culty of their holding it, if General Howe should fall upon it with his whole force," he wrote General Greene, who had command of the Jersey shore, to " govern himself by circumstances." Greene was in favor of holding on.

To John Augustine Washington, General Washington gave a different coloring to the story, saying that the fort at the last was held contrary to his wishes and opinion. To Joseph Reed he described the affair three years later in a way which, while showing the views of Greene and of Congress, admits his lack of decision, "that warfare in my mind, and hesitation, which ended in the loss of the garrison." This mistake caused much hostile criticism, and it is probably the clearest example which Washington ever gave of the occasional evil results of too little confidence in his own judgment. General Charles Lee wrote to General Gates, after the capture of the post:

"Between ourselves, a certain great man is most damnably deficient. Our councils have been weak to the last degree."

Joseph Reed wrote to General Lee that it was entirely owing to Lee that the army was not entirely cut off. Referring to the Fort Washington error, he remarked:

"General Washington's own judgment, seconded by representations from us, would, I believe, have saved the

men and their arms; but, unluckily, General Greene's judgment was contrary. This kept the General's mind in a state of suspense till the stroke was struck. Oh, General, an indecisive mind is one of the greatest misfortunes that can befall an army; how often have I lamented it this campaign."

Lee himself, about this time, on another point, with characteristic impudence, thus wrote to Washington:

Oh, General, why would you be overpersuaded by men of inferior judgment to your own? It was a cursed affair."

Howe following up his successes, Washington moved toward the Delaware, his army constantly decreasing. Pursued by a detachment under Lord Cornwallis, he crossed the river, and as Howe made no further move, there was quiet for about three weeks. During this time, General Lee, who had acted almost in direct insubordination to the orders of the commander-inchief, was captured by a party of light horse"taken by his own imprudence," Washington said. As Lee had been in the British army, he was held as a deserter by General Howe, until Washington threatened retaliation unless he was treated as a prisoner of war, whereupon Howe, after consulting with Lord George Germaine, yielded the point.

Washington's situation at this time was prob

ably at least as discouraging as at any period during the war. Robert Morris wrote on December ist:

"Our people knew not the hardships and calamities of war when they so boldly dared Britain to arms; every man was then a bold patriot, felt himself equal to the contest, and seemed to wish for an opportunity of evincing his prowess; but now, when we are fairly engaged, when death and ruin stare us in the face, and when nothing but the most intrepid courage can rescue us from contempt and disgrace, sorry am I to say it, many of those who were foremost in noise, shrink coward-like from the danger, and are begging pardon without striking a blow."

Washington himself wrote in November:

"The different States, without regard to the qualifications of an officer, quarrelling about the appointments, and nominating such as are not fit to be shoeblacks, from the local attachments of this or that member of Assembly."

About how officers ought to be selected he gave these precise directions:

"Take none but gentlemen; let no local attachments influence you . . . recollect, also, that no instance has yet happened of good or bad behavior in a corps in our service that has not originated with the officers. Do not take old men, nor yet fill your corps with boys, especially for captains."

"I have labored, ever since I have been in the service, to discourage all kinds of local attachments and distinctions of country, denominating the whole by the greater name of AMERICAN, but I have found it impossible to overcome prejudices."

New Jersey and Pennsylvania showed small devotion to the cause, and the prospect of having a proper army in the spring, upon which everything would depend, did not look rosy. On December 20th Washington wrote to Congress, that ten days more would put an end to the existence of the army. Before those ten days were gone, however, something happened.

CHAPTER X

FROM TRENTON TO VALLEY FORGE

"He resembled Marcellus rather than Fabius, notwithstanding his rigid adherence to the Fabian policy during the war."- GENERAL CHARLES LEE.

WASHINGTON realized the importance of public opinion, and knew that the public mind would be depressed by the loss of Philadelphia. Howe was alive to the same fact. Congress, likewise, conceived the idea of influencing the general spirit by resolving that they would not leave Philadelphia, a resolution which was, on Washington's advice, wisely suppressed, since that body soon gave various exhibitions of nervousness. As the British advanced Congress adjourned to Baltimore. "The fatal consequences that must attend its loss," wrote Washington, referring to Philadelphia, "are but too obvious to every one." He felt that, for the sake of holding up the courage of the country, some desperate blow must be struck.

During his retreat across the Delaware a pamphlet had been written called "The Crisis," by