The formation of a corporation is but a means directed by the testator to be used for the purpose of more efficiently administering the charity. The gift is a complete gift to charity, without regard to whether or not the time for the organization of the corporation is fixed and without regard to whether or not the corporation is ever created. Even though it may never be created, the gift, being to a charitable use, will be upheld. Crerar v. Williams, 145 Ill. 625; Jones v. Habersham, 107 U. S. 174.

It is the rule that if a gift in trust for a charity is conditioned upon a future and uncertain event, the rules applicable to such a gift are the same as apply to any other estate depending for its coming into existence upon a condition precedent. Should the condition never be fulfilled the estate would never arise, or if it is so remote and indefinite as to transgress the limits of time prescribed by law against perpetuities the gift fails. Such, however, is not the situation here. There is no contingent interest created by this will. There can be no hiatus in this estate. It is a present devise of all the property in question to the trustees in trust for charity. In other words, the cestui que trust is a charity and the gift is one in præsenti. (Crerar v. Williams, supra; Andrews v. Andrews, 110 Ill. 223.) The provisions of the will directing the conveyance to this home, when established, of the property comprised in the residuum of the estate, and the legacies in trust to the widow and to Spooner when their interest in them shall terminate, are merely directions in the administration of the estate. The title vests in this charity by the will.

Counsel for appellant cite the case of Johnson v. Preston, 226 Ill. 447, as supporting their contention that this clause is in violation of the rule against perpetuities. That case is to be distinguished from the case at bar. There it was provided that a trustee should hold the property devised for a space of twenty-five years from and after the date of the probate of the will, and it was held that from the

language of the will it was evident that whatever interest the executor took under it would not vest in him until the probate of the will, and that while such an event would ordinarily occur within a few months, yet it could not be said that it was a condition that must happen within twenty-one years after the death of the testatrix, and, the will creating no precedent estate, the gift violated the rule against perpetuities. In the present case the will, as we have seen, vests the property in the trustees upon the death of the testator, to be held in trust for the charity designated. The will provides the method by which the estate shall be administered and this charity organized for practical purposes before the trust shall be discharged and the possession of the property turned over to the trustees of the home. There is nothing in these provisions of the will that in any way tends to hold any estate in the testator's property in abeyance.

It is further urged by appellant that because the will provides that the widow may, instead of receiving in cash three-ninths of the estate remaining after other legacies are provided for, take certain described real estate at a price fixed in the will upon giving notice of an election within sixty days from the time of the appointment of the executors by the probate court of Cook county, therefore the fee to such real estate does not vest pending the appointment of executors and her election concerning said real estate; that the appointment of the executors may be indefinitely postponed and that the fee in the real estate is held in abeyance pending such election on her part. We are unable to concur with this view. The will refers to the trustees as both executors and trustees. The effect of this provision of the will was merely to give to the widow the option to buy the described real estate at the fixed price of $140,000. In that regard she occupies the same position as a stranger to the will.

But it is urged that this is an alternative gift, and since it is possible that the wife's three-ninths of the residuum

of the estate may not amount to $140,000, the effect of this provision would be to reduce the amount given to charity. We do not think so. While no evidence is pointed out by the appellant tending to establish that the wife's three-ninths interest will not amount to more than $140,000, yet even if it does not, such fact will not change the import of the will. It might well be to her advantage to purchase the same at $140,000, though the balance of the purchase price be supplied from moneys other than her three-ninths portion of the residuum of the estate, and the will merely gives her the option of purchasing this property from the trustees and applying her legacy on the purchase price. This does not prevent the fee to the land vesting in the trustees immediately upon the death of the testator. This is an option to purchase and not an alternative gift.

We have considered the other objections urged by counsel for appellant as reasons for holding this clause void, but as these objections are predicated upon the ground that the gift in clause 7 cannot be held to be a valid gift to charity, it does not become necessary to extend this opinion by presenting them further.

Under the direction of the testator that the trustees shall convert all realty into cash this estate is to be considered as personal property. It has long been the established rule in this State that where a testator directs that his entire estate shall be first converted into money, the estate is to be treated as a devise of money and not of land. (Baker v. Copenbarger, 15 Ill. 103; Jennings v. Smith, 29 id. 116; Rankin v. Rankin, 36 id. 293; Crerar v. Williams, supra; Bispham's Principles of Equity, 307.) Under this will the duty to convert all real estate into money is imperative. Not a single bequest of the will can be satisfied without the payment of money. All gifts are therefore gifts of personalty, and it cannot be said that because the bill questions the validity of the clause creating the gift to charity, the direction to convert into personal property is like

wise void because such direction is contained in said clause. Even though the gift to charity made under clause 7 were an invalid gift, the estate would nevertheless be treated as personalty and not realty. (Crerar v. Williams, supra.) This being true, and the testator having been survived by a widow, appellant, who is his niece, could take no interest in this property even though such gift to charity be void.

It has long been the established rule in this State that courts of equity favor gifts to charity. This has been likewise the general rule. In Gray on Perpetuities (607) it is said: "But if the court can see an intention to make an unconditional gift to charity, (and the court is very keen-sighted to discover this intention,) then the gift will be regarded as immediate, not subject to any condition precedent, and therefore not within the scope of the rule against perpetuities." In this State a court of chancery will consider a charity as the substance of the gift, and if the mode pointed out in the conveyance or will for carrying it into effect fails, courts of equity will provide another mode by which the charity will take effect. Heuser v. Harris, 42 Ill. 425; Andrews v. Andrews, supra; Hunt v. Fowler, 121 Ill. 269; Crerar v. Williams, supra.

As our conclusion is that the residuary bequest in this will is a good and valid gift to a charitable use, and that by the direction to the trustees to convert all of the realty into personalty an equitable conversion is effected and all property of the estate is treated as personalty, it follows that the appellant is without any interest in the estate of the testator, and the chancellor did not err in dismissing her bill for want of equity.

There is no ambiguity in the will and appellant could take no interest under it in any event, and the chancellor did not err in refusing to allow her solicitors' fees.

The decree of the circuit court dismissing appellant's bill for want of equity was right and it will be affirmed. Decree affirmed.

(No. 13201.-Reversed and remanded.)

LOUISE DAVIS, Appellee, vs. THE SOUTH SIDE ELEVATED RAILROAD COMPANY, Appellant.

Opinion filed April 21, 1920.

I. NEGLIGENCE—only ordinary care is required of carrier in the maintenance of station buildings and appurtenances. The rule requiring the highest degree of care on the part of railroad companies for the protection of passengers applies only to the operation of trains and immediate incidents of transportation, and as to station buildings and other appurtenances the carrier is required to exercisc only ordinary care to keep them in a reasonably safe condition for use.

2. SAME degree of care required of carrier should be commensurate with the danger involved. The degree of care owed by a carrier to its passengers is lessened to the extent of the lessening of the danger involved.

3. SAME when elevated railroad company is not liable for injury to passenger on stairway leading from station. An elevated. railroad company is not liable for an injury to a passenger who slipped on a banana skin and fell on the stairway leading from the elevated station to the street, where the evidence does not show that the company had notice that the skin was on the stairway or that it had been permitted to be upon the stairway for a sufficient time to imply notice.

APPEAL from the First Branch Appellate Court for the First District;-heard in that court on appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. SHERIDAN E. FRY, Judge, presiding.

WILLIAM A. MORROW, and CARROLL H. JONES, (AddiSON L. GARDNER, of counsel,) for appellant.

Mr. JUSTICE CARTER delivered the opinion of the court: Appellee filed a statement of claim of the first class in the municipal court of Chicago against appellant for damages alleged to have been sustained through an accident from falling on the stairway leading from an elevated railway station in Chicago after leaving the train the evening of