The pendency of proceedings in the probate court of a State cannot be pleaded in abate-
ment of a suit in the federal court. Green's Administratrix v. Creighton, 464...... 23
H. 90.
1. When a sail vessel and a steamer are approaching each other, it is the duty of the
former to hold on her course and of the latter to keep out of her way. The Steam-
ship Pacific, (New York and Liverpool Mail Steamship Company v. Rumball,) 37......
2. These rules are binding on both vessels, from the time of possible collision until
such possibility is passed, or until there is no chance of avoiding danger by that
Įb.
3. As the steamer is bound to keep out of the way, and it devolves upon her to shape
her course and adopt other means for the security of both vessels, it is necessary,
to enable her to do this, that the sail vessel should steadily hold on her course. Ib.
4. The controversy in this case is on the question whether the sail vessel did not depart
from this rule, improperly changing her course; and the court finds from the evi-
dence that she did not, and that the steamer is responsible for the collision. Ib.
5. It is the established rule for tugs in the harbor of New York to offer their services
by approaching in the wake of the vessel, and to come up on the starboard quarter
and slack the engine, so as not to pass her. Tugs approaching in any other direction
must round to, so as to head the same way as the vessel. The R. L. Mabey, (Sturgis
v. Clough et al.,) 88 .....21 H. 451.
6. The Mabey, in this case, meeting the brig at an acute angle, run into the other tug,
the Hector, which was approaching from the rear, according to the rule. As the
collision was due to the violation by the Mabey of the rule which required her to
round to and approach with her head in the same direction as the vessel, she must be
held to pay the damages of the collision. Ib.
In a collision between a steamer and a propeller on Lake Erie, the vessels approaching
each other from opposite directions, or nearly so, in the night, with fair starlight, it
was held-
7. That the propeller was in fault for the want of knowledge and skill of the mate in
charge of her. Chamberlain v. Ward and Ward v. Chamberlain, 162......21 II.
548-572.
8. For his persistence in pursuing his course, when he had ample time to avoid the
danger by changing. Ib.
9. Because the signal light, though sufficient when put up, had been permitted to become
dim for want of trimming and other attention. Ib.
10. The steamer was also chargeable with fault for want of a look-out or watch. The
mate who has other duties, and attends to them, is not such sufficient look-out. The
look out should give his exclusive attention to that business, and should be stationed"
where he could best see without obstruction by rigging, and without being too much
elevated above the water. Ib.
11. Also because the mate in charge of the vessel, who discovered the lights of the
propeller a mile away, though doubting what it was, did not take suitable steps to
avoid a collision, while running at the rate of sixteen miles an hour. Ib.
12. The true construction of the act of March 3, 1859, which makes a vessel liable for ali
the damages arising from want of proper signal lights, does not impair the admiralty
rule that where, in case of collision, the other vessel is also in fault, the damages
should be divided. The other vessel in such case is not relieved from the conse-
quences of her own wrong by this provision. Ib.
13. The result in this case is, that their damages must be equally divided between the
owners of the two vessels, as it is a suit in personam. 1b.
14. In a narrow stream, at a time when steamboats are using it, a flat-boat should
have lights on each end in the night, oars at each end also, and should descend the
stream with its length parallel to the current, and not diagonally across it; and for
failing to observe these matters, the boat was in fault. The Brigadier General
Stokes, (Nelson v. Leland,) 228......22 H. 48.
15. The steamer was also in fault, because the pilot, mistaking the light which he saw
on the boat for a landing place, did not stop his vessel until he could be assured he
was right. The boat is responsible for such mistakes, when they might be avoided
by due care.
16. In a case of collision between a steamship and a propeller, with a barge in tow, the
latter is not to be treated or to govern herself as a sailing vessel under similar cir-
cumstances. The Keystone State, (New York and Baltimore Transportation Com-
pany v. Philadelpria and Savannah Steam Navigation Company,) 410 .....22 H. 461.
17. She is bound by the rule that two steam vessels approaching each other in opposite
directions must each port helm and go to the right. Ib.
18. A look-out, standing behind the wheel-house, so that it obstructs his view forward,
is not in his proper place. The owner of the barge sunk by the collision cannot
recover on account of a violation of these rules by the propeller. Ib.
19. It is the duty of a sailing vessel to keep her course and a steamer to keep out of
the way when approaching each other. The Louisiana, (Haney et al. v. Baltimore
Steam Packet Company,) 543......23 H. 287.
20. It is the duty of a steamer to have a look-out, who shall be assigned to that duty
alone. Ib.
21. It is the duty of the officer whose watch it is, to be on deck, especially if he knows
another vessel is approaching. Ib.
22. A violation of any of these rules renders the vessel liable for the consequences. Ib.
23. Where two sailing vessels are approaching each other in converging lines, and the
one in the rear is the heaviest and the fastest sailer, it is her special duty to give way
if there is danger of collision as they approach. The Fannie Crocker, (Whitridge et
al. v. Dill et al.,) 647. ....23 H. 448.
24. A vessel is in fault for want of a sufficient look-out, when the only looky out is so
engaged in working the sails that he does not discover a vessel ahead of or parallel
with his until too late to avoid a collision. Ib.
1. The general rule is that delivery of goods at the place of destination, or readiness
to deliver, is a precedent condition to the right to demand payment of freight. The
Ship Alboni, (Brittan v. Burnaby,) 148 .....21 H. 527.
2. If the shipment is large, so that it cannot be landed in one day, the master may
require a pro rata payment, as regards value, before the parcels first landed can be
taken away; but he cannot demand payment for all on delivery of a part. Ib.
3. Words stamped on the back of the bill of lading by the master, without evidence of
the assent of the consignee or shipper of the goods, cannot vary this rule so as to
authorize a demand of payment for all before any of the goods are ready for deliv
ery. Ib.
4. By the laws of Brazil, goods not found on the manifest of a vessel, nor added to it
before delivery, are liable to seizure and confiscation. The owner of a vessel who
contracted to deliver goods to consignee in Rio de Janeiro, is responsible for the fail-
ure of the master to observe this law, if the goods are thereby lost to the consignee.
The Bark Griffin, (Howland v. Greenway,) 424......22 H. 491.
5. It is no defense, under such circumstances, that the goods were actually landed and
received in the custom house and the duties paid by consignees. The delivery con-
tracted for by the master is a delivery free from prior liability to confiscation for his
acts in violating the local revenue law. Ib.
6. What constitutes a delivery to a consignee in an ordinary contract of affreightment
will depend largely on the established usages of the particular trade, and of the
port in which the delivery is made. The Bark Tangier, (Richardson v. Goddard,)
442......23 H. 28.
7. By the commercial and maritime law it is the settled rule that the carrier by water
shall carry from port to port and from wharf to wharf, and is not bound to deliver
at the warehouse or business place of the consignee. Ib.
8. Goods delivered at the proper wharf at a proper time, with notice to consignee, is a
good delivery, though, if consignee refuse to receive them, it is the duty of the car-
rier to put them in a place of safety. Ib.
9. The day of fasting and prayer fixed by proclamation of the governor of Massachu-
setts is not, by law or by any general usage or custom of the city of Boston, a day
on which labor or business is forbidden, and a delivery on that day on the wharf was
a valid delivery; and a loss by fire consequent on the failure of the consignees to
remove the goods from the wharf on that day is not chargeable to the vessel or her
Ib.
1. The admiralty jurisdiction extends to the Yazoo river, although it is wholly within
the State of Mississippi, and the stage of the water is sometimes too low for practi-
cable navigation. The Brigadier General Stokes, (Nelson et al. v. Leland et al.,)
228......22 H. 48.
2. The district court of the United States sitting in admiralty has no jurisdiction of a
contract of partnership for the use of a vessel put into a line for carrying passengers
and freight. The contract arranged the contributions which each party was to
make, and the share of profits to be received; and though one of the parties fur-
nished the vessel, the contract was not a charter party. Ward v. Thompson, 361......
3. While the jurisdiction of the admiralty court in cases of contract depends on the
nature of the contract, in torts it depends solely on the locality. Hence, leaving
piles concealed in the navigable waters of a river, by which a vessel is injured, is a
marine tort. Philadelphia, Wilmington, and Baltimore Railroad Company v. The
Philadelphia and Havre de Grace Steam Towboat Company, 507......23 H. 209.
4. This court reasserts the decision of the New Jersey Steamboat Company v. The
Merchants' Bank, 6 Howard, 334, that the district courts sitting in admiralty have
jurisdiction of contracts of charter-party and affreightment, which are maritime
contracts. Morewood v. Enequist, 677......23 H. 491.
5. Also, that where the district and circuit courts have made the same finding of facts
on conflicting testimony, this court will not reverse on a doubt raised by such testi-
mony. Ib.
1. Building a ship, supplying engines or furnishing timber for her, is not a maritime
contract. People's Ferry Co. v. Beers, 20 H. 400, (2 Miller, 489,) reaffirmed. Steamer
Capitol, (Roach et al. v. Chapman et ul.,) 260......22 H. 129.
2. The district courts of the United States, therefore, have no jurisdiction of such a
contract; nor can a State statute giving a lien on the vessel in such case give juris-
diction in the federal court.
1. Where, both in the libel and answer, the issue made is upon the improper stowage of
the cargo, and carelessness in landing, reloading, and re-stowing under a deck which
was leaky, the court cannot inquire into the seaworthiness of the vessel, or any other
cause of injury than the one put in issue. The Ship Pons Aelii, (McKinlay v. Mor-
rish,) 18......21 H. 343.
2. The court finds in this case, from an examination of the testimony, that the injury
did not accrue from either of the causes charged in the libel. Ib.
3 The injury to the goods (soap) was the result of a sweating process, caused by the
agitation of the vessel and the high temperature, for which the vessel is not
liable. Ib.
4. Whatever may be the rule of courts of common law, as to the circumstances under
which a consignee may sue for an injury to the cargo, there is no difficulty in the
way of such suit in a court of admiralty. Ib.
JURISDICTION OF CIRCUIT COURT, 1, 2, 3, 4; SALVAGE, 2.
1. Where parties made a contract for raising a vessel within a certain time and for a
definite compensation, they cannot repudiate the contract and libel the vessel for
salvage. Steamboat Kate, (Bondies v. Sherwood,) 298......22 H. 214.
2. Whether an admiralty suit in rem and in personam in the same libel can be sustained,
and whether admiralty has jurisdiction of a salvage case occurring on a river wholly
within a State, are open questions in this court not necessary to the decision of this
case. Ib.
1. Where the agreement shows that the contract with the agent was for his principal,
whose name and residence is disclosed in the writing, the right of the principal to
sue on it cannot be denied on the ground that he resided in another State, and the
defendants looked to the agent alone in the matter. Oelricks et al. v. Ford, 451 ....
2. A railroad company having contracted for the driving of these piles, as part of their
bridge across the Susquehanna, and their engineer having superintended the work,
and the company having abandoned their bridge before built and discharged the
contractor, is responsible for the dangerous condition in which the piles were left.
Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Wilmington Railroad Company v. The Philadelphia
and Havre de Grace Steam Towboat Company, 507......23 H. 209.
BANKS AND BANKING; CONTRACTS, CONSTRUCTION OF, 6; EVIDENCE, 2. 3.
The cashier of a bank wrote to the secretary of the treasury, authorizing one of the
directors, as agent of the bank, to contract for the transfer of money from New York
to New Orleans. Held, that such an authority was not within the ordinary power of
the cashier alone. and that as no act of the board of directors nor any rule of the
bank had given such authority, the contract was not binding on the bank. The
special circumstances under which the letter was written fully considered.
States v. The City Bank of Columbus, 28......21 H. 356.
APPEALS AND WRITS OF ERROR.
JURISDICTION OF SUPREME COURT; PRACTICE IN SUPREME COURT.
BOUNDARY OF GEORGIA AND ALABAMA.
The point in dispute is, whether the boundary is the western bank of the Chattahoochee
river or the low-water mark of the west side of that river. This depends on the
construction of the line described in the treaty of cession by Georgia to the United
States, to wit: "west of a line beginning on the western bank of the Chattahoochee
river, where the same crosses the boundary between the United States and Spain,
running up said river and along the western bank thereof." Held, that the western
bank is the boundary line, that the jurisdiction of the bed of the river is in Georgia,
and includes all that part of the soil which is alternately covered and left bare, and
which is adequate to contain it at its average and mean stage during the entire year.
The State of Alabama v. The State of Georgia, 687......23 H. 505.
1. Micheltorena's general power to Sutter to grant or confirm titles within his jurisdic-
tion of New Helvetia and Sacramento was abrogated by the unsuccessful issue and
overthrow of the former in the contest in which he was then engaged. United States
v. Nye, 62......21 H. 408.
2. In the present case the power conferred was exercised more than a year after Michel-
torena's abdication, and the claim founded on it is void, and the claimant's petition
must be dismissed. Ib.
3. Under the act of March 3, 1851, concerning private land claims in California, an
appeal may be had to this court from the decree of the district court confirming or
rejecting the claim, and another appeal from a subsequent decree rendered after it is
remanded from this court ascertaining the boundaries. United States v. Fossatt, 83
4. But this last decree must be conclusive as to the boundaries, which is not the case
when only three sides of the grant are given, and the survey has not been made or
completed. Ib.
5. The district court has power to compel the completion of a survey according to its
decree; and until this is done there is no final decree on the question of boundary, in
case where a survey is necessary, from which an appeal lies. Ib.
6. The decree of the district court confirming this claim is reversed and remanded for
a further hearing and additional testimony, for the following reasons: The titulo
or concession was really male a few days before the possession of California by the
Americans, and the date was altered to make it appear to have been February instead
instead of June. There was no actual occupation, though claimant swears there was.
The genuineness of the governor's signature seems to be very doubtful. United States
v. Galbraith, 246......22 H. 89.
7. Where the grant gives specific boundaries, and also states that the grant is one league
in length and three quarters in breadth, a little more or less, also speaking of the
surplus to be left to the nation, the concession is confirmed for the quantity mentioned
inside the boundaries described. Gonzales v. United States, 273......22 H. 161.
8. A grant with boundaries, but not well defined, the land being two square leagues, a
little more or less, with diseño and other matters: Held, that claimant is entitled to
two leagues square, or four square leagues, within the described boundaries. United
States v. Pacheco, 306......22 H. 225.
9. Claimant shows an order of 1844 from Micheltorena, governor of California, authoriz-
ing him to search for and settle upon land, with a view to a future grant, a petition
for the land to Governor Pico in 1846, and a reference to the alcalde for information,
and the report of this officer that the land was not private property. This, with proof
of possession under the first order, was all claimant's evidence: Held, that it showed
no grant or other vested rights, and the claim must be rejected. United States v.
Garcia, 330......22 H. 274.
10. The laws of Mexico concerning grants of land permitted one league of irrigable land,
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