Notifying Kemper Mill & Elevator Co. v. Hines. or authority to receive the goods or makes them agents of the consignor for so doing. Under the language of the bills themselves, Eby & Son had no interest in or authority over the goods whatever. [4 R. C. L. sec. 294, p. 842; Bank v. Railroad, 132 Mo. 1. c. 500; 1 Michie on Carriers, p. 560, secs. 865 and 866.] But the claim is here, not that Eby & Son had any such authority by implication from the bill of lading itself, but that they were specially authorized by plaintiff to receive and re-consign the goods for and on account of the plaintiff as the agents of the plaintiff by the parol testimony under consideration. (b) Said Act of Congress provides (Sec. 8604-d, U. S. Comp. Stats. 1918, Compact Ed. p. 1374): "The insertion in an order bill of the name of a person to be notified of the arrival of the goods shall not limit the negotiability of the bill or constitute notice to a purchaser thereof of any rights or equities of such person in the goods." But this statute obviously applies only to contests with the purchaser of the bill, and not to contests between the carrier and the shipper while the latter is still the holder and owner and in possession of the bill, as in this case. (c) It is also true that under said Bills of Lading Act contracts for interstate shipments must be evidenced by a bill of lading, which necessarily implies that such contracts must be in writing. Hence, the provisions of such bills of lading cannot be varied by parol testimony. [U. S. Complied Stats. 1918, Compact Ed. sec. 8604-a; Thee v. Wabash Railroad, 217 S. W. 567; Vittuci Co. v. Canadian Pacific Railroad, 238 Fed. 1005; Inman & Co. v. Seaboard Railroad, 159 Fed. 960; Vanderbilt v. Ocean S. S. Co., 215 Fed. 888; Bark Delaware v. Oregon Iron Co., 14 Wall. 579.] But the parol testimony here in question in no way adds to or varies the terms of the bill of lading, because, by the terms of the bill under said Act of Congress, as we have seen, the plaintiff being the owner of the goods Kemper Mill & Elevator Co. v. Hines. and being in possession of the bill of lading, had a right without surrendering the bill, to receive and forward the goods, as was done, by its duly authorized agents, whose authority, we have determined, need not be in writing, but may be shown by parol. Same IX. It is also insisted by learned counsel for respondent that inasmuch as the two cars in question were moved from their point of origin, April 10th and April 16, 1918, respectively, they were transactions Transaction. prior, in point of time, to the shipment of the other cars referred to in paragraph second of our statement of the rejected testimony, and therefore the testimony that such other cars were forwarded to eastern points the same as the two cars in controversy, by Eby & Son as plaintiff's agents with plaintiff's consent, was inadmissible, as relating to another transaction. But, according to the offered testimony, said two cars were part and parcel of the same order of 10,000 sacks of meal as said other cars referred to, and plaintiff did not complain of the conversion of the cars in question until July 3, 1918, which was after the other cars had been forwarded under orders from Eby & Son for plaintiff to eastern points and disposed of by plaintiff itself or by Eby & Son as its agent. We think, therefore, the testimony as to the handling of such other cars, prior to plaintiff's complaint of the conversion herein, was competent and should have been admitted as part of the same transaction as the two cars in question. X. But we think the testimony embraced within the "Third" paragraph of the rejected evidence, namely, that it was the custom for all shipments made to Joliet, Illinois, under shipper's order bills of lading, Custom. that the "notify" parties mentioned in the bills as such had authority to authorize the carrier to divert the goods to other points without producing or having the bills of lading and without having special authority from the shippers, was properly rejected. Proof of such Kemper Mill & Elevator Co. v. Hines. custom was not competent. [4 R. C. L. 25, sec. 27; Bank v. Railroad, 132 Mo. 1. c. 500; Great Lakes Co. v. Transp. Company, 238 Fed. 1. c. 481; Hirsch v. Georgia Iron & Coal Co., 169 Fed. 1. c. 581; 1 Michie on Carriers, p. 560, secs. 865 and 866.] Besides, defendant's witness, the traffic manager of the terminal railroad handling such shipments, testified that they were "handled on instructions from either the shipper or consignee"-thus denying they were handled by the "notify party" without special authority from the owner of the goods. The testimony as to the custom of the "notify" parties to change the destination of the goods was therefore properly excluded. XI. It was proper to permit the jury to allow the plaintiff in the discretion of the jury six per cent interest per annum on the value of the property from the time of the conversion. [Arkansas Valley Land & Cattle Co. v. Mann, 130 U. S. 79; Rivinus v. Langford, 75 Fed. 961; Sec. 4222, R. S. 1919; State ex rel. v. Hope, 121 Mo. 34; Goodman v. Railway, 71 Mo. App. 460; Bank v. Railway, 192 Mo. App. 614.] Interest. Value of XII. Appellant also complains as to the admission of certain testimony concerning the value of the meal at the time of its alleged conversion at certain other places than Joliet, but we need not pass on such objection for the reason that the bills of lading themselves provide that the measure of damages is the value of the meal at the time and place of shipment and not of destination. This provision of the bill is valid and binding on the parties. [Georgia F. & A. Ry. Co. v. Blish Milling Co., 241 U. S. 190; Brockman v. Railway, 195 Mo. App. 1. c. 615.] XIII. From what has been said it is clear there was a case for the jury and, therefore, defendant's demurrer to the evidence was properly refused. Other errors are complained of by appellant, including errors in giving and refusing instructions, and that the ver State v. Meyer. dict was greater than the amount prayed for in the petition. But we need not consider such further alleged errors, as most, if not all, of them have been disposed of by the conclusions we have already announced, and upon a retrial it is not likely there will be any cause for complaint on account thereof. The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for retrial according to the views herein expressed. Ragland, C., concurs; Brown, C., not sitting. PER CURIAM:-The foregoing opinion by SMALL, C.., is adopted as the opinion of the court. All of the judges concur. THE STATE v. ALVIN MEYER, Appellant. Division Two, March 18, 1922. 1. CRIMINAL LAW: Former Appeal: Identity of Questions Determined. Where, on a second appeal in a criminal prosecution, it appears from a comparison of the record with the record on the former appeal, that the question determined on the former appeal was whether defendant had been deceived or misled into entering a plea of guilty, while the question on the second appeal is whether a confession made by defendant was voluntary or involuntary, there is no such identity of the questions involved as to render the decision on the first appeal the law of the case on the second appeal. 2. - Confession: Admissibility. Where a confession is made, by one under arrest upon a criminal charge, to an officer of the law, without any improper influences exerted by him and without any threats of harm or promises of worldly advantages made by him, such confession is admissible in evidence. 3. 4. : State v. Meyer. : Jury Question. Defendant, while under arrest charged with having committed robbery, on being questioned by the sheriff and prosecuting attorney orally admitted his guilt. He afterwards signed a written confession and pleaded guilty, and was sentenced to five years' imprisonment in the penitentiary. He thereafter employed counsel and moved to set aside the judgment on the ground that he had been deceived or misled into entering the plea of guilty, relying on a promise by the prosecuting attorney that he would be paroled. His motion was overruled by the trial court, and on appeal the judgment was reversed and the cause remanded. On the trial of the case thereafter the sheriff and prosecuting attorney were permitted to testify to his oral admissions, but the written confession was not introduced as evidence. He testified that he was induced to "sign" the written confession by the promise of a parole. Held, that it was for the jury to determine on the evidence whether the admissions were voluntary or involuntary, and the trial court having submitted such question to the jury in full and fair instructions there was no error. -: Defendant as Witness: Cross-Examination. Where the defendant is a witness in his own behalf in a criminal prosecution, the cross-examination of him by the State's attorney, under Section 4036, Revised Statutes 1919, is not to be limited to a mere categorical review of subjects covered by the direct examination, but may embrace the subject-matter covered by the examination in chief. Appeal from St. Charles Circuit Court.-Hon. Edgar B. Woolfolk, Judge. AFFIRMED. Wm. Waye, Jr., for appellant. (1) The confession made by appellant to the sheriff and prosecuting attorney was not a voluntary confession, and, therefore, was not admissible in evidence against appellant. State v. Keller, 263 Mo. 539; State v. Caperton, 276 Mo. 314; State v. Hunter, 181 Mo. 316; State v. |