneficial end in view, and to prevent a failure of the remedy; and, as a general rule, a remedial statute ought to be construed liberally.

A construction the most reasonable and the best suited to accomplish the general purpose of the statute will be applied to a remedial statute where the words are not clear or precise.

1