A court of bankruptcy has no power to enjoin a stranger to the proceeding who resides outside the jurisdiction and who is not served with process therewith.10 Under its ancillary jurisdiction, such an injunction can be obtained from the Court of Bankruptcy in the district where such stranger resides or can be served.11 A person who is granted leave to intervene submits himself to the jurisdiction and may be enjoined from taking proceedings in other courts which amount to an attack on the decrees or orders of the Court of Bankruptcy.12 A Court of Bankruptcy has jurisdiction upon a summary application to issue an injunction in aid of its jurisdiction.13 The referee may issue such an injunction or restraining order in ordinary cases; 14 but he cannot enjoin the proceedings of a court or of an officer thereof.15 The injunction should be prayed in a petition filed in the proceedings in bankruptcy, which, after adjudication, is usually filed with the referee, except in cases where a court or an officer thereof is to be restrained. Before adjudication, it should be filed with the clerk of the Court of Bankruptcy.16 10 Acme Harvester Co. v. Beekman Lumber Co., 222 U. S. 300, 311, 56 L. ed. 208, 215; Re Isaac Harris Co., 173 Fed. 735. 11 Acme Harvester Co. v. Beekman Lumber Co., 222 U. S. 300, 311, 56 L. ed. 208, 215. Prior to the amendment of 1910 (36 St. at L. 838), it was held that a Court of Bankruptcy had no ancillary jurisdiction to issue an injunction in aid of bankruptcy proceedings in another district, except in a plenary suit, of which it otherwise had jurisdiction. Re Williams, 120 Fed. 28, 9 Am. B. R. 741; Remington on Bankruptcy, § 1812. Compare Horskins v. Sanderson, 132 Fed. 415, 13 Am. B. R. 101. Re Peiser, 115 Fed. 199, 7 Am. B. R. 690. But see 12 Re Ohio Copper Mining Co., 241 Fed. 711. A person who is denied leave to intervene does not, although he has addressed the court upon diverse occasions in the proceedings. Ibid. 18 White v. Schloerb, 178 U. S. 542, 44 L. ed. 1183; Wall v. Cox, 181 U. S. 244, 45 L. ed. 845; Remington on Bankruptcy, §§ 359, 1901; Brandenburg on Bankruptcy, § 683. 14 Re Booth, 96 Fed. 943, 2 Am. B. R. 770; Re Adams, 134 Fed. 142, 14 Am. B. R. 23; Remington on Bankruptcy, § 207. But see Re Benjamin, 140 Fed. 320. It has been intimated that a referee cannot enjoin persons from proclaiming their adverse claims to bidders at a sale under the orders of a Court of Bankruptcy, or from threatening proceedings against such purchaser. Re Rochford, C. C. A., 124 Fed. 182, 10 Am. B. R. 608. 15 General Order XII; Re Steuer, 104 Fed. 976, 5 Am. B. R. 209; Re Siebert, 133 Fed. 781, 13 Am. B. R. 348. § 634. Receivers in bankruptcy. A Court of Bankruptcy has power to "appoint receivers or the marshals, upon application of parties in interest, in case the court shall find it absolutely necessary, for the preservation of estates, to take charge of the property of bankrupts after the filing of the petition and until it is dismissed or the trustee is qualified," and to "authorize the business of bankrupts to be conducted for limited periods by receivers, the marshals, or trustees, if necessary in the best interests of the estates, and allow such officers additional compensation for said services, but not at a greater rate than in this Act allowed trustees for similar services."1 Receivers in Bankruptcy are usually appointed by the court through a judge thereof. § 1919. It has been held that, if the petition is properly entitled, it need contain no allegations to show that the proceedings in bankruptcy are pending within the district, Re Goldberg, 117 Fed. 692, 9 Am. B. R. 156. It should be verified; but the verification may be made by an attorney, where the papers show that the residence of the petitioners is distant and state the reason for the attorney so verifying the same. Re Goldberg, 117 Fed. 692, 9 Am. B. R. 156. Under ordinary cir cumstances, notice of the filing of the petition and of the application should be given to the parties against whom the injunction is sought, Re Steuer, 104 Fed. 976, 5 Am. B. R. 209; Beach v. Macon Grocery Co., C. C. A., 116 Fed. 143, 8 Am, B. R. 751; but to avoid irreparable injury, the injunction may be issued without notice, Re Steuer, 104 Fed. 976, 5 Am. B. R. 209; Beach V. Macon Grocery, 12 Am. B. R. 626; Orinoco Iron Co. v. Metzel, C. C. A., 230 Fed. 40; Remington on Bankruptcy, § 1921. For the dissolution of an injunction for laches, see Re Lederer, 125 Fed. 96; Re Latimer, 141 Fed. 655. § 634. 130 St. at L. 544, 545. It seems that the applicant for the receivership must file a bond similar to that required of applicants for warrants of seizure. 30 St. at L. 544, § 3e. See supra, § 631; Re Independent Machine & Tool Corporation, C. C. A., 251 Fed. 48. The bond may be waived by the bankrupt, Ibid., and the courts often do not insist upon compliance with this salutary statutory requirement. Ordinarily, notice of the appointment should be given to the bankrupt, T. S. Faulk & Co. v. Steiner, Lobman & Frank, C. C. A., 165 Fed. 861, 866. Where all the parties in interest are before the court and the case is a proper one for a receivership, an ex parte order appointing a receiver will not be vacated. Re Standard Cordage Co., 184 Fed. 166. See $317, supra; and to any receiver of his property who has been appointed by the State court, Sidney L. Bauman Diamond Co. v. Hart, C. C. A., 192 The referee may appoint the receiver after the general order of reference to him has been made, and also upon the receipt of the certificate of the clerk that the judge is absent or unable to act. The appointment of a receiver is an extraordinary remedy, and it was the intention of the statute that it should be rarely made. It has been held that a referee has no power to appoint a receiver without a finding as to its necessity.5 Fed. 498. In an extraordinary case, the appointment may be made without notice to the bankrupt, Re Francis, 136 Fed. 912; affirmed as Latimer v. McNeal, C. C. A., 142 Fed. 451. See supra, § 315. Notice to the creditors is not necessary, Re Abrahamson & Bretstein, 1 Am. B. R. 44, Referee Moss, New York; Remington on Bankruptcy, § 381. 2 Re Florcken, 107 Fed. 241. The courts should not appoint receivers who are selected by the alleged bankrupt; and if named at his instance, upon the discovery of that fact, they should be removed; but, it has been held that that is no ground for the dismissal of the petition. mingham Coal & Iron Co. v. Southern Steel Co., 160 Fed. 212. Bir 3 Re Kelly Dry Goods Co., 102 Fed. 747. 4 Re Rosenthal, 144 Fed. 548; T. S. Faulk & Co. v. Steiner, Lobman & Frank, C. C. A., 165 Fed. 861. As to the appointment of a receiver of a corporation charged to hold assets of the bankrupt, see Sprague v. L. D. Margolis Co., 211 Fed. 171. After adjudication, the necessity for the appointment of a receiver is more easily demonstrated. Re Huddleston, 167 Fed. 428. 5 Re Rosenthal, 144 Fed. 548. The petition for the appointment must show such necessity, Re Rosenthal, 144 Fed. 548; T. S. Faulk & Co. v. Steiner, Lobman & Frank, C. C. A., 165 Fed. 861. Facts which show the necessity must be therein stated. Re Rosenthal, 144 Fed. 548; T. S. Faulk & Co. v. Steiner, Lobman & Frank, C. C. A., 165 Fed. 861; Re Pilcher & Son, 228 Fed. 139; Badders Clothing Co. v. Burnham-Munger Root Dry Goods Co., C. C. A., 228 Fed. 470. A showing of an application for a voluntary dissolution of the corporation with the division of its assets among the creditors and stockholders and that the plant and factory had been closed to save cost and running expenses when the company was still selling its products in the customary way, was held to be insufficient. Re Standard Cordage Co., 184 Fed. 156; and the petition must be sworn to, Re Rosenthal, 144 Fed. 548. T. S. Faulk & Co. v. Steiner, Lobman & Frank, C. C. A., 165 Fed. 861, 867. An affidavit merely as to belief was, in one case, held to be insufficient, Re Rosenthal, 144 Fed. 548. The consent of the bankrupt to the appointment of a receiver is not sufficient, T. S. Faulk & Co. v. Steiner, Lobman & Frank, C. C. A., 165 Fed. 861. Where property is in the custody of a receiver appointed by a State court, the court of bankruptcy should not, before an adjudication, appoint a re The receiver's rights date from the time of the appointment." It is customary to require a bond of the receiver. A receiver in bankruptcy is a mere custodian and has no title to the property of the bankrupt. A receiver in bankruptcy may be sued in ceiver thereof except under extraordinary circumstances. Re Spalding (C. C. A. Second Circuit), May, 1905, reported in Re Oakland Lumber Co., C. C. A., 174 Fed. 634, 637; Re Desrochers, 183 Fed. 991; Re Standard Cordage Co., 184 Fed. 156; Gealey v. South Side Trust Co., C. C. A., 249 Fed. 189; Ingram v. Ingram Dart Lighterage Co., 226 Fed. 58; Re Hargadine-McKittrick Dry Goods Co., 239 Fed. 155. See, §§ 52, 55, 59, supra. Where the property is in the custody of an assignee appointed in insolvency proceedings under a State statute, no receiver should be appointed over it, except under extraordinary cir cumstances. Re Rosenthal, 144 Fed. 548, 549; Re Oakland Lumber Co., C. C. A., 174 Fed. 634; Rę Wentworth Lunch Co., C. C. A., 191 Fed. 821. Contra. Re D. & E. Dress Co., 244 Fed. 885; Re Federal Mail & Express Co., 233 Fed. 691; Re Resnek, 243 Fed. 417. After an adjudication of bankruptcy, a receiver appointed by the State court may be ordered to deliver possession to a receiver in bankruptcy. Re Diamond, 259 Fed. 70; Re J. W. Zeigler Co., 189 Fed. 259. The court refused to punish the State receiver for refusal to deliver possession of the property to the receiver in bankruptcy, when the former had acted under the advice of counsel. See Re Hecox, C. C. A., 164 Fed. 823. 6 Re Erie Lumber Co., 150 Fed. 817; Re Alton Mfg. Co., 158 Fed. 367. 7 Re Alton Mfg. Co., 158 Fed. 367. 8 Re Kelly Dry Goods Co., 102 Fed. 747; Boonville Nat. Bank v. Blakey, 107 Fed. 891, 47 C. C. A. 43; Re J. C. Winship Co., C. C. A., 120 Fed. 93; Re Kolin, C. C. A., 134 Fed. 557; Re Benedict, 140 Fed. 55. It has been said that a temporary receiver of a bankrupt has authority only to inventory and receive and retain the assets, and that he cannot employ custodians. Re Tisch, 202 Fed. 1018, nor employ an expert accountant to examine the books, nor employ an attorney, without special permission of the court. Re Leonard, 177 Fed. 503. The attorney for one of the petitioners in a proceeding in involuntary bankruptcy should not be employed as attorney for the receiver, except under special circumstances. Re Strobel, 160 Fed. 916; Re T. E. Hill Co., C. C. A., 159 Fed. 73, 77. Ordinarily, the court will not interfere with the discretion of the receiver in the selection of his attorney. Re Champion Wagon Co., 193 Fed. 1004. Such a receiver cannot sue to recover a preference, Boonville Nat. Bank v. Blakey, 107 Fed. 891, 47 C. C. A. 43; Frost v. Latham & Co., 181 Fed. 866 nor to set aside a fraudulent transfer of the bankrupt's property, Guaranty Title & Trust Co. v. Pearlman, 144 Fed. 550. But see Re Fixen & Co., 96 Fed. 748. It has been held that he may, in defensive proceedings, attack the validity of a chattel mortgage, because of a failure to a State court for trover, without the permission of the Court State statute. file the same as required by the Re Schmidt, C. C. A., 181 Fed. 73, 76. But see Re Dempster, C. C. A., 172 Fed. 353, 357; nor can he institute proceedings to take property held adversely by a stranger to the proceeding; Re Kolin, C. C. A., 134 Fed. 557; Beach v. Macon Grocery Co., C. C. A., 116 Fed. 143. But see Re Dempster, C. C. A., 172 Fed. 353. It has been said that it is clearly within the jurisdiction of the court appointing a receiver in bankruptcy to authorize him to institute necessary actions for the recovery of the bankrupt's property, Re Fixen & Co., 96 Fed. 748, 754; per Wellborn, J. In one case, he has been authorized to take possession of property held adversely pending a plenary suit to be subsequently instituted by the creditors or trustee to recover the same, Re Haupt Bros., 153 Fed. 239. See Dokken v. Page, C. C. A., 147 Fed 438. See Re Schoenfield, 190 Fed. 53. The court will grant an application by him for the surrender of property not held adversely in cases similar to those in which such relief is given to the trustee, Re Muncie Pulp Co., C. C. A., 139 Fed. 546; Re Rosenblatt, 143 Fed. 663; infra, 635. It was held that an alleged bankrupt could not, by the mere claim that they would tend to incriminate him without averring any facts tending to support the same, prevent an order for the delivery of his account books to a receiver appointed to carry on his business. Re Rosenblatt, 143 Fed. 663. For the denial of a motion to compel a State District Attorney to surrender books and papers of the bankrupt to the latter's receiver, Re Mandel, 224 Fed. 642. As to moneys taken by an unlawful search and seizure, see Le Master v. Spencer, C. C. A., 203 Fed. 210; Re A. Musica & Son, 205 Fed. 413. Relief of this character will not be granted to a receiver in a case where a trustee would not be entitled thereto. Re Greenberg, C. C. A., 175 Fed. 1020. Contempt proceedings for refusal to surrender property to an agent of the receiver will ordinarily be dismissed, unless the demand is made by a person who presents written evidence of his authority. Skubinsky v. Bodek, C. C. A., 172 Fed. 340. A dispute between a receiver in bankruptcy and a stranger to the proceeding as to whether a contract was made between them for the purchase by the latter of property of the estate, is a "controversy arising in bankruptcy proceedings," and an order made therein is reviewable by appeal, Re J. Jungmann, Inc., C. C. A., 186 Fed. 302. Cf. Re C. M. Burkhalter & Co., 179 Fed. 403. But see Re Vogt, 159 Fed. 317, in which the author was counsel. Where a receiver took possession of goods, which it was claimed that the bankrupt had transferred to a third person, it was held that the Court of Bankruptcy might, by consent, take jurisdiction of an intervention by the claimant and determine his title to the goods. Dokken v. Page, C. C. A., 147 Fed. 438. Where a receiver had deposited money in a designated depository, it was held that the court of bankruptcy had no summary jurisdiction to compel repayment thereof, Re Bologh, 185 |