Opinion of the Court. the bill of exceptions, and if he fails to do so, the Supreme Court can not pass upon the question. 3. SAME when it does not purport to contain all the evidence, other evidence presumed to have been introduced. Where the bill of exceptions fails to show that it contains all the evidence introduced on the trial, it will be presumed that other evidence was introduced sufficient to authorize the verdict of the jury. WRIT OF ERROR to the Circuit Court of Iroquois county; the Hon. N. J. PILLSBURY, Judge, presiding. Messrs. JUSSEN & ANDERSON, for the plaintiff in error. Mr. JAMES K. EDSALL, Attorney General, for the People. Mr. JUSTICE CRAIG delivered the opinion of the Court: This was an indictment against the defendant for selling intoxicating liquors without having a legal license to keep a dram shop, under section 2, chapter 43, Revised Statutes of 1874, page 438. The indictment contained thirteen counts. On the trial of the cause the jury rendered a verdict of guilty in manner and form, as charged in the indictment in the first, second, third, fourth, fifth and eighth counts. The court, upon the verdict of the jury, rendered a judgment against the defendant for a fine of $100, and sentenced him to imprisonment in the county jail for thirty days. Several errors have been assigned upon the record, but the defendant, in the argument of the cause, relies upon two grounds to reverse the judgment of the circuit court: First-That the verdict was not authorized by the evidence. Second-That the judgment of imprisonment for thirty days in gross was error, as there should have been a specified number of days of imprisonment on each count upon which the defendant was convicted. So far as the first point is concerned, upon an examination of the bill of exceptions contained in the record, it does not purport to contain all of the evidence introduced on the trial of the cause. This court has held, in a number of cases, that 3-80TH ILL. Opinion of the Court. where the bill of exceptions fails to show that it contains all the evidence introduced on the trial, it will be presumed that other evidence was introduced sufficient to authorize the verdict. We will, therefore, presume that the evidence heard upon the trial fully justified the verdict of the jury. The second question has been settled by the former decisions of this court. In Mullinix v. The People, 76 Ill. 211, which was an indictment for selling intoxicating liquor to a person in the habit of getting intoxicated, the defendant was convicted on two counts of the indictment, and the court rendered a sentence that he be imprisoned twenty days, generally. It was said: "It is error to sentence a person on such a conviction to a single term, but it should be for a specified term under each count, the time under the second to commence when the first ends, and so on to the last. No distinction is perceived between the case cited and the one under consideration, and the decision must be regarded as conclusive of the question raised. See, also, Martin v. The People, 76 Ill. 499, and The People ex rel. Menyx v. Whitson, 74 Ill. where the same point was decided. The defendant also claims, that the court erred in excluding from the jury a book, containing the constitution and by-laws and proceedings of a certain society, for which the defendant claimed to be acting. The offered evidence was excluded by the court on the ground that it was not material to the question involved. As the bill of exceptions does not, however, contain the offered proof, we have no means of ascertaining whether it was material or not, and can not pass upon the question. Had the defendant desired to present the point, as was held in Shoudy v. School Directors, 32 Ill. 290, he should have incorporated the offered evidence in the bill of exceptions; but as he has failed to do this, we can not determine whether the court erred or not in the exclusion of the testimony. For the error indicated, the judgment will be reversed and the cause remanded Judgment reversed. 80 35 79a 102 80 35 80 35 87a 297 1. PLEADING-averments in a declaration on a life insurance policy. In a suit on a policy of life insurance, procured by the insured for the ben- 80a 511 efit of another, it is not necessary that the declaration should aver that the beneficiary had any interest in the life of the insured, but a different rule prevails where one procures an insurance on the life of another. In such a case, the plaintiff must aver, in his declaration, that he had an insurable interest in the life insured. 2. Where a party made application, in the name of his father, for a policy of insurance on the life of the father, for his (the son's) benefit, and the agents of the company, being aware of all the facts, and that the father knew nothing of the transaction, and paid nothing on the policy, still caused the policy to be issued to the father as if procured by him for the benefit of the son, it was held, that, as a mere question of pleading, the company could not be heard to make objection that the transaction was different, in fact, from what it purported to be by the policy, and that, in declaring on it, the plaintiff was not to aver in his declaration that he had an insurable interest in his father's life. 3. Where a policy of insurance contains a recital that it was issued in consideration of the application of a previous policy which is made part of the new policy, it is not necessary, in declaring on the policy sued on, to refer to such application; a cause of action is shown by declaring upon the policy sued on, alone, and if the representations in the former application furnish any matter to defeat the right of action, it should be set up in defense. 4. FRAUD false representations made to an agent of a company, who knows they are false, but adopts them as true, does not amount to a fraud on the company. Where the agents of a life insurance company solicited a party to take out a policy of insurance on his life, which he declined to do, but suggested taking one in the name of his father, on the life of the father, for his benefit, and thereupon, without the knowledge of the father and with full knowledge to the agents, the necessary application was made out in the name of the father, and the policy issued to him as if upon his own application, it was held, that the conduct and dealing of the agents throughout the whole affair showed too much privity and knowledge on their part, in respect to the actual facts, to expose the transaction to the imputation of being a fraud upon the company. 88a 389 Syllabus. 5. EVIDENCE-of amount of premium paid on former policy, in a suit on a substituted policy. In a suit brought upon a policy of life insurance, which contained a clause that, if the death of the assured should be caused by suicide, the company should only be liable for the amount of premium paid on such insurance, and the defense set up to the suit was, that the assured had committed suicide, it was held, that it was competent for the plaintiff to prove that the policy sued on was, in fact, a substitute for a former policy and the amount of premium paid on both policies. 6. SAME presumption as to manner of death of party whose life is insured. In a suit on a policy of life insurance, where there is the occurrence of death, and no evidence as to the cause, the presumption is, that it was from natural causes, and not an act of self-destruction, and so it is where the evidence as to whether it was by suicide or not, is equally balanced, but no such presumption arises merely from the fact that, under the evidence, there may be a doubt as to whether the death was caused by suicide. 7. Where the defense in a suit upon a policy of life insurance is, that the death of the assured was produced by self-destruction, the question should be fairly submitted to the jury, and be decided by them upon a preponderance of the evidence, and it is error to tell them that, if the evidence leaves the matter in doubt, the presumption is, that the death was produced by natural causes, and not by self-destruction. 8. INSTRUCTION—when calculated to mislead the jury. An instruction as to what the presumption of law is, upon a question of disputed fact, is extremely likely to mislead a jury, and should not be given. 9. LIFE INSURANCE-wager policy void. A policy of insurance issued to one who has no insurable interest in the life of the assured, is a mere wager policy, and void. 10. SAME-moral claim not an insurable interest. A moral claim does not constitute an insurable interest in the life of another, in behalf of one as a creditor. 11. SAME-mere relation of father and son does not constitute an insurable interest in the son in his father's life. The mere relation of father and son does not constitute an insurable interest on behalf of the son in the life of the father, unless the son has a well founded or reasonable expectation of some pecuniary advantage to be derived from the continu ance of the life of the father. 12. SAME-effect of insurance in excess of insurable interest. Even if a party has an insurable interest in the life of another, yet, if the sum insured is largely in excess of such insurable interest, it tends to prove that the insurance was procured for mere purposes of speculation, and if such is the fact, there can be no recovery on the policy. Statement of the case. 13. INSURABLE INTEREST-facts only tending to prove an insurable interest should not be declared by the court to constitute such interest. A son continued to reside with his father for several years after he becomes of age, and worked for him, for which he receives no compensation, and also makes valuable improvements upon a piece of land, upon a well grounded expectation that his father will give him the land, and the father disposed of the land, and paid him no compensation for such improvements: Held, that these facts were no more than evidence tending to show an insurable interest in the son in his father's life, and should not be declared by the court, in instructions to the jury, to constitute an insurable interest. WRIT OF ERROR to the Circuit Court of Winnebago county; the Hon. WILLIAM BROWN, Judge, presiding. On December 31, 1868, the plaintiff in error, a corporation in New York. granted to John Hogan, of Rockford, Illinois, a policy of insurance, No. 16,870. on his life, for $10.000, to be paid to his son, Patrick Hogan, who resided some 17 miles from Rockford, in Ogle county, on the death of the father, subject to the conditions of the policy. The circumstances under which the policy was issued were, that J. C. Mayberry was the general agent of the company in 1868 and 1872, residing at Rockford. L. E. Herrick was a solicitor of insurance, under Mayberry, and went out in company with one Parkison, another insurance solicitor, from Rockford to Ogle county, to solicit Patrick Hogan to take insurance on his own life. He declined to take any, but originated a suggestion for a policy on his father's life, John Hogan, an old man, living at Rockford, if it was practicable. There were doubts of its practicability, but, after an interview of some hours, an application was made out by Herrick, to be delivered to Mayberry. Herrick knew nothing of John Hogan, except from Patrick's statements, neither he nor Mayberry ever having seen John Hogan till long after the policy was issued. The application was taken away by Herrick, and soon after delivered by him to Mayberry. The signature of John Hogan appeared to the application, and, as may be inferred from the evidence, was in the handwriting of Her |