reading, but as each argu

security on the part of the shippers. The correspondence on this subject is at great length, and may be described as an endless diplomatic chain of apparently unanswerable argument on the one hand, and of equally convincing reply and counter-argument on the other. From this point of view it affords, indeed, most instructive ment seems in turn to have been demolished by the reply, it is difficult to evolve from the correspondence any definite conclusion. As regards the allegations against Great Britain, similar complaints appear to have been called forth by the action of the United States. But on this, as on nearly every other point of the law of nations from its maritime. aspect, the views of Great Britain and of the United States are in strict accord. As regards the United States, arms were exported thence on a large scale, with the avowed object of sale to the French Government. The French Government being in need of this class of supplies, a refusal to permit shipment of the latter would, no doubt, have produced forcible remonstrances on the part of France, on the ground that such a prohibition was an act of partiality towards Germany.

But while a neutral government is, as it is held, under no obligation to prevent its subjects from continuing to ship to belligerents goods, whether contraband of war or otherwise, which it is part of the ordinary trade of such subjects to supply (0), the neutral government should not itself be a party to the like transactions. Thus, in 1825, whilst Spain was at war with her revolted subjects in Mexico, the Swedish Government offered for sale six warships. These vessels were bought by a Swedish firm, which transferred them to a London house, the financial agents of the revolted subjects. There being no doubt as to the object of the purchase, the

(0) Vide Bell v. Reid, 1 M. & S. 727; De Tastet v. Taylor, 4 Taunt. 238.

Spanish Government made representations to the Swedish Government, pointing out the disloyal act into which Sweden had been unwittingly betrayed, and urging cancelment of the sale to the Swedish firm. Several of the European powers having supported the Spanish demand, Sweden ultimately cancelled the sale, so far as concerned three of the vessels still within the national jurisdiction. The original sale by the Swedish Government was, no doubt, a purely commercial transaction, but on the facts becoming known to the selling government it could not, consistently with neutrality, refuse to prevent the vessels passing over to the enemy of Spain. Nor must a neutral power permit the sale of coal out of the government stores to a belligerent (p).

Clearly it is within the right of neutrals, as of belligerents (q), to pass such municipal laws as may be deemed generally expedient; and the right may be exercised in respect of prohibition of export of warlike stores, either because such stores may be required by the neutral government, or because it is desired to abstain from any action likely to create ill-will on the part of either belligerent (»). But that there is, according to the view of this country, no obligation on neutrals to prohibit export of contraband, has just been demonstrated. The provisions of special treaty engagements may, however, sometimes be found to require the observance of particular rules not by the public law of Europe rendered obligatory.

There is nothing in the law of nations to impose on a neutral state the obligation to prevent its subjects from send

(p) Twiss's Internat. Law, pp. 468, 469.

(9) As instanced on p. 306, supra.

(r) On the outbreak of war between France and Germany, the sale of contraband of war to belligerents was forbidden to Peruvian subjects by the national government. 61 State Papers, 656, 657.

ing to belligerents vessels specially adapted for warlike uses, any more than contraband articles of a more ordinary kind. An instance of this principle is supplied by The Independencia del Sud, an armed vessel sent out with a cargo of munitions of war from Baltimore for sale at Buenos Ayres to the de facto government, at that time engaged in hostilities with Spain. The vessel, subsequent to her purchase by the revolted colony, effected the capture of a Spanish vessel, and carried into the port of Virginia certain goods taken out of this vessel. The Spanish owner of this property thereupon claimed that it should be restored to him by the United States Government, on the ground that the capture had been effected in circumstances which involved a violation of the neutrality of the United States. It was pleaded by the claimant in support of this demand (1) That the capturing vessel had been originally equipped, armed, and manned as a vessel of war in the United States; and (2) that during her cruise she had illegally augmented her force whilst in an American port. The first plea was at once dismissed by Justice Story, who, in delivering the judgment of the Supreme Court, declared, in effect, that the vessel was ordinary contraband of war, of which the neutral power was under no obligation to prevent the despatch to a belligerent. "It was a commercial adventure which no nation was bound to prohibit, and which only exposed the persons engaged in it to the penalty of confiscation." The original outfit, therefore, was in no sense illegal. With respect to the second plea, however, the learned judge found that there had been an illegal augmentation of the vessel's force in an American port, whereby there was both an infraction of the country's municipal law and a violation of the law of nations. "It has never been held," said Justice Story, "that an augmentation of force or an illegal outfit affected any captures made after the original cruise was terminated. By analogy to other

cases of violation of public law, the offence may be well deemed to be deposited at the termination of the voyage, and not to affect future transactions. But as to captures made during the same cruise, the doctrine of this Court has long been established, that such illegal augmentation is a violation of the law of nations as well as of our own municipal laws; and, as a violation of our neutrality, by analogy to other cases, it infects the captures subsequently made with the character of torts, and justifies and requires a restitution to the parties who have been injured by the misconduct. It does not lie in the mouth of wrongdoers to set up a title derived from a violation of our neutrality."

So that, according to a strict interpretation of the law of nations, there would seem to be nothing more required of a neutral state, as regards the prohibition of export of armed vessels to belligerents, than in the case of any other warlike articles; but the result of The Alabama claims (s), to be referred to presently, is by no means in harmony with this principle.

The position of neutral subjects engaging in the transport of contraband of war generally has already been considered under the head Belligerent Rights against Neutrals, pp. 156 -200.

Carriage of Belligerent Goods.-That neutrals may in time of war carry on their ordinary trade with belligerents has already been seen, and amongst such lawful trade is included the carriage of goods the property of belligerents (f). This right exists, however, without prejudice to the countervailing belligerent right to seize goods so carried, the right of seizure being attended by the obligation to pay freight on the goods

(s) Vide p. 364, infra.

(t) Barker v. Blakes, 9 East, 283.

seized, to the neutral carrier. Neutrals may carry belligerent goods, but they must in so doing take their chance of the attendant inconvenience of being carried into port for adjudication. This is the position under the common law of nations; but it is, of course, materially modified by the principle embodied in the Declaration of Paris, that "free ships make free goods."

In The Mary Clinton (u), it was held, in the United States, that a neutral friend to both belligerents may not ship the property of the one to the use of the other; but whether the Court intended this decision to be accepted as expressing a general principle, or only as applicable to the special circumstances of the case under adjudication, cannot be certainly affirmed. There would seem to be no doubt, however, that a neutral is fully entitled to carry the (permissive) goods of one belligerent to the other without contravening neutral obligations, and without any regard to the fact that in so doing he may be conducing to an illicit trade between the subjects of hostile states.

If the carrier should be found guilty of conduct inconsistent with neutrality, such as attempting to screen from lawful capture the goods carried, or otherwise to mislead or baffle the captor, he will be held to have forfeited his right to freight, and may be further punished by the confiscation of his ship, as already explained (r).

Also, neutrals must not engage in the privileged or colonial trade of belligerents,—that is, in any trade which in time of peace is limited to the belligerent subjects (y); nor may they sail under the licence or pass of belligerents (y).

Resistance of visit and search is a breach of neutrality in

(u) Blatch. Pr. Ca. 556.

(x) Vide "Enemy Goods in Neutral Vessels," p. 88, and " Freight to Neutrals," p. 339, supra.

(y) Vide p. 233.

Payment of