of the county court to borrow the $7000 involved and the order of the court on said petition, that the commissioners were authorized to borrow this money in anticipation of the collection of the second assessment, and that the warrant issued by the commissioners was to be paid out of the second assessment, subject to the lien of the bonds for ninety per cent of such assessment. It follows, therefore, that the only fund against which this warrant is a lien is the fund arising from the ten per cent of the second assessment over and above the bonds issued thereon and funds. then in the treasury. It But it is urged by plaintiff in error that the order and warrant were made also a lien against any funds in the treasury, and that since the order of the court remitting ten per cent of the original assessment was void, such portion of the original assessment should be considered funds in the treasury for the purpose of paying said warrant. contends that such ten per cent of the original assessment was assets in the hands of the district at the time the warrant was issued, and further contends that the words "funds now in the treasury," used by the county court in authorizing the loan, include the surplus of the original assessment over and above the first ninety per cent thereof, and cites in support of its contentions, Spring Creek Drainage District v. Elgin, Joliet and Eastern Railway Co. 249 Ill. 260. The question in that case was whether or not, at the time the debt there questioned was contracted, the district was in debt over and above all its assets, it being there claimed that if such was the case the contract was null and void to the extent that the obligation exceeded the funds on hand at the time the contract was made. It appeared from the record in that case that the district owned a certain parcel of real estate, of the value of $8000, that was not necessary for use for right of way purposes of the district but which the district had bought and paid for out of the previous assessment collected. The court held that by rea son of the fact that the district had collected and had had as funds in its hands from the original assessment the amount used to buy the strip of ground in question, said strip of land represented the money collected and would likewise be considered funds in the hands of the district. The term "funds" has been defined to be property of every kind when such property is contemplated as something to be used for payment of debts. (Anderson's Law Dict. 482.) It has also been held to be a certain amount of money which, when collected, is to be applied to a particular purpose. (People v. New York Central Railroad Co. 34 Barb. 123.) The language, "funds now in the treasury," used in the order of the county court authorizing this debt, is not, however, susceptible of the broad construction. claimed by plaintiff in error. The language, "now in the treasury," cannot be here applied to the original benefit assessment now uncollected and which will not be collected for some years to come. This is made evident in this record by the fact that the county court ordered said ten per cent to be remitted to the land owners and supposed at that time that it had authority so to do, and it cannot be supposed that it intended to include such assessment by the use of the language, "funds now in the treasury." But it is earnestly urged on the part of the plaintiff in error that it is entitled to have a money decree in the nature of a deficiency decree, and that unless it be given a lien against the uncollected ten per cent of the original assessment it will be without remedy for the payment of more than half the warrant. It is contended, on the other hand, by the defendant in error that ten per cent of the second assessment, together with the interest accruing thereon, when collected, will be sufficient to pay this warrant and the interest thereon. If that be true, then, of course, plaintiff in error is not harmed by the decision of the Appellate Court limiting its recovery to the second assessment. The warrant does not, in terms, fall due at any particular time, but it is evident from the order of the court authorizing the warrant that it is not to become due until the collection of the second assessment. This assessment is divided into eleven installments, the first of which was due in 1911 and the last will be due in 1921, at which time the warrant becomes due. Since the warrant will not be due until the collection of the last installment of the second assessment, and since it is not known what, if any, part of the warrant will remain unpaid after the lien against the second assessment is exhausted, there can be no basis for entering such money decree, and plaintiff in error is not now entitled thereto. In view of the fact that the whole of the $7000 was to pay for work in the district which had been authorized and for which there was in the first and second assessments a sufficient amount uncollected, over and above the bonds, to meet this entire warrant, the county court might have made the warrant a lien against both assessments, as such a loan was not wholly ultra vires the district. Nor do we see any reason why the county court may not still direct that it be paid out of both assessments, if need be. This case is not similar to Badger v. Inlet Drainage District, 141 Ill. 540, and Winkelmann v. Moredock Drainage District, 170 id. 37, cited by defendant in error to support its contention that this loan, so far as it may not be paid out of the second assessment, is a void loan. In those cases the commissioners contracted certain debts and afterward sought to levy an assessment to pay the same, and it was held that the commissioners were without power so to do. Nor is this a case where the debt sought to be contracted was in excess of the amount of the unpaid assessments, as was the case in Badger v. Inlet Drainage District, supra, where it was held that the commissioners have no power to borrow money in excess of the amount of the assessments unpaid. Here there will be ample funds arising from the two assessments to meet this warrant when all have been collected. The county court authorized this loan. It is within the limits prescribed by the statute. The only apparent reason for not including the original assessment within the lien was that the county court erroneously supposed the balance of such assessment had been remitted. The statute provides the method by which money may be borrowed by a drainage district. It cannot be done by any other method. The powers of a drainage district are limited to those prescribed by the statute. (Badger v. Inlet Drainage District, supra; Winkelmann v. Moredock Drainage District, supra.) The purpose of the provision limiting the borrowing power of the commissioners is to keep the debts of the district within the assessment for benefits. The county court has power to authorize the borrowing of money within those limits and to direct that the money borrowed shall be re-paid from the balance of any assessment or assessments over and above the bonds outstanding against such assessment. This is clearly a debt within those limits, authorized by a court having power so to do. There appears to be no equitable ground for defeating this debt. The money borrowed was used for the benefit of the district. The loan was authorized. The order of the county court authorizing the loan is not before us for review. Plaintiff in error's amended bill alleged that the warrant was by the order of the county court made a lien against the original as well as the second assessment. This averment is not borne out by the proof. The Appellate Court did not err in modifying the decree of the circuit court so as to exclude the original assessment from the effect of the warrant as a lien. It does not follow from the judgment of the Appellate Court, nor from anything appearing in the record, that the plaintiff in error is to be precluded from having the balance of its claim over and above the amount realized from the second assessment after such claim has matured. The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed. (No. 13074-Decree affirmed.) BYRON GREGORY, Defendant in Error, vs. THE SUBURBAN REALTY COMPANY, Plaintiff in Error. Opinion filed April 21, 1920. 1. REMOVAL OF CAUSES-when petition for removal of cause is properly denied. A petition for the removal of a cause is properly denied where it is not on file, properly verified, until the second day of the return term of the court in which the suit is brought. 2. MORTGAGES-second mortgagee acquires only an interest in equity of redemption. A second mortgagee acquires only an interest in the mortgagor's equity of redemption under the prior mortgage, and the purchaser at the foreclosure of the second mortgage will be presumed to have regulated his bid with reference to the prior lien. 3. SAME-first mortgagee is not a necessary party to a suit to foreclose second mortgage. In a suit to foreclose a second mortgage the first mortgagee is not a necessary party, as the object of foreclosing a second mortgage is to cut off all claim of right or interest subsequent to it. 4. SAME when first mortgagee cannot be compelled to accept proceeds of foreclosure sale of second mortgage. On a foreclosure of a second mortgage a first mortgagee cannot be compelled to accept payment from the proceeds of the sale unless his lien has matured and he appears and consents to the decree. 5. SAME-lien of first mortgage is not affected by a decree for foreclosure of second mortgage. Where a first mortgagee is made defendant to a bill to foreclose a second mortgage under the general allegation that he claims some interest in the premises, and a decree for foreclosure and sale is entered in the usual form, barring all defendants of any right or claim, the lien of the first mortgage will not be affected. 6. CLOUD ON TITLE—when bill need not allege, in terms, that the master's deed is void and a cloud on title. Where a party who has acquired title to premises from a first mortgagee after foreclosure files his bill to clear the title and alleges facts showing that a master's deed under the foreclosure of a second mortgage is invalid as against his title and a cloud thereon, it is not necessary that the deed be alleged in express terms to be void. 7. COSTS―when plaintiff in error should not be required to pay damages for delay. Section 23 of the Costs act, authorizing the court to order the payment of a sum not exceeding ten per cent of |