Insurance.

The word salvage, like the word insurer, is used in two distinct and opposite senses. On the one hand, it means a sum of money payable to persons who have saved the ship from loss; on the other, it means the property or proceeds of property which may remain after a loss has been incurred. As regards salvage in the former sense, it may be broadly stated that wherever the underwriters are liable for a loss, they are liable for charges incurred in averting the same. Therefore, if the property insured be captured, and the owners, in order to regain possession of it, have to pay salvage to recaptors, such a payment, unless the risk of capture be excluded by the policy, gives rise to a claim against underwriters. The salvage must, however (t), have been properly ascertained and paid by the assured.

As regards salvage in the sense of proceeds, an instance may be mentioned of a so-called salvage of a very exceptional kind which attached to goods in vessels destroyed by the Confederate cruiser Alabama. Part of the compensation paid by the British Government under the Geneva award (u) was ordered by the United States Government to be applied in payment of any deficiencies as between the actual and the insured values of property so destroyed. This difference was, in Burnand v. Rodocanachi (x), claimed from the assured by the underwriters, who had paid as for a total loss of certain goods in respect of which this compensation had been received. The Court, however, decided against this claim, on the ground that defendant had received the money under the Act of Congress and judgment of the American Court expressly to keep it for himself, and not to pay it over to the plaintiff (y).

(t) Arnould's Insce., 5th ed., 779.

(u) Vide p. 364, infra.

(x) L. R. 7 App. Cases, House of Lords, 333.

(y) The following clause is sometimes used in marine policies on vessels chartered by the government during hostilities:

"To include war risk, but all money received from H. M. Government as compensation for value of ship if lost or captured to be treated as salvage": Owen's Marine Insce. Notes and Clauses, 2nd ed. p. 100.

THE BOMBARDMENT OF SEABOARD TOWNS.

According to first principles, the individual is, by the law of nations, so identified with the government to which he is subject, that acts of aggression or reprisal which may lawfully be exercised against his government, may equally be put in force against himself. He may be slain or imprisoned wherever found. But as the influences of civilization and religious sentiment have gathered force, the crudeness of this original principle has been greatly toned down in practice. So that at the present day it is, on the outbreak of hostilities, regarded as a matter of course that the noncombatant individual, so long as he stands aloof, will be allowed to go unharmed, and that his property will not be seized or destroyed, unless as a measure of necessity or safety on the part of the hostile forces. It is, indeed, nowadays, nothing uncommon for an invading force to tender payment for supplies gathered from residents in the hostile country traversed, and this practice, to whatever motives it may be attributed, seems destined to be in time regarded as a rule binding on civilized nations. Therefore, whatever may have been the rights or usages sanctioned or tolerated under less mature conditions of civilization, it must now, there can scarcely be a doubt, be taken as a recognised principle of modern warfare, that the lives and property of non-combatants are to be respected; and any nation wantonly, and without valid reason, burning or destroying defenceless cities, would undoubtedly become the object of the hatred and contempt of the world at large.

This is no doubt true. But, on the other hand, the wellestablished principle has to be kept in view, that the aim and object of a belligerent is to force his adversary to sue for peace, and that he is justified in taking such measures as may, by creating panic, dismay, and loss, incline the foe to come to terms. The application of this principle would scarcely justify a belligerent in wantonly bombarding an unfortified town; but it seems by no means evident that a hostile fleet, finding a wealthy and important seaboard town of the enemy at the moment without its defences, would not be held justified in demanding money or supplies from such a town, under penalty of bombardment in case of refusal (≈).

During the great maritime war which prevailed at the beginning of the present century, this question does not seem to have arisen. Seaboard towns, such as now exist, for example, along our own south-eastern coast-line, were comparatively unknown, their growth since then being almost entirely due to facilities of communication afforded by the railways. Owing to the great range and power of modern projectiles, these seaboard towns are probably incapable of defence against bombardment, except by warships; and, should

(z) “A ship at 4,000 or 5,000 yards range is so insignificant an object that she need fear no sort of fire from the shore at her; whilst the town aimed at is a very large target indeed. But two jokes which are current amongst naval and military men give a point to the modern ideas of bombardment, which nothing else rivals. It is said that ships intending to bombard will shelter themselves under the curvature of the earth; and it has been stated that one of the ships in the late manœuvres laid her guns 'W.S.W. by compass, eight and a quarter miles,' for a large inland town.” -Edinburgh Review, October, 1888, p. 473.

But if the above be jokes, a note in the Times of 26th December, 1888, under the head "Monster Russian Guns," would seem to invest them with a spice of reality. For the note attributes to the weapons referred to a range of over thirteen miles, and remarks that as a consequence of this range "the fire of the guns can only be directed by the map, the object fired at being out of sight."

the enemy succeed in bringing his naval forces near one of such towns, in the temporary absence of the defending fleet, the temptation to turn the opportunity to solid advantage might, perhaps, not be resisted. That such a contingency is not to be regarded as outside the range of the contingencies or conditions of modern naval warfare, may not unreasonably be inferred from the proceedings of some of the vessels of the British fleet during the naval war-game which took place between two opposing fleets in the summer of 1888. Professor Holland, in a letter which appeared in the Times of 29th August in that year, whilst protesting against what he describes as this "buccaneering precedent," remarks, that "It should be remembered that operations conducted with the apparent approval of the highest naval authorities, and letters in the Times from distinguished admirals, are, in truth, the stuff that public opinion, and, in particular, that department of public opinion known as ' international law,' is made of." Concluding, he observes that "We are as yet far from having disposed of the comparatively simple question as to the operations which may be properly undertaken by a naval squadron against an undefended seaboard." On the question of precedent, it may be here mentioned that in 1866 the city of Valparaiso, which was left absolutely undefended, was bombarded by the Spanish fleet, after a delay-conceded by the Spanish admiral, it is stated, on the representations of the commander of the British fleet then off the port-had been granted in order to give the inhabitants time to withdraw.

It is true that the delegates of all the States of Europe laid it down, inter alia, at the Brussels Conference of 1874, assembled at the invitation of the Emperor of Russia, that open or undefended towns cannot be attacked or bombarded; but such irresponsible expressions of opinion or sentiment cannot be looked upon as binding upon any one. Lord Derby,

indeed, writing on the subject of this Conference, declared that "A careful consideration of the whole matter has convinced her Majesty's Government that it is their duty firmly to repudiate, on behalf of Great Britain and her allies in any future war, any project for altering the principles of international law upon which this country has hitherto acted; and, above all, to refuse to be a party to any agreement the effect of which would be to facilitate aggressive wars and to paralyse the patriotic efforts of an invaded people " (a).

The Times, treating on this subject (), writes as follows: "The rules of international law are singularly precarious agreements, observable just so long as it may suit the strongest nations to observe them, and not a moment longer. It is but a very few years since Admiral Aube, a French officer of the highest distinction, and afterwards for a considerable time Minister of Marine, published in the Revue des Deux Mondes an article in which he laid it down that France, in any future war with a country like England, would make at once for the coast towns, and either bombard them without mercy or hold them to heavy ransom." And Admiral De Horsey, writing to the same journal (c), expresses himself thus: "A state of war, I venture to maintain, not only warrants, but makes it the duty of a belligerent to do everything in his power, consistent with humanity and the rights of neutrals, to induce his enemy to sue for peace. Few will deny the above brief definition of a belligerent's duty, and if that be granted, it is obvious that in pursuance of this object everything belonging to an enemy, whether afloat or on land, which can afford shelter, means of repair, aid or subsistence to his forces, is subject to capture or destruction; and that

(a) This expression of sentiment is interesting in conjunction with any consideration of the novelties formulated by the Declaration of Paris. (b) 10th August, 1888.

(c) 25th August, 1888.