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6. When erroneous, not cured by others. Where one instruction is given authorizing a recovery against a railroad for injuries caused by the negligence of its servants, which contains no requirement of care or caution on the part of the injured party, the error will not be cured by other instructions which do contain such requirement. Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Co. v. Harwood, 88.


1. Presumed to be made by the party signing it. It may be shown, in actions upon insurance policies, that the applicant for the policy did not, in fact, make the representations as shown by the application, and that the application was filled out by the agent of the company, who inserted the statements claimed to be false, of his own accord, but the court will not, in the absence of proof, presume the application was thus made out, but on the contrary, that the party signing it knew and indorsed its contents. Hartford Life and Annuity Insurance Co. v Gray et al. 28.

2. Fulse representations made to an agent of a, who knows they are fulse, but adopts them as true, does not amount to a fraud on the company. Where the agents of a life insurance company solicited a party to take out a policy of insurance on his life, which he declined to do, but suggested taking one in the name of his father, on the life of the father, for his benefit, and thereupon, without the knowledge of the father, and with full knowledge to the agents, the necessary application was made out in the name of the father, and the policy issued to him as if upon his own application, it was held, that the conduct and dea). ing of the agents throughout the whole affair showed too much privity and knowledge on their part, in respect to the actual facts, to expose the transaction to the imputation of being a fraud upon the company.

Guardian Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Hogan, 35. INSURAELE INTEREST.

3. Interests of landlord and tenant each insurable. Where property of a married woman is leased for a term of years by her husband to another, both the wife and the lessee have an insurable interest in the demised premises. Ely v. Ely et al. 532.

4. Rights of mortgagee insuring. Where a mortgagee insures property, the mortgagor, having no connection with it, can not claim its benefit, but the mortgagee may receive and enjoy the insurance money

and still collect the mortgage debt of the mortgagor. Ibid. 532. EXCEPTION AS TO CAUSE OF LOSS.

5. Construction of policy. A clause in a policy of insurance that provides “ if a building shall fall, except as the result of fire, all insurance by this company shall immediately cease and determine,” is to be


understood in the ordinary meaning of the words used. And so long as the building remains standing, no matter how much it may be depre. ciated by the action of the winds or any other cause, the liability of the company under the policy of insurance will continue. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Congregation Rodeph Sholom, 558.

6. Company liable if risk is permitted to stand after it becomes more hazardous. Where a building which is insured against fire, is after. wards so damaged from other causes as to render the risk more hazardous, if the company does not take steps to cancel the policy, but permits the risk to stand, and the building is destroyed by fire, the company

will be liable. Ibid. 558. NOTICE AND PROOF OF LOSS.

7. As to notice to be given. Where a clause in a policy of insurance requires the assured, in case of loss, to "give immediate notice thereof in writing,” and “render to the company a particular account of said loss, in writing," and the policy further provides that payment shall be made in sixty days after due notice and proofs of the loss, a liberal construction should be given to the words used, and it will be held to require notice and proofs to be given within a reasonable time after the loss. Knickerbocker Ins. Co. v. Gould et al. 388.

8. What is reasonable time to give notice. Where a loss occurred on the 8th or 9th of October, and notice and proof of loss were given on Nov. 13th following, it appearing that the office of the insurance company was also destroyed, so that the assured did not know where to find its officers, and the conflagration was so general as to suspend all busi. ness transactions, and the assured held many other policies under which he sustained losses, it was held, that the court could not say the delay, under the circumstances, was unreasonable. Ibid. 388.

9. Diligence in giving notice a question of fact. Where there is no dispute as to the facts of the case, it is a question of law whether due diligence has been used in giving notice of a loss; but where the facts in regard to diligence are disputed, it is a question of fact for the jury, and it is proper to submit to the jury whether, under all the circum. stances, immediate notice was given. Ibid. 388.

10. Waiver of due notice. Where a defective notice and proof of loss is given to an insurance company, and no defects are pointed out, so as to afford an opportunity to correct the same, objection to the same will be considered as waived, but not so where the notice is not giren in time. The retaining of the notice, and making no objection, waiver of the failure to give the same in time. Knickerbocker Ins. Co. v. Gould et al. 388.

11. Evidence of value of property destroyed. The proofs of loss fur. nished an insurance company are admissible in evidence, in an action upon a policy of insurance, to show that such proofs were made and

not a


delivered as required by the terms of the policy, but not for the pur. pose of proving the extent of the loss to the jury—that must be shown

by other evidence. Knickerbocker Ins. Co. v. Gould et al. 388. LIFE INSURANCE.

12. Policy on husband's life procured by wife's persuasion. A wife has the right, by the use of all the persuasive arts at her command, to induce her husband to procure a policy of insurance on his life for her use, and, on his death, to receive all its benefits and proceeds. Pingree et al. v. Jones, 177.

13. Under wager policy void. A policy of insurance issued to one who has no insurable interest in the life of the assured, is a mere wager policy, and void. Gurdian Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hogin, 35.

14. Moral claim not an insurable interest. A moral claim does not constitute an insurable interest in the life of another, in behalf of one as a creditor. Ibid. 35.

15. Mere relation of father and son does not constitute an insurable interest in the son in his father's life. The mere relation of father and son does not constitute an insurable interest on behalf of the son in the life of the father, unless the son has a well founded or reasonable expec. tation of some pecuniary advantage to be derived from the continuance of the life of the father. Ibid. 35.

16. Effect of insurance in excess of insurable interest. Even if a party has an insurable interest in the life of another, yet, if the sum insured is largely in excess of such insurable interest, it tends to prove that the insurance was procured for mere purposes of speculation, and if such is the fact, there can be no recovery on the policy. Ibid. 35.

17. Facts only tending to prove an insurable interest shouid not be declared by the court to constitute such interest. A son continued to reside with his father for several years after he became of age, and worked for him, for which he eceived no compensation, and also made valuable improvements upon a piece of land, upon a well grounded expec. tation that his father would give him the land, and the father disposed of the land, and paid him no compensation for such improvements: Held, that these facts were no more than evidence tending to show an insur. able interest in the son in his father's life, and should not be declared by the court, in instructions to the jury, to constitute an insurable interest. Ibid. 35.

18. Evidence of amount of premium paid on former policy, in a suit on a substitued policy. In a suit brought upon a policy of life insur. ance, which contained a clause that, if the death of the assured should be caused by suicide, the company should only be liable for the amount of premium paid on such insurance, and the defense set up to the suit was, that the assured had committed suicide, it was held, that it was competent for the plaintiff to prove that the policy sued on was, in fact,


a substitute for a former policy and the amount of premium paid on both policies. Guardian Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Hogan, 35.

19. Presumption (18 to manner of death of party whose life is insurel. In a suit on a policy of life insurance, where there is the occurrence of death, and no evidence as to the cause, the presumption is that it was from natural causes, and not an act of self-destruction, and so it is where the evidence as to whether it was by suicide or not, is equally balanced, but no such presumption arises merely from the fact that, under the evidence, there may be doubt as to whether the death was caused by suicide. Ibid. 35.

20. Where the defense in a suit upon a policy of life insurance is, that the death of the assured was produced by self-destruction, the ques. tion should be fairly submitted to the jury, and be decided by them upon a preponderance of the evidence, and it is error to tell them wiat, if the evidence leaves the matter in doubt, the presumption is, that the death was produced by natural causes, and not by self-destruction. Ibid. 35.

21. Waiver of condition for forfeiture. A condition in a policy of life insurance, that it shall be void if the annual premium is not paid on or before the time specified, by being one for the benefit of the insurance company, may be waived by it, and if waived, the policy will not become void on non-payment at the day specified, and may be enforced. Chicago Life Insurance Co. v. Warner, 410.

22. When company estopped from insisting on forfeiture. If the practice of an insurance company, and its course of dealing with the insured, and others known to be insured, has been such as to induce a belief that so much of the contract as provides for a forfeiture in a cer. tain event, will not be insisted on, the company will not be allowed to set up such forfeiture as against one in whom their conduct has induced such belief. Ibid. 410.

23. Where a policy of life insurance required payment of the annual premium on June 28th, of each year of the life of the insured, and provided for a forfeiture in case of non-payment on or before the day named, and on June 1 the insured was notified that he would be entitled to a dividend of $6.40, on the 28th, and the insured died on the 29th, without payment being made of the balance of the annual premium, and on July 2 the company wrote the insured that the premium fell due on the 28th, and if he wished to continue the policy, to remit the amount thereof by return mail: Held, that this showed that no forfeiture had been declared up to that time, and was a waiver of the forfeiture, and the balance of the premium being tendered in a few days after this notice, the company was liable on the policy. Ibid. 410.

24. Dividend-of its application. Where a dividend is declared in favor of one whose life is insured, the same payable at the same time with the next annual premium, if the premium is not paid, the com


pany will have the right to apply such dividend in part payment of the
premium, but not to add the same to the amount of the policy, without
the express assent of the assured. The fact that the company give
notice that it would be so applied, unless directed otherwise, and no
direction was given, will not amount to an assent to make such addition.
Such dividend, in the absence of an express agreement to the contrary,
will be treated as a payment on the premium. Chicago Life Insurance

Co. v. Warner, 410.

Right of tenant to insurance paid landlord. Sce LANDLORD AND



1. On loss under insurance policy. A policy of insurance being a
contract to pay money at a certain time after a loss, it is proper to allow
interest on the same from the time it becomes payable. Knickerbocker
Insurance Co. v. Gould et al. 388.

2. On judgment condemning landwhen interest not allowed. Sce

3. On decree or judgment. Under the statute, judgments and decrees
can only draw six per cent interest, and a decree which provides that
sum found due shall bear ten per cent interest until paid, is erroneous
to the extent of the difference between six and ten per cent interest.
Hans et al. v. Chicago Building Society, 248. See, also, DIVORCE AND


4. When there is no payments. In rendering a decree for the amount
due on a promissory note, it is error to compute interest on the note to
the time of its maturity and add it to the principal, and then compute
interest on the gross amount from the maturity of the note to the time
of rendering the decree. The proper mode of computing interest is,
when there have been no payments, to compute from the time the note
begins to draw interest up to the time of rendering the decree. Barker

et al. v. Internitional Bank of Chicago, 96.


42_80TH ILL.

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