Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. Vorys' whole intention on that was misinterpreted.

Mr. FULTON. May I say this: That the question there was not the same as the question here. That became a fight to set aside a certain amount of the money under the Marshall-plan program rfor suprase, and to the industrial people it looked as though they were setting it aside or freezing part of the funds by prior legislative allocation, to the derogation of industrial products. I was one of the ones who opposed it too.

Mr. RIBICOFF. Well, I do not think that was Mr. Vorys' intention at all.

Mr. FULTON. But it happened that way.

Now, on the new money that will have to be spent other than for current Government stocks, will you come up with a statement of that to us to show us the source and the purpose of the funds and whatever there might be going into this program, tracing the source down? Then I will yield to Mrs. Bolton.

Mr. PERKINS. Yes; we will get that together for you. (The information referred to is as follows:)

COMMODITIES IN STOCK AND OPEN-MARKET PURCHASES IN THE YUGOSLAV

EMERGENCY PROGRAM

The total program is comprised of foodstuffs with a market value of $75,000,000, of which $53,000,000, or 71 percent, are held in the stocks of the Commodity Credit Corporation; and $22,000,000, or 29 percent, chiefly flour, lard, and seeds, must be purchased in the open market.

The program before the Congress has an estimated market value of 34.4 million dollars, of which 24.6 million dollars, or 72 percent, are in CCC stocks, while 9.8 million dollars, or 28 percent, must be purchased on the open market.

Dried beans, dried eggs, and dried milk are sold by the CCC at "nominal" prices to member countries of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations for use in special feeding projects. Included in the total program are 35,000 metric tons of dried beans, 4,500 tons of dried eggs, and 6,000 tons of dried milk, but only those foods purchased with Yugoslav funds, provided under the Export-Import Bank credit, were obtained at special prices. The remainder, procured with appropriated funds, are included in the program at regular market prices in keeping with the provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948.

Under section 416, Public Law 439, Eighty-first Congress, "perishable" items are made available to private welfare organizations in the United States for the assistance of needy persons at points of storage in the United States without charge. It is expected that modest amounts of dried eggs, dried milk, and possibly some cheese may be obtained by United States welfare organizations for Yugoslav relief purposes. Potatoes and butter, the only other "perishable" items offered by the CCC without charge under section 416, are not expected to be shipped in view of the high handling costs, excessive ocean transportation charges, and the probabilities of spoilage.

A table prepared by the Department of Agriculture indicating the items in the total and congressional portions of the program which must be purchased in the open market is presented herewith for insertion in the record:

Breakdown of Yugoslav-aid program in terms of commodities in stock with. Department of Agriculture and those requiring purchase in the open market

Represents replacement for 110.000 tons of flour being delivered direct to Yugoslavia from Italy and Germany under ECA arrangements. Some portion may be procured by recipient countries on open market. * Only perishable item in congressional portion of total program.

Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. Lodge, do you have any questions? Mr. LODGE. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Perkins, this question may have been asked before: Is it proposed to reimburse the Mutual Defense Assistance program and any other program's funds contemplated for use until this program gets under way?

Mr. FERKINS. No.

Mr. LODGE. Then, actually, you will diminish the amounts which are available under the Mutual Defense Assistance program?

Mr. PERKINS. Yes; that is correct.

Mr. LODGE. Does it not seem to you, in view of the current international situation, that the full amount in the Mutual Defense Assistance program should be available for the purpose for which it was intended by the Congress?

Mr. PERKINS. This thing was very carefully canvassed, Mr. Lodge, and it was concluded that reimbursement should not be asked now. Mr. LODGE. What was the reason for that?

Mr. HIGGS. If the appropriation runs short, we would just have to ask for a supplemental appropriation later, and in this short session it was felt that it would be more convenient for the Congress and simpler to handle it in this way.

Mr. LODGE. The decision was made then as a matter of tactics in dealing with the Congress, not as a matter of dealing with the situation in the world?

Mr. PERKINS. Insofar as a military angle is concerned

Mr. LODGE (interposing). I am not saying that it was not proper to use it for that purpose, I am simply inquiring whether it would not be a good idea to reimburse the MDA appropriation. It does not seem to me that the needs of Europe have diminished since the Mutual Defense Assistance program was passed, but, rather, that they have increased. Of course, this is a relatively small amount by comparison with the 4 billion dollars that we added to it at the end of the last session of Congress. It may be that it can be taken care of by the Eighty-second Congress, but I think it is important for us to confront that possibility and not turn our backs on it.

Mr. PERKINS. Let me look into that, because I was not in on that part of it.

(The information is as follows:)

REASONS FOR NOT REQUESTING AUTHORITY TO REIMBURSE MDAP APPROPRIATIONS

Reimbursement of the MDAP appropriation for the funds withdrawn to meet the emergency food crisis in Yugoslavia will be encompassed in the next request made to the Congress for funds to support MDAP in general. This request may not, of course, be in the form of a specific request related to the particular funds withdrawn for the purpose of aiding Yugoslavia. The funds which have been appropriated for MDAP have been programed to the point where the reduction of those programs by $16,000,000 has a specific effect on the program. However, since the total program involves funds in the neighborhood of $5,000,000,000, and because of the long lead times involved in carrying out parts of the program, it does not become necessary immediately to replace the $16,000,000 withdrawn for the purpose of aiding Yugoslavia. It was felt, therefore, that consideration of the question of reimbursement to the MDAP appropriations for the benefit of other countries should not be injected into consideration of the bill which has the single objective of aid to Yugoslavia.

Mr. LODGE. Now, this proposal does not limit the cost to $38,000,000. What is it going to cost?

Mr. PERKINS. About $69,000,000.

Mr. LODGE. It is important to get that figure in mind so that we will have some idea of the total cost.

Mr. PERKINS. In table 1 at the back of the book it gives the appropriation request of the stopgap program, and following it in table 2 you come to 69.4 million dollars as the total amount involved in the program from the United States Government. The market value of the total prepared program is $81,000,000 including ocean transportation costs of $6,000,000. The actual program expenditure including the Export-Import Bank credit totals 69.4 million dollars including the $6,000,000 transportation costs. The difference between $81,000,000 and $69,000,000 is explained by the special prices allowed by the Commodity Credit Corporation for beans and dried eggs, purchased with funds from the Export-Import Bank.

Mr. FULTON. How about the figure we were given yesterday for the current need plus $35,000,000 or $72,000,000?

Mr. PERKINS. No, it is 31.4 million dollars in the stopgap program and $38,000,000 we are now asking for.

Mr. LODGE. I have one more question that I would like to ask, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. RICHARDS. Yes, Mr. Lodge.

Mr. LODGE. I gather, then, that there is no intention whatsoever to ask for any kind of quid pro quo in connection with this matter?

Mr. PERKINS. Other than connected with the distribution of the aid itself there is no quid pro quo. It is just the conditions in connection with the distribution of the aid.

Mr. LODGE. As a quid pro quo.

Mr. PERKINS. No, except as contained in the MDAP agreement. Mr. LODGE. There is no intention to ask for strategic materials then?

Mr. PERKINS. There is a provision in the draft bill that they would continue to make accessible strategic materials.

Mr. LODGE. I do not believe, Mr. Secretary, that the program can be justified on a humanitarian basis.

Mr. PERKINS. No, neither do we.

Mr. LODGE. No. I notice that you say that in your statement. Of course, we are a generous people and a humanitarian people but the object of this surely would be to stem communism. It seems to me the only way we can look at it is in terms of the strategic necessities of the hour. I think if you tried to justify it on the basis of humanitarianism because of conditions in all the rest of the world today it would be a very ineffective thing to do.

Mr. RICHARDS. Mrs. Bolton, I believe you had a question.

Mrs. BOLTON. The time is past, thank you.

Mr. RICHARDS. That will terminate the hearings this morning.

I would like to say to the committee that General Bradley will be here at 2:30 this afternoon first at a public session and then in executive session, and I hope that all of the members will be here.

(Thereupon, at 12:20 p. m., the committee adjourned until 2:30 p. m. of the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

(The committee resumed at 2:30 p. m., Hon. James P. Richards presiding.)

Mr. RICHARDS. The committee will please be in order. We have the pleasure of having with us General Bradley, but at this point in the hearings I am going to ask, before General Bradley testifies, that the clerk read a letter that we have received from General Marshall on the subject of Yugoslavian aid.

(The clerk read the letter which is as follows:)

Hon. JOHN KEE,

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
Washington, November 29, 1950.

Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs,

House of Representatives.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The President has asked the Congress to take action to provide funds for emergency food aid for Yugoslavia. Because of the effect of the current food shortage on the Yugoslav armed forces regarding their ability to maintain internal security, and ability to resist external attack, the Department of Defense fully endorses the granting of such assistance as will alleviate this situation.

The economic crisis in Yugoslavia will lower the morale of the armed forces, due to the shortage of rations for the troops and their families.

Continued shortage of rations will limit the ability to conduct the necessary training.

From the standpoint of United States security, the strategic importance of the effects referred to in the preceding paragraphs are as follows:

It appears desirable that the largest armed force on the continent of Europe (over 30 divisions) outside of the U. S. S. R. should remain militarily effective

and friendly to the western powers.

Communist guerrilla activity in Greece

immediately decreased after the Yugoslav break with Moscow. The Yugoslav-Cominform rift has quite evidently had the effect of slowing down the drive for the close control which Moscow desires over the Communist parties in other countries.

In view of the foregoing considerations, the Department of Defense strongly supports the enactment of the emergency food legislation.

Faithfully yours,

G. C. MARSHALL

STATEMENT OF GEN. OMAR N. BRADLEY, CHAIRMAN,

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Mr. RICHARDS. We are fortunate in having with us General Bradley. I believe, General, your title is now Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDS. You have been informed that we are holding this hearing on the question of aid to Yugoslavia?

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir. I believe all I can say, Mr. Chairman, is something of an elaboration on the statement of General Marshall. We think and I am speaking for the Joint Chiefs of Staff as Chairman-that this economic crisis in Yugoslavia has provided an opportunity for the United States to seek further gains in exploiting the Yugoslav-Soviet break in behalf and in the interest of the west. We believe it is in the military interest of the United States that this break be exploited as much as possible.

The emergency food aid which the Congress is now considering might provide a lever for exploiting this break. The Joint Chiefs of Staff fully concur that it is important and that it is in the important interest of the west that Tito maintain his resistance to dominance from Moscow. We believe that there are significant security advantages to the United States if this rift between Tito and the Kremlin continues, and especially if Tito's example gives impetus to defections by other satellite states. The Yugoslav success in opposing Soviet domination could, in fact, present opportunities which the United States might capitalize on to attain certain of its national objectives. So, because of the advantages which we might obtain through this rift we believe that from the military point of view the United States economic aid to Tito is sound. I believe that states, Mr. Chairman, the military point of view. In other words, we consider this an opportunity to further this rift to the military advantage of the west.

Mr. RICHARDS. Thank you, General. I am sure you would not mind the committee asking you some questions. I just want to say that if there are any questions which you feel should not be answered or that you would prefer to answer in executive session, do not hesitate to say so.

Mr. Battle

Mr. BATTLE. General Bradley, it is a pleasure to see you again, sir. I appreciate your appearance here. I am just wondering what your idea is about whether or not we should tie any strings to this economic aid, such as requiring the return of strategic materials to the United States that might be of use to us. Or do you think it should be just an outright gift with no strings attached?"

General BRADLEY. I think that is a question that could probably be better answered by representatives of the State Department who make