Opinion of the Court. by the court in the decree, and it is admitted by this demurrer, that it. in fact, issued from the Municipal Court, it being so alleged in appellants' bill of complaint. It is argued, however, by appellees, if the fact be so, and that the sale to Gardner under this writ was absolutely void, and that by operation of law the legal title to the land vested in Harris as assignee, appellants' case would not be aided, so long as this Cornell and Fellows decree stands. Counsel must mean Miller, as he was the assignee of Harris, he. Harris. not claiming, at any time, as assignee of any one. On this proposition lies the difficulty. The object of the bill of complaint of appellants, among others, is to impeach this decree as having been obtained by fraud and by perjured testimony. The bill on which the decree was based was filed by the complainants therein as holders by regular conveyance of the title of Gardner, acquired by him under this sale, and in order to compel the execution of a deed by the sheriff on Gardner's certificate of sale, and to induce the court to decree as prayed, complainants falsely alleged in their bill that the execution on which the sale was made to Gardner issued from the circuit court. No defense was made to the bill. Harris himself was a non-resident, and had been for years, and had no other notice of the proceeding than such as is effected by publication. All the defendants were defaulted, and a reference made to the master to take proofs of the matters alleged in the bill. Among the proofs taken by the master was the testimony of one Julius Mulvey, a witness produced by complainants, who testified he had carefully examined the records of the title to the land in controversy, and, so far as record thereof can be found in the recorder's office of Cook county, that there is no record in that office of any conveyance of this land to Benjamin Harris, or any right or interest in Harris in the premises. This testimony was taken by the master on the 12th day of June, 1855, in presence of complainants, and on Opinion of the Court. which the master in chancery reported to the court that said Benjamin Harris had no title of record to the said parcel of land, and that his mortgage to Kercheval should be declared null and void as to the parties holding the title of record. The court decreed in all things in substantial conformity with the master's report, there being no person present to except to it. This false testimony, added to the false allegation in their bill, secured the decree in their favor. We say the testimony of Mulvey was false, for the fact is not denied that a deed of conveyance for these premises from Noble to Harris was on record in the recorder's office of Cook county on the first day of August, 1837, nearly twenty years before he testified, and was on record at the time he testified. But it is said Harris was a party to these proceedings, and it was in his power to prevent the decree, by proper proofs on his part, and it is now too late for him or his heirs to contest this decree. Here is the important point in the case. The rule is well settled, that a party to a decree in chancery or to a judgment at law is concluded by the decree or judgment. Another rule is. that all parties whose interests may be affected, and those only, can be parties to judicial proceedings at law or in chancery. In this sense, was Harris a party to these proceedings? We are inclined to the opinion he was not, and if not, his heirs or privies are not affected by it. It is admitted by the pleadings that, in 1841, whilst the Bankrupt Act of that year was in force, some fourteen years before the Cornell and Fellows bill was filed, Harris had been adjudicated a bankrupt, and one Cyrus F. Miller appointed his assignee, in whom all Harris' estate, real and personal, vested, by operation of that law. From that day thenceforth Harris was as a dead man, so far as property rights were concerned, another owner appearing in the person of his legal representative, his assignee, Miller. Harris being dead to all possessions, he had not the capacity to be a party to any proceeding touching the same. He could not bring an action Opinion of the Court. for any interest he may have had in property prior to the adjudication and the appointment of an assignee, nor could he be made a party to defend such property. This being so, Harris was not, in legal contemplation, a party to the Cornell and Fellows proceedings and decree. The Bankrupt Act, proprio vigore, divested the bankrupt of all his property rights, and vested them in the assignee, who thenceforth held the absolute title to it, and no principle is better settled than this, that a party holding the legal title to property which is made the subject of judicial investigation, is a necessary and an indispensable party to such proceedings. If he is not, no decree which may be passed affecting such property can bind him. No citations of authority are necessary on this point. It is so self-evident as to require neither argument nor authority to sustain it. It is urged by appellees, that Harris could have taken advantage of this defect in the Cornell proceedings, at the proper time, by plea or otherwise, but as he was not a party to the proceedings, for the reasons we have given nothing can be urged against him for non-action on his part. It is somewhat singular, and worthy of note and comment, that the party having the legal title to this land was a resident within the jurisdiction of the court at the time the bill of Cornell and Fellows was filed, and amenable to the process of the court, and he was not made a party, whilst Harris, who had no interest, and was non-resident, was made a party. It is no answer, to say Miller's rights as assignee were unknown to the complainants, for the records of the District Court in which the adjudication in bankruptcy was had, and by which Miller's rights arose, were open public records, and notice to all the world. We have said, by this adjudication the title of Harris to this land became vested in Miller, but it is denied that Harris had title at any time. Here, dates are of importance. Noble's deed to Harris bears date October 6, 1836. On that day Harris had all the 5-80TH ILL. Opinion of the Court. title Noble had, and his title is not disputed, for appellees • claim through and under Noble. How was Harris deprived of that title? It is answered, before he recorded his deed from Noble, which he did not do until August 1, 1837, Gardner obtained a judgment against Noble on the 7th of July preceding. This judgment would be a lien for seven years, had Gardner sued out an execution within one year after the rendition of the judgment. This he did not do, and did not sue out his execution until the 5th of February, 1840, nearly three years thereafter. In the interval, on August 1, 1837, Harris placed his deed on record, and he became vested with a legal recorded title. By not suing out the execution within the year, Gardner lost his lien, and Harris' title became impreg nable. This principle is fully established in Fitts et al. v. Davis et al. 42 Ill. 391, and again affirmed in Eames v. The Germania Turn Verein, decided at Sept. T. 1874. As between Harris and Gardner, the title of Harris was paramount. His deed was on record August 1, 1837. These are the facts as they appear in the record. yet, in 1855, when Cornell and Fellows exhibited their bill of complaint, they alleged therein that the execution on Gardner's judgment was issued from the circuit court of Cook county, and after reference to the master to take proofs, a witness was produced by them, who testified he had examined the records of Cook county, and no deed was on record conveying any interest in this land from Noble to Harris, when, in truth and in fact, it had been on the records nearly eighteen years, and was then on record. It was on this allegation and this false testimony the court passed the decree. Can there be any doubt the court was imposed upon? Can it be supposed the court would have passed such a decrec. had it known the writ was issued out of the office of a defunct court, and would it have held Harris had no title, if it had been informed his deed was on record, and had been near eighteen years? It is not possible. It seems to us the case Opinion of the Court. is fully within the principles of McConnel v. Gibson et al. 12 Ill. 128. There is another fact of which the court was not advised, in the Cornell and Fellows proceedings, and it was important-that is, that Harris had been adjudicated a bankrupt, and his estate, of which this tract of land was part, had vested in an assignee, and that assignee not a party to the proceedings. This bill seeks to impeach the Cornell and Fellows decree, for fraud, and the facts constituting the fraud being admitted by the defendants, and well stated in the bill, the court should not have dismissed the bill, but retained it for an answer. It may be, all these charges can be satisfactorily explained, but, as the case now stands, they are admitted to be true, and being true, appellants are entitled to a decree. But it is said, in argument, they have been guilty of laches; they have delayed too long now to gain the favorable ear of a court of equity. That question is usually presented by answer, and will not be discussed now. It may be remarked, however, that Cornell and Fellows did not take any steps to perfect. their title until nearly or quite thirteen years had elapsed after Gardner's purchase at sheriff's sale, and there is no allegation or proof on either side that actual possession has been taken of the premises, or any expenditure of money thereon in improvements or otherwise. There are no such facts alleged in the Cornell and Fellows bill. We will barely remark, on the other point, that Miller is now, the debts of the bankrupt being outlawed, a naked trustee for appellants; that this principle seems to have been settled by this court at the September term, 1875, in the case of Hardin v. Osborn, where it was held the purposes of the trust having been accomplished, the owner of the trust became, by operation of law, reinvested with the legal title, and could sue in ejectment. We have not designed to go fully into the merits of all the |