cess in procuring the contract and, as we shall hereafter show, should be distinguished from agreements for services in presenting information on the subject for the consideration of the government. It was a case where nothing was to be paid if no contract was obtained, and if obtained the compensation was to be proportionate to its extent. In deciding the case, the court said: "Considerations as to the most efficient and economical mode of meeting the public wants should alone control in this respect the action of every department of government. No other consideration can lawfully enter into the transaction, so far as the government is concerned. Such is the rule of public policy, and whatever tends to introduce any other elements into the transaction is against public policy. That agreements like the one under consideration have this tendency, is manifest. They tend to introduce personal solicitation and personal influence as elements in the procurement of contracts, and thus directly lead to inefficiency in the public service and to unnecessary expenditures of the public funds. ** All agreements for pecuniary considerations to control the business operations of the government or the regular administration of justice, or the appointment to public offices, or the ordinary course of legislation, are void as against public policy, without reference to the question whether improper means are contemplated or used in their execution. The law looks to the general tendency of such agreements, and it closes the door to temptation by refusing them recognition in any of the courts of the country."

*

In this case the doctrine of the court in Marshall v. R. R. Co., reported in 16th Howard, 314, was emphasized. There compensation was claimed by the plaintiff for services rendered in procuring the passage of a law by the Legislature of Virginia, upon a contract that if the law was not passed, or, if passed, was not accepted and adopted or used by the stockholders, no compensation should be allowed. It was held that the contract was void as against public policy. The court, speaking through Mr. Justice Grier, said: "Bribes in the shape of high contingent compensation must necessarily lead to the use of improper means and the exercise of undue influence. Their necessary consequence is the demoralization of the agent who covenants for them; he is soon brought to believe that any means which will produce so beneficial a result to himself are proper means;' and that a share of these profits may have the same effect of quickening the perceptions and warming the zeal of influential or 'careless' members in favor of his bill." See, also, Wood v. McCann, 6 Dana, 366; Mills v. Mills, 40 N. Y., 543.

In Trist v. Child, reported in 21st of Wallace, 441 [Burke v. Child,88 U. S., XXII., 623], the distinction is drawn between the use of personal influence to secure legislation and legitimate professional services in making the Legislature acquainted with the merits of the measures desired. Whilst the former is condemned, the latter are, within certain limits, regarded as appropriate subjects for compensation. There the defendant had employed the plaintiff to get a bill passed by Congress for an appropriation to pay a claim against the United

States. It was considered by the court to have been a contract for lobby services, and adjudged void as against public policy. Other similar cases were mentioned by the court, and, after observing that in all of them the contract was held to be against public policy and void, it added, speaking through Mr. Justice Swayne, "We entertain no doubt that in such cases, as under all other circumstances, an agreement express or implied for purely professional services is valid. Within this category are included drafting the petition to set forth the claim, attending to the taking of testimony, collecting facts, preparing arguments and submitting them orally or in writing, to a committee or other proper authority, and other services of like character. All these things are intended to reach only the reason of those sought to be influenced. They rest on the same principle of ethics, as professional services rendered in a court of justice, and are no more exceptionable. But such services are separated by a broad line of demarcation from personal solicitation, and the other means and appliances which the correspondence shows were resorted to in this case.'

So, too, with reference to furnishing the gov ernment with arms or supplies of any kind. It is legitimate to lay before the officers authorized to contract, all such information as may apprise them of the character and value of the articles offered, and enable them to act for the best interests of the country. And for such services compensation may be had as for similar services with private parties, either upon a quantum meruit or, where a sale is effected, by the ordinary brokerage commission. And here it may be observed, in answer to some authorities cited, that the percentage allowed by established custom of commission merchants and brokers, though dependent upon sales made, is not regarded as contingent compensation in the obnoxious sense of that term, which has been so often the subject of animadversion by this court, as suggesting the use of sinister or corrupt means for accomplishing a desired end. They are the rates established by merchants for legitimate services in the regular course of business. But where, instead of placing before the officers of the government the information which should properly guide their judgments, personal influence is the means used to secure the sales, and is allowed to prevail, the public good is lost sight of, unnecessary expenditures are incurred, and, generally, defective supplies are obtained, producing inefficiency in the pub lic_service.

In Meguire v. Corwine, decided at the last Term, the doctrine of the above cases was approved. There an agreement to pay the plaintiff, in consideration of his appointment as government counsel, one half the fees he might recover, was adjudged invalid. Transactions of the kind were declared to be "an unmixed evil;" and the court said that whether forbidden by statute or condemned by public policy, "no legal right could spring from such a source." 101 U. S., 111 [XXV., 900].

In the present case there is no feature that relieves the contract which the plaintiff seeks to enforce from the condemnation pronounced in the several cases cited. It is the naked case of one officer of a government, to secure its pur

Luning (supra); see, also, Morse v. Rogers, 118 Mass., 572; Smith v. Dodge, 2 N. H., 303; Bowman v Farmer, 8 N. H., 402; Drew v. Drew, 28 N. H., 489; Hall v. Davis, 36 N. H., 569; Cunningham v. Curtis, 57 N. H., 157; Enfield v. Permit, 5 N. H., 280.

Messrs. J. G. Abbott, Daniel Saunders and Charles G. Saunders, for defendant in er

ror:

It has been repeatedly decided that the line of another tract of land is a monument, which will control both courses and distance mentioned in a deed.

Peaslee v. Gee, 19 N. H., 273; Cunningham, v. Curtis 57 N. H., 157; Breck v. Young, 11 N. H., 485; Howe v. Bass, 2 Mass., 380; Flagg v. Thurston, 13 Pick., 145; Henshaw v. Mullens, 121 Mass., 143; Bond v. Fay, 8 Allen, 212; Chadbourne v. Mason, 48 Me., 389; Abbott v. Abbott, 51 Me., 575; Haynes v. Young, 36 Me., 557; Park v. Pratt,38 Vt.,545; Bolton v. Lann, 16 Tex., 96; James v. Brooks, 6 Heisk., 151; Corn v. McCrary, 3 Jones, 496.

Hart's Location is such a monument. The fact that its westerly line had never been actually located on the ground at the point where the north line of Elkins' Grant strikes it, will in no way vary the rule. Id certum est quod certum reddi potest.

Corn v. McCrary (supra); Dula v. M'Ghee, 12 Ired.,332; Brown v. Hobson,3 A. K. Marsh., 380; Kronenberger v. Hoffner, 44 Mo., 185.

If the distance from the Lincoln corner to the location was greater than they supposed, that would not affect a deed conveying all the land lying between the two bounds.

Newsom v. Pryor, 7 Wheat., 7; Mayhew v. Norton, 17 Pick., 357.

It has been decided that the words," by land of adjoining owner," mean along the line of such land.

Peaslee v. Gee (supra); Breck v. Young (supra); Enfield v. Day, 11 N. H.,520; Brown v. Hobson (supra).

The line from Hart's Location to the Albany corner must be a straight one.

Allen v. Kingsbury, 16 Pick., 235.

To the same effect are the following cases: Henniker v. Hopkinton, 18 N. H., 98; Jenks v. Morgan, 6 Gray, 448; Henshaw v. Mullens (supra); Call v. Barker, 12 Me., 320.

There is no such point as that mentioned in the grant, from which a line drawn due south shall strike the northwest corner of Albany, the whole western boundary of the location being east of such line.

This boundary must then be a line drawn from Albany to the nearest point on the west erly line of the location.,

Campbell v. Branch, 4 Jones, 313.

In the case of Coburn v. Coxeter, 51 N. H., 158, the above case of Campbell v. Branch, is cited in the opinion, and the principle there laid down, approved by the New Hampshire court. Where any principle of law, establishing a rule of real property has been established in the state court, the same rule will be applied to the United States Courts that would be applied to the state tribunals.

Suydam v. Williamson, 24 How., 427 (65 U. 8., XVI.,742); Jackson v. Chew, 12 Wheat.,153; Walker v. State Harbor Comrs., 17 Wall., 648 (84 U. S., XXI., 744).

Mr. Justice Bradley delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a writ of entry brought by the plaintiff in error, the demandant below, against the defendant, to recover possession of a certain tract of land in Grafton County, New Hampshire, described as follows: Beginning at the northwest corner of the Town of Albany, and thence running north about 3 degrees east, three miles and 65 rods, to a spruce tree marked; and from thence north about 6 degrees east, 4 miles and 95 rods, to a fir tree marked; and from thence south about 87 degrees east, to the westerly line of Hart's Location, and to the easterly line of Grafton County, as established by the Act approved July 3d, 1875, entitled An Act Establishing the East Line of Grafton County;' and from thence along the east line of Grafton County to the bound begun at, and containing 8,000 acres of land, more or less."

The defendant filed a plea, defending his right in, and denying disseizin of, all the land described in the plaintiff's writ which is included in the following described tract, viz: "Beginning at the nortwest corner of the Town of Albany, formerly called Burton, and thence running north about three degrees east, three milesand sixty-five rods, to a spruce tree marked; and from thence north about six degrees east, four miles and ninety-five rods, to a fir tree marked; and from thence south about eightyseven and one-half degrees east, to the westerly line of Hart's Location; thence southerly by the westerly line of Hart's Location to the point in said westerly line nearest to the nortwest corner of said Albany; thence in a strai't line to the northwest corner of said Albany." As to the remainder of the land claimed in the plaintiff's writ, the defendant disclaimed title.

Upon these issues the cause came on to be tried, and after the demandant's evidence was adduced, the court below instructed the jury that upon the case made by the demandant it was not entitled to recover, and a verdict was given for the defendant, and judgment rendered accordingly. The present writ of error is brought to reverse this judgment.

The specific points raised upon the trial, upon which the court was called upon to pass, are presented by a bill of exceptions, which exhibits the evidence in detail. Such parts of this evidence as may be necessary to understand the matters of law raised by the writ of error will be adverted to.

The demandant, on the trial, produced and deraigned title under a quitclaim deed from James Willey, land commissioner of the State of New Hampshire, to Alpheus Bean and others, dated Nov. 26, 1831, made by authority of a resolve of the Legislature, which included the lands claimed in the writ.

The demandant also produced a prior deed, under which the defendant claimed the land described in his plea, being a deed from Abner R. Kelly, Treasurer of the State of New Hampshire, to Jasper Elkins and others, dated August 31, 1830, and made by authority of a resolve of the Legislature, which deed purported to convey the following described tract in the County of Grafton, New Hampshire, to wit:

"Beginning at the northeast corner of the Town of Lincoln, and running east seven miles and one hundred and seventeen rods to Hart's

There can be no doubt, therefore, that when Hart's Location was referred to in public Acts and resolves, whether for the purpose of taking the census, taxation or political jurisdiction, it was referred to as a defined tract or portion of territory, within the bounds of which the State claimed no proprietary interest. In 1830, when the Legislature, by a resolve, authorized, and by its treasurer made, to Elkins and his associates, a grant of land to extend from the Town of Lincoln on the west to Hart's Location on the east, the exterior line extending along "by the westerly boundary of said location," it is difficult to find any ground for uncertainty or ambiguity in the grant, or to imagine how, after that, the State, or any persons claiming under the State, could, with any show of reason, claim that there was no such thing in being as a Hart's Location having a western boundary; or that the Elkins grant did not extend to and bound upon it. All rights of the State up to and adjoining said location were as clearly disposed of as if the two grants, that of Hart's Location and that to Elkins and others, had been made in the same instrument; granting to one party, first, Hart's Location as described in Chadbourne's patent, and then granting to Elkins and his associates all the residue of the lands westward to the Town of Lincoln between designated side lines on the north and south.

The truth is, that Hart's Location itself was the monument indicated, whatever might be the location of its western boundary. The existence of the location as a territorial subdivision of New Hampshire was as notorious and certain as the existence of any township in the State. It must of necessity have had a boundary whether that boundary had ever been actually surveyed on the ground or not. The State owned all the land lying westerly of it, between it and the Township of Lincoln, and this land had never been granted to any person. It was wild, mountainous land of little value. The whole area, equal to the extent of a large township, and containing probably seventy or eighty square miles, was in 1830 valued at only $800. All this tract thus lying to the west of Hart's Location was granted to Elkins and his associates. They may have been under an erroneous impression as to the true location of the western boundary of Hart's Location, but whatever it was, and whenever found, that was to be the boundary of the grant. It may be true, as stated by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in Morse v. Rogers, 118 Mass., 578, that where a boundary is inadvertently inserted or cannot be found or an adhereace to it would defeat the evident intent of the parties, "the boundary may be rejected, and the extent of the grant be determined by meascrement, or other portions of the grant.' But that is not the case here. The evident intent of the parties was to go to Hart's Location as a territory or known body of land, without particular regard to a marked, designated and visible line. It was their intent to leave no land belonging to the State between that territory sud the tract granted. This was clearly the principal object in view; and as Hart's Location must necessarily have a western boundary some where, and as its limits and bounds were shown, whether correctly or incorrectly, by public maps in the archives of the State, it could not be said

that this boundary was incapable of ascertainment. To hold this, and abandon the call of the deed for Hart's Location, and to confine the grantees to courses and distances, would defeat instead of furthering the intention of the parties. If the western boundary of Hart's Location had never been surveyed on the ground, it could be surveyed; or it could be located by agreement between the owners of it and the owners of the Elkins grant. They were the only parties who after that grant had any interest in the matter.

It may well be asked, if the call for Hart's Location and its western boundary can have no significance in the Elkins grant in 1830, how does it suddenly acquire significance in 1831, in the grant under which the demandant claims? The language used is almost exactly the same: "thence easterly to Hart's Location; thence southeasterly by said Hart's Location, etc."

With the accumulated evidence on the subject which was presented in the demandant's case, most of it of such a character as not to admit of contradiction, we think that the Judge was perfectly right in assuming that Hart's Location was a monument sufficiently definite to control the courses and distances given in the grant. Indeed, we do not see how he could have done otherwise. The fact that the Town of Burton, which lay to the south of Hart's Location, extended so far westerly that its northwest corner would not be met by a line drawn due south from any part of Hart's Location, cannot prevent the Elkins grant from extending to Hart's Location, as its eastern boundary, as called for in the deed. As before stated, the connection between this location and the northwest corner of Burton, if it cannot be made by a line drawn due south as called for, must necessarily be made by the line of shortest distance between them. This is the surveyors' rule and the rule of law. Campbell v. Branch, 4 Jones (N. C.), 313. It is constantly applied when trees or monuments on or near the margin of a river are called for in a deed where the river is a boundary.

We think that the Judge did not err in relation to the construction and effect of Elkins' deed.

But the demandant raised another point at the trial, namely: that the owners of the Elkins grant had estopped themselves from claiming under it any land eastwardly of a line running north from the northwest corner of the Town of Burton, or Albany. The evidence offered on this point tended to show that about, or soon after the date of the Elkins grant, the grautees or some of them employed surveyors to ascertain the extent and boundaries of the grant, and that a line was run directly (or nearly) north from the northwest corner of Burton, to the north line of the grant, as the supposed eastern boundary adjoining Hart's Location; but that this was done without any communication or agreement with the proprietors of Hart's Location or any other parties having an interest in the adjoining lands, and in ignorance of the true western boundary of that location on the land. The evidence consisted of the testimony as to the declarations of some or one of the grantees, as to the running of such line, made over forty years before, and of a recent examination of marked trees, which indicated a date corresponding with the period referred to.