It is earnestly contended by appellants that this is an action in trover; that the gist of such an action is the unlawful conversion of the property, and that under no circumstances can malice become the gist of an action in trover. It is also contended that malice cannot be the gist of any action where the cause is brought as a first-class case in the municipal court, and that actions in tort in the municipal court cannot be brought where the amount is in excess of $1000.

The municipal court has jurisdiction in the following cases of the first class: (a) All actions on contracts, express or implied; (b) all actions for the recovery of personal property; and (c) all actions for the recovery of damages for the conversion of or injuries to personal property when the amount involved in said cases exceeds $1000. (Hurd's Stat. 1917, p. 890.) It hardly seems necessary to assert that the statute plainly provides that the municipal court shall have jurisdiction in “all actions for the recovery of damages for the conversion of personal property.” While all actions in cases of the first class under division (a) are ex contractu, actions under divisions (b) and (c) may be ex delicto. All actions ex delicto for the recovery of damages for conversion of personal property are necessarily in the nature of trover, trespass or case. Actions ex delicto are actions of tort. Trover is an action of tort, and it is technically one of the forms of trespass on the (21 Cyc. of Pl. & Pr. 1013.) It is true that this proceeding is similar to the common law action of trover, but, regardless of its technical name, there is nothing to prevent malice being the gist of this action if it is properly pleaded. There is nothing in the Municipal Court act which prevents the bringing of an action in tort where the amount exceeds $1000. When the subject matter there under consideration is considered, our holdings in Chudnovski v. Eckels, 232 Ill. 312, and in Arnold v. Dodson, 272 id. 377, are not contrary to the view here expressed. The actions there

case.

under consideration were actions of assumpsit, and actions of assumpsit could not be brought as class I cases in the municipal court unless the amount involved was more than $1000. Actions of tort growing out of personal injuries, and other causes of action not covered by divisions (b) and (c) of cases of the first class where the amount involved is more than $1000, are not within the jurisdiction of the municipal court. But all actions for the recovery of damages for the conversion of personal property, whether of tort or otherwise, are within the jurisdiction of the municipal court as class I cases where the damages exceed $1000. The court does not lose jurisdiction of such actions where malice is the gist of the action.

The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

(No. 12915.-Reversed and remanded.)

ROBERT H. HEADEN et al. Defendants in Error, vs. MARK C. COHN, Plaintiff in Error.

Opinion filed February 18, 1920-Rehearing denied April 8, 1920.

I. ADMINISTRATION-there is no necessity for administration where there are no debts. Where there are no debts owing by the estate of an intestate there is no necessity for administration.

2. SAME-administrator in State of domicile of intestate is entitled to money in Illinois. Administration in Illinois of property of an intestate domiciled in another State is ancillary and is granted in order to reduce property in Illinois to money, and where it is admitted there are no debts in Illinois but there are debts in the State of the domicile, the administrator in the State of the domicile is entitled to the money.

3. SAME-distribution of a non-resident's personal property in Illinois is governed by Illinois statute. At common law the succession to personal property was governed by the law of the domicile of the intestate at the time of his death, without regard to the actual situs of the property at the time, but the Illinois Statute of Descent by express terms applies to both real and personal property in Illinois of resident and non-resident proprietors dying intestate,

and the distribution of tangible personal property actually in Illinois and belonging to a non-resident dying intestate is governed by the Illinois statute. (Cooper v. Beers, 143 Ill. 25, approved; Russell v. Madden, 95 id. 485, distinguished.)

4. SAME-rules of inheritance are controlled by statute. Rules of inheritance, both as to real and personal property, are subject to control and regulation by statute, and, except as to rights already vested, may be changed at the pleasure of the legislature, and the law existing at the time the descent is cast governs the right to inherit.

5. SAME descent and heirship of real property are governed by law where land lies. The descent and heirship of real property are governed by the law of the place where the land is situated.

6. PLEADING when answer must be taken as true. Where no replication is filed to the answer and a hearing is had on the bill and answer alone, the answer is to be taken as true.

WRIT OF ERROR to the Appellate Court for the Third District;-heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Morgan county; the Hon. NORMAN L. JONES, Judge, presiding.

BEACH & TRAPP, and DEAN HILL, for plaintiff in error.

THOMPSON & THOMPSON, BELLATTI, BELLATTI & MoRIARTY, and W. N. HAIRGROVE, for defendants in error.

Mr. JUSTICE FARMER delivered the opinion of the court: This case is brought to this court from the Appellate Court for the Third District by petition for writ of certiorari to review a judgment of that court affirming a decree of the circuit court of Morgan county.

The lands of Fannie Hills Headen, who died intestate, were sold at partition sale under a decree of the circuit court of Morgan county, and the proceeds of the sale, after payment of costs and expenses, were ordered distributed among her heirs, eight in number. There was in the hands of the master in chancery when the final decree for distribution was entered, $7309.08 for each of said heirs. The decree of the circuit court, which was entered March 16, 1918, ordered the master to pay said amount to each of the heirs.

Hannah Headen Cohn was one of the heirs and the decree directed the master to pay to her said sum. She lived in California, was married, but had no children or descendants of a child or children. She died intestate March 27, 1918, before the money was paid to her by the master. After her death her surviving brothers and sisters filed a supplemental bill in the partition suit, setting up the facts as to the partition suit, the death of Mrs. Cohn before receiving her distributive share, that she left no child or children, and alleging her surviving husband and her brothers and sisters were her only heirs-at-law. The bill alleged that under the Statute of Descent of the State of California, where a person dies intestate leaving no issue and no father or mother, one-half of the estate descends to the surviving husband or wife and one-half to the brothers and sisters of the decedent. The statute was set out in the bill. The bill prayed a decree directing the master in chancery to pay one-half the amount in his hands belonging to the estate of Mrs. Cohn to her brothers and sisters, share and share alike, and the other half to the surviving husband, Mark C. Cohn, or that the master be directed to pay all of said sum to Robert H. Headen and Margaret M. Killam, who, the bill alleged, had been appointed by the county court of Morgan county and had qualified as administrators of the estate of Mrs. Cohn. The supplemental bill alleged there were no debts owing by the estate in Illinois, and further alleged on information that Mark C. Cohn, the surviving husband, had been appointed administrator of the estate in California.

Mark C. Cohn answered the bill, admitting he was appointed, qualified and is administrator in the State of California, which is the State of the main and principal administration of said estate, and denying the legality of the appointment of Robert H. Headen and Margaret M. Killam in Illinois; admits there are no debts owing from the estate of Mrs. Cohn in this State, and alleges the statute of California set out and relied upon by complainants has no ap

plication to personal property in this State but such property is specially excepted by the code of California, wherein it is provided that the law of descent concerns only property in that State or in a State having the same law of descent as the State of California; that the law of descent of Illinois is different from the law of California, and under it the surviving husband of a wife dying without issue takes all of the personal estate. The answer avers Mrs. Cohn left no estate other than the $7309.08 in the master's hands; that she left debts in the State of California and no other estate to pay them. Cohn also filed a cross-bill alleging substantially the same matters set up in his answer; that as administrator he had demanded the money from the master but payment was refused. The cross-bill prayed an order and decree directing the master to pay cross-complainant the sum of $7309.08 upon his execution, as administrator, of a bond to be approved by the court, to save harmless the master from all creditors or debts of the estate; that it be ordered and adjudged that, subject to debts, costs and expenses, no other person, party or corporation has any title, interest or claim to said money except cross-complainant.

The answer to the cross-bill denied the right of crosscomplainant to the relief prayed and relied substantially on the same matters alleged in the supplemental bill. Among other matters the answer to the cross-bill alleged respondents did not know whether Cohn had been appointed and qualified as administrator in California; denied the money in the master's hands is the only property or estate of Mrs. Cohn, and alleged at the time of her death Mrs. Cohn had a large estate in California, and that no part of the money in the master's hands was required to administer her estate there. Cross-complainant filed a replication to the answer. No replication was filed by the complainants in the original supplemental bill to the answer of Cohn.

The cause was heard on the pleadings, no proof being offered by either party, and a decree entered finding the