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SOUTH PARK. DEFENSES AFTER CONFIRMATION. Continued.
lic. That objection must be made before the assessment is confirmed,
where the party has notice of the application for confirmation. Lehmet
v. The People ex rel. etc. 601.
OF A NEW ASSESSMENT.
4. To cure defects in former one. Where a special assessment is
held invalid on account of the ordinance under which it is made, it
being illegal, the defect can not be cured or remedied by making a new
assessment and report under the invalid ordinance. City of Chicago v.
SOUTH PARK ASSESSMENTS.
6. Confirmation conclusive. Where the park commissioners of South
Park, under the requirement of the law, made an assessinent upon
property contiguous to the park, for benefits, and returned the same to
the circuit court, where the same was found to be valid, and confirmed,
and divided into yearly installments, on application for judgment for
the third yearly installment, it was held, that the confirmation of the
assessment by the circuit court was res adjudicata as to the validity and
legality of the assessment and levy, and precluded a reinvestigation of
the matters so decided. The People ex rel. v. Brislin, 423.
6. Interest of parties making. Where, by law, interested parties are
constituted a tribunal to make special assessments of benefits for a pro-
posed public park, the assessments made by them can not be invalidated
by their interest, as the law qualifies them to act. Ibid. 423.
Officer to apply for judgment on. See TAXES AND TAXATION, 10.
SPECIAL VERDICTS. See VERDICTS, 1.
To enforce acts of Congr888. See JURISDICTION, 5.
OF THEIR PASSAGE.
1. Constitutionality with respect to title. The act entitled "An act to
enable the corporate authorities of two or more towns, for park pur-
poses, to issue bonds,” etc., is not in violation of section 13 of article 4 of
the constitution, as embracing more than one subject, or matters not
expressed in its title. The body of the act is germane to the title of the
bill. The People ex rel. v. Brislin, 423.
2. Relating to sale of estates of lunatics, etc. The act of 1853, au-
thorizing the sale of the real estate of any idiot, lunatic or distracted
person, for certain specified purposes, has no reference whatever to non-
resident owners. It applies only to cases where the idiot, lunatic or
STATUTES. STATUTES CONSTRUED. Continued.
distracted person and his conservator reside in this State. Sales by non-
resident conservators are authorized by the act of 1865. Wing et al. v.
Dodge et al. 564.
3. School law of 1872. See SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL LANDS, 3
4. Laying out highways. See HIGHWAYS, 1, 2.
REPEAL OF STATUTES.
5. Effect on right of action. Under the revision of 1874, no new law
shall be construed to repeal a former one, whether such former one is
expressly repealed or not, as to any offense committed against the former
law, or as to any act done, or any right accrued or claim arising under
the former law. The revision of the Liquor Law in 1874 does not take
away any right of action accrued under the act of 1872 on the subject.
Roth v. Eppy, 283.
WHEN NOT NECESSARY TO BE CALLED.
TO STOCK OF CORPORATION.
1. Whether a subscription or security for a loan. Where a contract with
an insurance company recites an absolute agreement "to subscribe for and
purchase 5500 shares of the capital stock” of the company, and to pay
therefor to the company $550,000 in certain installments, and provides
that the subscription and purchase shall be made in ten days, and gives
the subscriber the option to have the company resell or repurchase the
stock within a given time, and under the agreement the subscription
was made and certificate of stock issued, it was held, that this was an
actual subscription, and that the shares were not taken as collateral
security for a loan. The option in such case is a right secured by the
contract above, and in addition to the absolute title to the stock. Mel-
vin et al. v. Lamar Insurance Co. et al. 446.
2. Right to cancel the same as against other stockholders. Where a
subscription is made to an insurance company to a large amount, and
twenty per cent paid in to enable the company to procure the Auditor's
certificate, but under a contract giving the subscriber the right to with.
draw the sum so paid in and have the subscription canceled, and other
large subscriptions are afterwards made to the capital stock by parties,
without actual notice of the contract, and believing the subscription to
be a permanent one, it was held, that such subscription could not be
canceled and the money paid thereon withdrawn, without the knowl-
edge and consent of those subscribing on the faith of it. Ibid. 446.
3. Presumption in respect to. All subscriptions are presumed to be
upon the same basis, and all shares entitled to the same benefits and
subject to the same burdens, and in the subscription of each person
SUBSCRIPTION. TO STOCK OF CORPORATION. Continued.
every other subscriber has a direct interest, and a right to have the same
remain and contribute in future burdens. Melvin et al. v. Lamar 112-
surance Co. et al. 446.
4. Agreement for withdrawal, fraudulent. A subscription to the cap-
ital stock of a corporation of a large amount, coupled with a righis
under a separate contract, to surrender the certificate of stock, and take
back the money paid therefor, and cancel the subscription, is a frau
upon the other subscribers, and such agreement will be treated as voiu,
and the party so subscribing held to all the responsibilities of a bona fiile
subscriber. Ibid. 446.
5. Release of, not allowed. The subscribed capital stock of a corpo-
ration, as well as its other property, is a trust fund for the bencfit of
creditors, and a subscriber can not be released from his obligation to
pay, to the prejudice of creditors or of any other stockholder. Ibid. 416.
6. Stockholders not bound to take notice of contract limiting and qual-
ifying absolute subscription. Where a certificate of stock is issued,
unaccompanied with any evidence of a condition, and the books of the
company show the stock to be bona fide and absolute, other subscribers
will have the right to rely on what thus appears as being true, and are
not bound to go back and take notice of an antecedent individual con-
tract existing between the directors and the takers of such shares, anıl
it seems that even if such contract is spread upon the record, it affords
no notice to other stockholders. Ibid. 446.
7. Remedy by stockholders 118 against another who is wrongfully re
leased. Where a stockholder in a corporation, under a prior contract
to his subscription, is allowed by the directory to surrender his stock,
and take back the assessments paid by him, in fraud of the other stock.
holders, any such stockholder so injured may, by bill in equity, hare
the money so withdrawn refunded, and the stockholder so withdrawing
declared liable on his subscription, in any and all assessments, the same
as other subscribers. Ibid. 446.
SUPERIOR COURT OF COOK COUNTY.
BRANCII IIELD BY CIRCUIT JUDGE.
1. There is no objection to one of the circuit judges of the State
holding a branch of the Superior Court of Cook county, and that more
than three branches thereof are held at the same time. Wadhams v.
PRACTICALLY SAME AS CIRCUIT COURT. See REPLEVIN, 2.
ON OFFICIAL BOND.
1. Continues during term of office. When the term of office of an offi.
cer is fixed by law at two years, and the record shows that the office was
filled by appointment at the time when, by law, the term would expire, it
SURETY. ON OFFICIAL BOND. Continued.
is conclusive that the appointment was for two years from that date, and
the sureties on the bond of the officer so appointed will be liable for his
acts during the full term of two years from the date of his appoint-
ment. Ladd et al. v. Board of Trustees, etc. 233.
MISREPRESENTATION OF PRINCIPAL TO SURETY.
2. At time of executing, no defense to suit. Where parties become
sureties on the bond of a township treasurer appointed at the time when
that office becomes vacant by limitation, they will be liable for the full
term for which he is appointed, and will not be permitted to defend
against such bond on account of any representations the principal may
have made to them in regard to the object or purpose of it at the time
it was executed. Ibid. 233.
PROPERTY PLEDGED BY PRINCIPAL.
3. Rights of surety. It is a well settled principle in equity, that a
creditor who has the personal contract of his debtor, with a surety, and
takes property from the principal as a pledge or security for his debt,
should hold the property for the benefit of the surety as well as him.
self, and if he parts with it without the knowledge or against the will
of the surety, he shall lose his claim against the surety to the amount
of the property so surrendered. Property so taken by the creditor is
taken and held in trust, not only for the creditor's security, but for the
surety's indemnity. And these rules of equity are recognized and
enforced in courts of law. Kirkpatrick v. Houck, 122.
4. A party signed a note, as surety, with the principal, and delivered
it to the principal, with authority to insert the name of a payee in a blank
left in the note for that purpose. The principal borrowed of the plaintiff
the amount of money the note called for, and inserted his name therein
as payce, and delivered the note to him, and at the same time, its addi.
tional security for the money, delivered, in pledge, a colt worth $100.
The colt was afterwards delivered up by the payee of the note to the
principal: IIeld, in a suit brought on the note, against the
the plaintiff could only recover the balance due on the note after deduct-
ing the value of the colt. Ibid. 122.
DECLARATIONS OF PRINCIPAL.
As evidence against surety. See EVIDENCE, 9, 10.
TAXES AND TAXATION.
ACT OF 1872.
1. Repeals all prior conflicting laws. The General Revenue Act of
1872 necessarily worked a repeal of all prior conflicting laws, whether
found in general acts or special city charters. Law v. The People ex rel.
POWER OF LEGISLATU'RE TO EXEMPT FROM.
2. Under constitution of 1848. It was not competent for the Gen-
eral Assembly, under the constitution of 1848, to exempt from taxation
TAXES AND TAXATION.
POWER OF LEGISLATUTE TO EXEMPT FROM. Continued.
property owned by educational, religious or charitable corporations,
which was not itself used directly in aid of the purposes for which the
corporations were created, but which was held for profit merely,
although the profits were to be devoted to the proper purposes of the
corporation. Northwestern University v. The People ex rel. 333.
SCHOOL PROPERTY NOT TAXABLE.
3. As the State is prohibited from appropriating any of this fund to
defray the expenses of the State, counties or other municipal bodies than
those created for public school purposes, it can not do the same by the
indirect means of taxation. City of Chicago v. The People ex rel. etc. 384.
4. Where moneys belonging to the school fund are loaned on mort-
gage security, and the title to real estate is acquired on foreclosure, and
is held for school purposes only, the legislature has not the constitu-
tional power to tax the same, although the legal title may be held in
the name of a city which is entrusted with the fund and the public
schools within its limits. Ibid. 384.
5. Real estate acquired on foreclosure of mortgages given to secure
the re-payment of school moneys loaned, in fact belongs to the State, in
trust for school purposes, and, under the Revenue Law of 1874 (section
2), is exempted from taxation. Ibid. 384.
6. By whom to be sworn to. Under the General Revenue Law of
1872, the county collector is the proper party to make the affidavit to
the return of a delinquent special assessment, and his return, prop-
erly sworn to by him, is not invalidated because other officers have also
attached their affidavits thereto. Law v. The People ex rel. 268.
ROAD AND BRIDGE TAX.
7. Application on prior indebtedness. The road and bridge tax
levied for any given year is legally applicable in payment for labor
performed and expenditures made on the roads and bridges during that
fiscal year, and can not rightfully be applied to any other purpose, even
to the payment of prior indebtedness. Commissioners of Highways v.
Newell et al. 587.
8. Where the commissioners of highways, in 1874, levied tax of
forty cents on the $100 worth of taxable property, which amounted to
$1782.39, there being a prior indebtedness of $1600 unpaid, and during
the year and before the tax was collected, contracted for the erection of
piers for a bridge, it was held, that they had the legal authority to make
such contract and pay the contractor out of the tax levied, when col.
lected, without reference to the prior indebtedness. Ibid. 587.
9. Power of commissioners of highways to lery. See HIGHWAYS,
mi to 11.