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SUIT BY WIFE FOR DAMAGES.
1. Evidence on question of damages. In a suit by a wife against one
for causing the intoxication of her husband in whole or in part, is
bearing on the question of damages, it is proper for the plaintiff to show
any want of, and inability of her husband to obtain employment in
consequence of his previous habits of intoxication, caused by the sie-
fendant's acts. But proof of the husband's desire for intoxicating
liquor after his recovery from insanity, should not be admitted. Roth
v. Eppy, 283.
2. Evidence in mitigation of damages. In such a suit, proof of the
husband and wife drinking together, is proper in mitigation of exem-
plary damages, but where other proof of the same character is aclmit-
ted, the exclusion of such evidence will not be a fatal error. Ibid. 283.
3. License no defense in civil suit for damages. In a suit by a wife
to recover damages for the sale of intoxicating liquors to her husband,
the defendant's license to sell such liquors is not admissible in evi-
dence on the defense. Ibid. 283.
4. Liability for selling. The statute gives a right of action to any
one who shall be injured in person, or property or means of support,
in consequence of the intoxication, habitual or otherwise, of any per-
son, and the party causing such intoxication, in whole or in part, can
not escape liability because he may not reasonably have foreseen the
consequences. Ibid. 283.
JOINDER OF COUNTS.
OF TRESPASS AND CASE. See PLEADING, 9.
ON CONDEMNATION OF LAND.
Its effect, interest and execution. See RIGHT OF WAY, 5.
Not binding on stranger. See ATTACHMENTS, 2; REPLEVIN, 1,2.
IN FORCIBLE DETAINER.
When binding on sub-tenant. See FORCIBLE DETAINER, 1.
IN CRIMINAL CASES.
Conviction on several counts. See CRIMINAL LAW,1.
OF MEANING OF INITIALS.
In description of land. Sce DESCRIPTION, 3.
1. Not affecting jurisdiction. No principle of law is better settled
than that, wliere a court has jurisdiction of the subject matter and of
JUDICIAL SALES. IRREGULARITIES. Continued.
the persons of the parties, its judgment or decree, when questioned col.
laterally, will be held valid, and, notwithstanding the court may have
proceeded irregularly, a purchaser in good faith under its judgment or
decree will be protected. Harris v. Lester et al. 307.
2. If the court ordering a sale of real estate has jurisdiction of the
subject matter and of the parties, no mere errors can have any effect
upon the sale, or the title under it. Until reversed, the decree confers
power 10 sell and pass the title, if there was jurisdiction, however erro-
ncous the decree may be. Wing et al. v. Dodge et al. 564.
SALE OF GUARDIAN BY AN AGENT.
3. Wbere the sale of real estate by a foreign guardian of an insane
person is made through an agent, the guardian not being present mal-
ing or directing it, and the guardian adopts the act of her agent, and
the court approves the sale, there being no exceptions on this account,
and the sale is fairly made and for a good price, it will be binding on
the purchaser, and it is doubled whether the sale could be impeached
in a direct proceeding. Ibid. 564.
FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION.
4. No cause for setting sale aside. If the crier of a judicial sale of
real estate on behalf of the guardian of an insane person states publicly,
at the sale, that the guardian will pay certain assessments on the prop-
erty, which is not done, this will furnish no ground to set aside the
sale by the purchaser, or furnish any ground of equitable relief. His
remedy, if any, is at law, for a failure of consideration, when sued on
his notes for the purchase money. Ibid. 564.
5. Where the court ordering sale of real estate has jurisdiction of
the subject matter and of the proper parties, even if the proceedings are
irregular and erroneous, the purchaser can not avoid the sale, as the
doctrine of careut emptor applies in all judicial sales. Ibid. 564.
FINDING OF COURT AS TO FACTS CONSTITUTING.
1. Effect of, in collateral proceeding. In all collateral proceedings,
the finding of the court that the defendants were duly notified by pub-
lication, will be sufficient evidence of that fact, unless the record shows
something to the contrary. Harris v. Lester et al. 307.
2. Presumption. It will be presumed that any court, in the absence
of competent evidence to the contrary, before adjudicating upon the
rights of litigants, heard evidence, and was satisfied, in some legitimate
mode, that the defendants were duly notified according to law. Ibid. 307.
OF CIRCUIT COURT.
3. Generally. Circuit courts in this State have general jurisdiction
of all cases at law and in equity, without regard to the origin of the
right or source of title. Isett v. Stuart, 404.
JURISDICTION. OF CIRCUIT COURT. Continued.
4. Of cases arising under Bankrupt Act. The State courts have
jurisdiction to aid in the enforcement of the bankrupt laws of the
United States, and may set aside a conveyance or mortgage made fraud.
ulent by such laws, at the suit of the assignee in bankruptcy. Isett v.
5. Under acts of Congress. In cases affecting the rights of individ.
uals under the laws relating to the sale of the public lands, the laws
relating to patents and copyrights, and in many other cases determin.
ing the ownership of property or rights under contracts, it is indispen.
sable that the State courts shall ascertain and determine what the rights
of the parties are, as defined by the acts of Congress under which they
originate. Ibid. 404.
OF COURTS OF EQUITY. See CHANCERY, 4, 5, 6.
OF COUNTY COURT. See COUNTY COURT, 1 to 4.
MODE OF IMPANNELING.
1. Right to twelve in box. Neither party can be required to examine
jurors touching their qualification, unless there are twelve jurors in the
box. It is not sufficient that there are twelve jurors called into the box
in the first instance. If the plaintiff, on examination of the jurors,
reduce the number in the box, by challenge, to less than twelve, the
defendant is entitled to have the number of twelve in the box before he
examines them. Sterling Bridge Co. v. Pearl, 251.
2. Passing on in parcels of four. The plaintiff is not, however, re-
quired to pass upon the entire panel of twelve before the defendant is
called upon to pass upon any of them, but each panel of four must be
accepted by both parties before calling up another; but there must be,
when either party requires it, cluring all the time the jury is being im-
panneled, twelve jurymen in the box; hence, when one is challenged,
before proceeding further another must be called in the box; and then
from those in the box another must be added to the panel of four being
passed upon. When the panel of four is accepted by both parties, they
become a part of the jury, and a panel of four more is called up and
the same process repeated. Ibid. 251.
AS A DEFENSE IN EQUITY.
To bill to rescind contract. See CHANCERY, 10, 11.
In case of secret trust. See TRUSTS, 3, 4.
LANDLORD AND TENANT.
WHETIIER TIE RELATION EXISTS.
1. Payment of rent. Where a party in possession of a room pays rent
to the plaintiff at the end of a quarter, this will afford evidence of the
LANDLORD AND TENANT.
WHETHER THE RELATION EXISTS. Continued.
relation of landlord and tenant, and warrant a tinding of his liability
to pay rent to the plaintiff as long as he occupies the premises. Voigt
v. Resor, 3:1.
WHO LIABLE TO PAY RENT.
2. A party in possession of a room under a lease purporting to be
made by a third person to the plaintiff's ancestor, with an assignment
by such third person to him, can not be held liable for rent under the
lease. Ibid. 331.
DESTRUCTION OF LEASED PREMISES.
3. As to duty of lessor to contribute to expense of rebuilding after loss
by fire. Where leased premises were destroyed by fire during the term,
the lessce having covenanted to yield possession in the same condition
he received the same, and, being about to rebuild, the lessor promised
to pay him, as the work progresserl, a sum equal to the insurance re-
ceived thereon, provided the work should be done under the supervision
of a particular architect, and the new building should exceed in value
the old one by that sum, he will be uncler no obligation to pay the sum
agreed unless the conditions have been complied with in all substantial
respects. Ely v. Ely et al. 532.
4. Legal effect of covenant in lease. The legal effect of a covenant in
a lease by the lessce to keep the demised building in repair at his own
expense, and to deliver it up at the end of his term in as good order and
condition as when he received it, without any exemption of loss by fire,
is, that in case the building is burned, the lessee will rebuild the same,
and such loss will not even stop the rent until the building is repiaced.
As TO INSURANCE MONEY.
5. Who entitled to it. Where a tenant, by the covenants in his lease,
is bound to rebuild in case of loss by fire, and the landlord's wife, as
owner of the property, insures the same, and the tenant refuses to pay
the premium, and after a loss by fire voluntarily rebuilds, he will not
have any contribution by the lessor, or have any claim, legal or equit.
able, to the insurance money, or any part thereof. Ibid. 532.
LICENSE TO RE-ENTER BY LANDLORD.
6. By agreement in lease. Where a lease contains a license to the
landlord, his agent, attorney or assigns, to enter into possession of the
leased premises with or without process of law, and expei and remove
the tenant or any other person occupying the premises, and to use such
force as may be necessary in so doing, and to regain and repossess the
premises, in case the tenant holds over, the landlord may enter and re-
more the tenant therefrom ifter the expiration of the term of the lease,
using no unnecessary force for the purpose, :und the tenant can not main-
tain an action of trespass therefor against him. Fabri v. Bryan et al.
LANDLORD AND TENANT.
LICENSE TO RE-ENTER BY LANDLORD. Continued.
7. Cumulative remedy. In such case the fact that the landlord bad
instituted an action of forcible detainer against his tenant would not
operate to deprive the former of his right to make entry under the
agreement in the lease. He had a right to resort to either or both reme-
dies at the same time. Fabri v. Bryan et al. 182.
A8 to duty to rebuild. See LANDLORD AND TENANT, 3, 4.
NO DEFENSE IN CIVIL SUIT FOR SELLING LIQUOR TO PARTY.
ICATING LIQUORS, 3.
1. A judgment is a lien upon real estate for seven years, provided an
execution is issued upon it within a year, but not otherwise. Harris
et al. v. Cornell et al. 54.
2. Where a party obtained a judgment in 1837, but had no execution
issued until 1840, and in the meantime a purchaser from the judgment
debtor had put a deed for the land purchased by him on record, the
title of such purchaser was unaffected by the judgment or execution.
3. Decree against husband for wife's debts. Where labor is per.
formed and materials furnished for a married woman in erecting a
building upon her real estate, it is erroneous to render a personal decree
against her husband for the payment of the debt, although it may ap-
pear he has some interest in the premises. Greenleaf et al. v. Beebe et
4. When husband a proper party to proceeding against his wife. See
5. How created. A vendor's lien in equity is created by operation of
law, even though the vendor does not know that such lien exists when
he parts with the title to land, without any other security for the pay-
ment of the purchase money. Mosier. Admr. v. Meek et al. 79.
6. Any act or declaration of the vendor which shows he does not
rely upon the lien, or has abandoned it, operates to prevent its attach-
ing, or to destroy it. Ibid. 79.
7. How lost. If the vendor transfers the notes taken for the purchase
money, he is regarded as having received his pay, and the lien is gone