and religion and some of those salient points, to say nothing of the Greek children.

Mr. HAGGERTY. Those issues, I am confident, are best handled in a more informal way than to spell them out as conditions. I am sure that we will accomplish a great deal more along those lines by putting our trust in our Ambassador there who is an extremely competent man and understands the situation and is handling it very well, than to try to write them in as conditions in the program. I think it would be self-defeating because in recent weeks the Yugoslav Government has shown that they are willing to go along with us as rapidly as they can. I would like to point out that this is a program which will extend over a period of possibly 5 or 6 months, from now until April or May. Yugoslavia is not an occupied country. The total aid which is contemplated, including the stopgap program which is already being implemented, will not represent more than 10 or perhaps 15 percent of the Yugoslav food supply, what they are actually going to have to eat from now until the next harvest, after taking account of the belt tightening which they are undergoing, and it is not a situation in which the tail can wag the dog. I think we have stretched as far as we dare this very thin and delicate membrane of our relationship and if we try to impose conditions, they are a proud people; they are proud of the struggle they went through in the liberation war. We have to, I think, have some regard for that fact. If we deal with them more on an informal basis we will accomplish a good deal more.

Mr. FULTON. How can Congress then say to Marshall-plan countries, either you get together and cooperate or we are going to look over the program again?

Mrs. BOLTON. I do not accept that, Mr. Fulton, as my point at all. My point is that, and I said something of this yesterday, this is a moment when this country and all the countries of the world are facing a survival proposition. It seems to me of extreme importance that we take each state that we can deal with practically, as a separate entity. The one thing we need to do for getting ourselves a little bit of help here and there is to pry loose from the Kremlin as many of these individual states as can be. Yugoslavia is the first one. that offers us any such chance. To me, what we are up against is so infinitely greater than any comparison that could be made between Yugoslavia and the Marshall states, Yugoslavia and Spain, any comparison of the small entities, the over-all is of such terrible importance to the survival of men on earth that I think we have got to broaden our point of view very much in this and not haggle over the little things.

Mr. FULTON. May I say then for myself, how can we rationalize putting conditions on the Marshall-plan countries?

Mrs. BOLTON. Because we are not prying them loose.

Mr. FULTON. When we are not putting conditions on Tito. Would you answer that?

Mr. HAGGERTY. I think in the very nature of the Marshall plan, in George Marshall's original speech which launched it, he said if European countries will do thus and so, if they will get together and they will, to the maximum possible extent meet one another's own needs economically, that the United States will be prepared to step in and help.

Mr. FULTON. That plan worked so well for the Marshall-plan countries, will you tell us then from your great experience in Yugoslavia why it should not work in a further extension to Yugoslavia?

Mr. HAGGERTY. For this reason: The Marshall-plan countries from the outset were basically friendly to us, in reaching out to us. Yugoslavia only a year ago was stacked up in the enemy camp. They have moved.

Mr. FULTON. How about next year?

Mr. HAGGERTY. Yugoslavia has moved, in my judgment, a very great distance in asking America for aid. The imposition of conditions at this point would destroy that. Next year is in the lap of the gods. I think it depends very much upon how we handle ourselves during the next 6 months.

Mr. FULTON. In closing, could I ask, did you see any of the so-called reeducation camps for Yugoslav people, to reorient them toward Tito's so-called Leninist communism in Yugoslavia?

Mr. HAGGERTY. I have not seen any such camps. I know that that sort of thing has been going on in the public schools and in the children's movement and in practically every walk of life. It perhaps still is.

Mrs. BOLTON. Going on? It is going on here, is it not?
Mr. HAGGERTY. You mean political propaganda?

Mr. FULTON. But the camps themselves, have you seen them?
Mr. HAGGERTY. No; and I have not been aware of their existence.
Mr. FULTON. Then you have not seen enough of Yugoslavia for me.
Mr. HAGGERTY. I have seen summer camps; I know that they are not
compulsory because I know that-

Mr. FULTON. I have a young DP I am sending through the University of Pittsburgh now from Yugoslavia. Within the last 18 months to 2 years, there was an attempt to kidnap him on a ship and get him back. That was Tito's government.

Mrs. BOLTON. May I ask a question, something that I would like to have in the record of today?

There has been written in the papers and in letters to us the suggestion that I will quote from this paper:

The hunger in Yugoslavia, once the granary of Europe, has its true cause in the foolish and unnatural Communist economic plan which has been imposed by a minority on the masses of the Yugoslav people against their will.

Now, this particular situation, does that, in your opinion, cover the real reason and the fundamental reason for this drought?

Mr. HAGGERTY. I would classify that as a half-truth. It is true that during the three-odd years of the Communist administration in Yugoslavia there has been economic deterioration in every phase of the economy, agricultural as well as others. It is still true this year. There has been a degree of apathy on the part of the peasants to produce, those who are in the collective farms, a great many of them having been coerced into joining. They have no great enthusiasm for it. They would just as soon see the collectives fail. Their attitude is, Let Henry do it. As a result, the record of production on collective farms, despite official propaganda to the contrary, is that they are not producing up to par set by private peasants. On the roughly three-quarters of the farms that are still private holdings there has been a deteriorating influence because they are constantly under the

threat of socialization; what they do produce is taken by the Government at low prices set by the Government and much of the economic inducement to work is gone. There has been this downward spiral, to put a statistical handle on that-I would not state it as a final judg ment-but just to illustrate it, I would say that the fallen production between 1949 and 1950 might be due to the extent of 10 or 15 percent to general economic deterioration and apathy and the rest of it is due to the drought.

Mr. RICHARDS. You would not say, as Mrs. Bolton has suggested, that these internal policies brought on the drought?

Mr. HAGGERTY. No; as a matter of fact, I do not think they have. Mrs. BOLTON. May I ask this in addition? I think it was Mr. Andrews who gave us figures on the collectivization. It made a difference in the collectivism of the state and the cooperatives, the farm co-ops. Is there a real difference between those two and do the farm cooperatives which the farm peasants as a rule voluntarily set up, have they any relation to our co-ops?

Mr. HAGGERTY. I use that word "voluntarily" in quotes in referring to Yugoslavia. State farms in Yugoslavia are factory farms. They are run as commercial enterprises under a manager and with hired labor force.

Mrs. BOLTON. Could you compare them very vaguely with the large farm industry of the Middle West or far West, farms of 5,000,000 acres?

Mr. HAGGERTY. I would say following the depression we had and we may have still some very large holdings of insurance companies which they found more or less unwillingly in their laps and they had to operate them to come out. They consolidated farms into large operating units, put a college-trained manager in charge and ran it as a business proposition until the real estate market would pick up to the time when they could sell.

The state farms are somewhat comparable. Their first function is to produce economically. Secondly, they are demonstration farms to prove to Yugoslav people that the socialist way is the better way. For that purpose they get machinery, fertilizer, seed, and what technical know-how is available in Yugoslavia; that is poured first into the state farm so they can show up to advantage.

Mrs. BOLTON. But in spite of that fact, they have not done as well as the private peasant?

Mr. HAGGERTY. When I made that statement, I was referring to collectives which I was just about getting to. In the collective farms like the Russian kolkhoz, the land is not nationalized. It is collectivized. The peasant signs a contract or an agreement to join with the collective for an initial period of 3 years. He pledges his land, his capital, his work stock, his machinery and his own labor for a 3-year period. The collective farms are of four categories, from the bottom up: First, the man puts his land in and obtains rent. In all four groups they receive payment on the basis of their day's work performed, but in the lowest group, he gets rent on his land and retains title.

Mrs. BOLTON. Just like Russia.

Mr. HAGGERTY. In the second group, he receives instead of rent, an interest on its estimated capital value. He also retains title.

In the third group, he retains title but receives no land income. He gets his payment in kind and in cash on the basis of his day's work performed.

The fourth group which the Yugoslavs call the highest group or highest type, full-scale collective, he donates his land, signs it away inviolably and his land becomes collective property, presumably in perpetuity, and the only income he gets is on the basis of the day's work performed. There is a quirk in the law regarding collectives by which the assembly of the collective can change the thing from a lower to a higher type so if the man goes into a lower type collective he may in the course of 2 or 3 years find that his collective has become one of the higher type and he has lost the right to withdraw the land. Mr. RICHARDS. Are there any other questions?

Mr. VORYS. I have one question, probably a foolish question. I notice that there are substantial shortages of potatoes and I just wonder why we can't send potatoes.

Mr. TRIGG. Mr. Vorys, I might answer that by saying we can send them. There are plenty here. But they would have to go under such conditions that it would not at all be economical or profitable to send them.

No. 1 is they would have to be shipped in refrigerated conditions to keep them from freezing. We can send them other commodities that on a calorie content basis they can get more calories per dollar spent for it either in transportation or in acquisition costs.

Mrs. BOLTON. They eat those other commodities?

Mr. TRIGG. Presumably wheat or something of that nature. They can get much more for the dollar spent.

Mr. VORYS. In this connection, the millers of the United States have always wanted to get a guaranteed minimum of flour in the ECA plan and at the suggestion of the Administrator, we have resisted that on the grounds that they needed the millings over there as much as the flour and that, while flour was cheaper to ship, being less bulky than wheat, they needed the milling over there.

Now, in this case, the Yugoslavs have requested wheat and we send them flour and also fodder and stuff which I, as a nonfarmer, would think would be taking the place of the millings. Why is it a good thing to turn down a Yugoslav request for wheat but insist that we want to send wheat to the rest of the European countries?

Mr. TRIGG. I think Mr. Haggerty explained it a minute ago. Why don't you repeat it?

Mr. HAGGERTY. It is partly a matter of geography and partly a matter of time. We are assuming a normal winter there. We have at the latest December, to get in flour to the areas where it is to be eaten. There is a factor of geography in that this chronic deficit area, the islands along the Dalmatian coasts have considerable population, and the mountain valleys running up from the coast are not grain-producing areas, consequently they don't have mills and if we shipped in wheat as I mentioned earlier, it would have to go to the wheat-producing regions to be milled. Of course, they would have the shorts and the bran there but it would be too late getting flour into the areas where it is needed.

Mr. VORYS. I don't quite understand that because we have been told that the stopgap program will take care of their situation until January and you have told us that whatever these valleys are getting,

for use up to March, they will have to have before January, so I am assuming that the one-third of the population or so that are in the mountains are going to be taken care of out of the stopgap program or they are not going to be taken care of at all. Am I wrong about

that?

Mr. HAGGERTY. I think that is largely true. I am sure that this flour that is going in from Germany and Italy will go for the most important part into these interior areas that get snowed in. The later shipments, their actual distribution will have to be worked out between now and the time they arrive with the Yugoslav authorities as to what their food situation is, what distribution they have made of their own food supply, and fill out where the shortages exist. I have been told that Yugoslavia anticipating the winter has already moved so much food from the grain-producing regions that if the full program goes through some of the American food is going to have to go back to grain-producing areas to take place of the requisitioning done to take care of mountain areas.

Mr. VORYS. If wheat were shipped to the grain-producing regions there would be flour mills and transportation?

Mrs. BOLTON. Is all of it flour?

Mr. HAGGERTY. The bulk of the program is flour.

Mrs. BOLTON. Some of it is wheat?

Mr. TRIGG. Yes; 110,000 is flour, 58,000 tons is to be wheat.

Mr. VORYS. I am looking at this report in front of me. They asked for 160,000 tons of wheat and 40,000 tons of flour. They are getting 168,000 tons of flour, of which 142,000 are in the stopgap program and 26,000 in the appropriation request. All I know is what I see here in front of me on paper.

Mr. TRIGG. I think my answer was incorrect. I was answering on the basis of the original authority or request of this program, but as I understand it, now it is all to be flour.

Mr. RICHARDS. Is white flour referred to when we talk about flour? Mr. TRIGG. Eighty percent.

Mr. RICHARDS. When we had this question up before, the millers wanted to send white flour.

However, in this particular case there is a need of byproducts for feed, because you have items here for feed..

Mr. VORYS. Milo, wouldn't that be comparable with millings in food value for stock?

Mr. TRIGG. Milo is pure and simple stock feed.

Mr. VORYS. Byproducts of wheat are stock feed, aren't they?

Mr. ANDREWS. Yes.

Mr. RICHARDS. Is milo from milling?

Mr. ANDREWS No; milo includes millet and certain related grains. Only in one area is milo used as food for direct human consumption. It isn't Yugoslavia, it is India.

Mr. VORYS. This $2,600,000 that is in here for milo, fodder. Is it just for exactly the same purpose that you could use millings? Am I right? I am no farmer.

Mr. RICHARDS. The rough wheat you are talking about, the rough stuff out of wheat.

Mr. TRIGG. I don't think you can say it is exactly the same. Milo has a different food value. Milo compares more with corn and it