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binding, or that people ought to employ the money for some other purpose than that for which they obtained it under the agreement. Let him convince you of the truth of any of these propositions. And if he can so convince you, who are sitting in judgment upon commercial contracts, I concede that he is preeminently clever. But I am quite sure that he will not be able to satisfy or convince you upon any of these points. But, apart from these considerations-suppose, by heavens, men of the jury, that the reverse had happened, and that it was not this man's deceased brother who owed me the money, but I who owed the brother a talent, or eighty minas, or more or less; do you think, men of the jury, that Lacritus the defendant would use the same language which he has now been dinning in our ears,1 or would say that he is not heir, and renounce his brother's inheritance, and would not exact the debt from me with the utmost severity, as he has exacted from other persons what was owing to the deceased either in Phaselis or in other places? And if any one of us, being sued by the defendant, had dared to plead a special plea suggesting that the action was not maintainable, I am sure he would have been indignant and complained bitterly to you, and called it scandalous and unlawful usage of him, if any one voted that his action, being a mercantile one, was not maintainable. Then, Lacritus, if you consider this just for yourself, why should it not be just for me? Are not the same laws enacted for all? Have not all the same rights in regard to mercantile actions? Is there any one so odious, so surpassing all mankind in baseness, as to advise you to decide that this mercantile action does not lie, when you are sitting now in judgment upon mercantile causes?

What do you require, Lacritus? Are you not content that we are deprived of the money which we lent you, but would you have us also consigned to prison for non-payment of the penalty adjudged against us? Would it not be atrocious and cruel and disgraceful to you, men of the jury, if people who have lent money on a maritime adventure in your port, and who are defrauded of it, should be carried to prison by the fraudulent debtors? Is it this, Lacritus, which you 1 κατακέχρηται. Pabst:-" die er jetzt missbrauchsweise führt." Auger:-"dont il abuse."

2 The ἐπωβελία.

would persuade the jury to sanction? Where are we to obtain justice, men of the jury, for commercial contracts? Before what magistrate, or at what time? Before the Eleven? They bring into court housebreakers and thieves, and other malefactors who are charged with capital crimes. Before the Archon? But the Archon is enjoined to take charge of heiresses and orphans and parents. Perhaps before the Kingarchon? But we are not gymnasiarchs, nor are we indicting any one for impiety. Or perhaps the Polemarch will bring us into court. Yes, for neglect of a patron, or residence without a patron. There remain the Generals. But they introduce and bring to trial the cases of the trierarchs; they bring no mercantile cause into court. I am a merchant, and you are the brother and heir of a merchant, who has obtained from me a mercantile loan. Before what tribunal then am I to take this action? Show me, Lacritus; but show it conformably to law and justice. That you can't do. No man (I don't care how clever he is) can say anything just upon a case like yours.

These are not the only wrongs, men of the jury, which I have suffered from the defendant Lacritus. Besides being deprived of my money, he would have brought me (as far as it lay in his power) into the utmost peril, had not the agreement with these men done me good service, testifying that I lent the money to Pontus and back to Athens. For of course you are aware, men of the jury, how severe the law is, if any Athenian carry corn to any other place than Athens, or lend money to any other port than that of Athens. You know what penalties there are for such offences, and how heavy and stringent they are. However, read them the law, that they may have more certain information.

THE LAW.

"It shall not be lawful for any Athenian, or any alien residing at Athens, or any person under their control, to lend out money on a ship which is not commissioned to bring corn to Athens, or anything else which is particularly mentioned. And if any one lend out money contrary to this 1 Penrose writes in a note,

"These words are not part of the law itself, but are substituted by the orator, for the sake of brevity, for a long list of different sorts of merchandise, which were specified in the law.-Reiske. Schäfer says

enactment, there shall be a presentment and an account of the money laid before the Overseers of the emporium, in like manner as is provided with respect to the ship and the corn. And such person shall have no right of action for the money, which he has lent out to any other place than to Athens, and no magistrate shall bring any suit thereupon to trial."

The law, men of the jury, is thus severe. Yet these rascally fellows, though it is expressly mentioned in the agreement that the money's worth shall come back to Athens, allowed the money which they borrowed from us at Athens to be carried to Chios. For when the shipowner of Phaselis wanted to borrow other money in Pontus from a certain Chian, and the Chian said he would not lend it, unless he received as security all that the shipowner had with him on board, and unless the previous lenders gave their assent, they allowed that which belonged to us to be given in pledge to the Chian, and put the whole of it at his disposal; then they sailed away from Pontus with the shipowner of Phaselis and the Chian creditor, and put into Thieves' Harbour, and never anchored their vessel in your port. And now, men of the jury, money which was lent from Athens to Pontus, and back from Pontus to Athens, has been carried to Chios by these men. It comes therefore to what I started with in the beginning you are injured fully as much as we who advanced the money. Only consider, men of the jury. Is it not plain that you are injured, when a man endeavours to place himself above your laws, and invalidates and annuls nautical agreements, and has sent off money lent in our port to Chios? Is it not plain that such a person injures you as well as us?

I, men of the jury, address myself to these persons only; for to them I advanced my money. They will have to deal with that shipowner of Phaselis, their own countryman, to whom they say they lent the money without our consent and that this cannot be, for Reiske forgets that this was not spoken by the party, but read by the clerk. But in this Schäfer forgets, that what the clerk read was not from any authenticated copy, but from extracts which had been taken and put into the echinus by the party; and so, if Androcles or Demosthenes had copied the law in this compendious form, the clerk would of course read it accordingly."

Pabst is not satisfied either with Reiske's view or with Schäfer's, but thinks the passage corrupt.

contrary to the agreement; we know nothing of their transactions with their countryman; that is a matter within their own knowledge. Such we consider to be a just view of the case; and we entreat you, men of the jury, to give redress to us who are the injured parties, and to punish people who resort to trickery and sophistry, as these men do. If you take this course, your decision will be in accordance with your own interests, and you will deprive the swindlers of those artifices by which some of them contrive to evade nautical contracts.

THE ORATION FOR PHORMIO.

THE ARGUMENT.

PHORMIO, on whose behalf the present speech was composed, is (as the readers will easily discern) a different person from the defendant in the action by Chrysippus. The defendant in the present action was at an early period a slave of Pasion the banker, whose business for a long time he managed, and from whom as a reward for his good conduct he received his freedom.

Pasion died leaving a widow, Archippe, and two sons, Apollodorus and Pasicles, the younger of whom was a minor. He left a will, by which he directed that Phormio should marry, his widow and receive with her a certain marriage portion; and he appointed him one of the guardians of his younger son, Pasicles. The bulk of his property was inherited by his two sons; between whom, soon after their father's death, a division was made by the guardians of all the inheritance, except the bank and a shield-manufactory, of which Pasion in his lifetime had granted a lease to Phormio, and the rents of which he continued to pay to the children until Pasicles came of age. At that time they came to a settlement; Phormio was discharged from the lease; and the brothers divided the two properties, Apollodorus taking the shield-manufactory, and Pasicles the bank. Upon the death of Archippe, Apollodorus made certain claims upon Phormio for property alleged to be in his possession; their dispute was referred to private arbitrators, under whose advice a compromise was agreed to, and Apollodorus gave to Phormio a release of all demands. A long time after this, and more than eighteen years after Pasion's death, Apollodorus preferred the claim, which is the subject of the present action, against Phormio, for a sum of banking stock, alleged to have been left by Pasion in the bank, and to have been fraudu lently appropriated by Phormio to his own use. Phormio indignantly denies the charge, asserting that Pasion possessed no banking stock, but, on the contrary, owed eleven talents to the bank when he took a lease of it. He contends that the charge was trumped up by

Apollodorus in order to extort money, he having brought himself into difficulties by litigation and extravagance.

Such is the case for the defence, stated to the jury by the friend who speaks on Phormio's behalf. Besides this answer on the merits, he pleads two pleas in bar of the action; first, a release of all demands by the plaintiff; secondly, the statute of limitations.

The result of the trial we learn from the speech against Stephanus, (page 1103,) where it is stated, that the speech for the defence made such an impression on the jury, that they would not hear a word that Apollodorus had to say, and the verdict passed against him by so large a majority, that he had to pay the Epobelia, or a sixth of the damages.

These

This speech, instructive and important as it is on other accounts, acquires an additional interest from the charge, to which it has given rise, against the character of the orator; who here attacks and bitterly inveighs against the character of a man, whom he had supported by his counsel and advocacy for a long series of years, and whom he again assisted in the suit against Stephanus, which arose out of this very proceeding. For Apollodorus our orator had composed the speeches against Timotheus, Callippus, Nicostratus, Polycles; that for the Naval crown, and several others. indeed were in no way connected with the present case; and, unless Apollodorus was the personal friend of Demosthenes, he could hardly be censured for having undertaken the cause of a new client who was opposed to him. The case of Stephanus however stands on a different footing. Stephanus gave evidence for Phormio to establish Pasion's will, which was disputed. Apollodorus sued him for false testimony, and Demosthenes composed in his defence the two extant speeches against Stephanus, in which he contends that the will which Phormio produced at the trial was a forgery, and gives a totally different complexion to the family history of Apollodorus, and the proceedings therewith connected, from that which is given in the present speech. It is by this act that Demosthenes has laid himself open to censure.

We may regard as mere calumny the unsupported assertion of Eschines, that Demosthenes betrayed his client's secrets to the adversary. Plutarch simply observes, that Demosthenes damaged his reputation by writing speeches for both sides, which, he says, was like supplying two adversaries with weapons from the same workshop. Reiske, Auger, and many other modern critics have expressed similar opinions. The suggestion of Albert Gerhard Becker, that the speech for Phormio may have been wrongly ascribed to Demosthenes, is opposed to the current of authority. Ranke conceives, that, as some time must have elapsed between the first trial and the proceeding against Stephanus, the orator may in the meantime have found reason to change his opinion, and gone over to Apollodorus because he thought the merits of the case were on his side. This would hardly justify him according to our English notions; for we hold that it is not the province of the advocate to set himself up as a judge between the contending parties, much less to desert from one to the other upon any such ground. Pabst

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