Muenchow v. Zschetzsche & Son Co. 113 Wis. 8. chargeable with knowledge of the dangers of his working place by reason of the unguarded shaft, does not make it so. Where there is room in evidentiary facts for conflicting inferences, it is the province of the jury to say which is the proper inference to be drawn therefrom. They are supreme in that field in a legal action; but when there is but one reasonable inference to be drawn from such facts, a contrary inference should not be suggested by submitting the question involved to the jury for decision, nor should such contrary inference, if found by them, be allowed to disturb the course of justice. A proposition which is indisputable upon any reasonable ground is not a proper subject for investigation by a jury, nor is the truth thereof dimmed at all because condemned by the verdict of a jury. Finkelston v. C., M. & St. P. R. Co. 94 Wis. 270; Cawley v. La Crosse City R. Co. 101 Wis. 145; Optenberg v. Skelton, 109 Wis. 241. It would seem that the conclusion above indicated, as to whether the deceased ought to have apprehended the danger of his being injured by the shaft, need not be supported by precedents. However, we might point to many analogous cases decided by this court, and cases involving the precise question here involved, decided by other courts, all in harmony with such conclusion, some of which cases are cited in appellant's brief. In Dougherty v. West Superior I. & S. Co. 88 Wis. 343, the plaintiff was injured by allowing his hand to become entangled in hay which he was manipulating to cause it to wind around a rapidly revolving spindle, by reason whereof his hand was drawn to the spindle and injured. He claimed that he did not know the danger of such an occurrence taking place, and that he should have been instructed in that regard by his employer. This court said. that whatever danger existed "was plain and open to observation upon the most casual inspection." "It was cer tainly not necessary to tell him [the employee] that, if he allowed his hand to be caught in the hay just where it was Muenchow v. Zschetzsche & Son Co. 113 Wis. 8. being wound around the spindle, there was danger that it would be seriously injured. Common sense would suggest that from the condition of affairs open to his observation." In support of that conclusion Russell v. Tillotson, 140 Mass. 201, was cited. The facts thereof were that an employee allowed his apron and jacket to come in contact with an overhead revolving shaft, which was in plain sight and was seen by him, whereby he was injured. It was claimed, in his action for damages against his employer, that he did not know of the danger and should not have been sent to work in the region thereof without instructions. On appeal from a judgment upon a verdict directed for the defendant, the judgment was affirmed, the court saying: "As it is not suggested that he was a man of manifest imbecility, we think that the foreman was entitled to assume that the plaintiff would protect himself by whatever precautions were necessary." In Kreider v. Wisconsin River P. & P. Co. 110 Wis. 645, the facts were that the plaintiff allowed his clothing to come in contact with a revolving shaft in which there was a set screw, whereby he was injured. A nonsuit was granted by the trial court upon the ground that the plaintiff assumed the risk of being injured by the shaft and set screw, the danger in that regard being obvious. In Helmke v. Thil many, 107 Wis. 216, an employee allowed his coat to be caught in some unguarded gears which were in plain sight and with which he was familiar, whereby he was injured. A judgment of nonsuit was affirmed. In Lemoine v. Aldrich, 177 Mass. 89, the facts were that an employee, whose duty required him to frequently pass under a revolving shaft, so located that care was required by him to prevent a sheet, used about his work and carried on his arm while passing under the shaft, from being caught and wound up on it, and drawing him thereto and injuring him, was so caught and injured, and he claimed, in an action for damages against Muenchow v. Zschetzsche & Son Co. 113 Wis. 8. his employer, that he should have been warned of the danger. A judgment for defendant was affirmed, the court saying the plaintiff was twenty-one years of age and the defendant had no reason to suppose that he needed warning of the danger. Ford v. Mount Tom S. P. Co. 172 Mass. 544, is to the same effect. The conclusion reached is that the deceased must be held to have assumed the risk of being injured by the shaft, and that the record discloses no ground for the recovery adjudged. Had a proper motion been made in the court below for a correction of the verdict in accordance with the undisputed evidence, by striking out the answers unfavorable to appellant and inserting in place thereof answers in its favor, on the subject of whether the danger incident to the deceased's working place, by reason of the unguarded shaft, was open and obvious to a person of ordinary intelligence and experience, the settled practice would allow us to reverse the judgment appealed from and remand the cause with directions to make such correction and render a judgment dismissing the complaint with costs. As no such motion was made, the judgment must be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial. By the Court.-The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial. State ex rel. Dunlap v. Nohl, 113 Wis. 15. THE STATE EX REL. DUNLAP, Appellant, vs. NOHL, January 9-January 28, 1902. Municipal corporations: Constitutional law: Delegation of legislative power: Ordinances: Punishment of violations: Justices' courts: General city charter: Police courts: Jurisdiction: Judgments: Forfeitures: Official direction to commence action, when necessary: Unlicensed dogs: Pleading: Immaterial errors: “Adjournments:" Entry on docket: Enacting clause of ordinance. 1. Sec. 1, ch. II, of the charter of Ripon (ch. 72, P. & L. Laws of 1858) provided for one justice of the peace in each ward and conferred on them such powers and duties "as are prescribed in this act, or as may be prescribed in any ordinance of said city, not inconsistent with said act, or which may not be incompatible with the nature of their respective offices;" and sec. 3, ch. IV, conferred upon the council power to make and amend "all such ordinances, rules and by-laws for the government and good order of the city, for the suppression of vice and immorality, for the prevention of crime, and for the benefit of trade, commerce and health, as they shall deem expedient; declaring and imposing penalties, and to enforce the same," etc. Held, that the common council of said city had power, by ordinance, to vest in the justices of the peace authority to entertain suits for breaches of such ordinances and recovery of the penalties thereby imposed. 2. Said charter provisions cannot be held to be an unlawful delegation of the legislative power vested by the constitution in the state legislature, since in creating subordinate political subdivisions, the legislature may delegate power to legislate over minor and detail subjects of local government. 3. An ordinance of said city providing that "the justices of the peace within said city shall have cognizance and jurisdiction of all offenses against the ordinances of said city, and shall have power to give judgment and issue executions thereon for any and all penalties and for forfeitures under the same," is an exercise of the power, given by sec. 1, ch. II, and sec. 3, ch. IV, of said charter. 4. Said ordinance created courts having the same jurisdiction as the police courts designated, in and upon which, by the general charter (sec. 925-65, Stats. 1898), are conferred "the civil State ex rel. Dunlap v. Nohl, 113 Wis. 15. and criminal jurisdiction of a justice of the peace within the limits of such city and exclusive jurisdiction of offenses against the ordinances of the city." Such justices' courts therefore continued in existence, after the adoption by the city of the general city charter, by virtue of sec. 925-61, continuing the jurisdiction of courts or magistrates existing at the time of its adoption by any city in which there was a court or magistrate having the jurisdiction of police justices conferred by sec. 925-65. 5. In such case, after the adoption by the city of the general city charter (ch. 40a) while such ordinance continued in force, the jurisdiction of the justices of the peace under said ordinance could be destroyed only in the manner specified in the general city charter or by new legislation, and could not be defeated by the repeal of that ordinance. 6. In such case, a judgment of a justice of the peace, in a prosecution for an offense against an ordinance of said city, simply adjudging that the defendant pay a penalty and the costs of the action, does not raise the question whether the justice had power to enforce his judgment by imprisonment in accordance with the general city charter (sec. 925-67, Stats. 1898). 7. An ordinance conferring jurisdiction upon justices of the peace of the city over offenses against city ordinances includes not only such ordinances as existed at the time such jurisdiction was conferred, but any others legally enacted, including such as were enacted after the adoption of the general city charter. 8. Sec. 3298, Stats. 1898 (providing that no action to recover a forfeiture shall be brought before a justice of the peace except by direction of certain specified officers), applies only to forfeitures authorized to be sued for in the name of the state, and does not apply to actions for the enforcement of ordinances in cities existing under the general city charter. 9. In a complaint charging violation of a city ordinance denouncing a penalty against "every person who shall own or have in his possession in this city an unlicensed dog," it is not necessary to allege that the defendant is a resident of the city. 10. It is not necessary in such a case that the complaint allege that at the time it was sworn to the defendant had a dog in his possession; the complaint is sufficient if it appears therefrom that the defendant had such a dog on a day within the period of the statute of limitations. 11. Sec. 925-69, Stats. 1898, prescribes the form of complaint in an action to recover a penalty for violation of the ordinance of a city existing under the general city charter, and the allegation |