Compromise of Judgment Indebtedness. graduates from the line and Marine Corps division, appointments shall be made hereafter as it shall be necessary to fill vacancies in the lowest grades of commissioned officers of the line of the Navy and Marine Corps; and the vacancies in the lowest grades of the commissioned officers of the Engineer Corps of the Navy shall be filled in like manner by appointments from the final graduates of the Engineer Division." Article 21 of the U. S. Naval Regulations is within the authority conferred upon the Secretary of the Navy by section 1547, Revised Statutes, inasmuch as it does not appear to be in conflict with any provision of the statute law relating to the relative rank of line and staff officers in the Navy. Very respectfully, The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY. RICHARD OLNEY. COMPROMISE OF JUDGMENT INDEBTEDNESS. Revised Statutes, section 3469, does not confer power to remit or release any portion of a judgment indebtedness on considerations of hardship to particular individuals. The authority to "compromise" relates to claims of doubtful recovery or enforcement. (13 Opin., 479, and 18 Opin., 72, distinguished.) DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SIR: Your communication of the 7th instant to the Attorney-General presents a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States, in a proceeding under Revised Statutes, section 3207, has adjudged (United States v. Snyder, 149 U. S., 210) that for certain internal-revenue taxes assessed against one Snyder, the United States have a lien upon real estate in the city of New Orleans now owned by the International Cotton Press Company, which that company bought from Snyder after the lien had attached. The amount of the taxes is $3,463.29, with considerable interest. The International Cotton Press Company submits an offer to pay $50, together with all costs and expenses, in consideration of a Compromise of Judgment Indebtedness. release of the lien, and the U. S. district attorney and the Solicitor of the Treasury recommended the acceptance of the proposition. You ask whether you can legally approve the proposed compromise under Revised Statutes, section 3469. The petition for settlement and the recommendations in support thereof are not based upon doubts as to the possibility of realizing the amount of the tax out of the property, but upon the ground of the hardship to the company supposed to be involved in enforcing against it the laws of the United States as interpreted by the Supreme Court in a proceeding to which the company was a party. I am of the opinion that section 3469 has no application to such a case. It provides that "Upon a report by a district attorney, or any special attorney or agent having charge of any claim in favor of the United States, showing in detail the condition of such claim, and the terms upon which the same may be compromised, and recommending that it be compromised upon the terms so offered, and upon the recommendation of the Solicitor of the Treasury, the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to compromise such claim accordingly. But the provisions of this section shall not apply to any claim arising under the postal laws." The section does not authorize the Secretary of the Treasury to remit or release moneys due to the United States and clearly recoverable, but to "compromise," which implies a claim of doubtful recovery or enforcement. In the case which you submit there is nothing to "compromise," for the right of recovery and the amount have been finally adjudged by the court of last resort, and the property is said to be sufficient to satisfy the debt. These views are not in conflict with the opinion to which I have been referred, given to the Secretary of the Treasury on November 13, 1884, by Mr. Solicitor-General Phillips (18 Opin., 72), for that was the case of a claim with respect to which, although it had been reduced to judgment, there was, to use the language of the opinion, "doubt whether anything more could be made;" nor with the opinion of Mr. Attorney Inspection of Steamships-Expired Certificates. General Akerman (13 Opin., 479), which seems to relate to a judgment open to be reviewed, and not to the final judgment of a court of last resort. INSPECTION OF STEAMSHIPS-EXPIRED CERTIFICATES. The regulations provided by title 52 of the Revised Statutes do not apply to American steam vessels whilst engaged in commerce beyond the jurisdiction of the United States. Expired inspection certificates can not be extended by consular officers of the United States; and there is no authority of law for sending local inspectors out of the country to make inspection. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, July 17, 1894. SIR: I have your letter of July 14, 1894, submitting for my "consideration and opinion the following questions regarding the application of the U. S. steamboat laws (title 52, Rev. Stat.) to American steam vessels, originally inspected under those laws in a port of the United States, whose inspection certificates have expired by limitation whilst the steamers are engaged in commerce between foreign ports outside the jurisdiction of the United States, and which steamers are likely to remain beyond such jurisdiction for an indefinite period." The question to be considered being, "Whether such steamers running on expired certificates of inspection outside the territory of the United States are liable to the penalties pro vided in title 52 for violation of the provisions of that title." And, "Whether under the diplomatic or consular laws of the United States there is any authority for such officers to extend inspection certificates granted by United States inspectors of steam vessels to American steamers," etc. : Inspection of Steamships-Expired Certificates. And, "As to the legality of sending local inspectors to Panama to inspect the vessels referred to," etc. Section 4400 of title 52, Revised Statutes, provides: "All steam vessels navigating any waters of the United States which are common highways of commerce, or open to general or competitive navigation, excepting public vessels of the United States, vessels of other countries, and boats, propelled in whole or in part by steam for navigating canals, shall be subject to the provisions of this title." As all of your questions relate to "steamers engaged in commerce between foreign ports outside the jurisdiction of the United States, and which are likely to remain beyond such jurisdiction for an indefinite period," it is obvious that they do not fall within the class to which title 52, Revised Statutes, applies; and it is difficult to see how, whilst they "remain beyond the jurisdiction of the United States and engaged in commerce between foreign ports outside such jurisdiction," the laws of the United States for the regulation of steam vessels can be made to apply to or be enforced against them. I am of opinion that such steam vessels, whilst so engaged in commerce beyond the jurisdiction of the United States, are not subject to the regulations provided by title 52 of the Revised Statutes, and that there is no authority of law for consular officers of the United States "to extend inspection certificates granted by the United States inspectors of steam vessels to American steamers;" and that there is no authority of law for "sending local inspectors to Panama to inspect the steam vessels referred to." Very respectfully, The SECRETARY OF TREASURY. RICHARD OLNEY. Military Equipments-Right of Control. MILITARY EQUIPMENTS-RIGHT OF CONTROL. The opinion expressed that certain arms furnished the Washington Light Infantry, of Charíeston, S. C., are held by the State of South Carolina for the use of the whole body of the militia of that State in such manner and in accordance with such rules and regulations as the proper authorities of the State may prescribe. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, July 25, 1894. SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge yours of the 23d instant, in which my opinion is requested upon two questions presented in a letter of the attorney-general of the State of South Carolina of the 22d instant. The facts as there stated are that under a joint resolution of April 27, 1876 (Stat. L., vol. 19, p. 212), certain arms and accouterments were loaned by the United States to the Washington Light Infantry, of Charleston, S. C., and that under joint resolution of March 9, 1878 (20 Stat. L., p. 248), 120 of these rifles and other accouterments were charged to the State of South Carolina on its quota, upon the written approval of the government of the said State, for the use of said Washington Light Infantry. The inquiries made are: "(1) Are these arms the property of the Washington Light Infantry or have they any right derived from the laws of the United States to said arms over and above any other particular militia of the State of South Carolina? "(2) Are these arms not to be considered as devoted to the general purposes of the militia of the State of South Carolina, and as between the said Washington Light Infantry and the State of South Carolina are they not subject to such disposition as the rules, regulations, and commands of the general militia may require?" It is exceedingly doubtful whether I can rightfully give any opinion as requested, the arms referred to having been absolutely and finally delivered by the United States, so that the inquiries above stated relate to the effect of an act already done by the War Department, rather than raise any question of present administration. Without passing upon that point, |