2. That he intended by those mortgages to give Mrs. Barbour a preference over his other creditors, by securing the debt due her and her children from him, as administrator of Barbour's estate. 3. That Mrs. Barbour did not know nor have reasonable cause to believe that Colby was insolvent when the mortgages were made and filed for record. the person receiving it or to be benefited thereby, should have had reasonable cause to believe that the person making such conveyance was insolvent and that it was made in fraud of the Bankrupt Act. The obvious meaning of this provision is to require the concurrence of the creditor who gets security for his debt in the purpose of defeating the Bankrupt Act. Such person must have It will be perceived that the conveyances reasonable cause to believe the grantor in the which are here in question were made, and the conveyance was insolvent at the time it was exproceedings in bankruptcy were commenced ecuted, and that it was made with intent to deagainst Colby, before the date at which the Re- feat the bankrupt law. Both these must exist vised Statutes became the law, and before the as facts which the grantee had reasonable cause Act of 1874, amendatory of the Bankrupt Law, to believe. And so careful was Congress to was passed. The validity of these mortgages, protect the rights acquired by an honest credthen, so far as they are affected by the bank-itor, that unless bankrupt proceedings are comrupt laws of the United States, is to be deter menced by or against the debtor within four mined by section 35 of the original Act of 1867. months after such a preference it should stand So much of that section as relates to the ques-good, though the creditor knew the debtor was tion before us reads as follows: "Sec.35. And be insolvent, and knew that the conveyance was it further enacted, That if any person, being in- intended to defeat the purpose of the Bankrupt solvent or in contemplation of insolvency, with- Law in securing equality of distribution of the in four months before the filing of a petition by debtor's property. And this period was reor against him, with a view to give a prefer- duced by the Act of 1874 to two months. ence to any creditor or person having a claim against him or who is under any liability for him, procures any part of his property to be attached, sequestered or seized on execution, or makes any payment, pledge or assignment, transfer or conveyance, of any part of his property, either directly or indirectly, absolutely or conditionally, the person receiving such payment, pledge, assignment, transfer or conveyance, or to be benefited thereby, or by such attachment, having reasonable cause to believe that such person is insolvent, and that such attachment, payment, pledge, assignment or conveyance is made in fraud of the provisions of this Act, the same shall be voil, and the assignee may recover the property or the value of it from the person so receiving it or so to be benefited." The act of making these mortgages by Colby, though he knew that he was insolvent, and knew that he was preferring Mrs. Barbour as a creditor at the expense of others, is not forbidden by the common law, and is not a violation of the statute laws of most of the States of the Union. Nor is it an act forbidden by any general rule of morals or of abstract justice. It was in fact a meritorious act, aside from the positive rule established by the bankrupt law. He had long had this money of a confiding widowed sister-in-law and her orphan children, and while holding it in a fiduciary capacity he had used it for his own purposes. He saw her called to account for it by the probate court, and knew he was unable to refund it. He also saw the gulf of bankruptcy before him, and before he was buried beneath its waters he determined at least to secure this debt, the creation of a trust reposed in him. Who shall arraign him for it in the court of conscience? It has never been denied, so far as we are advised, that in attacking such a conveyance by the assignee of a bankrupt it is necessary to prove the existence of this reasonable cause of belief of the debtor's insolvency in the mind of the preferred party. The testimony fails to establish that Mrs. Barbour had any reasonable cause to believe this of Colby. She was a widow, devoted to her children. Her business affairs were managed for her by others. Colby was her brother-inlaw and friend, and had been the friend of her deceased husband. He had been reputed for many years to be a wealthy man. He was known to be the owner of valuable real estate. All this was well understood by Mrs. Barbour, while she did not know and had no reason to suspect, that he was largely in debt and his real estate covered by mortgages. Up to the time of the failure of the First National Bank of Mansfield, September 26, 1873, very few persons had any doubt of Mr. Colby's entire solvency. The rapid succession of events in the locality where Colby and Mrs. Barbour resided, and its effect upon Mr. Colby's condition, as described by some of the witnesses, might well have been matters of which Mrs. Barbour was ignorant. She swears that she was, and no one is able to say that she had any reason to be aware of the effect of these matters on Mr. Colby. Nothing was brought to her notice or attention which would suggest a suspicion of his insolvency, and her confidence in him clearly was not shaken. In the case of Grant v. Bk., 97 U. S., 80 [XXIV., 971], this court said: "The Act very wisely, as we think, instead of making a payment or a security void for mere suspicion of the debtor's insolvency, requires for that purpose that his creditor should have some reasonable cause to believe him insolvent. He must have knowledge of some fact or facts calcu If, then, it was forbidden neither by the common law nor by the statute of the State nor by the highest sense of honor, it must be made to appear clearly that it is void under the sec-lated to produce such a belief in the mind of an tion of the bankrupt law which we have quoted, or else it must stand. It is a fundamental condition of the right of the assignee to avoid such a conveyance, that ordinarily intelligent man." Tested by this rule, which, we think, is the sound one, there is no evidence of any such knowledge brought home to Mrs. Barbour. In fact we do not believe that at the time the deeds were executed she Smith, Asst. Atty-Gen., for defendant in error. even suspected Mr. Colby's insolvency or contemplated his failure. It results from this view of the case that the decree of the Čircuit Court must be reversed, and a decree rendered establishing the validity of the mortgages to her and adjusting the rights of the parties on that basis. Mr. Justice Woods delivered the opinion of the court: Section 5352 of the Revised Statutes of the United States declares: "Every person having a husband or wife liv. ing, who marries another, whether married or single, in a territory or other place over which James H. McKenney, Clerk, Sup. Court U. S. the United States has exclusive jurisdiction, is True copy. Test: JOHN MILES, Plff. in Err., D. UNITED STATES. (See S. C., 13 Otto, 304-316.) Jury in territorial court-defense in bigamy proof of first marriage-reasonable doubtsecond wife, when witness. 1. In impaneling a jury in a territorial court, the court is bound follow the law of the Territory on that subject. 2. On an indictment for bigamy, it is no defense that the doctrine and practice of polygamy were parts of the religion of the accused. 3. On an indictment for bigamy, the first marriage may be proved by the admissions of the prisoner. 4. A charge to a jury, that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is such as will produce an abiding conviction in the mind, to a moral certainty, that the fact exists that is claimed to exist, held, not erroneous. upon a writ of error. 5. This court cannot re-examine questions of fact 8. It is only in cases where the first marriage is not controverted, or has been duly established by other evidence, that the second wife is allowed to testify; and she can then be a witness to the second marriage, and not to the first. [No. 592.] Argued Jan. 25, 1881. Decided Apr. 4, 1881. IN ERROR to the Supreme Court of Utah Territory. The case is fully stated by the court. Messrs. E D. Hoge, W. N. Dusenberry and Arthur Brown, for plaintiff in error. Messrs. Charles Devens, Atty-Gen., and E. B. NOTE-What constitutes a valid marriage; evidence to prove marriage. See, note to Jewell v. Jewell, 42 U.S. (1 How.), 219. Causes of challenge of jurors and their qualifications. See, note to Clinton v. Englebrecht, 80 U. S., XX., 659. Bigamy; proof of marriage in cases of. A foreign marriage may be proved by the foreign registry or a certified copy of it, with proof of the foreign law, if it requires the keeping of such a registry. State v. Dooris, 40 Conn., 145; Stanglein v. State, 22 L. J. Ch., 177; Bird v. Com., 21 Gratt., 800; Squire v. State, 46 Ind., 459. The testimony of witnesses to the fact of marriage may be substituted for the registry. The evidence of the register or of some person who was present is sufficient. Morris v. Miller, 4 Burr., 2057; Birt v. Barlow, Doug., 171; Reg. v. Cradock, 3 Fost. & F., 837; Reg. v. Hawes, 2 Cox C. C., 432; Reg. v. Mainwaring, 7 Cox C. C., 192; Murphy v. State, 50 Ga., 150; State v. Hodgkins, 19 Me., 155; People v. Clark, 64 N. Y., 456; People v. Calder, 30 Mich., 85; State v. Kean, 10 N. H., 347; State v. Williams, 20 Iowa, 98; Warner v. Com., 2 Va. Cas., 95; Wolverton v. State, 16 Ohio, 173; Arnold v. State, 53 Ga., 574; State v. Clark, 54 N. H., 456; Com. v. Putnam, 1 Pick., 136. A consensual marriage is, by the common law, valid; and proof of such marriage by admissions and conduct is sufficient where there is no conflicting statute. They are not alone sufficient to convict, but must be coupled with cohabitation. Carmichsel v. State, 12 Ohio St., 553; Stanglein v. State, 17 Ohio St., 453; State v. Hilton, 3 Rich., 434; Jackson v. People, 3 Ill., 231; Langtry v. State, 30 Ala., 536; guilty of bigamy, and shall be punished by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars and by imprisonment for a term not more than five years.' وو The plaintiff in error was indicted under this section in the Third District Court of Utah at Salt Lake City. He was convicted. He appealed to the Supreme Court of the Territory, firmed. where the judgment of the district court was af That judgment is now brought to this court for review upon writ of error, The indictment charged that the plaintiff in error, John Miles, did, on October, 24, 1878, at Salt Lake County, in the Territory of Utah, marry one Emily Spencer, and that afterwards, and while he was so married to Emily Spencer and while she was still living, did, on the same day and at the same county, marry one Caroline Owens, the said Emily Spencer, his former wife, being still living and at that time his legal wife. The criminal procedure of Utah is regulated by an Act of the territorial Legislature, passed February 22, 1878. The following are the sections pertinent to this case, which prescribe the rules for the impaneling of juries: "SEC. 241. A particular cause of challenge is: 1. For such a bias as, when the existence of the facts is ascertained, in judgment of law, disqualifies the juror, and which is known in this Act as implied bias. 2. For the existence of a state of mind on the part of the juror which leads to a just inference, in reference to the case, that he will not act with entire impartiality, which is known in this Act as actual bias. Williams v. State, 54 Ala., 131; State v. Britton, 4 McCord, 256; Cameron v. State, 14 Ala., 546; Wolverton v. State, 16 Ohio, 173; State v. Seals, 16 Ind., 352; Squire v. State, 46 Ind., 459; Finney v. State, 3 Head, 544; State v. Abbey, 29 Vt., 60; Gorman v. State, 23 Tex., 646; State v. Crayford, 7 Me., 57; Robinson v. Com., 6 Bush, 309; Com. v. Jackson, 11 Bush, 679; 1 Am. Cr. R., 74; State v. Sanders, 30 Iowa, 532; Com. v.Murtagh, 1Ashm., 272; Com. v. Littlejohn, 15 Mass., 163; People v. Humphrey, 7 Johns., 314; Reg. v. Creamer, 10 Low. Can., 404; Reg. v. Simmonsto, 1 Car. & K., 164; Reg. v. Newton, 2 Moody & R., 503. Marriage may be proved by parol, and if prima facie regular, it will be presumed that the technical conditions existed. Com. v. Holt, 118 Mass., 61; Reg. v. Creswell, 13 Cox C. C., 126. The testimony of the minister, and the marriage license with his certificate, is sufficient whether he was ordained or not. Taylor v. State, 52 Miss., 84. Reputation alone is not sufficient to prove a marriage; nor is cohabitation alone sufficient; but proof of cohabitation, accompanied by defendant's admissions of the marriage, is sufficient. Langtry v. State, 30 Ala., 536; Moore v. State, 7 Tex. Ct. of App., 608; Steward v. State, 7 Tex. Ct. of App., 326; Brown v. State, 52 Ala., 340; Williams v. State, 44 Ala., 24; Breakey v. Breakey, 2 U. C. Q. B., 353; Doe v. McWilliams, 3 U.C.Q. B., 165; Reg. v. Smith, 14 U. C. Q. B., 567. The first and lawful wife is not a competent witness, even for the defense, to prove her marriage unlawful. Reg. v. Bienvenu, 15 Low. Can. Jur., 141; Reg. v. Tublee, 1 U. C. P. R., 103; Reg. v. Madden, 14 U. C. Q. B., 588; Williams v. State, 44 Ala., 24. juror was excused. A large number of other jurors were examined and challenged, and ex SEC. 246. If the facts are denied, the challenge must be tried as follows: (1) If it be for implied bias, by the court: (2) If it be for act-cused on the same grounds. ual bias, by triers. SEC. 247. The triers are three impartial persons, not on the jury panel, appointed by the court. All challenges for actual bias must be tried by three triers thus appointed, a majority of whom may decide. SEC. 249. Upon the trial of a challenge to an individual juror, the juror challenged may be examined as a witness to prove or disprove the challenge, and must answer every question pertinent to the inquiry. SEC. 250. Other witnesses may also be examined on either side, and the rules of evidence applicable to the trial of other issues govern the admission or exclusion of evidence on the trial of the challenge. SEC. 252. On the trial of a challenge for actual bias, when the evidence is concluded, the court must instruct the triers that it is their duty to find the challenge true, if, in their opinion, the evidence warrants the conclusion that the juror has such a bias against the party challenging him as to render him not impartial; and that if, from the evidence, they believe him free from such bias, they must find the challenge not true; that a hypothetical opinion unaccompanied with malice or ill will, founded on hearsay or information supposed to be true, is of itself no evidence of bias sufficient to disqualify a juror. The court can give no other instruction. SEC. 253. The triers must thereupon find the challenge either true or not true, and their decision is final. If they find it true, the juror must be excluded." Upon the trial of the case in the district court of the territory, Oscar Dunn and Robert Patrick were called as jurors. They were challenged for actual bias, and sworn upon their voir dire. Three triers were appointed by the court to pass upon the challenges to the jurors. Dunn, in answer to questions propounded to him, testified that he believed polygamy to be right, that it was ordained of God, and that the revelations concerning it were revelations from God and that those revelations should be obeyed, and that he who acted on them should not be convicted by the law of the land. The juror was challenged by the prosecution "For actual bias for the existence of a state of mind on his part which led to a just inference that he would not act with entire impartiality.' The triers found the challenge true and the juror was rejected. Robert Patrick was examined on his voir dire, and testified that he believed that the revelation given to Joseph Smith touching polygamy came from God, that it was one of God's laws to his people, and that he who practiced polygamy, conscientiously believing that revelation to be from God was doing God's will. He also testified that, in his opinion, the law of Congress was in conflict with that law of God, that Congress had the right to pass such a law, and that on the trial of a person who was in the practice of polygamy charged with bigamy he would consider it his duty, if satisfied by the evidence, to find the defendant guilty, and that he would do so. The juror was challenged for actual bias, and the triers found the challenge true, and the Upon the trial, evidence was given tending to show that a short time before the date laid in the indictment, October 24, 1874, the plaintiff in error was in treaty for marrying, at or about the same time, three young women, namely: Emily Spencer, Caroline Owens and Julia Spencer, and that there was a discussion between them on the question which should be the first wife, and that upon appeal to John Taylor, president of the Mormon Church, the plaintiff in error and the three women being present, it was decided by him that Emily Spencer, being the eldest, should be the first wife; Caroline Owens, being the next younger, the second, and Julia Spencer, being the youngest, the third wife; that being according to the rules of the church. It appeared further that marriages of persons belonging to the Mormon Church usually take place at what is called the Endowment House; that the ceremony is performed in secret, and the person who officiates is under a sacred obligation not to disclose the names of the parties to it. It further appeared that, on October 24, 1878, the plaintiff in error was married to the said Caroline Owens, and that on the night of that day he gave a wedding supper at the house of one Cannon, at which were present Emily Spencer, Caroline Owens and others. Evidence tending to establish these facts having been given to the jury, the court permitted to be given in evidence the declarations made by the plaintiff in error, on that night, in presence of the company assembled, and on subsequent occasions, to the effect that Emily Spencer was his first wife. Section 1604 of the compiled laws of Utah declares: "A husband shall not be a witness for or against his wife, nor a wife a witness for or against her husband." Upon the trial and after the evidence above recited had been given, tending, as the prosecution claimed, to prove the marriage of the plaintiff in error to Emily Spencer just before his marriage to Caroline Owens, the latter was offered as a witness against him to prove the same fact. Thereupon the defendant admitted, in open court, the charge of the indictment that he had been married to Caroline Owens, and even offered testimony to prove it, but this was ruled out by the court. The defendant, therefore, objected to the introduction of Caroline Owens as a witness against him, the objection being based on the statute just quoted. The court overruled the objection and admitted her as a witness, and she gave testimony tending to prove the marriage of the plaintiff in error to Emily Spencer previous to his marriage with the witness. It appeared from the evidence that the name of Caroline Owens' father was Maile, but that she had been adopted by an uncle and aunt named Owens, and had taken their name, by which she was called and known, but that, when she was baptized in the Mormon Church, she was required to be baptized in her father's name, and was married to Miles under that name. The court, among other things, charged the jury as follows: If you find, from all the facts and circumstances proven in this case, and from the admissions of the defendant, or from either, that the defendant Miles married Emily Spencer, and while she was yet living and his wife he married Caroline Owens, as charged in the indictment, your verdict should be, guilty. A legal wife cannot, but when it appears in a case that the witness is not a legal wife but a bigamous or plural wife then she may, testify against the bigamous husband, and her testimony should have just as much weight with the jury as any other witness, if the jury believe her statements to be true. And her evidence may be taken like the evidence of any other witness to prove either the first or second marriage. And so in this case you are at liberty to consider the testimony of Miss Caroline Owens, if you find from all the evidence in the case that she is a second and plural wife, and give it all the weight you think it entitled to, and may use it to prove the first marriage alleged, to wit: the marriage of defendant and Emily Spencer, or any other fact which in your opinion is proven by the testimony, if you believe it, as you do the testimony of any witness to prove any fact about which she has testified. The prisoner's guilt must be established beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is such as will produce an abiding conviction in the mind to a moral certainty that the fact exists that is claimed to exist, so that you feel certain that it exists. A balance of proof is not sufficient. A juror in a criminal case ought not to condemn unless the evidence excludes from his mind all reasonable doubt; unless he be so convinced by the evidence, no matter what the class of the evidence, of the defendant's guilt, that a prudent man would feel safe to act upon that conviction in matters of the highest concern and importance to his own dearest personal interests.” The plaintiff in error alleges as ground of error, the exclusion from the jury of Oscar Dunn and Robert Patrick and others of the Mormon faith. He claims that the examination of the proposed jurors and the rulings of the court show that it was the deliberate purpose of the court to exclude from the jury everyone who was of the Mormon faith. He insists that neither the court nor counsel had the right to inquire into the religious belief of the juror. There is no complaint that the jury was not a fair and impartial one, or that any juror impaneled was disqualified. Whether the exclusion of qualified jurors from the panel is a ground for setting aside the verdict and judgment on error, we do not find it necessary to decide. It is insisted on behalf of the defendant in error that the excluded jurors were not qualified to sit in the case of the defendant in error. In impaneling the jury the court was bound to follow the law of the Territory on that subject. linton v. Englebrecht, 13 Wall., 434 [80 U. S., XX, 659]; Reynolds v. U. S., 98 U. S., 145 [XXV., 244]. The jurors excluded were objected to by the prosecution as disqualified from serving in the case of the plaintiff in error for actual bias. The challenge for actual bias was tried by the triers appointed by the court, in accordance with the law of the Territory. The triers found the challenge true. By the same law their decision is declared to be final, and thereupon the jurors challenged must be excluded. The law was carefully followed. The jurors were found disqualified and were, therefore, as required by the law, excluded from the panel. It is evident from the examination of the jurors on their voir dire, that they believed that polygamy was ordained of God, and that the practice of polygamy was obedience to the will of God. At common law, this would have been ground for principal challenge of jurors of the same faith. See, 3 Bl., 303. It needs no argument to show that a jury composed of men entertaining such a belief could not have been free from bias or prejudice, on the trial for bigamy, of a person who entertained the same belief and whose offense consisted in the act of living in polygamy. But whether the evidence of bias was sufficient or not, it was so found by the triers and that was conclusive. Whether or not that bias was founded on the religious belief of the juror, is entirely immaterial, if the bias existed. It has been held by this court, that on an indictment for bigamy it was no defense that the doctrines and practice of polygamy were a part of the religion of the accused. Reynolds v. U. S. [supra]. It could not, therefore, be an invasion of the constitutional or other rights of the juror, called to try a party charged with bigamy, to inquire whether he himself was living in polygamy, and whether he believed it to be in accordance with the divine will and command. If the jurors themselves had no ground of complaint, it is clear the defendant had none. We find nothing in the record in relation to the impaneling of the jury which would have required the Supreme Court of the Territory to set aside the verdict and the judgment of the district court. It is next assigned for error, that the court admitted the declarations and admissions of the plaintiff in error to prove the fact of his first marriage, and the charge of the court that the declarations of the accused were evidence proper to be considered by the jury as tending to prove an actual marriage, and that such marriage might be proven like any other fact, by the admissions of the defendant, or by circumstantial evidence, and that it was not necessary to prove it by witnesses who were present at the ceremony. To hold that, on an indictment for bigamy, the first marriage can only be proven by eyewitnesses of the ceremony, is to apply to this offense a rule of evidence not applicable to any other. The great weight of authority is adverse to the position of the plaintiff in error. In Regina v. Simmonsto, 1 Car. & K., 164, it was held that, "On an indictment for bigamy, the first marriage may be proved by the admissions of the prisoner; and it is for the jury to determine whether what he said was an admission that he had been legally married according to the laws of the country where the marriage was solemnized." The same view is sustained by the following cases: Regina v. Upton, cited in 1 Car. & K., 165, note; and in 1 Russ. Crimes, Greaves' ed., 218; Duchess of Kingston's Case, 20 How. St. Tr.,355; | not be a witness for or against his wife, nor a Truman's Case, 1 East P. C., 470; Cayford's Case, wife for or against her husband. 7 Me.,57; Ham's Case, 11 Me., 391; State v. Hilton, The marriage of the plaintiff in error with 3 Rich., 434; State v. Britton, 4 McCord, 256; Caroline Owens was charged in the indictment Warner v. Com., 2 Va. Cas., 95; Norwood's case, and admitted by him upon the trial. The fact 1 East P. C., 470; Com. v. Murtagh, 1 Ashm., of his previous marriage with Emily Spencer Pa., 272; Regina v. Newton, 2 Moo. & R., 503; was, therefore, the only issue in the case, and State v. Libby, 44 Me., 469; State v. McDonald, that was contested to the end of the trial. Un25 Mo., 176; Cameron v. State, 14 Ala., 546; til the fact of the marriage of Emily Spencer Wolverton v. State, 16 Ohio, 173; State v. Seals, with the plaintiff in error was established, Car16 Ind., 352; Quin v. State, 46 Ind., 725; Ar- oline Owens was prima facie his wife, and she nold v. State, 53 Ga., 574; Brown v. State, 52 could not be used as a witness against him. Ga., 338; Com. v. Jackson, 11 Bush. (Ky.), 679; Williams v. State, 44 Ala., 24. The declarations of the plaintiff in error touching his marriage with Emily Spencer, admitted in evidence against him, appear to have been deliberately and repeatedly made, and under such circumstances as tended to show that they had reference to a formal marriage contract between the plaintiff in error and Emily Spencer. We are of opinion that the district court committed no error in admitting such declarations, or in its charge to the jury concerning them. The charge of the court defining what is meant by the phrase "reasonable doubt" is assigned as ground of error. The evidence upon which a jury is justified in returning a verdict of guilty must be sufficient to produce a conviction of guilt, to the exclusion of all reasonable doubt. Attempts to explain the term "reasonable doubt" do not usually result in making it any clearer to the minds of the jury. The language used in this case, however, was certainly very favorable to the accused and is sustained by respectable authority. Com. v. Webster, 5 Cush., 320; Arnold v. State, 23 Ind., 170; State v. Nash, 7 Iowa, 347; State v. Ostrander, 18 Iowa, 435; Donnelly v. State, 2 Dutch., 601; Winter v. State, 20 Ala., 39; Giles v. State, 6 Ga., 276. We think there was no error in the charge, of which the plaintiff in error can justly complain. The plaintiff in error next alleges that the description of the woman named in the indictment as the person with whom the crime of bigamy was committed was not sufficiently specific, and that on the trial she turned out to be not Caroline Owens, but Caroline Maile. The ground upon which a second wife is admitted as a witness against her husband, in a prosecution for bigamy, is that she is shown not to be a real wife by proof of the fact that the accused had previously married another wife, who was still living and still his lawful wife. It is only in cases where the first marriage is not controverted or has been duly established by other evidence, that the second wife is allowed to testify, and she can then be a witness to the second marriage, and not to the first. The testimony of the second wife to prove the only controverted issue in the case, namely: the first marriage, cannot be given to the jury on the pretext that its purpose is to establish her competency. As her competency depends on proof of the first marriage, and that is the issue upon which the case turns, that issue must be established by other witnesses before the second wife is competent for any purpose. Even then she is not competent to prove the first marriage, for she cannot be admitted to prove a fact to the jury which must be established before she can testify at all. Witnesses who are prima facie competent, but whose competency is disputed, are allowed to give evidence on their voir dire to the court upon some collateral issue, on which their competency depends, but the testimony of a witness who is prima facie incompetent cannot be given to the jury upon the very issue in the case, in order to establish his competency, and at the same time prove the issue. The authorities sustain these views. Upon a prosecution for bigamy under the statute of 1 Jac., cap. 11, it was said by Lord Hale: The designation of Caroline Owens, as the "The first and true wife is not allowed to be person with whom the second marriage was a witness against her husband, but I think it contracted, is clearly sufficient. If it were not, clear the second may be admitted to prove the it is too late after verdict to object. As to the second marriage, for she is not his wife, confact, the jury has found that the person whom trary to a sudden opinion delivered in July, the plaintiff in error was charged to have mar-1664, at the Assizes in Surrey, in Arthur Armried while his first wife was living, and still his legal wife, was Caroline Owens and not Caroline Maile, and that question is, therefore, conclusively settled by the verdict. This court cannot re-examine questions of fact upon writ of error. Rev. Stat., sec. 1011. The plaintiff in error, lastly, claims that the court erred in allowing Caroline Owens, the second wife, to give evidence against him touching his marriage with Emily Spencer, the alleged first wife; and in charging the jury that they might consider her testimony, if they found from all the evidence in the case that she was a second and plural wife. This assignment of error, we think, is well founded. The law of Utah declares that a husband shall strong's Case, for she is not so much as his wife de facto." 1 Hale's Pleas of the Crown, 693. So in East's Pleas of the Crown the rule is thus laid down: "The first and true wife cannot be a witness against her husband, nor vice versa; but the second may be admitted to prove the second marriage, for the first being proved she is not so much as wife de facto, but that must be first established." 1 East, P. C., 469. The text of East is supported by the following citation of authorities: 1 Hale, 693; 2 M. S. Sum., 331; Ann Cheneys Case, O. B. May, 1730, Sergt. Foster's Manuscript. In Peake's Evidence (Ñorris), 248, it is said: "It is clearly settled that a woman who was never legally the wife of a man, though she has been in fact married to him, may be a witness |