gram. I think it is fair to state that I have heard the testimony of every witness who has appeared throughout all those years on this program. And it is my conviction that there has not been evidence presented of any material injury that has been done to any American industry under the reciprocal trade agreements program.

However, it has never been enough just to have agreement on tariff rates, because there are other forms of trade barriers, such as quotas, preferences, complicated customs regulations, and other interferences with trade such as subsidies, State trading, and many others. There has also been a great need for an orderly method of taking over and solving trade problems by consultation rather than by economic warfare. The idea of an International Trade Organization was advanced on February 21, 1919, by the Honorable Cordell Hull who was then serving as a Member of the House of Representatives. It was my privilege to serve with Mr. Hull in the House of Representatives before he went to the Senate.

Speaking in the House of Representatives on that date, Mr. Hull said, among other things, this:

We have seen practiced with impunity all forms of tariff discrimination and retaliation; preferential right of entry of ports; violations of the open door; discriminating embargoes or restrictions; seizure of patents, copyrights, trademarks, trade brands; wrongful interference with trade routes; unfair utilization of bounties, bonuses, subsidies, draw-backs and rebates; the economic and financial violation of a territory of small, uncivilized, or backward nations; tonnage and shipping discriminations; economic alliances; trade concessions; and other preferences by special agreements.

I do not contend that all harmful, dangerous, and unfair trade practices in international commerce can be abolished by common agreement among nations. I do believe, however, that it would be most wise and feasible at this propitious time for the governments of the various nations to enter into an agreement defining what their most enlightened joint judgment would suggest with respect to the term "fair trade" and eliminating and abandoning by mutual consent the principle and more vicious devices, acts, and conduct I have described. Mr. Hull proposed at that time a permanent, workable agency; an international organization constituted for the purpose of investigating and deciding when a given set of acts are a violation of fair trade.

At Habana, the delegates of the various countries followed Mr. Hull's advice very closely. The charter the committee is considering would set up a trade organization, and acceptance of membership would obligate members to limit, modify, or abandon many of the restrictive measures they now impose on trade of others to their common advantage.

I would like to briefly mention some of the impressions gained at the Habana conference: There was naturally a great variety of opinions and needs of the different countries. There was a common realization of the importance of improving trade conditions and a common desire to get agreement on trade principles. The United States provided leadership in providing the basic draft, in suggesting solutions to problems, and in maintaining integrity of original proposals.

I have read articles saying the United States delegation was not firm enough in maintaining the United States position. I believe this is quite untrue. The United States took a very firm position and accomplished gratifying results. The experience of the influence and ability of the United States delegation to exercise leadership at Habana leaves no ground for worry about the fact that each member of the ITO will have only one vote.

I should like to mention the way the United States delegation worked:

Every morning at 9 o'clock either Mr. Clayton, chairman, or Mr. Wilcox, as vice chairman of the United States delegation, held a full meeting of all governmental and private delegates and advisers of the United States delegation, to explain the program for the day, to discuss the problems that would be encountered, and to formulate the United States position on each negotiating issue. As stated in the official report of the United States delegation, all members of the delegation and its advisers took part in these meetings in which the problems at issue were thoroughly discussed.

The United States delegation was organized in individual teams, each to negotiate one or more provisions of the charter. A team was typically composed of one delegate assisted by several members of the panel of official and nongovernmental advisers. Ten or twelve of these teams on the average were in action 6 days a week throughout the 4 months of the conference.

At the beginning of each day each team reported in the 9 o'clock meeeting of the full United States delegation concerning its activities. of the preceding day, and it received instructions for the current day. Each of the United States teams negotiated in a subcommittee established to work out those particular provisions of the charter which are composed of single negotiating teams of the other countries of the conference.

If I should be asked whether the charter obligates the United States to change procedure under the Trade Agreements Act, my answer would be clearly "No." Article 17 of the charter obligates members to negotiate, but it is specific that it does not require any member to reduce at any particular rate, that the negotiations must be on a mutually advantageous basis, that they must be on a selective, productby-product basis which allows adequate opportunity to take into account the needs of the individual countries and individual industries. I might point out that people abroad cannot earn dollars to pay for our exports unless we buy things from them, or unless we send them dollars by investment, tourists, or gifts.

Now, Mr. Chairman, in conclusion it is my conviction that the ITO Charter simply provides a code of ethics for the conduct of the commercial nations of the world to make it possible for our own businessmen to carry on trade relations with other countries of the world to the mutual advantage of our people and the people of other countries of the world.

I feel very strongly that this committee should favorably report the pending legislation.

Thank you.

Mr. CARNAHAN (presiding). Mr. Battle

Mr. BATTLE. Mr. Chairman, I do not have any questions but I would like to make a comment:

Congressman Cooper is from the State of Tennessee, which borders the great State of Alabama, so I have a very close and kindred feeling with him, but further I noticed the gentleman said he was from the Ninth District of Tennessee.

Mr. COOPER. That is right.

Mr. BATTLE. I am from the Ninth District of Alabama, so that gives me an even closer tie with the gentleman from Tennessee.

I am especially proud of this because you, Congressman Cooper, are one of the most outstanding Members not only of the Ways and Means Committee, but also of the House of Representatives. Therefore, your ideas and opinions are highly valued by me and I am sure they will be just as highly valued by this committee. I appreciate your appearance here this morning and your testimony because I believe that you have a broad picture of world affairs and a practical vision of how to bring about conditions where we can have peace in the world.

I am happy to have you with us this morning.

Mr. COOPER. Thank you. I appreciate your very kind remarks. Mr. BATTLE. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. CARNAHAN (presiding). Mr. Burleson

Mr. BURLESON. I wish to concur with the sentiments expressed by Mr. Battle. I consider Mr. Cooper one of the great statesmen of our day and time and in this Congress and place him with that other great statesman from Tennessee, the Honorable Cordell Hull. Thank you for your appearance here, Mr. Cooper.

Mr. COOPER. My friends are much too generous, but I appreciate it. Mr. CARNAHAN (presiding). Mr. Cooper, I want to join with my colleagues in saying that we really do deeply appreciate your appearance before the committee. It certainly is refreshing to have one of our own distinguishd colleagues give us his opinion of this legislation that we are considering.

We especially appreciate your explanation of the workings of the United States delegation.

If you will permit, I might say that we had a witness who appeared before the committee who gave us the notion that at the Habana meeting the document ceased to be American, and the American delegation was completely outwitted. We would just like your comment if you care to comment.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your very kind remarks. I certainly very strongly disagree with any such impression as that if it has been created here before the committee.

Mr. Chairman, the paramount and dominating thing at the entire Habana conference was the preeminent position occupied by the United States and its delegation there, headed by one of the ablest men I have ever known, Mr. Will Clayton, former Under Secretary of State and one of the outstanding businessmen of the world.

If you will permit a remark in that connection I might tell you of a little experience I had one time in the Ways and Means Committee. We were conducting hearings on one of the extensions of the reciprocal trade agreements program. Mr. Clayton was then Under Secretary of State in charge of economic affairs and appeared as a witness. He made one of the greatest witnesses I have ever had the privilege of hearing. Our good friend and former colleague, Hon. Harold Knutson, of Minnesota, who served for a brief period as chairman of the committee-but this was before that time-undertook to cross-examine Mr. Clayton. It was really interesting to observe that cross-examination. Mr. Clayton in a very courteous and polite, but yet in a very effective manner simply eliminated every argument advanced by Mr. Knutson and every point raised by him. After he finished, Mr. Knutson came over to me and said, "You know, there is a pretty big fellow." I said "Fellow, a man cannot take a stenog

rapher's notebook and run it to $100,000,000 business without having something on the ball.”

Mr. Clayton started out as a stenographer, a court reporter down in my section of Tennessee, and, of course, he is now one of the leading businessmen of the world.

I have heard him say and have heard other businessmen say, one of the great difficulties encountered by our businessmen in doing business throughout the world, is the tremendous number of restrictions they run into that are imposed by different countries of the world.

I have heard businessmen say "There is no difficulty on our part to meet competition of businessmen in other countries of the world. We can hold our own in the field of competition. But after we go there and make money, the trouble is we cannot ever get it out of there and get it back home, because of restrictions that are imposed." So I believe, Mr. Chairman, that this charter, providing a code of ethics for commercial intercourse between the people of the world is one of the most wholesome things that we could accomplish. I believe it is of tremendous importance to our people here at home as well as the people throughout the world.

I might further comment, Mr. Chairman, about the work of the United States delegation at Habana, in more direct response to your inquiry. That was the "workinest" outfit with which I was ever connected. It was a day and night grind from 7 o'clock in the morning until 11 or 12 o'clock at night.

Unfortunately, because of important matters coming up in the House, I was unable to stay there the entire time, but I stayed there 3 weeks and worked 7 days a week in the entire time.

We would attend these 9 o'clock meetings every morning, made up of the entire United States delegation. All of the delegates, the alternates, and all of the advisers and everybody there was welcome to sit in and participate in these 9 o'clock meetings. We would go over all the problems together, there, review what had been done the day before, and map out a course for that day. Then we would go to the sessions of the conference. We would then attend the various committee meetings and subcommittee meetings. It was a long and continuous process which as I say involved more hard work than almost any experience I have ever had.

I do want to once more emphasize the fact that the United States was recognized all the way through as the dominating influence of the entire conference, and the United States delegation certainly held up its part, and very ably represented the interests of this country of ours.

Mr. CARNAHAN. Of course, the entire proceedings were purely democratic?

Mr. COOPER. Absolutely. Entirely so.

Mr. CARNAHAN (presiding). We will again remind you that we certainly appreciate your appearance here.

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your courtesies very much.

Thank you.

Mr. CARNAHAN (presiding). Without objection, we will enter in the record at this point a statement of Charles A. Weil.

(The statement referred to is as follows:)

MEMORANDUM TO COMMITTEE OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE ORGANIZATION MEASURE HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION 236 IN OPPOSITION TO THE MEASURE WITHOUT RESERVATIONS RELATIVE INTERNATIONAL COMMODITY AGREEMENTS

POINT I

International commodity agreements are contrary to our foreign policy, our antitrust laws, a peril to our security: and entail reimposition of wartime import controls leading to national socialism just as the trend in other countries is away from it.

The financial page of the World Telegram of May 2 reports a proposed pregnant with serious possibilities, namely, a commodity control agreement on tin to which the United States Government is to be a party under the Habana Charter for International Trade Organization. (Let me make clear I am not interested in tin, never have bought it or used any crude tin in my business, and have ro intention of so doing.)

Under the proposed plan a council, representative of the governments of producing and consuming countries, will "estimate" the demand for tin and fix the amounts to be produced, or rather exported, by the producing countries. The council will appoint a stock manager who will buy and sell tin to consumer countries, within prices fixed as lower and upper margins, at his discretion.

This recrudescence of a prewar scheme we then protested poses questions, the answers to which should be furnished by these departments of the Federal Government most concerned, State, Commerce, and Justice now that we may become parties to such schemes. For this proposition involves effects on our foreign policy, our security (since tin is a strategic material), our import policy, and our internal fair trade policies (i. e., antitrust and analogous legislation). What I should like an authoritative answer to, are the following questions: 1. Who will determine, and by what standards, how much tin will be allowed to move to the United States and will it be at prices that do not discriminate either against the United States at large or against individual nationals of the United States who may wish to buy tin?

2. Who will determine and by what standards, how the quantitative allotment to the United States is to be divided up among American nationals, to whom, and at what prices in the event that the demand for tin within the United States exceeds the quantities the council may "estimate" to be the requirement of the United States?

In other words does this proposal spell the end of a free market in resales within the United States if the stock manager, for example, should elect to sell his tin only to end users who would not allow any of their allotments to come upon the free market?

At least in this connection, with tin, the United States Government has a voice in the council for what that may be worth, since it is almost certain to be outvoted, for the council consists of 15 members. We are with Canada, Czechoslovakia, and Italy the only members who are not, for our own account or for account of colonies, more interested in tin as producers than as consumers.

But this scheme opens up possibilities of unilateral action in which foreign raw material producer countries, without even giving us a theoretical "voice" in the amount we may be allowed to buy, the price at which we may buy, and who among our nationals may be eligible to buy, may just ram down our throat: such an invasion of our sovereignty and usurpation of powers denied to our Congress, except in time of war.

Formerly, under a different State Department, foreign nations had some respect for our policy and laws and did not make a violation of our antitrust laws a condition precedent either to our getting raw materials, or to the fulfillment of obligations to narrow the dollar gap.

Are we going to take it and then hand out more money to them for bigger and better Marshall plans?

In substance, there is nothing new to this. Prior to the war at least 39 raw materials important to our industries were under foreign cartel control. But those cartels were mostly private and could be, and were, dealt with under the antitrust laws, even in the few instances where the cartels were government owned in part, or effected by foreign government action.