Friedman v. United Railways Co. incompetent as a witness, the statements made by him were incompetent, These statements were in the nature of admissions against interest and were competent (22 C. J. 231, 297; Linderman v. Carmin, 255 Mo. 62, 164 S. W. 614, 142 Mo. App. 519, 127 S. W. 124; Chambers v. Chambers, 227 Mo. 262, 1. c. 285, 127 S. W. 86; Tuite v. Woodmen Circle, 193 Mo. App. 619, 187 S. W. 137; Wilson v. Albert, 89 Mo. 537; Forrister v. Sullivan, 231 Mo. 345, 132 S. W. 722; Sparr v. Wellman, 11 Mo. 230; Heller v. Ferguson, 189 Mo. App. 484, 176 S. W. 1126; Gillespie v. Insurance Co., 168 Mo. App. 320, 153 S. W. 1079); and it was the duty of respondent to show the whole conversation, including the statements of appellant's husband. [22 C. J. 411; Kritzer v. Smith, 21 Mo. 296.] Whether this waived the incompetency of appellant's husband as a witness we need not decide, as appellant's counsel withdrew him as a witness after the court had ruled in favor of his competency, and the hysterical state of mind of appellant would only bear on the weight credibility of such statements. Other Occasions. III. The complaint that the court excluded competent testimony offered by appellant is untenable. Appellant attempted to show that her husband was a careful driver, had never had a previous accident, and had been driving carefully on the day of the collision. The court was most liberal in her favor, as he permitted appellant to testify, over the objection of respondent, that her husband was a fair driver and that he was driving slowly immediately before the accident (referring to the drive through the park). The court properly excluded any testimony as to whether or not he had had previous accidents, as such testimony would open the door to perplexing side issues. [22 C. J. 746; Funsch v. Stevenson, 223 S. W. (Mo.) 593; Black v. Railway, 162 Mo. App. 90, 144 S. W. 131; Hipsley v. Railway, 88 Mo. 348; Horr v. Railway, 156 Mo. App. 651, 137 S. W. 1010.] Respondent objected to such testimony, on the ground that it was immaterial, as it had no bearing upon Friedman v. United Railways Co. the question of appellant's care or lack of care in this case. Appellant cites no authorities. Respondent urges upon our attention Goble v. Kansas City, 148 Mo. 470, wherein this court ruled that it was improper to admit testimony of other accidents in the suit against the city, involving a defect in the sidewalk. That case was expressly overruled in the case of Hebenheimer v. St. Louis, 269 Mo. 92, 189 S. W. 1180, where it was held that evidence of other accidents arising from a defect in a sidewalk was admissible. However, these cases have no application here. Plaintiff testified that at the time of the accident, she was looking for the approach of a street car and was therefore vigilant for her own pro-. tection. IV. We are precluded from a consideration of appellant's assignment of error to the court's refusal to give her instruction numbered C. She did not so complain in her motion for a new trial, so that question is not before us for review. [Crecelius v. Railroad, 274 Mo. 671, 205 S. W. 181; Reddy v. Ins. Co., 221 S. W. (Mo. App.) 397; Viles v. Viles, 190 S. W. (Mo. App.) 41.] Motion for New Trial. to Jury. V. At the conclusion of the evidence, and after the jury were instructed, appellant's counsel asked for twenty minutes on each side for argument. Respondent's counsel proposed to submit the case without argument. Appellant's counsel requested ten minutes for Argument his opening argument and ten minutes for closing. Twelve minutes were used by him in the opening, and at the close thereof counsel for respondent declined to make any argument, whereupon appellant's counsel demanded the right to make a closing argument, and this was denied him. Complaint is made here that the trial court abused its discretion in thus closing the argument. We cannot so say. The issues in the case were not complex or involved. Appellant's counsel had twelve minutes, wherein to present his inferences from the facts and apply the law. Respondent Friedman v. United Railways Co. had requested no instructions. Appellant's instructions only were given to the jury (barring the court's formal instructions). This made the issues most simple. Moreover, the purpose of a concluding argument is to answer the argument by counsel who holds the negative in a given case, and if, perchance, defendant's counsel declines to argue and waives argument, plaintiff for the affirmative has nothing to answer. Within the sound judicial discretion of the court, permission for a concluding argument under such circumstances may be refused. [38 Cyc. 1474.] And likewise the court may limit the time of arguments. [Reagan v. Transit Co., 180 Mo. 117.] No Exceptions. VI. Appellant complains against the conduct of the trial court in exhibiting impatience, as she alleges, which she says was prejudicial to her case, in the minds of the jury. No exceptions were saved to the alleged improper conduct of the court, and in consequence there is nothing before us for review. [Section 1512, R. S. 1919; Baade v. Cramer, 213 S. W. (Mo.) 121; Gardner v. Railway, 167 Mo. App. 605, 152 S. W. 98.] The case of McCarty v. Transit Co., 192 Mo. 396, urged by appellant, has no application to the facts here, and neither did the decision in that case seek to overturn an express statutory requirement, but simply enumerated those things that would pass before the trial judge, warranting action by him, and which facts were of such nature as to be incapable of preservation for our review. That case was nothing more or less than an assignment of reasons for sustaining the judicial discretion of the trial judge. Under this paragraph it may be noted that appellant complains that whereas the court did not exclude her husband as a witness, he offered to admit his testimony under such circumstances as to prejudice her case. The record shows that the court reluctantly offered to admit the testimony of plaintiff's husband but admonished counsel that he was taking a chance, whereupon counsel withdrew appellant's hus Friedman v. United Railways Co. band as a witness. Appellant insisted that her husband's disability had been waived and the court yielded to the importunity of her counsel. His friendly act in admmonishing her counsel does not form the basis of a legitimate complaint, and particularly as he did not object or except at the time. Declaring Law VII. Finally, appellant complains that the court erred in declaring the law of the case during the trial. This contention must be ruled against her. During the trial her counsel, in offering certain testimony, expressed his opinion in an argument to the court, as to what he believed the law was, as follows: "That, unless a passenger on a car has reason to believe that the driver is negligent in driving the car, then there is no duty on that passenger to do anything with regard to the guidance of that car or its control.” To which the court replied, "I don't believe that is the law." The court was not only correct in his opinion, but his ruling necessarily followed as a sequence to the argument of appellant's counsel. We find no error in this record, and we accordingly affirm the judgment. It is so ordered. Railey, C., concurs; White, C., not sitting. PER CURIAM:-The foregoing opinion by REEVES, C., is adopted as the opinion of the court. All of the judges concur. State v. Culpepper. THE STATE v. WALLACE CULPEPPER, Appellant. Division Two, March 18, 1922. 1. CRIMINAL LAW: Robbery in First Degree: Instruction: Animus Furandi. In a prosecution for robbery in the first degree by compelling the prosecuting witness to give defendant a check for $175, if such sum was due defendant from the prosecuting witness or if defendant in good faith believed it was due, he was not gulty of robbery because the animus furandi, the felonious intent, was wanting. And the court having given an instruction to that effect, it was not error to refuse a similar instruction asked by defendant. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. : Evidence: Good Faith. Where defendant was prosecuted for robbery in the first degree by compelling the prosecuting witness to give him a check for $175, and claimed on the trial that such sum was due him as commissions on two real estate deals, it was error for the trial court to exclude telegrams and a letter which clearly established defendant's agency in one of the deals and which might, in connection with other evidence, have aided the jury in determining the question of the good faith of defendant's contention. : : Cross-Examination of Defendant. The cross-examination of the defendant in a criminal prosecution must be confined to matters testified to on his examination in chief; and if not so confined, it is presumed to be prejudicial, unless the contrary is made to appear. In this case, the cross-examination was prejudicial. -:: State's Witness: Leading Questions by State's Attorney. While the trial court has large discretion in permitting leading questions, particularly in formal and preliminary matters, or where the witness is timid or unwilling, yet, where, as in this case, the State's witnesses were not unwilling and some of them were admittedly unfriendly to defendant, it was prejudicial error to permit the State's attorney to lead the witness as was done in this case. -: Evidence: Hearsay. The admission of hearsay evidence given by the prosecuting witness in a prosecution for robbery in the first degree is error. : : Peace Bond. It was prejudicial error in a prosecution for robbery in the first degree to permit the prose |