4. 5. : Jacobs v. Cauthorn. : -: Pleading: No Constitutional Question. A petition in a suit to enjoin the county clerk and school directors from levying and extending a tax for repairing and furnishing school buildings in excess of the limit fixed by the Constitution, charging that such tax was illegal and praying for general relief, but not referring to the Constitution, did not raise a constitutional question within the meaning of the rule that a constitutional question must be raised at the first opportunity, but raised simply a question of law and was sufficient. : : : -: Injunction: Inadequate Remedy at Law. A petition in a suit to enjoin the levying and extending of a tax for school purposes in excess of the constitutional limit is not subject to the objection that plaintiffs had a remedy at law, where the petition challenged the legality of the tax upon general grounds and contained a general prayer for relief against the burdens of an illegal tax, inasmuch as it is not necessary to the exercise of equitable relief that plaintiffs should not have any remedy at law, but only that such remedy be inadequate or incomplete, and when a court of equity once acquires jurisdiction of a case it will retain it to do full and complete justice. 6. ILLEGAL TAX: Injunction to Restrain. It is settled in this State that a taxpayer is entitled to maintain a suit in equity to restrain and enjoin an illegal tax which would cast a cloud over his title to land. 7. EQUITY SUIT: Instructions. In suits in equity, instructions, including demurrers to the evidence, have no place, and no error can be predicated on the giving or refusing of them by the trial court. Appeal from Audrain Circuit Court.-Hon Ernest S. Gantt, Judge. REVERSED AND REMANDED (with directions). Fry & Fry for appellant. (1) The $1.25 tax voted being in excess of the constitutional rate is void. Sec. 11, Art. 10, Mo. Constitution; Harrington v. Hopkins, 231 S. W. 263. (2) If ' sufficient facts are stated to entitle the party to relief, the conclusions of law the pleader may draw, may, if Jacobs v. Cauthorn. necessary, be disregarded and the court will grant any relief consistent with the case. Sharkey v. McDermott, 91 Mo. 657; R. S. 1919, sec. 1531; Brick v. Meyers, 196 Mo. App. 296; State ex rel. v. Drainage District, 269 Mo. 453; Teters v. Tolle, 223 S. W. 885; Spaulding v. Edina, 122 Mo. App. 68. (3) An estimate by the school board to the county clerk is an essential prerequisite to levying the tax. Sec. 11142, R. S. 1919; Railroad v. Chapin, 162 Mo. 409. (4) A tax for building purposes is valid only when voted by two-thirds of the voters. R. S. 1919, sec. 11152. R. D. Rogers and J. W. Buffington for respondent. (1) Plaintiffs showed no grounds for injunctive relief in this case. Secs. 11142, 11153, R. S. 1919; Barrow v. Davis, 46 Mo. 394; McPike v. Pugh, 48 Mo. 525; Hopkins, v. Lovell, 47 Mo. 102; Rush v. Brown, 101 Mo. 586. (2) The constitutional question injected was not timely nor properly raised. Milling Co. v. Blake, 242 Mo. 32; Troeger v. Roberts, 223 S. W. 798; Carlson v. Lafgran, 250 Mo. 527; Johnson v. Elec. Light Co., 232 S. W. 1094; Lavelle v. Life Ins. Co., 231 S. W. 616. (3) The court properly refused plaintiffs' instructions. Lee v. Lee, 258 Mo. 599; Forrester v. Products Co., 231 S. W. 671; Degonia v. Railway, 224 Mo. 564; State ex rel. v. Ellison, 270 Mo. 654. Statement. REEVES, C.-Injunction to restrain the levying and extending of a tax for the building and repair fund of Consolidated School District No. 1 of Audrain County, Missouri, upon the ground that said tax, as voted by the legal voters of the district, is illegal. The petitioners are qualified voters of the district and the defendants were the County Clerk of Audrain County and the directors of said district, six in number. Said district was a consolidation of parts of four other districts and is known to the law as a "town district" (State ex rel. v. Railroad, 263 Mo. 689) as it included Jacobs v. Cauthorn. the town of Farber, together with other appropriate continguous-territory. Plaintiffs were cast below and have duly prosecuted their appeal to this court, complaining that the court erred in refusing to grant the relief prayed for and for dismissing their bill. Other complaints will be noted in the course of the opinion. The petition, after alleging that plaintiffs were resident tax-paying citizens and legal voters of said district, averred that on the 13th day of March, 1920, notices were given of the annual meeting of the qualified voters of said district to be held on the 6th day of April, 1920, and that said notices specified the following, among other things, to be considered: 1. To vote a nine months' school. 2. To vote sixty cents in excess of forty cents tax on $100 valuation as prescribed by law. 3. To vote twenty-five cents building and repair fund. 4. To elect two directors for a term of three years. That at said meeting a printed ballot was delivered to said voters for their use, which read with respect to the "building and repair fund" as follows: "To vote twenty-five cents Building and Repair fund" and 'Against twenty-five cents Building and Repair Fund;" that upon a vote on said proposition ninety-nine votes were cast for it and eighty-four votes against it; that said proposition was not carried by two-thirds of the votes cast by the qualified voters voting at said election; that the clerk of the said school board did not certify, as required by law, the result of such vote and the rate of taxation so voted, but only addressed a letter to the county clerk reciting as follows: "Below is result of Farber Consolidated Dist. No. 1 election held April 6, 1920. Levy voted and carried $1.25 for school purposes on $100 valuation (which consisted of $1 Teacher Fund and 25 cents Building and Repair Fund) ;" that the board of directors of said district had no legal right or authority to make an estimate for such an assessment, and Jacobs v. Cauthorn. that said board had not forwarded to the said county clerk legal estimates, and that without such action said county clerk had no legal right to make such assessment and levy and extend such tax on the property of the district, including the property of the plaintiffs; that there was no legal authority to vote an increase on said school district for a "building and repair fund;" that said 25 cents tax was not legal because not founded upon a petition by at least ten tax paying citizens of said district; that it was illegal because of insufficiency of the notice; that the ballots employed were illegal; that it did not carry by a two-thirds vote of the voters; that the board of directors did not make an estimate as required by law, and that said tax "has not been legally established." It was then averred that the county clerk was about to levy and extend said tax of 25 cents, and that same being illegal, would cast clouds and place liens on the property of plaintiffs, and that the defendants generally were threatening to levy such illegal tax, all to becloud the title "of the plaintiffs and other property owners in said district and cause a multiplicity of law suits." There was an appropriate prayer for a restraining order upon the defendants, which prayer concluded as follows: "and for such other and further relief as to the court shall seem meet and just." The answer was a general denial. The testimony supported the allegations of the petition except that it appeared that a proper estimate as required by Section 11142, Revised Statutes 1919, had been submitted to the county clerk by the board of directors before May 15th. At the conclusion of the evidence the court dismissed the plaintiffs' bill. I. As will appear from the foregoing statement the chief complaint of appellants in their bill was directed against the "25 cents building and repair fund," and mainly on account of the manner of authorization. Their Building and Jacobs v. Cauthorn. complaint that the proposition should have been supported by a petition of ten taxpayers of the district is not tenable, as Section 11152, Revised Statutes 1919, specifically grants to the board of directors the right, when such board deems it necessary, to submit the question of increase of the annual rate of taxation for repairing and furnishing school buildings, and the same section permits said increase for those purposes upon a vote of a majority of those qualified voters casting their votes on the proposition. The notice of said election and the ballots used sufficiently comply with the law as it does not appear that any one participating in said meeting was deceived by said notice or confused in the matter of casting an intelligent ballot. This contention must be ruled adversely to appellants, and we also hold that the board of directors seasonably submitted its estimate to the county clerk. II. It was alleged in the bill that said tax had not been legally established and there was a prayer for general relief. Section 11, Article 10, of the Constitution fixes the maximum rate for school purposes. The district in question, as stated, is a "town district," that is to say, composed of a town and contiguous territory and therefore it falls within the provisions of said section Town School District: Limit on Taxation. limiting the maximum rate for all purposes to $1 on the $100 valuation, so that it was not within the power of the district to vote an annual rate for school purposes beyond that limit, and the act of the voters in doing so was illegal. [Harrington v. Hopkins, 231 S. W. 263.] The purpose for which said increase was voted was not to erect a school building, but such increase, as stated in the notice and on the ballots, was for "building and repair fund." If the voters of the district had intended. to erect a school building, then it would have been legitimate to vote an increase beyond the maximum fixed by the Constitution, but in such case, both under the Constitution and by statute, it would have been necessary for |