TO AMEND THE MUTUAL DEFENSE ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1949 MONDAY, JUNE 26, 1950 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Washington, D. C. The committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10:40 a. m. in the Foreign Affairs Committee room, United States Capitol, Hon. John Kee (chairman) presiding. Chairman KEE. The committee will come to order. We will continue our hearings today-and incidentally this promises to be the last hearing on the military assistance program. Our witness this morning is Frederick J. Libby, executive secretary of the National Council for Prevention of War. STATEMENT OF FREDERICK J. LIBBY, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR PREVENTION OF WAR, WASHINGTON, D. C. Chairman KEE. Do you have a prepared statement, Mr. Libby? Mr. LIBBY. No, Mr. Chairman, I have a five-point summary of my case which I shall speak to. Chairman KEE. We will be very glad to have you proceed in such manner as you wish. Mr. LIBBY. First, I believe the military aid program to be a hollow fraud, deceiving ourselves, and perhaps some of our allies, but probably not the Soviet Union. We are promising protection to nations which we cannot protect from attack. Mr. Chairman, in support of this first point, I have here a variety of clippings. First of all, you will recall General Bradley told your committee last October that Russia can create a 500 division army. The headline in the New York Times of October 16 says that General Bradley reported, "Russia can do this in months and has 175 divisions now." The question that you faced at that time and which you face today with regard to the military-assistance program is, what can you do against 175 divisions in Europe, with the aid of the western European nations? Now, you have been told lately by General Bradley that it would require the conversion of the United States into an armed camp if we were to try to create a sufficient defense against Russia. This was on March 8: "Bradley sees the United States an armed camp, in any effort to match the Red Army.' 111 Mr. EATON. Would the gentleman yield for a question at that point? What is the alternative you propose under those circumstances? Mr. LIBBY. May I come to that later, Mr. Eaton? Mr. EATON. I hope you will. Mr. LIBBY. I will. Last year, you were told also that Europe can mobilize perhaps 15. divisions. And then General Bradley testified that if we had 50 or 60 divisions we could probably hold back the Red army. But General Feller published an article which one of your colleagues put into the Congressional Record, an article from Human Events for June 7, in which he points this out: What is the political object? It is officially to save Europe. But from a purely military view Soviet Russia's force poised on the edge of western Europe is insuperable. It is well known that her 200 divisions could sweep to the Pyrenees in less than 60 days. In short, Stalin has won a round in the battle of cold strategy. Then he goes on to say: An abiding fear haunts our European allies. Russia would be able to terrorize western European powers into neutrality. With the atomic bomb as a threat, Stalin could issue an ultimatum that if our allies refuse to be neutral, they will take out their cities as their first act of war. Now, General Bradley stated that he hoped to defend France from attack. The problem, however, was that France did not want to be liberated, she wanted to be defended, and that question was never answered. That question never was discussed in your committee or in the Senate Armed Services Committee: How a Maginot line could now be created east of France that would be adequate to stop Russia's divisions. We could liberate, but France does not want liberation, but wants protection and that we cannot give. The same is true in Asia, when you come to South Korea which you are discussing this morning, and very naturally. How can we protect South Korea against an attack if Russia should add her forces as we are adding ours, to the protection of Korea? To the invasion of Korea. Russia is nearer than we are, and at present it is only the Koreans themselves, apparently, communist Korea, that are attacking South Korea. But we are sending aid to the South Koreans and our only hope is that Russia will not do the same for North Korea. because if that happened there would be the beginning of a world war. And the only question would be, which country would send the more aid to the Koreans, to their side in Korea, rather. Therefore, it seems to me that our program is a fraud; we cannot protect the nations we are promising to protect, and therefore we are deceiving them and deceiving ourselves in thinking that we can. I will come back to the constructive proposal which our Government has already made, I understand, a little later under point 5. Secondly, the costs of the military aid program to the American people and to our allies alike, are prohibitive and self-defeating in direct proportion to their supposed adequacy. Now in any arms race the question of adequacy is determined by what the other fellow does. In this particular case the question is. Where will Russia decide to put pressure? If Russia puts pressure again in Greece, then we have to send aid to Greece. If Russia puts pressure in South Korea, then we are obliged to send aid to South Korea. The arms race is a very dangerous device for attempting to achieve security. I should have added a word about the new weapons that have been spoken of. Secretary Johnson, according to the New York Herald Tribune of June 7, was asked by the Joint Congressional Atomic Energy Committee, what those new weapons are, and the charge was made by one committee member that the development of new atomic weapons "is not supported by the facts." A letter asking Secretary Johnson the source of the information used by him and General Collins was sent yesterday by Senator McMahon, chairman of the committee, after a meeting of the group that was described as highly critical of the "unwarranted impressions" being given the American people. "Mr. Johnson's reply is expected to be discussed at the committee's next meeting on Friday"-that was a previous Friday. Committee members said they acted after ascertaining from the Atomic Energy Commission that the development spoken of by Secretary Johnson and General Collins was still "years in the future," and not something that would be available for anything like an immediate emergency. Another clipping said that one of the members of the committee said they were "paper and for that matter apparently tissue paper." Now, then, on this second point, the costs: I have before me some extremely significant clippings. Here is one: "Arms spending seen impeding Europe's gains." That was the report of Gunnar Myrdal, executive secretary of the United Nations Commission for Europe. He said: One of the penalties of the cold war is the growing burden of military spending "which threatens to stifle again, as it has so often in the past, the chances of economic progress in both the East and the West, by diverting resources to the manufacture of armaments and the maintenance of military forces." Mr. Paul G. Hoffman opposes using the relief fund for arming Europe. He sees such action as supporting the Russian charge that ERP was a war plan from the start, and the harm to economic recovery is what he points out. Now with respect to what the weapons that will be required for defense here and abroad will be, there is a great variety of material from our daily newspapers. Here is one clipping, "The coast cities map atomic defenses." That was on June 14, from the New York Times. But from the front page of the New York Times on February 10 we read that Dr. Vannevar Bush told the Senate Armed Services Committee, meeting behind closed doors, of the virtual impossibility of building foolproof protection against atomic attack. He went on to develop that theme. Regarding the costs, here is a clipping saying an Army Reserve of $1,000,000 is the goal for October of 1956. Here is another. "Twenty thousand spotters to man an aircraft cordon" in New York State alone. Here is a clipping, "Bill to recruit spies." This was from last Friday's New York Herald Tribune. "Measure to enlist 2,500 spies now goes to conference. The Senate bill allows 10,000." That was from the New York Herald Tribune, as I say. Here is another one, "Gain in guided missiles." An article by Hanson W. Baldwin, whom I look upon as extremely trustworthy, and he tells of the gain we are making in guided missiles. But on the other hand here was the New York Herald Tribune of yesterday in which it says, "The cost of guided missile war is astronomical. A research and development board spokesman said today that guided missile warfare and peacetime preparation for it would cost astronomical sums." Then, "Airplanes are increasing in size for the Navy." They have to build not only the big airplanes but then they have to build ships from which they can take off, and so they are talking again of building a super airplane carrier. An atomic fleet is being discussed. Dr. Einstein says, according to the New York Times of February 11: If successful, radioactive poisoning of the atmosphere, and hence annihilation of any life on earth has been brought within the range of technical possibilities. That sentence was quoted three times by Senator Tydings in his speech for universal disarmament down to rifles. Now, Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that those clippings from the daily papers, recent issues of the daily papers, show that the cost of the military aid program on top of our own expenditures for national defense are prohibitive and self-defeating in direct proportion to their supposed adequacy, which is obviously a myth. Now with regard to fighting communism. My third point is that communism is rooted in low living standards and should therefore be treated primarily as a domestic problem in each country, as seven nations of the Far East recently declared in announcing that they will not take sides between the Soviet Union and the United States. Mr. FULTON. Is Korea in that group? Mr. LIBBY. No, the seven were as follows: Australia, Ceylon, India, Pakistan, Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia. Those seven nations. They decided unanimously not to take sides in the cold war, that for them communism represents an internal problem to be tackled by efforts at improving their living standards, which of course is very much the point of view of this country in dealing with its own communism. But we have adopted a somewhat different policy in fighting communism on a global scale. Now, the militarization of nations, assuming that the nations are correct in believing that for them communism is a domestic problem in each country, their militarization obviously depresses still further their living standards, without doing either of the two things that are essential to lifting living standards: Without increasing the productivity of their land-it is not a question of money, it is a question of what they can produce-without increasing the productivity of their land, or otherwise improving the life of the people. Militarization was opposed by Secretary Acheson at one time, as the newspapers reported, in relation to Latin America when the Secretary of War at that time General Marshall-was advocating our sending weapons to Latin America. Secretary Acheson as Secre tary of State was advocating industrialization of Latin America as the only way to lift their living standards and thus to oppose communism. There are two theories of how to fight communism and one is by suppression, on the theory that Russia will recognize nothing but force, and the other theory is by improving living standards and, as you would expect, I support that second theory and fortunately I have noticed a strong movement in that direction in both Houses of Congress. My fourth point is that the arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union, of which the military assistance program is an intensification, is leading the world inexorably toward war and not peace, a war which we cannot win, nor can the Soviet Union. Now, I have here in support of that interpretation of current events among other clippings, one from the New York Times, the front page of the New York Times of May 22, a quotation from our Vice President, Mr. Barkley. I will read the whole little clipping: NEW ORLEANS, May 21.-Vice President Alben Barkley says the United States must maintain armed forces throughout the world and perhaps occupy more countries before the cold war ends. He did not name the countries that might be occupied nor the nation that would make the occupation necessary. The Vice President said, however— and I particularly call your attention to this- the Vice President said, however, "We must drive back this monster that has crept over Europe, destroying the freedom of man." Mr. Barkley modified this the next day, evidently in response to criticism: WASHINGTON, May 22.-Vice President Alben W. Barkley said today he saw no prospect for expansion of American occupation forces unless some North Atlantic Pact countries asked for United States troops. Mr. Barkley said the wrong emphasis had been placed on his New Orleans speech. He said then "the United States must maintain armed forces all over the world and we may have to occupy more countries before the cold war is ended." Mr. Barkley said today, "I did not have in mind any extension of our occupation forces with the possible exception that some of the countries in the North Atlantic Pact might ask for some American forces to be stationed within them to help round out their defenses. I was speaking primarily of our responsibility to maintain our armed forces and our commitments in countries where such forces already are stationed." You will observe Mr. Barkley did not take back the more important sentence of his speech which was: We must drive back this monster that has crept over the earth, destroying the freedom of man, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, if I correctly interpret the results of our policy of military aid to other countries and the results of our own policy of peace through strength, that means war. To drive back this monster-which obviously means the Soviet Union-drive back this monster-presumably from the occupied countries, the countries of eastern Europe, which President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill gave to Stalin in the famous conferences at Tehran and Yalta-drive Stalin back. I do not believe it can be done by the cold war. I believe that it means a hot war and that our Government is steadily moving toward the possibility of that hot war. I have here the plan which you have not yet turned down, the plan called Reorganization Plan No. 25, under which Mr. Symington would be made the dictator for the handling of our national resources, with power over the other members of the Committee. They would become merely his advisers under this proposal. I do not have this clipping before me but I know it by heart. It is extremely dangerous. Mr. Symington would become an unrestrained dictator in case of war to determine what every person would eat, what every person would do. He would have complete control of everything with no one restraining him except the President, who would be presumably busy. |