river with his leaden messenger, and was operating it up to the moment when it ceased to move, and was therefore, in a legal sense, after the ball crossed the state line up to the moment that it stopped, in Georgia. It is entirely immaterial that the object for which he crossed the line failed of accomplishment. It having been established by abundant authority and precedent that, in crime, there may be a constructive, as well as an actual, presence, there can be, in a case of this kind, in which the act of the accused, when analyzed, is simply an attempt to unlawfully wound another by shooting, no rational distinction, in principle, as to the question of jurisdiction, whether the attempt is successful or not. The criminality was complete, and the offense was perpe trated in Georgia, irrespective of results.

3. The evidence was conflicting. According to that introduced by the accused, and supported by his statement, he did not intend to shoot the prosecutor at all; but the evidence of the latter was amply sufficient to warrant the jury in concluding that the accused actually, deliberately, and without any legal excuse or justification whatever, undertook to shoot him. In view of this evidence the jury might well have found the accused guilty of assault with intent to murder, and he cannot complain that they found him guilty of the lesser offense of shooting at another. There was no error in denying a new trial.

Judgment affirmed.

CRIMINAL LAW-PLACE WHERE CRIME IS COMMITTED.-The ancient common law is said to have maintained the very absurd and unreasonable doctrine, that, if a person be struck and wounded in one county and die in another, his murderer could be tried in neither: 1 Hawkins' Pleas of the Crown, c. 13, sec. 13; 1 Chitty's Criminal Law, *178. At common law, if a man had been stricken in one county and died in another, it was doubtful whether the felon was indictable or triable in either, but the more common opinion was that he might be indicted where the stroke was given, for the death is but a consequence though the victim died in another county or country: 1 Hale's Pleas of the Crown, 426. Independently of statute the doctrine seems to be universally adopted in the United States that the crime of murder is committed at the place where the mortal wound is inflicted, regardless of any question as to the place where the victim dies as a result of such wound. This question arose and was decided in United States v. Guiteau, reported in 1 Mackey, 498; 47 Am. Rep. 247. That case involved the facts that on July 2, 1881, the President of the United States, James A. Garfield, while standing in the waiting-room of the Baltimore & Potomac Railroad depot, in the city of Washington, District of Columbia, was fatally shot by Charles J. Guiteau. The ball from the assassin's pistol entered the back of the President and inflicted a wound which resulted in death about

three months afterward at Elberon, in the county of Monmouth, in the state of New Jersey. Guiteau was arrested, indicted, tried, convicted, and sen. tenced at a criminal term of the supreme court of the District of Columbia. His counsel appealed his case to the general term of that court, mainly on the ground that the criminal court had no jurisdiction of the case. Counsel contended that the evidence was undisputed; that the death occurred in New Jersey; that the common law prevailed and was in force in the District of Columbia, in reference to the place where the crime was committed, and had not been modified by statute; that at common law, where the mortal wound was inflicted in one county or jurisdiction and the death occurred in another, the accused could not be tried and convicted in either of mur. der, for the reason that the crime of murder was not complete until the death happened, and the mortal wound and death must occur in the same jurisdiction. The court, however, decided that the murder was committed where the fatal blow was struck or the mortal wound inflicted. Mr. Jus tice James, in delivering a well-reasoned opinion, based upon an exhaustive review of the authorities, said: "We believe that these authorities establish the conclusion that at common law, when the felonious blow was struck in one county, and death ensued in another, murder was held to have been thereby committed in the county where the blow was struck. They excluded the notion that the death was one of the acts of felony, and that, when it hap. pened in a different county from that of the blow, the felony was incomplete in each. In this respect the common law has undergone no change, and what it has always been is well stated in the late English decision of King v. Hargrave, 5 Car. & P. 510." In the late case of Ex parte McNeeley, 36 W. Va. 84, 32 Am. St. Rep. 831, it was decided that if a man is unlawfully struck or injured in one state or county, from which he dies in another, the courts of the former, in the absence of any controlling statute, are the only ones which can inquire into and punish the crime, thus affirming the rule that the crime is committed where the blow is struck or the wound inflicted. People v. Gill, 6 Cal. 637, holds that the crime is committed at the time and place where the blow is struck. In State v. Gessert, 21 Minn. 369, a person was stabbed in Minnesota and died in Wisconsin, and the supreme court of the former state decided that the death in Wisconsin was only a consequence of the criminal act done in Minnesota, and that the murder was committed in the latter state. In passing upon this question, Mr. Justice Brewer, in State v. Bowen, 16 Kan. 475-479, said: "It seems to us, without pursuing the authorities further, reasonable to hold that, as the only act which the defendant does toward causing the death is in giving the fatal blow, the place where he does that is the place where he commits the crime, and that the subsequent wanderings of the injured party, uninfluenced by the defendant, do not give an ambulatory character to the crime, at least that those movements do not, unless under express warrant of the statute, change the place of offense; and that, while it may be true that the crime is not completed until death, yet that the death simply determines the character of the crime committed in giving the blow, and refers back to and qualifies that act." In State v. Foster, 8 La. Ann. 290, 58 Am. Dec. 678, it was decided that in case of homicide, when the mortal blow is struck in Louisiana, but the death occurs in Mississippi, the crime is deemed to be committed in Louisiana. And if a shot is fired in one state at a person in another, resulting in his death, the crime thereby committed is deemed to have been committed in the state where the shot takes effect, and not in the one where it is fired. Therefore, the courts of

the latter state have no jurisdiction to try and punish the party, though he is one of its citizens: State v. Hall, 114 N. C. 909; 41 Am. St. Rep. 822; 115 N. C. 811; post, p. 000. In Tyler v. People, 8 Mich. 320, it was said that "a wounding must of course be done where there is a person wounded, and the criminal act is the force against his person. That is the immediate act of the assailant, whether he strikes with a sword or shoots with a gun, and he may very reasonably be held present where his forcible act becomes directly operative." In that case a homicide was committed on the river St. Clair beyond the boundary line between the United States and Canada, and within a county in the latter country, and it was determined that the courts of the United States had no jurisdiction of the crime al. though the victim died within the borders of the latter country. In Commoncealth v. Macloon, 101 Mass. 1, 100 Am. Dec. 89, the court said that if one's "unlawful act is the efficient cause of the mortal injury, his personal presence at the time of its beginning, its continuance, or its result, is not essential. He may be held guilty of homicide by shooting, even if he stands afar off, out of sight, or in another jurisdiction." Again, in People v. Adams, 3 Denio, 190, 45 Am. Dec. 468, these words were used: "Personal presence at the place where a crime is perpetrated is not indispensable to make one a principal offender in its commission. Thus, where a gun is fired from the land which kills a man at sea, the offense must be tried by the admiralty and not by the common-law courts; for the crime is committed where the death occurs, and not at the place from whence the cause of the death proceeds. And on the same principle an offense committed by firing a shot from one county which takes effect in another must be tried in the latter, for there the crime was committed." In State v. Carter, 27 N. J. L. 499, the defendant was on trial for killing a man whom he shot in New York, but who died in New Jersey. The court said "nothing was done by the defendant in this state. When the blow was given both parties were out of its jurisdiction, and within the jurisdiction of the state of New York. The only fact connected with the offense alleged to have taken place within our jurisdiction is, that after the injury the deceased came into and died in this state. This is not the case where a man stands in New York, and shooting across the border, kills one in New Jersey. When that is so the blow is in fact struck in New Jersey. It is the defendant's act in this state. The passage of the ball, after it crosses the boundary, and its actual striking, is the continuous act of the defendant. In all cases the criminal act is the impinging of the weapon, whatever it may be, on the person of the party injured, and that must necessarily be where the impingement happens, and whether the sword, the ball, or any other missile passes over a boundary in the act of striking, is a matter of no consequence. The act is where it strikes, as much where the party stands out of the state as where he stands in it."

In State v. Chapin, 17 Ark. 561, 65 Am. Dec. 452, the court expressed itself as follows: "For example, if a man standing beyond our boundary line in Texas were, by firing a gun or propelling any other implement of death, to kill a person in Arkansas, he would be guilty of murder here, and answerable to our laws, because the crime is regarded as being committed where the shot or other implement propelled takes effect." In State v. Kelly, 76 Me. 331, 49 Am. Rep. 620, the court decided that when the mortal blow is inflicted in a fort of the United States, and the person struck or wounded dies out of the fort, the crime cannot be regarded as committed AM. ST. REP., VOL. XLIV.-6

where the person dies. Murder is committed where the fatal wound is in. flicted with felonious intent, and the ensuing death in another jurisdiction or state is but the result of the unlawful act, and does not affect the jurisdic tion: Green v. State, 66 Ala. 40; 41 Am. Rep. 744.

Statutes providing in effect that when any person shall be feloniously stricken or poisoned at any place out of the jurisdiction of the state, and shall die of the same stroke or poisoning within the jurisdiction of the state; or, on the other hand, that, if any person feloniously stricken or poisoned within the jurisdiction of the state, shall die of such stroke or poisoning at any place out of the jurisdiction of the state jurisdiction is given to the courts of that state to try and punish such murders, although often assailed as having an extraterritorial effect, have universally been upheld as con stitutional on the ground that it is competent for the legislature of each state to determine what acts within the limits of the state shall be deemed criminal, and to provide for their punishment: Hunter v. State, 40 N. J. L. 495; State v. Hall, 114 N. C. 909; 41 Am. St. Rep. 822; 115 N. C. 811; post, p. 000; Ex parte McNeeley, 36 W. Va. 84; 32 Am. St. Rep. 831; Green v. State, 66 Ala. 40; 41 Am. Rep. 744; Commonwealth v. Macloon, 101 Mass. 1; 100 Am. Dec. 89.

Accessaries before the fact in one state to a felony committed in another state, as where an agreement or conspiracy is entered into in the former state to commit the felony in the latter, are guilty of the crime in the state where they become accessaries only, and must be tried there as that is the place where the crime is deemed to have been committed in so far as they are con cerned: State v. Chapin, 17 Ark. 561; 65 Am. Dec. 452; Johns v. State, 19 Ind. 421; 81 Am Dec. 408; State v. Moore, 26 N. H. 448; 59 Am. Dec. 354. Conspiracy. If an illegal conspiracy is entered into within the limits of the state and within the jurisdiction of the court, the crime is complete, and the subsequent overt act in pursuance thereof may be done anywhere: Dealy v. United States, 152 U. S. 539; United States v. Britton, 108 U. S. 204. If it is shown that a conspiracy was entered into in one state, and that one or more overt acts were committed in that state, the crime is deemed to have been committed there although other actual overt acts in further ance of the conspiracy were committed in another state by an agent or coconspirator: Ex parte Rogers, 10 Tex. App. 655; 38 Am. Rep. 654. And in order to the conviction of parties charged with conspiracy, it is not es sential that they should have resided within the jurisdiction of the court trying the indictment, at the time the conspiracy was formed, if the con spiracy was entered into and had its headquarters in that jurisdiction United States v. Howell, 56 Fed. Rep. 21.

Larceny. When goods are stolen in one jurisdiction and carried into another, in legal contemplation, the crime of larceny is committed in both jurisdictions, and may be punished in either: People v. Staples, 91 Cal. 23; Kidd v. State, 83 Ala. 58; Dixon v. State, 15 Tex. App. 480; Powell v. State, 52 Wis. 217; Mack v. People, 82 N. Y. 235. The rule may be stated to be that after one has done what amounts to a complete theft, if he continues carrying away the stolen goods, each step he takes with them may be regarded as a new larceny, and he may be indicted either in the county where he first took the goods, or in any other into which, the intent to steal continuing, he carries them: Dixon v. State, 15 Tex. App. 480. Thus, when one enters a moving car in one county, with intent to commit larceny therein, and with the same intent continues in the car until it passes into: another county, and there commits the intended larceny, there is in law

a fresh entry in the latter county, and the crime is indictable therein: Powell v. State, 52 Wis. 217. When stolen property is brought inte one state from another, jurisdiction may be conferred by statute upon any county in the former state, into or through which the stolen property has been brought: People v. Staples, 91 Cal. 23.

Abortion. It has been decided that the crime of abortion is committed in South Carolina so as to give the courts of that state jurisdiction, by one who, while in another state, procures medicines or digs for that purpose, and mails them to a woman with child, to be delivered to her in the former state, there to be taken by her, for the purpose of procuring the abortion: State v. Morrow, 40 S. C. 221. An Iowa case holds, however, that the crime of abortion is committed in the county wherein the medicine intended to preduce the miscarriage is administered, and not where a miscarriage takes plaos: State v. Hollenbeck, 36 Iowa, 112. The chief distinction between these cases rests in the fact that the statute which governed the former provided that any person who prescribed for or administered to any woman with child, or suggested to, or advised, or procured her to take any medicine or thing to produce an abortion not necessary to preserve life, was guilty of a felony, while the statute governing the latter case provided in terms that to commit a felony a person must willfully administer the medicine or thing to the woman with intent to commit an abortion.

Forgery is deemed to have been committed at the place where the false and forged instrument is uttered and published with intent to defraud, and not at the place where the forgery, in so far as it consists merely in execut ing the false writing, is committed: Lindsey v. State, 38 Ohio St. 507; Ez parte Rogers, 10 Tex. App. 655; 38 Am. Rep. 654; Rogers v. State, 11 Tex. App. 608; Foute v. State, 15 Lea, 712; In re Carr, 28 Kan. 1. Hence, if the forged instrument has been uttered and published in one state with intent to defraud, it is no defense to an indictment in a proper county in that state to show that the accused was never in the state, or that he owes allegiance to another state or government: Lindsey v. State, 38 Ohio St. 507; and the same principle is expressed in Ex parte Rogers, 10 Tex. App. 655; 38 Am. Rep. 654; Rogers v. State, 11 Tex. App. 608. In Hanks v. State, 13 Tex. App. 289, it was decided that the forgery in another state of titles to lands in Texas, or of any instrument affecting the titles to lands in the latter state, was an offense against the laws of that state, and punishable there.

EMBEZZLEMENT is committed, and a prosecution therefor may be maintained in the county in which the accused took or received the property embezzled, or through or into which he may have undertaken to transport it: Cole v. State, 16 Tex. App. 461; Reed v. State, 16 Tex. App. 586; Cohen v. State, 20 Tex. App. 224.

OBTAINING MONEY BY FALSE PRETENSES. This crime is committed wherever the money is obtained by means of false pretenses, regardless of the locality where the conspiracy was formed or the false pretenses first made: People v. Arnold, 46 Mich. 268; State v. House, 55 Iowa, 466. An attempt to commit this crime is committed at the place where the attempt to get the money is made: State v. Terry, 109 Mo. 601.

Crimes Against United States Mails are committed, and the party committing them must be indicted and tried in the district where the letter or other illegal matter is deposited in the postoffice, and not in the district to which it is addressed or delivered: United States v. Comerford, 25 Fed. Rep. 902; United States v. Worrall, 2 Dall. 384.