ships that will dominate, we will say, most of the sea. But everywhere on land we would be impotent, and the movement from the United States to the European field would be virtually an impossibility under those conditions. So that our arming to the teeth here would merely mean that we were going to live an isolated existence in the world, militarily, economically and politically.

Mr. VORYS. Of course, General, the thought behind this-and it was expressed by a psychological warfare officer last fall-was that as we increase military strength locally in Europe we, of course, increase Soviet suspicions. To that extent we build toward a fight.

General MARSHALL. I would not say that was the correct use of the word when you say "suspicion," because that may be the propaganda reaction. But the actual reaction to them would be a very clear one as to what was going on.

They are military men and they have developed a real military staff out of their great war experiences, and leaders, who would know full well that this western Europe set-up could not carry out an aggressive policy. They would know that well.

Whether or not they would choose to have western Europe reach the position of power where it could successfully resist or not is another question. But certainly a negative procedure would not diminish the possibilities. In fact, it would increase the risk instead of lessening the risk, in my opinion.

I do not know whether I make my meaning plain or not. I assume that the Soviet Government has a very capable staff of "appreciaters" we will say. Certainly they can have a knowledge of our activities that we do not possess at all in respect to theirs. Witness this young lady here today. You do not see her American prototype in such meetings in the Soviet Union.

So there is no question of conspiracy. Everything we do is in the wide open-almost too open at times-while there it is all under cover and in a way which we cannot well penetrate.

I assume that their appreciation of the situation, which they can know in its complete details, is full and, therefore, it would be an absurdity for them to claim, except as a matter of propaganda, that this was an aggressive affair.

This could only be used in the same way as the-what did they call us warmongers, the cracks that were made by Mr. Vishinsky. A few of our people get so mad they say many drastic things, but as for going to war on our own initiative, I do not think there is anything further from the American Government's or the American public's intentions and the Soviets well know this.

Mr. VORYS. I think the Soviets know that as long as we are to be the ones to make the decision, any thought of aggressive or preventive war is just out of the question, because our people would not stand for it, but as Europe becomes stronger there might be other possibilities which would affect not merely Soviet propaganda but their military decisions.

General MARSHALL. I think that is correct; however, the other procedure of the negative course, I think, would be fatal. Then they could take away from us without a war.

Mr. VORYS. That is the situation we have been in for 5 years. I always thought the atom bomb and threat of our terrific production, once we started, was possibly the war preventive during this period.

General MARSHALL. It is a discouragement.

Mr. VORYS. But now the atom bomb part of it is somewhat eliminated, that is, as far as it being a one-sided threat. If we overextend ourselves, of course, we lessen the threat of our military power.

General MARSHALL. That is my concern, that we overextend ourselves.

Mr. JAVITS. General, would you estimate the increase of our military budget, either in order of magnitude or in dollars-it is now about 14 billion dollars-which would result from what Mr. Vorys has just described as a policy of our arming to the teeth and not doing anything about arming Europe?

General MARSHALL. You mean our present actions toward our military budget is that any indication we are arming to the teeth?

Mr. JAVITS. What I meant was: Suppose we did do just what Mr. Vorys has asked-which is hypothetical-that we arm to the teeth and did not arm Europe. How much of an increase would that mean in our 14 billion dollar defense budget?

General MARSHALL. I suppose you would get a difference of opinion from the military men and from the Bureau of the Budget.

I would say something around-well over 30 billion dollars a year. Mr. JAVITS. Infinitely greater per annum than anything we propose to do in even a 10-year program for western Europe?

General MARSHALL. Yes.

Mr. VORYS. You brought out a point which I attempted to develop last fall and was discouraged by diplomatic and military people, who felt it was not nice to say it, but I have felt that by making it possible for those in western Europe to furnish some of the manpower in our common defense we would ultimately get to a place where it was more economical for us than by arming to the teeth.

I think that is what Mr. Javits had in mind.

General MARSHALL. That is a fact. It is not only more economical but the other procedure would be wholly impractical for us.

Mr. VORYS. The diplomats said, "You mustn't even mention that because it will be used as propaganda."

General MARSHALL. It would be.

Mr. VORYS. We would be charged with asking for cannon fodder. But I have always felt that when you give people a chance to defend their own soil as part of a common security goal you are not asking anything of them that you are not going to do yourself, and that there is not much value to that sort of propaganda.

Mr. JUDD. Can it not therefore be said, as some of us have repeteadly said, that in dealing both with the economic recovery legislation and this mutual defense assistance program last year, we can make out a case that this is not costing the taxpayer a nickel in the sense that if we reject this program he is not going to save any money? It is going to cost him more money for the increased burden that will inevitably fall upon him for our own economy here at home. Cannot that statement be made?

General MARSHALL. I think that is a fact.

Mr. JUDD. So, as much as it may cost, our choice is not between that cost and something less, but between that and something more? General MARSHALL. That is why I say we must be coldly calculating in how we do this, and not be led into waves of feeling about this and that, because we have always to consider, to protect our greatest strength, which is our economy.

When I say "greatest strength," of course, there are our fundamental liberties. But we would be in a hopeless situation in the world if we too greatly weakened our economy.

Mr. VORYS. On the other hand, autarchy, complete self-sufficiency, is frightfully expensive the way we might operate it here. Trying to have an economic and military unit here in North America that would be completely self-sufficient would run into a lot of money.

General MARSHALL. That would be so self-sufficient it would be ingrowing.

Chairman KEE. Mr. Mansfield

Mr. MANSFIELD. General, along the line of this hypothetical questioning which has taken place in response to Mr. Javit's question as to what it would cost us if we were to arm to the teeth and at the same time do nothing about rearming and rehabilitating western Europe you were asked to make a statement, and your statement was $30,000,000,000. Of course, we know it is just an estimate.

General MARSHALL. I said, "More than $30,000,000,000."

Mr. MANSFIELD. More than $30,000,000,000. My question is this: If we were not engaged in the Europen recovery program and the military assistance pact or the military assistance program, and if we were expending in excess of $30,000,000,000, or just even $30,000,000,000 in building up our own defenses, politically and economically what would be the results in this country of such a program, in your opinion?

General MARSHALL. I do not think I am the expert to answer that, sir. In the first place, it is too heavy a drain. You would have to consider the reactions of our people to such a procedure.

I do not think there would be a continuing support of such a procedure, if we were heavily militarized here at home. That requires a very expert approach, along three or four lines, in which I do not feel I am qualified to judge.

I just think the procedure in relation to world affairs, in relation to our own healthy development, is an impossible one.

Mr. MANSFIELD. In response to an observation made by Mr. Judd, it would bring a type of prosperity, but it, in my opinion, would be the most unfortunate type of prosperity, because it would be the type of prosperity Hitler had in Germany before he went to war. But it would appear to me if we were to embark upon such a program we not only would have far greater deficits in our budget requirements, but we would very likely have a regimented type of economy and a governmental system here which would react to our great disadvantage, and in the long run might bring about the very thing that we were fighting against in the beginning. That is all.

General MARSHALL. I might add one point in connection with your reference to Hitler. I think people forget that Hitler's procedure in Germany had a date line.

People remember the tremendous effect of his superior air power at the start compared to that of the British and compared to that of the French, his great superiority of material of all kinds, tanks, artillery, and special infantry weapons.

I was asked, as I recall, by a committee of Congress at about that time what it would cost the United States to carry out a program such as Hitler was then engaged in.

I took a day to answer it because I was getting estimates from various officials whom I thought could have some appreciation of a correct answer. The thought for the military program alone, before we got in the war, would be a minimum of $50,000,000,000 a year.

Now, that leads me to another observation, that one of our great difficulties in this present situation is what we do, in effect, costs us a dollar where the Soviets can get almost the same result from, we will say, 5 or 10 cents under their procedure.

That, of course, makes it extremely difficult for us, because we do not control and hold things down in the way they do, and we do not use men like kindling wood.

Mr. JAVITS. I just wanted to make clear that the $30,000,000,000 or more estimate we appreciate it is an estimate is an annual figure?

General MARSHALL. Yes.

Mr. JAVITS. And it would be recurrent?

General MARSHALL. Yes.

Chairman KEE. I think it is perfectly clear.

Mr. FULTON. May I refer to something that was brought up here as to the organization of the countries for the Far East for their development?

Chairman KEE. Briefly.

Mr. FULTON. In H. R. 5895, the original mutual defense assistance program, in the finding and the declaration of policy, it was stated:

The Congress hereby expresses itself as favoring the creation by the free countries and the free peoples of the Far East of a joint organization, consistent with the Charter of the United Nations, to establish a program of self-help and mutual cooperation designed to develop their economic and social well-being, to safeguard basic rights and liberties and to protect their security and independence. The President on January 5 in his statement had said that Formosa should be given economic help but no military help.

In this particular bill that has come up the reverse is true, because for the countries of southeast Asia we are giving them military help but the State Department has in no way acted to implement this joint organization for self-help and social well-being.

Will you explain to us why there should be the difference in policy on Formosa and the southeast Asia countries?

General MARSHALL. I cannot answer that because I have not been involved in any of the discussions at all.

Mr. FULTON. You do not see where there should be a difference? General MARSHALL. I would not express an opinion on that.

Mr. FULTON. Do you feel that Formosa is necessary for our defense in the Pacific area?

General MARSHALL. I do not want to get into a discussion of that.
Mr. FULTON. Do you think it is a factor in the defense?
General MARSHALL. I would say it is a factor in the defense.
Mr. FULTON. Thank you very much for the factor.

Mr. JUDD. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask the General this question on the basis of his experience out there. You said we could not get a positive policy in China because the situation was too big and too bad and too difficult. Now is it likely that we can find any government in southeast Asia that is going to be good enough to give us very much better prospects?

General MARSHALL. I do not know what is the result in Indonesia. I did know a little about Siam, but that little is passé already. It is a very small nation anyway.

India is in the throes of adjustment with Pakistan. I only know what I read about that.

I know more about the Philippines from my past experience. I would say the Philippine Government has a very excellent chance of finally getting its problems solved, despite its present difficulties.

I do not know enough about Indochina. That is an extraordinary situation there. It was difficult from the very start.

Mr. JUDD. It is your view that, despite those difficulties, there is still more hope in making a positive effort than there is of using those difficulties as

General MARSHALL. If you can find a reasonable basis for it there is. Mr. JUDD. Mr. Chairman, I want to get this further point on the record. General, you said that during the 2 years you were Secretary of State you tried to get from somebody a practical program for China and never could get one. You very generously listened to me for almost an hour one time in July 1947 when I submitted a five-point program.

The first point you acted on. Probably you had it in mind before I suggested it. Nothing was done about the others. Doubtless you thought they were not practical. Will you agree that the policy that was followed was not very practical either?

General MARSHALL. It was more inevitable than practical.

Mr. JUDD. It was inevitable, yes, under the policies followed. I have to add that one of the things I suggested was that a drastic change be made in the staff in the Far Eastern Division where there was a negativism which began with the assumption that nothing could be done.

My feeling was that as long as the people in charge said nothing could be done, why, of course, it could not be. They were psychologically blocked by their own defeatism.

Unfortunately, those people were kept in power, and those in the State Department who understood communism and the Soviet Union were eliminated-a good many before you came along.

You said the Soviet intentions were becoming clearer day by day, but there were experts in our State Department who have been perfectly clear about their intentions from way back, is that not true? General MARSHALL. I think so.

Mr. JUDD. And those were the men whose advice was not followed; in fact, most of them were forced out of the Department or the diplomatic service or were assigned secondary positions, and, instead, the men were kept in who said nothing could be done to save China or who said that the Soviet Union was a peace-loving democracy and would cooperate with us.

So there were errors of judgment on our side in not following the advice of those both in China and in our own Government who were quite clear as to Soviet intentions and the designs of Chinese Communists.

I hope we will discontinue following the advice of the people who say nothing can be done, and take a chance on the advice of those who believe something can be done.