traffic to do likewise has been and will be to hamper the respondent, pro tanto, in performing adequate service in both interstate and intrastate commerce. Whatever adjustments, if any, may or should be made in the respondent's freight rates, the freight shippers should not be called upon to bear a deficiency from this suburban service which can reasonably be borne by the suburban riders.

Upon further hearing, we find:

1. That the respondent's present suburban fares made or imposed by authority of the State of Illinois are abnormally low and do not produce sufficient revenue to cover the out-of-pocket cost of the service nor a fair share of the respondent's revenue needs.

2. That the respondent's suburban fares cause and, unless increased to the extent herein set forth, will continue to cause undue, unreasonable, and unjust discrimination against, and an undue burden on, interstate commerce, in violation of section 13 (4) of the Interstate Commerce Act.

3. That such undue, unreasonable, and unjust discrimination and undue burden can and should be removed by establishing for such intrastate travel fares no lower than the bases set forth as prescribed in the appendix hereto.

4. That the fares, as so increased, will produce additional revenue of about $798,170 a year, which is the approximate measure of the revenue discrimination against interstate commerce resulting from the respondent's present suburban fares and the additional amount necessary for such fares to make a fair contribution to the respondent's indirect costs and return on investment.

5. That increased fares will be just and reasonable for the future, and are necessary to enable the respondent, under honest, economical, and efficient management, to provide adequate and efficient service at the lowest cost consistent with the furnishing of such service.

6. That the outstanding orders in No. 11703 should be modified accordingly.

An appropriate order will be entered.

FREAS, Chairman, concurring:

I did not subscribe to that portion of the original report which prescribed fares higher than those sought. At the further hearing, the respondent submitted as necessary a somewhat higher level of fares than originally prescribed by the majority. The new level is herein found to be justified and I agree.

COMMISSIONER ARPAIA, being necessarily absent, did not participate in the disposition of this proceeding.

COMMISSIONER WEBB did not participate in the disposition of this proceeding.

Subject to a minimum of 25 cents per trip in connection with all types of fares: Between all points in the suburban area, one-way fares shall be based on 3.6 cents per mile, round-trip fares shall be 180 percent of the one-way fares, and 10-trip fares shall be 5 times the round-trip fares.

Between Chicago Union Station, on the one hand, and all other points in the suburban area, on the other, 25-trip fares shall be 111⁄2 times the round-trip fares, and weekly and 46trip commutation fares, respectively, shall be 25 and 90 percent of the unrestricted monthly fares, subject to maxima of 6 and 23 times the round-trip fares.

305 I. C. C.

Ex PARTE No. 213

ACCIDENT NEAR MOUNT PULASKI, ILL.

Decided October 16, 1958

Accident at Mount Pulaski, Ill., on June 1, 1958, caused by the explosion of a tank car loaded with nitromethane.

Erle J. Zoll, Jr., and John W. Foster for a rail carrier.

Earl S. Hodges for himself.

Grover R. James, Jr., for interested parties.

Fred R. Pefferle for a fire insurance company.

Robert M. Egan for the State Fire Marshall, State of Illinois. Clarence W. Greenwald for the city of Niagara Falls, N. Y.

R. G. Heckenkamp for a carrier.

T. B. Hart, Clyde Thompson, and George P. Sheahan for railway labor organizations.

REPORT OF THE COMMISSION

DIVISION 3, COMMISSIONERS TUGGLE, MURPHY, AND MCPHERSON TUGGLE, Commissioner:

This is an investigation by the Commission on its own motion with respect to the facts, conditions, and circumstances connected with an accident which occurred on the Illinois Central Railroad at Mount Pulaski, Ill., on June 1, 1958. Hearing was held at Springfield, Ill., on August 20, 1958. The accident resulted in the death of 2 trainservice employees, and the injury of 4 train-service employees.

LOCATION OF ACCIDENT AND METHOD OF OPERATION

This accident occurred on that part of the Springfield Division designated as the Peoria District and extending between Mattoon and I. C. Junction, Ill., 110.0 miles. This is a single-track line over which trains are operated by timetable, train orders, and an automatic block-signal system. At Mount Pulaski, Ill., 63.8 miles north of Mattoon, a single-track line of the Springfield District crosses the main track at grade at an angle of 60°. Geographic directions are approximately east and west on the Peoria District, and north and south on the Springfield District. Timetable directions are north and south on both districts. Timetable directions on the Peoria District, except as indicated, are used in this report. The station at Mount Pulaski is located in the northeast angle of the crossing

at a point 176 feet east of the crossing. A wye track diverges to the east from the main track. The switch of this track, which is facingpoint for northbound movements, is located 2,045 feet south of the station. This track connects with the main track of the Springfield District at a point 2,043 feet east of the station. An auxiliary track parallels the wye track on the south. The west switch of this track

Ex Parte 213

is located 150 feet north of the west wye-track switch, and the east switch is located 549 feet west of the east wye-track switch. An auxiliary track, designated as the New Storage Track, parallels the main track on the east. The north and south switches of this track, connecting the track with the main track, are located, respectively, 2,093 feet and 4,903 feet south of the station. An auxiliary track, designated as the New Pass Track, parallels the main track on the west. The south switch of this track, connecting the track with the main track, is located 5,018 feet south of the station. This track diverges to the west in the vicinity of the crossing and connects with the Springfield District main track at a point 519 feet west of the station. Four crossovers connect the main track with the New Pass Track. The north switch of the most southerly crossover, which is facing-point for southbound movements on the main track, is located 2,705 feet south of the station. U. S. Highway 54 spans the railroad on a steel and concrete bridge. The centerline of the bridge is located 3,812 feet south of the station. The accident occurred within yard limits on the main track at a point 3,155 feet south of the station. From the south on the main track there are, in succession, a tangent throughout a considerable distance to the point of accident and 1,695 feet northward, and a 0°20′ curve to the right 1,525 feet to the crossing and a considerable distance northward. The grade is level at the point of accident.

The maximum authorized speed for the type of freight trains involved in this accident was 35 miles per hour on the Peoria District and 50 miles per hour on the Springfield District.

DESCRIPTION OF ACCIDENT

No. 292, a northbound second-class freight train, departed from Mattoon at 9:05 a. m., 3 hours 5 minutes late. Switching operations were performed en route. When the train arrived at Mount Pulaski at 1:05 p. m., 3 hours 15 minutes late, it consisted of roadswitcher type diesel-electric units 9188 and 9136, coupled in multipleunit control, 31 cars, and a caboose. Switching operations were performed at Mount Pulaski by the members of the crew before the arrival of No. 68.

No. 68, a northbound second-class freight train by timetable directions on the Springfield District, departed from East St. Louis, 121.5 miles south of Mount Pulaski, at 9 a. m., 3 hours late. Switching operations were performed en route. When the train arrived at Mount Pulaski at 2: 35 p. m., 4 hours late, it consisted of road-switcher type diesel-electric units 9174 and 9019, coupled in multiple-unit control, 78 cars, and a caboose. GATX 29633, a tank car, was the 36th car in the train. The 1st to the 36th cars, inclusive, were de