Hon. Frank S. Dietrich, United States District Judge for Idaho, delivered an address on "Writing and Reporting Judicial Opinions at the afternoon session, January 22nd, and suggested a number of remedies for relief in this direction.

The Association condemned the practice of filing written briefs in the District Courts of the State.

At this session the following officers were elected, to serve two years:

President: Secretary: Treasurer:

Willis E. Sullivan, Boise. Sam S. Griffin, Boise. N. Eugene Brasie, Boise. Beginning at 6:30 p. m., Thursday, January 23rd, the members of the Association enjoyed a banquet at the Boise Commercial Club, over which Hon. William Morgan, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Idaho, presided as toastmaster. Hon. M. A. Kiger and Hon. E. W. Whitcomb, members of the House and Senate, respectively, Captain Edgar T. Hawley of the Aerial Service, Major C. M. Booth of the Infantry, Lieut. C. M. Holst of the Red Cross, all former practicing attorneys of the State, and Hon. James H. Hawley, retiring President of the Association, delivered addresses.

A vigorous membership campaign is being planned and it is hoped that at its conclusion the seven hundred attorneys of the State will all be affiliated with the Association.

Respectfully,

SAM S. GRIFFIN,
Secretary.

CORRESPONDENCE.

NECESSITY FOR TRAINED MEN AS

JUDGES.

Editor Central Law Journal:

Permit me to congratulate you on your No. 1, Vol. 88, January 3, 1919. This is by far the best number I have received in my different subscriptions to the Journal. The editorial, "Are the People Themselves a Court of Last Resort," the excerpt, "The Reign of the Law," and the article, "The New Function for Courts -Declaring the Rights of Parties," are three of the best articles I have ever read, and coming together as they do in a single number makes that number of the Journal not only exceedingly valuable but almost impossible to equal, not to say excel.

If you will kindly permit, would like to direct your attention further to the fact that you mention but do not carry out into workable detail and that is in your editorial "The Administration of Justice Requires Trained Men to Do It Properly." You have never said anything more true. There have been articles and discussion in yours and other journals on the matter of expediting justice, of taking the making of rules of its administration out of the hands of legislatures and placing it in the hands of the courts, etc., ad nauseam, but not a syllable before about "trained men to do it properly."

I recognize that mere training alone is not sufficient. Picking out a young man and then giving him some mere academic training is far from sufficient, neither would it be sufficient to put a young man in some of the inferior courts to get such training. It would not give him that close touch with life that is necessary to proper administration of justice. Have given much thought to this matter and from my observation and study of the matter, have come to the conclusion that there should be both an age and general practice qualification for all judges. There is an old saying that "Young Men for War, Old Men For Counsel." A man with 25 or 30 years of active general practice has a much better general knowledge of the law, its application, deficiencies, and wise administration, than a younger man, no matter how much of a fault-finding reformer he may be. Furthermore, if we made it a rule that only active general practitioners of mature years should be eligible for the bench, we would not only have the advantage of their years of experience and learning, with mature judgment resultant, but it would be an inducement, more so than at present, for a lawyer to follow the practice of the law in a careful, studious, conscientious manner, recognizing that though thereby he might not be able to accumulate the amount of wealth that others less conscionable and more tricky might do, but he would have a good chance of closing his career with a few years on the bench and hand the name and fame thereof to his posterity. This would result in betterment of conditions in two directions. It would tend to give us better judges and would also tend to give us lawyers better in more ways than one as it holds out to them a probable reward for well doing. There is practically none such at present, save the inner consciousness a man has of well doing. In general, to

get on the bench these days requires a personal or political pull, and therefore to so aspire, the first thing to do is to work for such pull; honesty and qualifications become secondary. Is not this the fact? Furthermore, a conscientious lawyer, when he gets to mature years, will not enter the scramble with younger men for the place, and younger men of necessity are more numerous than the old, are disposed to and do make more combinations to attain their end. People are ready to help them along ("He is a friend of mine"), whether to attain some personal end, or merely to say they helped put him on the bench, and claim some of its effulgent honor therefrom. The older man, however, has seen his friends drop out of life, one by one, and unless he has been a mere wire puller, would not have the support against the younger, more virile and more ambitious younger men. He knows this, and knows and feels it unbecoming to join an almost useless scramble so far as he is concerned. However, if years of experience were required as preliminary qualification, and not mere ambition, these same younger men would be looking about as to the qualifications of the older men, with a result on the whole much more satisfactory in every respect than the present system, with no pre-requisite qualifications at all. The only wonder is that we have had as good men on the bench as we have had.

[We cannot express how sympathetically we have read the above suggestions of our esteemed contemporary. Having just passed the fortieth milestone of his life, the editor is able to appreciate the fact that he did not know as much law as he thought he did about twenty years ago and is quite certain from personal experience, that wisdom is not always the product of a brilliant intellect, but most frequently results from adequate intellectual equipment combined with thorough experience.

We are convinced that the age limit for judges should not be below thirty-five years. This would limit the possible candidates to those who at least have had experience. While some of these men will not be intellectually qualified, they can be more easily eliminated than younger men, with their great capacity for wire pulling.

We might also state that the primary is wholly unsuited to the process of selecting judges. In the first place it prevents good men from running except at a great sacrifice of those finer instincts which have been heretofore so zealously cultivated and cherished by the profession. Under the second article

of the Canons of Professional Ethics lawyers are required to regulate personal aspirations for judicial position by "an impartial estimate of their ability to add honor to the office and not by a desire for the distinction the position may bring to themselves."

It takes more than ordinary capacity for self-restraint for men thus to deny their own desires and the men who will do it are the very men who would in most cases adorn the bench. If the primary law is to remain, however, the only alternative is for local bar associations, through committees selected according to party affiliations, to draft men for nomination and finance the campaign to secure their nomination. Such a call no lawyer would refuse, under ordinary circumstances, but the people will come gradually to see that their best interests will be conserved by the selection of such men to office.-EDITOR.]

HUMOR OF THE LAW.

Doctor-What was the most confusing case you ever tried?

Judge-A case of champagne. I hadn't got half-way through it before I was all muddled

up.

Here's to the woman with many a care,
Who sits all day in an office chair,

And at night, when her day's work there is through,

Goes home and finds more work to do.
Gets up in the morning and cooks and scrubs,
And wrestles around with laundry tubs.
Yet the usual hour finds her smiling there
Beside her desk, in the office chair.

If she's strong enough to these burdens tote,
Here's to the states where they let her vote!
-Globe-Democrat.

Mark Twain once addressed an audience in the interest of his fellow townsman, General Joseph Hawley, who was a candidate for reelection to the United States senate, and said, in the course of a droll address: "General Hawley deserves your support, although he has about as much influence in purifying the senate as a bunch of flowers would have in sweetening a glue factory. But he's right; he never would turn any poor beggar away from his door empty-handed. He always gives them something-almost without exception a letter of introduction to me, urging me to help them."

WEEKLY DIGEST.

Weekly Digest of Important Opinions of the State Courts of Last Resort and of the Federal Courts.

Copy of Opinion in any case referred to in this digest may be procured by sending 25 cents to us or to the West Pub. Co., St. Paul, Minn.

Arkansas

California..

Colorado

Florida

Georgia

Idaho

Kansas..

Kentucky.

Louisiana..........

Massachusetts.

Michigan...

Missouri

New Jersey.

Oklahoma...

Oregon

28

13, 18, 29, 40, 62, 65, 66, 79 76

69 38 48, 87

.35, 45, 53 ..8, 44, 83 .6, 16, 17, 20, 27, 34, 55, 57, 78, 94 ..14, 19, 60, 67, 74, 85 .15, 31, 32, 37, 39, 49, 56, 58, 64, 68, 70, 71, 77, 88, 90, 92, 95 33 .4, 36, 43, 59, 72, 89, 91 .7, 30, 51, 75, 86 ..47, 82 ..1, 21, 23, 52 54, 63, 80 3, 12, 24 2, 5, 25, 61, 93 .10, 46, 81, 84 ...41, 73

1. Alteration of Instruments-Materiality.An agreement to pay interest on interest is a "material alteration" of a note affecting the sum payable for interest within Negotiable Instrument Act, May 16, 1901 (P. L. 211) § 125.Schroyer v. Thompson, Pa., 105 Atl. 274.

2. Bankruptcy-Contempt.-A creditor of a bankrupt, though having a dischargeable claim, does not become guilty of contempt of the bankruptcy court merely by taking proceedings in another court to enforce his claim, where no order forbidding such action has been made, and especially when the creditor had no knowledge of the bankruptcy proceedings. In re Weisberg, U. S. D. C., 253 Fed. 833.

is a

3. Equity.—A court of bankruptcy court of equity.-Bridgeton Nat. Bank v. Way, U. S. C. C. A., 253 Fed. 731.

4. Estoppel.-Where a trustee in bankruptcy voluntarily submitted himself and his rights to jurisdiction of a state court in action to foreclose a chattel mortgage upon outstanding accounts of the bankrupt, he is in no position to lawfully avoid the enforcement of a decree to account for moneys received by him resulting from the accounts, wheresoever the same may have been collected.-Commercial Trust Co. of New Jersey v. Drayton, N. J., 105 Atl. 241.

5. Family Corporation.-A family corporation, organized by a bankrupt when insolvent, to which he transferred his property in an attempt to place it beyond the reach of creditors, and which borrowed money and paid off certain judgment liens on the property, occupies no better position with respect to the property than the bankrupt, and is not entitled to subrogation to such liens.-In re Liller, U. S. D. C., 253 Fed. 845.

6. Jurisdiction. - - Where a United States Court having jurisdiction is about to sell bankrupt's property for benefit of creditors, the state courts, having jurisdiction of homestead exemption under Constitution, would not recognize property as exempt from seizure and sale, as they could not enforce their decree or interfere with federal court's jurisdiction.Aubry v. Guillaumin, La., 80 So. 241.

7. Banks and Banking-Ultra Vires.-Where a cotton buyer shipped to a factor and a bank guaranteed factor against any loss in cotton, and drafts with bill of lading attached were drawn by buyer on factor and indorsed to bank which gave buyer credit therefor the bank was liable to factor for loss sustained by it though guaranty was ultra vires.-Bennett v. W. A. Gage & Co., Okla., 176 Pac. 744.

defeat

8. Bills and Notes-Alteration.-To 'the rights of a holder of commercial paper in due course, a fraudulent alteration must be a material one.-Citizens' State Bank of Greenup v. Johnson County, Ky., 207 S. W. 8.

9. Extension.-Telephoning to holder of note regarding extension, and failure of holder to keep promise then made to meet maker, did not even raise a question for the jury on the issue as to whether there was agreement for extension.-Thomas v. Derrick, Tex., 207 S. W.

140.

10. Carriers of Goods-Misdelivery.-Where a storekeeper sold his business to an employe, who had been in the habit of receiving and giving receipt for goods at a carrier's warehouse in the storekeeper's name, the carrier was liable to a consignor for goods delivered to the employe, where ordered, subsequent to the sale, by the employe in the name of the former storekeeper, to whom they were consigned; carrier and consignor both being ignorant of sale of business.-L. Kommel & Son v. Champlain Transp. Co., Vt., 105 Atl. 253.

11. Receipt by Carrier.-A receipt taken by a carrier for goods is prima facie, but not conclusive, proof of delivery.-Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Rosenthal Dry Goods Co., Tex., 207 S.. W. 167.

12. -Special Cars.-The obligation to carry goods often requires that special kinds of cars be supplied for the transportation of goods, which the carrier has accepted or holds itself out to carry. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Lawton Refining Co., U. S. C. C. A., 253 Fed. 705.

13. Carriers of Passengers-Elevator.-Owner of building for whom passenger elevator is being operated may be liable for injuries sustained in fall of elevator, where operator was powerless to prevent overloading of elevator. -Campbell v. Bradbury, Cal., 176 Pac. 685. 14. Charities Intention. Where testator gave his estate to charity, specifically missions, after wants of wife, daughter, and another were supplied, failure to name organizations he wished to benefit, selection of which was left to others, was insufficient to defeat his clearly expressed intention.-Co n v. Attorney General, Mass., 121 N. E. 397.

15. Chattel Mortgages-Passing of Title.The title to property upon which a chattel mortgage is executed does not pass to mortgagee, but remains in mortgagor.-Young v. Phillips, Mich., 169 N. W. 822.

16. Compromise-Setting Aside.-A written settlement between parties who are able to con

tract is the law unto them until it is set aside in a direct action for that purpose.-Succession of Rouse, La., 80 So. 229.

17. Contempt

Summary

Proceeding.-Contempt is only a summary proceeding to enforce obedience to court's orders and where the main issue only concerns the court and the defendant in rule. Le Banc, Limited, v. Port Barre Timber & Tie Co., La., 80 So. 203.

18. Contracts- Condition Precedent.-When within its constitutional powers the Legislature has sought by statute to provide that certain contracts may be made only after obtaining certain permits, the obtaining of the latter are conditions precedent to the making of enforceable contracts.-Napa Valley Electric Co. Calistoga Electric Co., Cal., 176 Pac. 699.

V.

19. Consideration.-Surrender by lender of individual note of borrower for note of bankrupt corporation, to meet whose pay roll loan had been used, was in itself consideration for written promise of borrower to pay lender difference between declared dividend, in company's bankruptcy proceeding, and amount owned lender, as soon as dividend was paid him.-Timson v. Parrott, Mass., 121 N. E. 423.

20.- -Construction of.-Where persons commit their agreements to writing, their intentions cannot be sought outside the four corners of the written instrument.-Bank of Napoleonville v. Knobloch & Rainold, La., So. 214.

21. Forbearance.-Forbearance to sue is an adequate consideration for a promise made in reliance thereon, but there must be an agreement to that effect, and a mere forbearance without an agreement is not a good consideration where there is nothing to prevent the bringing of suit in any time. Schroyer V. Thompson, Pa., 105 Atl. 274.

22. Mutual Assent. To make a contract there must be mutual assent, and the assent must comprehend the whole proposition. Browne Grain Co. v. Walker, Tex., 206 S. W. 859.

23. Corporations - Dividends.-Profits realized by a corporation are not "dividends" until so declared by its proper officials, but distribution of profits, however made, are dividends, the form of distribution being immaterial.-In re Thompson's Estate, Pa., 105 Atl. 273.

or

24. Estoppel.-Where a corporation was ganized to take over the business of a partnership, which by contract acknowledged patent infringement and agreed to cease, held, that any estoppel arising from the contract was effective against the corporation, and as it continued the old-method manufacture it was estopped to deny infringement.-Dudlo Mfg. Co. v. Varley Duplex Magnet Co., U. S. C. C. A., 253 Fed. 745.

25. Public Utility.-The charter authority of a corporation to become a public utility is a mere naked authority to do business as such, and until its business is so pursued such charter does not make the corporation a public utility subject to regulation.-De Pauw University v. Public Service Commission of Oregon, U. S. D. C., 253 Fed. 848.

26. Counties-Comity.-The comity existing between states and nations sanctioned the rule that an inhabitant of another state or another nation has free access to courts for the redress of wrongs or the prosecution of rights.-Coss v. Coss, Tex., 207 S. W. 127.

27. Criminal Law-Credibility.-At common law the right to determine the credibility of a witness testifying in a criminal prosecution is within the province of the jury.-State v. Hataway, La., 80 So. 227.

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28.- -Cross-Examination.-Credibility of witness may be impeached by proof on crossexamination of contradictory statements.Lockett v. State, Ark., 207 S. W. 55.

29. Jeopardy.-Defendant, who by habeas corpus causes a second sentence to be imposed upon himself, ordinarily will not be heard to claim twice in jeopardy.-Ex parte Bouchard, Cal., 176 Pac. 692.

30. Overt Acts.-A guilty intention, unexecuted, or unconnected with an overt act or out

ward manifestation, cannot be made the subject of punishment under the law.-Proctor v. State, Okla., 176 Pac. 771.

31. Res Gestae. An unmailed addressed envelope with its inclosure, signed by defendant, found at the place of the assault 30 minutes after its occurrence, was admissable as part of the res gestae, though disclosing defendant was a paroled prisoner.-People v. Ballard, Mich., 169 N. W. 844.

32. Statutory Construction.-Criminal statutes cannot be extended to cases not included within the clear and obvious import of their language; and, if there is doubt as to whether the act charged is embraced in the prohibition, such doubt is to be resolved in favor of defendant.-People v. Ellis, Mich., 169 N. W. 930.

33. Damages-Future Suffering.—"Suffering in the future" from injury is distinguished from "permanent injury," in that the former will persist after the trial, but may cease, while the latter will last throughout life.-Colby v. Thompson, Mo., 207 S. W. 73.

34. Death Circumstantial Evidence. Circumstantial evidence showing merely a probability that an accident, which no living person witnessed, happended as alleged in a petition claiming damages for injuries to a person deceased, is an insufficient basis upon which to rest judgment for plaintiff.-Bishop v. Town of Mansfield, La., 80 So. 217.

35.

Divorce-Alimony.-An incidental award of alimony for a gross sum payable in three installments, declared to be in full of all claims for alimony or on any other account, is enforceable in the same manner as an ordinary judgment for debt.-Bassett v. Waters, Kan., 176 Pac. 663.

36. Insanity.-Where a wife who is the defendant in a divorce suit becomes insane after deserting her husband and is confined in an insane asylum, her seperation from her husband ceases to be "willful, continued, and obstinate" within the meaning of Divorce Act, $ 2, subd. 2.-Gordon v. Gordon, N. J., 105 Atl. 242. 37. Jurisdiction.-Jurisdiction of circuit courts in chancery in divorce proceedings is entirely statutory.-Heck v. Bailey, Mich., 169 N. W. 940.

38.- -Ne Exeat.-On wife's petition for temporary and permanent alimony and attorney's fees, alleging husband's abandonment, sale of household goods, refusal to contribute to support of herself and children, and that, on hearing of her suit, he would depart, court did not err in issuing a writ of ne exeat.-Crapps v. Crapps, Ga., 97 S. E. 680.

39. Easements-Prescriptive Right.-In suit between adjoining lot owners involving title to a stairway and land occupied by it, held, that defendant's use of stairway and space above it for over 20 years, after mutual revocable license had been revoked, was such as to give him a prescriptive right to said use so long as present building stands.-First Nat. Bank v. Vanden Brooks, Mich., 169 N. W. 920.

40. Eminent Domain-Additional Servitude. -A railroad in a street which carries freight as well as passengers imposes no additional servitude.-City of Albany v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 176 Pac. 705.

41. Natural Gas.-Company organized to transport and serve public with natural gas may condemn for its pipe lines lands necessary to proper conduct of its business as a public carrier; such use being none the less a public use because pipe lines therefor are carried by gasoline plant to extract gasoline and to facilitate its piping to consumers.-Pittsburgh & West Virginia Gas Co. v. Cutright, W. Va., 97 S. E. 686.

42. Equity-Equal Equity.-As between Persons having equitable interests, the rule "qui prior est tempore, potior est jure," applies only where the equities are equal.-Hess & Skinner Engineering Co. v. Turney, Tex., 207 S. W. 171. 43. Estoppel-Equitable Estoppel.-The doctrine of equitable estoppel is not exclusively of equitable cognizance, for, although the creature of equity and depending upon equitable