THE following difcourfe is a kind of remonftrance in behalf of king William and his friends, against the proceedings of the house of commons; and was published during the recefs of parliament in the fummer of 1701, with a view to engage them in milder meafures when they should meet again.

At this time Lewis XIV. was making large ftrides towards univerfal monarchy; plots were carrying on at St. Germains; the Dutch had acknowledged the duke of Anjou as king of Spain, and king William was made extremely uneafy by the violence with which many of his minifters and chief favourites were pursued by the commons; the king, to appease their refentment, had made feveral changes in his miniftry, and removed fome of his most faithful fervants from places of the highest trust and dignity: this expedient, however, had proved ineffectual, and the commons perfifted in their oppofition; they began by impeaching William Bentinck, earl of Portland, groom of the stole; and proceeded to the impeachment of John Somers, baron Somers of Evesham, first lord keeper, afterwards lord chancellor; Edward Ruffel, earl of Orford, lord treafurer of the navy, and one of the lords commiffioners of the admiralty; and Charles Mountague, earl of Halifax, one of the commiffioners of the treasury, and afterwards chancellor of the exchequer. Its general purport is to damp the warmth of the commons by fhewing that the measures they purfued had a direct tendency to bring on the tyranny, which they profeffed to oppose; and the particular cafes of the impeached lords are paralleled in Athenian characters.

A

DISCOURSE

OF THE

CONTESTS and DISSENTIONS

BETWEEN THE

NOBLES and the COMMONS

IN

ATHENS and ROME;

With the Confequences they had upon both those STATES.

Si tibi vera videtur,

Dede manus, & fi falja eft, accingere contra.

Written in the Year 1701.

CHAP. I.

LUCRA

IT is agreed, that in all government there

turally and originally feems to be placed in the whole body, wherever the executive part of it lies. This holds in the body natural; for wherever we place the beginning of motion, whether from the head, or the heart, or the animal fpirits in general, the body B 5

moves.

t

moves and acts by a confent of all its parts. This unlimited power, placed fundamentally in the body of a people, is what the beft legiflators of all ages have endeavoured, in their feveral schemes or inftitutions of government, to depofit in fuch hands as would preferve the people from rapine-and oppreffion within, as well as violence from without. Most of them feem to agree in this, that it was a trust too great to be committed to any one man or affembly, and therefore they left the right ftill in the whole body; but the administration or executive part in the hands of the one, the few, or the many, into which three powers all independent bodies of men feem naturally to divide; for by all I have read of those innumerable and petty commonwealths in Italy, Greece, and Sicily, as well as the great ones of Carthage and Rome, it feems to me, that a free people met together, whether by compact, or family-government, as foon as they fall into any acts of civil fociety, do of themfelves divide into three powers. The first is that of fome one eminent fpirit, who, having fignalised his valour and fortune in defence of his country, or by the practice of popular arts at home, comes to have great influence on the people, to grow their leader in warlike expeditions, and to prefide, after a fort, in their civil affemblies; and this is grounded upon the principles of nature and common reason, which in all difficulties or dangers, where prudence or courage is required, do rather incite us to fly for counfel or affistance to a

fingle perfon, than a multitude. The fecond natural divifion of power is of fuch men, who have acquired large poffeffions, and confequently dependencies, or defcend from anceftors who have left them great inheritances, together with an hereditary authority, Thefe eafily uniting in thoughts and opinions, and acting in concert, begin to enter upon meafures for fecuring their properties, which are beft upheld by preparing against invasiops from abroad, and maintaining peace at home; this commences a great council or fenate of nobles for the weighty affairs of the nation. The laft divifion is of the people, whofe part of power is great and indifputable, whenever they can unite either collectively, or by deputation, to exert it. Now the three forms of government, fo generally known in the fchools, differ only by the civil administration being placed in the hands of one, or fometimes two, (as in Sparta) who were called kings; or in a fenate, who were called the nobles; or in the people collective or reprefentative, who may be called the commons. Each of thefe had frequently the executive power in Greece, and fometimes in Rome : but the power in the last resort was always meant by the legiflators to be held in balance among all three. And it will be an eternal rule in politics among every free people, that there is a balance of power to be carefully held by every state within itflf, as well as among feveral states with each other.

B 6

The

The true meaning of a balance of power, either without or within a ftate, is beft conceived by confidering, what the nature of a balance is. It fuppofes three things: First, the part which held, together with the hand that holds it; and then the two fcales, with whatever is weighed therein. Now confider feveral states in a neighbourhood; in order to preferve peace between thefe ftates, it is neceffary they should be formed into a balance, whereof one or more are to be directors, who are to divide the reft into equal fcales, and upon cccafion remove from one into the other, or elfe fall with their own weight into the lighteft; fo in a ftate within itself, the balance must be held by a third hand, who is to deal the remaining power with the utmost exactnefs into the feveral fcales. Now it is not neceffary, that the power fhould be equally divided between thefe three; for the balance may be held by the weakest, who, by his addrefs and conduct, removing from either scale, and adding of his own, may keep the scales duly poifed. Such was that of the two kings of Sparta, the confular power in Rome, that of the kings of Media before the reign of Cyrus, as reprefented by Xenophon; and that of the feveral limited states in the Gothic inftitution.

When the balance is broken, whether by the negligence, folly, or weakness of the hand that held it, or by weights fallen into either scale, the power will never continue long in equal divifion between the remaining parties,

but,