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Mr. JUDD. Has the Defense Department, and all elements of it, approved this liberalization?

Mr. HARRIMAN. Yes, they asked for it.

Mr. JUDD. A keyman in one of the three Departments within Defense told me, do not change that language. He says the present situation just stinks.

Mr. HARRIMAN. I do not know what he was talking about.

Mr. JUDD. That is the reason I want to get to the bottom of it. Mr. HARRIMAN. I thoroughly differ with the gentleman in question, and I think if he were exposed to all of the knowledge we have had about this he would change his opinion. The idea that we should not help these people to acquire the extra equipment they cannot get in Europe in order to get into production on things they can better produce themselves is a great mistake.

Mr. JUDD. On page 6 of your statement you say:

Once a balanced collective force with adequate reserves is developed, we can hope for a reduction in military expenditures.

Will that ever be possible, Mr. Ambassador? Can we with any certainty foresee a day when we will have a balanced collective force with adequate reserves? Are we not in that. language holding out false hopes? When we first took this up the CIA came before us and told us that we had an atomic monopoly, that the Soviets could not possibly break before 1955 or probably 1956. After they broke it in 1949, ČIA trimmed its estimates down to 1952, and the resources that seemed adequate only 3 years ago are today very far from adequate. That is the grave trouble with arms races. We could never have enough to be adequate. By the time we get 20 miles further along, we may find the enemy has progressed 19 miles, or even 21 months. So we are still not in a position of adequacy. I do not think we ought to hold out to our people the hope that by building up our defense force we can get to a point where we can make a reduction in military expenditures.

Why do we not be honest and say that there is no hope for a reduction in military expense until the present leadership in the Kremlin is overthrown, either from the outside or the inside. We want it to be overthrown from the inside, and therefore we must carry this on no matter what it costs, because the alternative is even more costly. Mr. HARRIMAN. May I explain what I had in mind in that sentence? General Bradley testified last year that we had to maintain a balanced force in the United States until such time as the defense establishments in Europe were of sufficient size that they contributed directly to our defense.

Now, there is that aspect of it, and the other aspect of it in this brief sentence is that we have a very weak situation in Europe from the standpoint of modern equipment.

The first step is to equip the forces which are agreed upon, those in existence and the reserves. The system is to train men. They go back to civil life and yet they are available for war. We have to have reserve equipment in order that we can form an overnight force which can be called out at once in order to fill up the line.

It is quite true that after you have done that you do not have to replace it except as it is worn out or as it becomes obsolete. You are quite right in saying that military equipment does become obsolete

to some degree. I think that statement is a fair statement. It will require an extra effort now both on the part of Europe and ourselves. In the future what the political situation will be I cannot say with any assurance, but the drain on the Soviet's economy is very great as it stands. Today that great trained army and air force is of very great value to them. I do not know whether they will maintain that force indefinitely. It is a great drain on their economy. I testified, before the Marshall plan got going, that it would be developing pressures from the west on the east rather than from the east on the west. What will happen, I would not want to predict, but it is not beyond the realm of possibility that you are right that there will be an indefinite period of that. On the other hand, I am hopeful that the political scene will change and that the strain will not be so great as it is now.

Chairman KEE. Relative to your remark about the Soviet Government having reached the limit of its expenditures, I was just wondering if, from your information, it is not your opinion that Russia today has reached just about the limit to which she can possibly go in her military equipment, that is, if she goes further her expenditures are going beyond any reasonably safe limit, and far beyond what her resources would justify?

Mr. HARRIMAN. In any free economy it would not be possible in peace.

Chairman KEE. That is what I am getting at.

Mr. HARRIMAN. Their standard of living is very low. It would not be possible to sustain it in a free society. It is only possible where the people are forced to accept.

Mr. JUDD. Now, in the last clause of the sentence in the second paragraph on page 6 of your statement, you say:

We can hope for a reduction in military expenditures.

I take that to mean that once we get the balance of collective forces and adequate reserves we can reduce our expenditures?

Mr. HARRIMAN. General Bradley testified last year we could hope for a lower level. I am only quoting from him. It would seem to be logical.

In Europe there is a double task we are now doing, which is to bring modern equipment to forces in being and then build up the reserves necessary. It is a fact that at the end of that period the replacement of that equipment, both that which wears out or becomes obsolete, should not be as great a burden as the initial furnishing of equipment necessary to supply those forces and the reserves.

Mr. JUDD. There is a question that I wish I had time to ask General Bradley this morning, but I would like to ask Ambassador Harriman the question, and if he does not feel that he is qualified to answer he does not need to.

I was in Europe last month and I heard in several places this report: The Soviets are carrying on extensive propaganda in France and the low countries through their fifth columns that anything we do along this line is useless because the Soviets have so improved the V-2's and other rocket bombs and that they have launching platforms in areas they control in Europe already prepared so that when the day comes they can just cut loose and destroy Paris.

The story was that they will not need to invade with land armies; panzer divisions are obsolete. They could blow western cities off

the map with the long-range rockets and bombs. A Frenchman told me that it was having real effect upon the morale of the people of France in some areas.

The editor of Le Monde was giving the impression that France was trying to disengage itself from the Atlantic Treaty. On the other hand I have heard reports to the contrary; that the morale is improved.

I ask this because you, more than anyone else, are familiar with the situation. Is it true that they are making headway with that kind of propaganda? Second, is there anything to the propaganda?

All

Mr. HARRIMAN. You will have to ask General Bradley about the military aspects of it. I have no information to that effect. kinds of propaganda are being used by the Communists.

In 1947 there was a strong development of neutrality and appeasement. It is remarkable that in 1949, 2 years later after the Marshall plan started, and when the North Atlantic Treaty was proposed, in France the vote for the North Atlantic Treaty was approved unanimously, except by the Communist vote and two fellow travelers. Those people voted because they thought they had the support of their people. The members of the Assembly in France are motivated by the terms of what their people at home feel.

It is quite true that Le Monde expresses the views of its publishers. We have certain publishers and editors in this country who express views. Sometimes they express a majority view; sometimes they have views that have no relation to the majority views.

It is my strong belief that these articles express a minority view. At the same time everything you see in France does have a certain influence. There is now and there will undoubtedly be continual talk in France about the desirability of neutrality or appeasement, until they reestablish pride and confidence in the French Army.

Whenever you talk about the pride in the French Army the Frenchman lights up. They are by nature rather reserved and apt to be a bit cynical and they do not expose their feelings very readily. I have no doubt, however, that when they have the confidence and pride that they should have in the French Army, you will find that the type of expression which sometimes crops up daily will recede and people will not dare write about it in that way.

Mr. JUDD. Thank you very much.

Mr. MERROW. Is there evidence, Mr. Ambassador, this program is having an effect on Soviet policy?

Mr. HARRIMAN. In what way?

Mr. MERROW. I am thinking of the policy of expansion. We have had this military assistance program for about a year. We are going to continue it. Is there any indication anywhere that the general Soviet policy is changing in any way in view of this program?

Mr. HARRIMAN. I do not think the Soviet policy basically has changed in the last few years. They have tried to put the pressure on and move wherever they could push a door open. Whenever they can push a door open they move in. There has been greater strength in Europe and therefore it has not been so obvious on the surface. It is different in the east. It is obvious there. Whenever they feel that they can make progress in Germany they put on the heat. When they fird that what they are doing reacts unfavorably to them (the spirit of the German in Berlin, for instance is strong), it seems that they move away from it. I do not think the policies are different.

You find the expression of them different, depending upon the strength of the situation.

Mrs. BOLTON. Part of their strategy is always retreat.

Mr. HARRIMAN. If they hit something they go back.

Mr. MERROW. If these pressures grow less, there will be a change in different areas?

Mr. HARRIMAN. I do not see how they can maintain their enormous expenditures if it is not profitable for them to do so. That is purely a personal opinion, and I am speaking in terms of over the years. I am very grateful for the opportunity of appearing before you. CHAIRMAN KEE. It has been a pleasure to have your testimony, Ambassador Harriman, and the committee will stand adjourned until 10:30 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon the committee adjourned at 4:10 p. m., to meet at 10:30 a. m. on Wednesday June 7, 1950.)

TO AMEND THE MUTUAL DEFENSE ASSISTANCE ACT

OF 1949

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 7, 1950

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, D. C.

The committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10:30 a. m. in room 1302, House Office Building, Hon. John Kee (chairman) presiding.

Chairman KEE. The committee will come to order.

This morning we will continue our hearings on the Mutual Defense Assistance Act. We have with us, I am glad to say, a most distinguished witness. Today we will hear the testimony of Gen. George C. Marshall.

He will need no introduction to this committee or to anyone in the audience or, in fact, to any citizen of the United States, so well and favorably is he known.

General Marshall, we are glad to have you with us.

General MARSHALL. Thank you.

Chairman KEE. Have you a prepared statement?

General MARSHALL. I have no statement.

Chairman KEE. You can proceed at your wish.

STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE C. MARSHALL, FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE

General MARSHALL. I am at your disposal, sir. I might say, Mr. Chairman, that I considered, after receiving your invitation to come here this morning, whether or not I should attempt to be briefed by the State Department and by the Pentagon. It seemed to me that that would not be a very wise business, because at best it would be quite superficial, and that I had much better come here without such briefing and confine myself to the fundamentals involved.

Chairman KEE. General Marshall, you are familiar with the objectives and the purpose of this enactment, and with the fact that the military assistance program has now been in operation for 1 year. We would like, if you will, for you to discuss the objectives of the plan and what it has accomplished, if you are familiar with that, and, if not, with its purpose, and give us your views upon the advisability of continuing the program from here on until the purpose is accomplished. General MARSHALL. Yes, sir. In the first place, Mr. Chairman, when we became engaged in the European recovery program, which was an economic matter pure and simple, for the rehabilitation of Europe, the first proposal was for Europe and by the actual working

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