Mr. Chief Justice Waite delivered the opinion of the court: This is a writ of error to the Supreme Court of Louisiana, and the federal question rests on the following facts: On the 8th of March, 1869, the General Assembly of the State passed Act No. 116, of 1869, to authorize an issue of negotiable state bonds to aid in the construction of the Mississippi and Mexican Gulf Ship Canal. Special provision was made in the Act, for taxation, to meet any liability that might be incurred in this way. Bonds to the amount of $480,000 were put out, purporting on their face to have been issued under the authority thus granted, and the New York Guaranty and Indemnity Company, for all that appears to the contrary, became the bona fide holder of $250,000 of this amount. On the 24th of January, 1874, Act No. 3, of 1874, was passed to provide for funding the obligations of the State by an issue, if necessary, of $15,000,000 of "Consolidated bonds of the State of Louisiana." To accomplish this a "Board of Liquidation" was created, with power to execute the new bonds and exchange them for old at the rate of sixty cents of the new for $1 of the old. If the Board rejected any bond offered for exchange, the holder could apply by petition to some proper court for relief, and if on that petition final judgment should be rendered in his favor against the Board, he would be entitled, on giving up his old bond, to get one of the new on the terms proposed. | Act the bonds issued in aid of the Mississippi and Mexican Gulf Ship Canal Company were specially designated as questioned and of doubtful validity. After this Act was passed, the Guaranty and Indemnity Company, being desirous of funding its bonds under the provisions of Act No. 3, filed its petition in the Fifth District Court of the Parish of Orleans, praying that the bonds "Be decreed to have been issued in strict conformity to law, and not in violation of the Constitution of this State or of the United States, and that they be declared legal and valid obligations against the State of Louisiana, and issued for a valid consideration." No other judgment was asked than such an one as was necessary under Act No. 11, of 1875, to secure the benefit of Act No. 3, of 1874, the funding Act. This petition got, in due course of procedure, to the Supreme Court of the State, and it was there decided that the suit thus begun was not one for the recovery of the money due on the bonds, but was rather in the nature of an inquisition to determine whether the bonds in question were of the class which the State had determined to include in its funding scheme. For this reason the court held that, for the purposes of such an inquiry, the petitioner occupied no better position as a bona fide holder than he would if he had been the first taker. Because of this ruling, the present writ of error has been brought. This statement of the case is sufficient, as we think, to show that the question below was not whether, in an action against the State, properly authorized, to recover the amount due upon the bond, Act No. 11 permitted the State to prove, as against a bona fide holder, that the bond was invalid, but whether the bona fide holder of an invalid bond was entitled to the benefit of the scheme of compromise which the State had offered to the holders of its securities that were valid in the hands of the first taker. Such being the case, no obligation of the orig inal contract has been impaired. Every legal right which the original taker acquired when the bond was put out still remains. The Guaranty Company may enforce all such rights now in any appropriate manner. All the court beOn the 14th of March, in the same year, 1874, low has said is, that as between the State and Act No. 55, of 1874, was passed, which purport- the first taker the bonds were not valid obligaed to prohibit all state officers from levying or tions and that, consequently, they are not encollecting any tax to pay the principal or inter- titled to the privileges of the funding laws. The est falling due after January 1, 1874, of any of obligation of the State to pay the bonds in the state debt, unless such levy and collection money to the bona fide holders in accordance was specially authorized by some law of the with the original promise still remains. The State subsequently adopted, and also prohibit- judgment, which has been rendered and which ing the setting apart of any funds in the Treasury we are now reviewing, is no bar to any proper for any such payment. The same law purport-proceeding for that purpose. The suit which ed to take away from the courts of the State all power or jurisdiction to arrest or impede its operation by mandamus, injunction or otherwise. On the 17th of March, 1875, Act No. 11, of 1875, was passed, to prohibit the Board of Liquidation from funding, under Act No. 3, of 1874, questionable and doubtful obligations of the State, "Until said bonds * * * shall first, by final decree of the Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana, have been declared legal and valid obligations against the State of Louisiana, and that the same were issued in strict conformity to law, and not in violation of the Constitution of this State or of the United States, and for a valid consideration." In this was authorized, and the suit which was actually begun, only related to the right of the holder to come into the compromise which the State offered to certain classes of its creditors. The judgment is, that the bonds do not belong to any of the designated classes. The question here is, not whether, if that inquiry were open to us, we should be of the same opinion, but whether the obligation the State is under to the Company has been impaired by Act 11, of 1875, as thus construed. We think the State had the right to say, when it proposed a scheme for the compromise of its debts, what creditors should be included. That, in our opinion, is all that has been done. It follows that the federal question was decided right below, and the judgment is, consequently, affirmed. True copy. Test: which he must adhere, till changed by legislation or judicial decision. The appellant, in the petition, in reference to this practice, avers "That the allowances made to it from time to James H. McKenney, Clerk, Sup. Court, U. S. time between May 6, 1870, and December 24, THE SWIFT AND COURTNEY AND v. UNITED STATES. (See S. C., 15 Otto, 691-696.) Commission on stamps-construction of statute. 1. Under the Act of July 14, 1870, ch. 255, proprietors of articles named in schedule C, who furnish their own dies, are allowed ten per cent commission on amounts over $500 of stamps purchased by them. 2. The rule, which gives determining weight to contemporaneous construction, put upon a statute by those charged with its execution, applies only in cases of ambiguity and doubt. 3. It is incumbent on the Government, in order to deprive one of his statutory right, not only to show facts from which an agreement to do so may be inferred, but an actual settlement of his claim based [No. 266.] upon such an understanding. Argued Apr. 4, 1882. Decided Apr. 17, 1882. APPEAL from the Court of Claims. The case is stated by the court. Mr. Justice Matthews delivered the opinion of the court: The appellant filed its petition in the Court of Claims for the recovery of certain commissions, alleged to be due to it on purchases of proprietary stamps under the internal revenue laws. 1878, have been in accordance with the uniform practice of said Internal Revenue Office from different times prior to 1866 protests were made its organization, but petitioner avers that at to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue by and on behalf of the manufacturers of friction matches against such a construction of the statute by him, by which only ten per cent commissions in stamps at their face value were allowed by him upon the amount of money paid by the purchasers, instead of ten per cent upon the whole amount of stamps purchased, and that such facts are and have always been known to petitioner." It is also averred that the appellant gave the required security for a credit of sixty days upon its purchase of stamps, as provided for in the Internal Revenue Act of June 30, 1864, 13 Stat. at L., 295, which enacted, "That the Commissioner of Internal Revenue may, from time to time, furnish, supply and deliver to any manufacturer of friction or other matches, cigar light or wax tapers, a suitable quantity of adhesive or other stamps, such as may be prescribed for use in such cases, without prepayment therefor, on a credit not exceeding sixty days, requiring in advance such security as may be judged necessary to secure payment therefor to the Treasurer of the United States within the time prescribed for such payment." The defendant filed a general demurrer, which was sustained and judgment rendered dismissing the petition. To review this judgment the present appeal has been prosecuted. The Act of July 1, 1862, section 102, to provide internal revenue, etc., 12 Stat. at L., 477, authorized the Commissioner of Internal RevIt alleged that it was, during the period enue to sell to and supply collectors, deputycovered by the transactions set out, the propri- collectors, postmasters, stationers or any other etor, manufacturer and vendor of friction persons, at his discretion, with adhesive stamps, matches; that, as such, at the beginning of its upon the payment at the time of delivery of the business, it furnished to the Commissioner of amount of duties said stamps represent, and Internal Reveuue its own die for stamps, to be thereupon to allow and deduct from the aggreused especially for its own proprietary articles; gate amount of such stamps the sum of not exthat, during said period, from time to time, and ceeding five per centum as commission, with continuously on different days of each and ev- the proviso, "That any proprietor or proprie ery month, it sent to the Commissioner of Inter-tors of articles named in schedule C, who shall nal Revenue sums of money from $1,000 to $10,000 as suited its convenience, and that said commissioner transmitted to it stamps, as it needed and ordered; so that in the account between it and the commissioner as to said stamps the creditor side showed moneys received by the latter in certain sums and at certain dates, but showed the receipt of no sum less than $1,000, and the debtor side of said account showed that stamps were sent by the commissioner to the appellant in different sums and at different dates, but never in amounts less than $1,000. It is further averred that upon the whole amount of stamps purchased, during the period referred to,it was entitled to a commission of ten per centum in money, amounting to $389,720.40, which the commissioner has refused to allow; and has allowed in lieu thereof $354,291.27 in stamps at their face value; insisting such to be the long established practice of the office, to furnish his or their own die or design for stamps, to be used especially for his or their own proprietary articles, shall be allowed the following discount, namely: on amounts purchased at one time of not less than $50 nor more than $500, . five per centum; on amounts over $500, ten per centum." By the amendatory Act of March 3, 1863, 12 Stat. at L., 714, the word "commission" was substituted for "discount" in this proviso. This section as thus amended was re-enacted as section 161 of the Act of June 30, 1864, 13 Stat. at L., 294, and schedule C enlarged so as to include friction matches. P. 302. The Act of July 14, 1870, section 4, 16 Stat. at L., 257, continued in force the same provision, directing the proprietors of articles named in schedule C, who shall furnish their own dies, shall be allowed commissions, on amounts over $500, "ten per centum on the whole amount purchased." It will be perceived, on examining this legis- | lation, that while, in respect to adhesive stamps sold, other than those to proprietors of articles named in schedule C from their own dies for their own use, the rate of the commission to be allowed to the purchaser shall not exceed five per centum, but within that limit, is subject to the discretion of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue; while, in respect to those of the latter class, including stamps on friction matches, the rate is fixed by the statute itself, and in the form as expressed in the Act of 1870, where the amounts of purchases are over $500, the commissions are established at ten per centum on the whole amount purchased. So that, while in the sale of adhesive stamps of the former description, in the exercise of his discretion as to the rate, the commissioner might lawfully provide that the commissions should be paid only in stamps at their face value; yet, in the sale of stamps to proprietors of friction matches, he was not authorized to diminish the commission by any such regulation but was required to allow and pay in money, ten per centum calculated on the amount of stamps purchased, on all sales exceeding $500 in amount. In the present case the appellant was allowed commissions not on the whole amount of stamps furnished him nor in money, but in stamps at their face value, calculated on the amount of money paid by him. The difference between the amounts, resulting from these two modes of calculating and allowing commissions, is the amount sought to be recovered by the appellant. There is no serious question raised as to the proper construction of the Internal Revenue Acts upon the point, it being virtually admitted that the contention on the part of the appellant upon the provisions of the statutes is correct. pendent purchases of stamps, settled for, at the time. when the commissions given by the law were paid by the commissioner, the purchaser voluntarily accepting payment, not in money, but in other stamps; and new dealings, of the same character, but separate as to each instance, had, afterwards, upon the same footing and by mutual understanding. On the contrary, the business was conducted upon the footing of a running account. Money was paid on account of stamps furnished or to be furnished, in sums differing in amount, but not less in any case than $500; and stamps were supplied in varying quantities, as ordered, without reference to corresponding and equivalent payments of cash; a bond with satisfactory security, in pursuance of law, having been given and accepted, to secure the Government against loss, in consequence of purchases on credit. The dealing is, undoubtedly, evidence that the appellant was willing to purchase stamps, to be paid for by a credit in account, in lieu of cash for commissions; but it does not prove that he was willing to waive his right to a commission upon the stamps so purchased. And it would be incumbent on the Government, in order to deprive him of his statutory right, not only to show facts, from which an agreement to do so might be inferred, but an actual settlement based upon such an understanding. The allegations in the petition, in our opinion, do not constitute such a bar to the recovery sought, and the demurrer interposed should not, therefore, have been sustained. For this error, the judgment of the Court of Claims is reversed and the cause remanded, for further proceedings in accordance with law; and it is so ordered. True copy._Test: James H. McKenney, Clerk, Sup. Court, U. S. Cited-111 U. S., 24. CRANE IRON COMPANY, Piff. in Err. It is met, however, in the opinion of the Court of Claims, and in argument on behalf of the Government here, that the contrary construction, to pay these commissions in stamp at their face value, has been acted upon by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue from the beginning; has been acquiesced in by purchasers and dealers; and has never been changed by Congress; AMOS and as an official practice has thus acquired the force of law; or if not, then, at least, it was a course of dealing, well known to the appellant, v. HOAGLAND ET AL., Comrs. of Drainage, etc.. and acquiesced in, by which it accepted stamps CHARLES The right construction of the Internal Revenue Acts, upon the point of the allowance of commissions to dealers in proprietary articles, persedeas. 1. Where a cause in a State Court has been ap purchasing stamps made from their own dies Writ of error to State Court-practice on-suand for their own use, is too clear to bring the case within the first alternative. The rule which gives determining weight to contemporaneous construction, put upon a statute, by those charged with its execution, applies only in cases of ambiguity and doubt. Edwards V. Darby, 12 Wheat.,210; Smythe v. Fiske,23 Wall., 382 [90 U. S., XXIII., 50]; U. S. v. Moore, 95 U. S., 763 [XXIV., 589]; U. S. v. Pugh, 99 U. S., 269 [XXV., 323]. And we are of opinion that the averments of the petition, admitted by the demurrer, do not bring it within the operation of the principle invoked in the second alternative. The case made by the petition is not that of successive and inde pealed to the Court of Errors of the State and there Court, the writ of error is properly directed to the affirmed, and the remittitur sent to the lower State latter court, because at that time the record had been transmitted to it and was then in its possession; but at any time before the remittitur, the writ may be directed to the state Court of Errors. 2. In those States where the highest court does not have possession of the record, and does not render a judgment, but decides questions certified by the inferior courts, and merely issues a rescript directing the latter what judgment to render, the case would, perhaps, be different. 18, 1881, being the judgment rendered by the Court. 3. Where the final judgment was rendered on July of Errors, and the writ of error was not issued and Mr. Justice Bradley delivered the opinion of the court: The controversy in these cases arose out of an assessment of benefits for the drainage of lands in New Jersey. It was decided by the Supreme Court of that State December 1, 1880. The Court of Errors and Appeals affirmed the judgment on the 18th of July, 1881, and the record was remitted August 31, 1881. On receiving the remittitur on that day, the Supreme Court entered a rule ordering it to be filed, and the cause to be proceeded with according to law. Writs of error from this court to the Supreme Court of New Jersey were allowed and bonds approved October 27, 1881, and were filed in the clerk's office of the latter court October 28, 1881. The writs of error were properly directed to the Supreme Court, because, at that time, the record had been transmitted to that court, and was then in its possession. See, Atherton v. Fowler, 91 U. S., 148 [XXIII., 267]. But at any time before the remittitur the writs might have been directed to the Court of Errors and Appeals, because the judgment of that court was the final judgment in the cause, and until the remittitur was made, it had possession of the record in contemplation of law. It is that judgment which is the object of revision here. The plaintiff in error insists that the action of the Supreme Court, on receiving the remittitur, was the final judgment. But this is not correct. Such action was not necessary to the jurisdiction of this court. A number of instances might be cited in which, without any remittitur, a writ of error from this court has been directed to the Court of Errors of New Jersey. This was the course in the noted cases of New Jersey v. Wilson, 7 Cranch, 164, and Bridge Proprs. v. Hoboken Co.,1 Wall., 116 [68 U. S., XVII., 571], and in the late case of New Jersey v. Yard, 95 U. S., 104 [XXIV., 352.] the inferior court is reversed, the Court of Er rors usually renders such judgment as ought to have been rendered, though it has the power to direct the court below what judgment to give. It is only necessary to open a book of New Jersey reports, containing decisions of the highest court, to ascertain its jurisdiction in this behalf. Thus in 2 Zabriskie, 623, is a judgment in the case of Demarest v. Hopper, reversing the judgment of the Supreme Court in an action of ejectment, and rendering judgment for the plaintiff; and in the same book, page 725, is another judgment of reversal in the case of Hopper v. Hopper, coupled with a judgment for the demandant in an action of dower, with a direction to the Supreme Court to award a writ of inquiry to assess the damages, and to issue execution therefor. We think that the final judgment in these cases was rendered on the 18th day of July, 1881, being the judgment rendered by the Court of Errors and Appeals; and that as the writs of error were not issued and served until the 28th of October, more than sixty days thereafter, they were too late to operate as a supersedeas; and, therefore, the rules to show cause must be discharged. Discharged, accordingly. True copy. Test: James H. McKenney, Clerk, Sup. Court, U. S. Cited-135 Mass., 33. Ν IN ERROR to the Supreme Court of the State of Minnesota. The case is sufficiently stated by the court. Messrs. Isaac N. Arnold Van H. Hig gins and Leonard Swett, for plaintiff in error. Mr. E. C. Palmer, for defendants in error. Mr. Chief Justice Waite delivered the opin In those States where the highest court does not have possession of the record, and does not render a judgment, but decides questions certified by the inferior courts, and merely issues a rescript directing the latter what judgment to render, the case would, perhaps, be different. But in New Jersey the record itself, or a transcript which stands for the record, is removed to the Court of Errors and Appeals, and a region of the court: ular judgment is there rendered. For certain purposes, as in England on writs of error from the House of Lords, the judgment of the inferior court pending proceeding in error, is supposed to be in existence. Action upon it may be brought and, on failure to give proper bail in error, execution may be issued. But for all other purposes, when a writ of error goes to an inferior court, the Court of Errors and Appeals obtains possession of the cause and renders a formal judgment therein. If the judgment of A majority of the court is of opinion that there has been no final judgment below in this case. Upon the trial in the District Court of Ramsey County, a verdict was rendered in favor of the plaintiff. Before any judgment was entered on this verdict, a motion was made for a new trial. This motion was overruled and thereupon an ap peal was taken to the Supreme Court of the State from "The order * denying the appli cation for a new trial." The judgment on this appeal is as follows: "Pursuant to an order of court duly made and entered in this cause on True copy. Test: company, its current expenses, or the purchase of equipments, tools and machinery. Subsequently, the mortgagor company was consolidated with the Chester and Iron Mountain Railroad Company, the consolidated company taking the name of the Iron Mountain, Chester and Eastern Railroad Company. From the first day of October, 1874, until the 5th day of June, 1876, the railroad and other property included in the mortgage was in the possession of D. C. Barber, as receiver, in a creditor's suit instituted by one Maxwell in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Illinois. On the last named day, in conformity with a stipulation signed by the James H. McKenney, Clerk, Sup. Court, U. S. attorneys in that suit, Barber was discharged LEWIS HAMMOCK ET AL., Appts., v. FARMERS' LOAN AND TRUST COM- (See S.C., 15 Otto, 77-94.) Power of judge to appoint a receiver-construction of state statute-redemption from mortgage sale-railway mortgage. as receiver, without being required to render an account of his acts, and the bill of Maxwell was dismissed at his costs. The present transcript does not show the grounds upon which Barber was appointed receiver, perhaps for the reason, disclosed in an affidavit, that the bill filed by Maxwell was not to be found among the files of his suit. On the day succeeding Barber's discharge as receiver, Hammock, assignee of two judgments, aggregating less than $1,000, with returns of no property, against the Iron Mountain, Chester and Eastern Railroad Company, and suing in *1. A judge of a circuit court in Illinois cannot, in behalf of himself and such judgment creditors vacation, appoint a receiver of a railroad corpora- as might unite with him, presented his bill in tion. The possession of a receiver so appointed is equity to the Judge of the Circuit Court of Perry 2. Section 49 of chapter 37, Rev. Stat. Ill. 1874, p. County, Illinois, in vacation," at Chambers," in 332, is to be construed as if there was no comma be- Washington County, Illinois, praying the apand the words "to dissolve injunctions." Punctu-pointment of a receiver of the railroad com not that of the court. tween the words "to hear and determine motions" ation is no part of a statute. 3. The Statutes of Illinois, giving the right to redeem mortgaged lands sold under decree, do not embrace the real estate of a railroad corporation mortgaged in connection with its franchises and personal property. Its real estate, personalty and franchises, so mortgaged, should be sold as an entirety, and without the right of redemption given 4. The chattel mortgage statute is inapplicable to an ordinary railway mortgage. by statute. [No. 164.] AF lan: pany and its effects, with authority to hold and administer the same under the direction of the court, and out of the net income arising therefrom to pay the judgments held by complainant and others. The only grounds assigned in the bill for a receiver are: the indebtedness of the company, the returns against it of nulla bona, its insolvency, and its refusal to pay the judgments outstanding against it. The Judge, without notice to the company, appointed Thomas M. Sams, receiver, and made an order requiring the railroad company, its officers, servants and agents, to deliver to him all of its property and effects of every kind, upon his presenting the certificate of the clerk of the court that he, Sams, had filed his bond, as reTo secure the payment of its bonds, aggre- ceiver, in the penal sum of $15,000, with certain gating the sum of $660,000, and issued for the named sureties (Barber, then recently the repurpose of raising money as well for its mining ceiver in Maxwell's suit, being one of them), and manufacturing business, as for the comple- conditioned that he would account for all proption and maintenance of its road, the Chester erty and effects coming to his hands, as receiver, and Tamaroa Coal and Railroad Company, an under the order and direction of the court. By Illinois corporation, executed, on the 12th day the terms of the order, Sams was authorized to of April, 1871, a deed of trust containing such use and operate the railroad, and pay all exconditions and provisions as are usually insert-penses incurred in its operation as far back as ed in railway mortgages. It embraced the entire road of the grantor, then made or thereafter to be constructed, from Chester, in Randolph County, to Tamaroa, in Perry County, together with the right of way, and all the real and personal property, then owned or subsequently acquired, and used or appropriated for railroad purposes; also, its privileges and franchises for holding, operating and maintaining the road, together with any income derived from the property, not applied to the construction and repair of the road, the conduct of the business of the *Head notes by Mr. Justice HARLAN. October 1, 1874, nearly two years prior to his appointment. The bill of Hammock, with the foregoing order indorsed thereon, was filed in the clerk's office on the 7th of June, 1876, and Sams, having executed the required bond, took possession of the railroad and all the property and effects of the company. On the 13th day of June, 1876, the Farmers' Loan and Trust Company-without knowledge, as we infer from the record, of the suit in the state court-commenced proceedings in the court below for the foreclosure of the before mentioned mortgage, and to obtain a decree for |