See CORPORATIONS, 4. EVIDENCE, 4. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES, 1. MORTGAGES, 1-3.
1. The mere renewal of a promissory note is not a payment of the debt, and does not, as between the original parties, affect the essential nature of the transaction thereby represented. Crocker v. Huntzicker,
181 2. Under sec, 1675-50, ch. 356, Laws of 1899, the introduction in evidence of a negotiable note establishes prima facie that it was given for value, and that every maker and indorser ap- pearing thereon have signed for value. Bank of Monticello v: Dooly, 590 3. General authority to a bank officer to make discounts does not authorize him to bind the bank by discounting notes to which he is a party. Ibid.
4. The directors of a bank, on examining its loans, found a note payable to D. and signed by its cashier as a joint maker. On the cashier's attention being called thereto, he stated that D. had agreed to indorse it, and D., having been called in, indorsed the note. Held, that when the note was found among the notes turned over by the cashier as cash or collateral, it was prima facie proof that the cashier had advanced the bank's money upon a note to which he was a party, and hence that the bank had not bought the note prior to the directors' meeting. Ibid. 5. In such case D. having signed the note for the purpose of meet- ing requirements imposed by the bank's directors before they would consent to purchase the note, the original consideration advanced by the bank attached to the transaction, and it was immaterial that no money passed directly to D. Ibid.
BOARD OF REVIEW. See MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 14. TAXATION, 3-5. BRIDGES. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1. HIGHWAYS, 2. VILLAGES, 4, 5. BRIEF. See APPEAL, 30.
CANCELLATION OF INSTRUMENTS. See EQUITY, 6.
CARRIERS. See RAILROADS.
CASHIERS. See BILLS AND NOTES.
CASES DISTINGUISHED, ETC.
1. Bank of Commerce v. Elliott, 109 Wis. 648. See No. 14.
2. Bogie v. Bogie, 41 Wis. 122. See No. 29.
3. Bonin v. G. B. & W. R. Co. 43 Wis. 210 (as to motion for a re- hearing), followed. Hocks v. Sprangers,
4. Cassidy v. Millerick, 52 Wis. 379.
5. Collins v. Lowry, 78 Wis. 329. See No. 14.
6. Cooper v. Waterloo, 88 Wis. 433; Sommers v. Marshfield, 90 Wis. 60; Toutloff v. Green Bay, 91 Wis. 490; Selleck v. Tallman, 93 Wis. 246 (as to primary liability of lotowner under charter for mere lack of repair). Devine v. Fond du Lac,
7. Davis v. Appleton, 109 Wis. 580 (as to charter provisions regard- ing presentation of claims being in the nature of statutes of limitation), overruled. O'Donnell v. New London, 292, 296 8. Devine v. Fond du Lac, 113 Wis. 61. See No. 17.
9. De Wolf v. Lawson, 61 Wis. 469 (as to suspension of power of alienation), distinguished. In re Writ of Kopmeier, 238 10. Dick v. Williams, 87 Wis. 651, and other cases (as to orders pen- dente lite being res adjudicata), distinguished. Castle v. Madi- son, 350 11. Erdall v. Atwood, 79 Wis. 1 (as to form of certificate in bill of exceptions), distinguished. Dorer v. Hood, 611 12. Falk v. Marsh, 88 Wis. 620 (as to holding under color of title), distinguished. Dorer v. Hood, 608, 612
13. Frederick v. Douglas Co. 96 Wis. 411 (as to showing necessary for taxpayer to maintain action), distinguished. Northern Trust Co. v. Snyder, 527, 529 14. Geiser T. M. Co. v. Smith, 36 Wis. 295; Mason v. Beach, 55 Wis. 607; Two Rivers Mfg. Co. v. Beyer, 74 Wis. 210; Collins v. Lowry, 78 Wis. 329; Bank of Commerce v. Elliott, 109 Wis. 648 (as to recovery of costs after satisfaction of cause of action), distinguished. Stolze v. M. & L. W. 'R. Co. 56 15. Gough v. Root, 73 Wis. 32, and other cases (as to motion for a rehearing), distinguished. Hocks v. Sprangers, 139 16. Hagan v. Casey, 30 Wis. 553 (as to waiver by accepting motion costs), distinguished. Gruetzmacher v. Wanninger,
17. Hausmann v. Madison, 85 Wis. 187; Devine v. Fond du Lac, 113 Wis. 61 (as to contributory negligence), distinguished. Ger- rard v. La Crosse City R. Co. 259, 266
18. Hunter v. Hathaway, 108 Wis. 620. See No. 19. 19. Koeber v. Somers, 108 Wis. 479; Hunter v. Hathaway, 108 Wis. 620 (as to implied covenants), followed. Koch v. Hustis, 603 20. Krall v. Lull, 46 Wis. 643 (as to motion for a rehearing), fol- lowed. Hocks v. Sprangers, 136, 138 21. Kruschke v. Stefan, 83 Wis. 383 (as to amendment of pleading to conform to the facts), distinguished. Hocks v. Sprangers, 130 22. Lathrop v. Knapp, 27 Wis. 214 (as to subscriptions), doubted. Hodges v. O'Brien, 102 23. Linden L. Co. v. Milwaukee E. R. & L. Co. 107 Wis. 493 (as to bringing in new parties), followed. Castle v. Madison, 356 See No. 14.
24. Mason v. Beach, 55 Wis. 607. 25. Mead v. Nelson, 52 Wis. 402 (as to authority of county boards, etc., to repeal resolutions), distinguished. Northern Trust Co. 532
26. Neilson v. C. & N. W. R. Co. 91 Wis. 557 (as to title to deposits in condemnation proceedings), explained. Stolze v. M. & L. W. R. Co. 52
27. Noyes v. State, 46 Wis. 250 (as to costs against the state), har- monized. Sandberg v. State, 589 28. Patten P. Co. v. G. B. & M. C. Co. 93 Wis. 283 (as to motion for rehearing), criticised and distinguished. Hocks v. Sprangers, 138
29. Peterson v. Olson, 47 Wis. 122; Bogie v. Bogie, 41 Wis. 122 (as to forfeiture for nonperformance of conditions subsequent), overruled. Glocke v. Glocke, 313-316, 318, 319, 321 30. Powers v. Oshkosh, 56 Wis. 660 (as to compensation of city clerk), distinguished. Anderson v. Milwaukee, 1, 2 31. Raymond v. Sheboygan, 76 Wis. 335; Schaefer v. Fond du Lac, 104 Wis. 39 (as to exhausting remedy against lot owner be- fore suing city), distinguished and limited. Devine v. Fond du Lac, 62, 69, 70
32. Schaefer v. Fond du Lac, 104 Wis. 39. See No. 31.
33. Selleck v. Tallman, 93 Wis. 246. See No. 6.
34. Smith v. Bahr, 62 Wis. 244; Cassidy v. Millerick, 52 Wis. 379 (as to contradicting justice's docket entries by parol), distin- guished. Johnson v. Turnell,
35. Sommers v. Marshfield, 90 Wis. 60. See No. 6.
36. State v. Goodrich, 84 Wis. 359 (as to felonies necessarily com- mitted by force), harmonized. State v. Lewis,
37. State ex rel. Durner v. Aiken, 110 Wis. 189. See No. 39. 38. State ex rel. Durner v. Hoyt, 110 Wis. 189. See No. 39. 39. State ex rel. Durner v. Huegin, 110 Wis. 189; State ex rel. Durner v. Aikens, 110 Wis. 189; State ex rel. Durner v. Hoyt, 110 Wis. 189 (as to conspiracy), followed. Aikens v. State, 419, 420
40. State ex rel. Sanderson v. Mann, 76 Wis. 469 (as to inheritance or succession taxes). Black v. State, 216, 217
41. Toutloff v. Green Bay, 91 Wis. 490. See No. 6.
42. Two Rivers Mfg. Co. v. Beyer, 74 Wis. 210. See No. 14. 43. Walker v. Ontario, 111 Wis. 113. See No. 44.
44. Welch v. Geneva, 110 Wis. 388; Walker v. Ontario, 111 Wis. 113 (as to use of highway by traction engines), distinguished. Stauffacher v. Sylvester, 562 45. Wis. Cent. R. Co. v. Taylor Co. 52 Wis. 37 (as to lack of uni- formity in taxation), distinguished. Black v. State, 116 46. Zillmer v. Landguth, 94 Wis. 607 (as to construction of wills), distinguished. In re Will of Kopmeier, 236
1. A common-law writ of certiorari will not issue when there is an adequate remedy by appeal or otherwise. In re Hammer, 96
2. Petitioner was brought before the circuit judge at chambers in habeas corpus proceedings, and, on being remanded, applied to the supreme court for a writ of certiorari. Held, that the ap- plication should be denied, as petitioner had an adequate rem- edy by application to the circuit court to review such order, and then, if adverse to petitioner, under sec. 3043, Stats. 1898, a writ of error could issue to review the order of the circuit court affirming the order made at chambers. Ibid.
3. A writ of certiorari commanding the supervisors of a town to certify and return to the circuit court all files, papers, entries
and orders used in making an order detaching lands from cer- tain school districts and creating new districts, is not misdi- rected, in that it runs to the supervisors of the town instead of to the town clerk. State ex rel. Bidgood v. Clifton, 107 4. A motion to supersede a writ of certiorari is, in effect, a de- murrer to the relation, and admits the facts therein alleged. Ibid.
CHANGE OF VENUE. See APPEAL, 2. CRIMINAL LAW, 7. VENUE.
1. The execution of a chattel mortgage transfers to the mortgagee a defeasible title to the mortgaged property, which becomes ab- solute at law by failure to pay the debt at the stipulated time, but is subject to the right in the mortgagor, or junior mortga- gees, of redemption after breach of the condition, and before sale. Klinkert v. Fulton S. & M. Co. 493
2. A mortgagee of chattels, after condition broken, has the right to the possession of the mortgaged property, and his right to re- cover against any person unlawfully converting the same in hostility to his rights is absolute, his damages against the per- son withholding possession being limited by the amount due on his mortgage debt.
CHILDREN. See INSURANCE, 3. EQUITY, 4-6. RECORDS, 1, 3-6. CIRCUIT COURTS. See CERTIORARI, 1, 2. JUSTICES' Courts, 3.
NICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 19. TAXATION, 4, 5. WILLS, 3.
CIRCUIT JUDGE. See SHERIFFS, 2, 3.
CITIES. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. PARTIES, 1.
CITY CLERK. See MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 14.
CLAIMS. See COUNTIES, 4, 5. ESTATES OF DECEDENTS.
CLASSIFICATION. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. TAXATION, 8, 10.
1. The clerks of the circuit courts take their offices cum onere, and compensation for all services performed by them within the scope of their official duties has no foundation unless it finds express warrant in the law. Green Lake Co. v. Waupaca Co.
2. Under sec. 747, Stats. 1898, regulating fees of the clerk of the circuit court, there is no warrant for the clerk taxing, in a criminal action, for "issuing witnesses' affidavits" proving their mileage and attendance, it being the duty of the witnesses to prepare such affidavits, and if the clerk administers the oath, it is a service for the witness and not for the state. Ibid.
3. In such case there is no warrant for taxing as fees of such clerk, "issuing fifty-four receipts for certificates $13.50, and filing same, $5.40;" sec. 4060, Stats. 1898, providing that the witness who receives such certificate shall receipt for the same, but provides for no fee to the clerk therefor. Ibid.
4. Neither is there warrant to tax as part of the expenses arising out of a change of venue, clerk's fees for issuing and filing jurors', sheriff's, clerk's and reporter's certificates. They are part of the regular business of a jury term, which is in no way affected or enlarged by the presence of the foreign case on the calendar. Ibid. 5. In the absence of any statute authorizing statements signed by the district attorney, certifying to the number of days attend- ance and miles traveled for each witness, there is no warrant for the clerk to include in his fee bill a charge for filing such statements. Ibid. 6. The term "judgment roll" applies only to civil actions, and in taxing against a county the expenses arising out of a change of venue in a criminal action, it is error to allow the clerk for making up the same. Ibid.
7. There is no warrant for "taxing bill of costs" except in civil actions, and the only charge authorized therefor is twenty-five cents. It is therefore error to make an allowance of $2.50 there- for in taxing the expenses arising out of a change of venue in a criminal action. Ibid.
CLOUD UPON TITLE. See QUIETING TITLE.
COGNOVIT. See JUDGMENTS, 2, 5, 6.
COLLATERAL ATTACK. See APPEAL, 2, 3.
COMMON COUNCIL. See MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 1, 2.
COMPENSATION. See APPEAL, 2, 3. COUNTIES. CLERKS OF COURTS. EMINENT DOMAIN, 1-7. SHERIFFS. VENUE.
CONDEMNATION OF LANDS. See EMINENT DOMAIN.
Precedent. See ACTIONS, 1. EJECTMENT, 3, 4. EMINENT DOMAIN, 6.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 18-20. QUIETING
Subsequent. See DEEDS, 1.
EQUITY, 5, 6. INSURANCE, 1.
CONSIDERATION. See BILLS AND NOTES, 5. FRAUDULENT CONVEY- ANCES, 2. JUDGMENTS, 3. LOGS AND TIMBER, 4.
See CORPORATIONS, 6, 7. EJECTMENT, 7. EMINENT DOMAIN, 1-7, 10-12. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 3. TAXATION, 8-11.
1. Sec. 1319, Stats. 1898, authorizes the raising of taxes by counties to aid towns in the building of bridges, but provides that the act shall not authorize the levying of any tax on the property of any city or incorporated village "that maintains its own bridges." Sec. 1, art. VIII, Const., declares that the rule of taxation shall be uniform. Held, that such exemption from taxation applies to such cities and villages as are required by law to maintain their own bridges, whether they in fact main- tain any or not, and so construed the statute is not unconstitu- tional as creating an unreasonable and artificial classification. Battles v. Doll,
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