1866, on a survey of the Guadalupe grant, which did not include the land in controversy; that this action terminated the authority of the landoffice in the matter, and the subsequent survey and patent of 1870, which do include the land, are therefore, void. It is not necessary to decide whether the refusal of the grantee to accept the patent in the present case, and its return by him to the Commissioner of the Land-Office, who ordered a new survey, remove the objection here made, though it is not easy to see why the refusal of the grantee to accept the grant, and his consent to the return of it to the office, before intervening rights had accrued to anyone, did not authorize a correction of any defect in that patent. This is in effect what was done, and whether the patent of 1866 is still a valid patent, or is no longer of any force, cannot affect this case. If it be valid as to the land covered by it, that does not make void the patent of 1870 for land not covered by it. 1. Where the legal representative of a deceased partner and all the beneficiaries of the estate, consented to the continued employment of the partnership property in the business of the partnership subsequently carried on by the surviving partners, they ceased to have a lien upon the property as against the subsequent creditors of the concern. If the conveyance of 1866 passed the title to ty was situate, had power to pass laws for the ap2. The Legislature of the State where the properthe claimant of a part of the land covered by pointment of guardians of the property of nonhis confirmed grant, there is no reason why an resident infants, situate in that State; and to preadditional patent should not convey the remain-scribe the manner in which such guardians shall perform their duties as regards the care, management, investment and disposal of such property. der when the proper officer became satisfied that the first did not convey all that had been con- 3. The Legislature may pass a law authorizing a firmed to claimant. Nor is the last patent ren-guardian to invest the property of his ward in the dered invalid because, in addition to the land not conveyed by the first patent, it purports to convey also what was already patented. In short, it is but the common case of a grantor who, having failed to convey what he was bound to convey, makes another deed to correct the wrong. The deeds are not in conflict. If the power of the land-office was exhausted by the first deed, it was only so as to the land which it included. The legal title to that alone could pass by that patent, and if the title to the land now in question remained in the government, the patent of 1870 was sufficient to convey it. We think the error is not well assigned. The only other assignment which requires no capital stock of a corporation engaged in manu- of the estate. Argued Jan. 12, 13, 14, 1881. Decided May 2, 1881. tice is, that judgment should have been rendere APPEALS from the Circuit Court of the for plaintiffs on the pleading. Plaintiffs averred that they were the owners of a certain large boundary of land. That held by defendants was but a small part of this. Defendants, by their answer, did not set out their own metes and bounds, or any description of what they held, but denied that plaintiffs were the owners and entitled to all the land described in the complaint. It is said that this made an immaterial issue, for if plaintiffs owned the land in possession of defendants, it was not necessary to prove their ownership of what lay outside of that, though claimed in their petition. This objection was not made in the case before the circuit court. The case was submitted to the court, which found all the facts necessary to decide the question of title to the land held by defendants. We think it is too late to raise this technical question after a full hearing and finding by the court of all the facts pertinent to the case. The pleading would be good after verdict. Multo fortior is it good after this finding, and on appeal, with no attempt to correct it in the court below. The decree of the Circuit Court is affirmed. James H. McKenney, Clerk, Sup. Court, U. S. United States for the District of Rhode Island. The case is fully stated by the court. Messrs. James McKeen, Thos. H. Hubbard T. T. Crittenden, Thomas E. Stillman, William Allen Butler and George F. Comstock, for appellants: The more frequent exercise of the legislative power in authorizing the sale of lands of infants and other persons under disability, for the purpose of promoting their interests, is upheld upon the ground of the parental or tutelary power of the Legislature, as parens patriæ. But in all these cases the courts, in sustaining this doubtful legislative prerogative, proceeded upon the established necessity of the case, or the manifest benefit to the infant or other disqualified person. Watkins v. Holman, 16 Pet., 25; Ward v.N. E. Screw Co., 1 Cliff., 565; and see, Cochran v. Van Surlay, 20 Wend., 365; Wilkinson v. Leland, 2 Pet., 627; Davison v. Johonnot, 7 Met., 388; Dorsey v. Gilbert, 11 Gill. & J., 87; Leggett v. Hunter, 19 N. Y., 445; Snowhill v. Snowhill, 2 Green, Ch. (N. J.), 20; Spotswood v. Pendleton, 4 Call. (Va. Ct. of Appeals), 514; Sohier NOTE.-Partnership; rights and powers of surviv ing partners. See, note to Moore v. Huntington, 84 U. S., XXI., 642. v. Hospital, 3 Cush., 483; Clarke v. Hayes, 9 | all attacks, is Rice v. Parkman, 16 Mass., 326; Gray, 526. which decides that the Legislature has power to license a sale of real estate of minors, notwithstanding the Legislature has delegated the same power to the judicial courts. But in the present case the infants were not citizens of the State or residents within it, or subject to its laws or its parental or tutelary power. They were foreigners to its jurisdiction. Moreover, it was not even made to appear, by any evidence, that their interests would be promoted by the conversion of their property, nor was such the fact. Whether, therefore, the Resolution of March 9, 1863, is regarded as a usurpation of judicial power, or as an attempt to deal with and dispose of the property of the non-resident infants, without due process of law, it was wholly ineffectual and void, and is condemned by the highest authorities. Sedg., Stat. and Const. L., 172; opinion of the Justices of the Superior Court of N. H., 4 N. H., 565--572; Jones v. Perry, 10 Yerg., 59; see, opinion of Green, J., reviewing the cases and distinguishing Wilkinson v. Leland (supra), and Rice v. Parkman, 16 Mass., 326, in view of the peculiar latitude of legislative powers under the colonial charter of R. I., and the Constitution of Mass.; Merrill v. Sherburne, 1 N. H., 199; Greenough v. Greenough, 11 Pa., 489; Powers v. Bergen, 6 N. Y., 358; In re Picquet, 5 Pick., 65; Lewis v. Webb, 3 Me., 327; Pryor v. Downey, 50 Cal., 388. The recent case of Burke v. Bk. (February, 1880), 12 R. I., 513, is expressly in point and, as we submit, decisive in this court as to the invalidity of the resolution. Time does not run against complainants thus situated until after the discovery of the fraud or illegality complained of. This court has never denied relief against the fraudulent or wrongful acts of guardians, trustees, or other persons standing in £duciary relations to infants, because of mere lapse of time or delay in bringing suit. Prevost v. Gratz, 6 Wheat., 481; Michoud v. Girod, 4 How., 503; Meader v. Norton, 11 Wall., 442 (78 U. S., XX., 184); Hallett v. Collins, 10 How., 174; Lee v. Brown, 4 Ves., 362; Wedderburn v. Wedderburn, 2 Keen, 722; Millar v. Craig, 6 Beav., 433; Farker v. Bloxam, 20 Beav., 295; St. Albyn v. Harding, 27 Beav.,11; Worrell's Appeal, 23 Pa., 44; Burrows v. Walls, 5 DeGex, McN. & G., 233; Godden v. Kimmell, 99 U.S., 201 (XXV.,431); Thomson v. Eastwood, L. R., 2 App. Cas., 215. Messrs. Benj. F. Thurston, Jas. Tillinghast and Charles Hart, for appellees: The bills should be dismissed because of failure to prove fraud. Price v. Berrington, 7 Eng. L. & Eq.. 254; Fisher v. Boody, 1 Curt., 206; Mount Vernon Bk. v. Stone, 2 R. I., 129; Ferraby v. Hobson, 2 Phil. (22 Eng. Ch.), 255; Glascott v. Lang, 22 Eng. Ch., 310; Eyre v. Potter, 15 How., 42; Wilde v. Gibson, 1 H. of L., 605; Tillinghast v. Champlin, 4 R. I., 173. The General Assembly had constitutional power to pass the resolution. Every constitutional objection that ingenuity could devise has been invoked against its exercise. The leading case, and one which has been more generally criticised and commented upon in all the later cases, but which has withstood In re Picquet, 5 Pick., 64; Davison v. Johonnot, 7 Met., 388; Sohier v. Hospital, 3 Cush., 483; Clarke v. Hayes, 9 Gray, 428; Cochran v. VanSurlay, 20 Wend., 365; Powers v. Bergen, 6 N. Y., 358; Thurston v. Thurston, 6 R. I.,296; Leggett v. Hunter, 19 N. Y., 463; Williamson v. Berry, 8 How., 495; Snowhill v. Snowhill, 2 Green (Ch.), 20; Dorsey v. Gilbert, 11 Gill. & J., 87; Spotswood v. Pendleton, 4 Call., 514; Watkins v. Holman, 16 Pet., 63; McComb v. Gilkey, 29 Miss., 146; Mason v. Wait, 4 Scam., 127; Florentine v. Barton, 2 Wall., 210 (69 U. S., XVII., 783). The next two cases relate to special enactments of the Rhode Island Legislature, prior to the adoption of the present Constitution. Wilkinson v. Leland, 2 Pet., 627; Ward v. Screw Co., 1 Cliff., 565. Neither the allegations in the bills of complaint, nor the proof in support of the allegations, are sufficient to relieve the complainants from the effect of their laches. Stearns v. Page, 7 How., 819; Fisher v. Boody, 1 Curt., 219; Badger v. Badger, 2 Wall., 87 (69 U. S., XVII., 836). In Upton v. Tribilcock, 91 U. S., 55 (XXIII., 207), the party seeking to rescind, waited some three years. The court says that "The principle laid down in the charge of the Judge, that one who claims to have been drawn into a fraudulent purchase must exercise care and vigilance to discover the fraud, and must be prompt in repudiating his contract on the ground of such fraud, is a sound one." Thomas v. Bartow, 48 N. Y., 193. Again; "If he is not held to be bound to know and accept all the consequences of this connection, he certainly is bound to use care and attention to ascertain his position and promptly to make his choice of retaining it with its advantages and responsibilities, or of abandoning it. A party must use reasonable diligence to ascertain the facts. Buford v. Brown, 6 B. Mon., 553." * * * And again; "Equity will not assist a man whose condition is attributable only to the want of diligence which may be fairly expected from a reasonable person. Duke of Beaufort v. Neald, 12 Cl. & F., 248, 286. And again, "Parties who are shareholders and claim to be relieved on the ground of fraud, must act with the utmost diligence and promptitude." Smith's Case, L. R., 2 Ch. Ap., 613; Denton v. MacNeil, L. R., 2 Eq., 532; Peel's Case, L. R., 2 Ch. Ap., 684; Grymes v. Sanders, 93 U. S., 62 (XXIII.,801), citing Flint v. Wooden, 9 Hare,622; Jennings v. Broughton, 5 DeGex. M. & G., 139; Lloyd v. Brewster, 4 Paige, 537; R. R. Co. v. Row, 24 Wend., 74; Minturn v. Main, 7 N. Y., 220; 7 Rob. Pr., ch. 25, sec. 2, p. 432; Campbell v. Fleming, 1 Ad. & El., 41; Sugd. Vend., 14th ed., 335; Diman v. R. R. Co., 5 R. I., 130; Lawrence's Case, L. R., 2 Ch. Ap., 424. The complainants, after they became of full age, had full knowledge of all the material facts on which they base their claims to relief, for more than six years before the filing of their bills; and that upon the authorities which we have considered, the statute is a complete bar. See, also, Farnam v. Brooks, 9 Pick., 212, 247; Knox v. Gye, L. R., 5 H. of L., 656; Bk. v. Daniel, 12 Pet., 32; Brown v. Buena Vista Co., 95 U. 8., 157 (XXIV., 422); Wood v. Carpenter (U. S. S. Ct.), 9 Reporter, 297; Bk. v. Same (U. S. S. Ct.), 9 Reporter, 300. The creditors' rights are superior to the complainants' claims. The creditors, and Mr. Chafee as their representative, thus stand as purchasers of this property for value, and cannot be affected by any secret trusts, equities or even fraud, if any existed between the complainants and other parties. Mr. Justice Bradley delivered the opinion of the court: These cases come up on appeal from the decrees of the Circuit Court for the District of Rhode Island dismissing the complainants' bills. One of the bills was filed by William S. Hoyt and the other by Charles G. Francklyn and Susan, his wife, against Amasa Sprague, Willlam Sprague, individually, and as guardian of the said Hoyt and said Susan; Fanny Sprague, widow and administratrix of Amasa Sprague, senior; Mary Sprague, widow and administratrix of William Sprague, senior, and formerly guardian of said Hoyt and said Susan; The A. & W. Sprague Manufacturing Company, and Zechariah Chafee, assignee of said company for the benefit of creditors, etc. The general object of the bills is, to establish a lien and trust in favor of the complainants, as grandchildren of William Sprague, senior, against the property of the A. & W. Sprague Manufacturing Company, now in the hands of Chafee, the assignee, each to the extent of one twenty-fourth part of the whole property; that being the amount of their interest in the property of the former firm of A. & W. Sprague, which was transferred to the corporation in 1865, whilst the complainants were infants, in fraud, as they allege, of their rights. Many charges of fraud are made in the bills against the defendants, Amasa Sprague and William Sprague, who carried on the business of the firm after the death of William Sprague, senior, in 1856, in connection with Byron Sprague, until 1862, and after that by themselves. The cases are substantially the same in all respects, and will be considered together. In order properly to understand the questions raised it will be necessary to take a summary view of the facts. Amasa Sprague and William Sprague, brothers, under the name of A. & W. Sprague, carried on the manufacturing business in Rhode Island until 1843, when Amasa died, leaving a widow, Fanny Sprague, and four children, two sons and two daughters. The widow took out letters of administration on her husband's estate. The value of the partnership property at that time was estimated at $100,000. William continued to carry on the business with the joint capital, under the same firm name, for the benefit of himself and his brother's family, for thirteen years, when, on the 19th of October, 1856, he died, leaving a widow, Mary Sprague, a son, Byron Sprague, and four grandchildren, who were the children of a deceased daughter, Susan, and her husband, Edwin Hoyt, of the City of New York. These children were at that time under fourteen years of age. Their names were Sarah, Susan S., William S., and Edwin Hoyt, junior. Sarah was 12; Susan, 11; and William S. was 9 years old at the time of their grandfather's death. William S. Hoyt is the complainant in one of the cases now under consideration, and Susan S. Hoyt, now wife of Charles G. Francklyn, with her husband, is complainant in the other case. William Sprague largely extended the business of the firm, so that when he died, the property, real and personal, was estimated at about $3,000,000. Shortly before his death, and during his last illness, he took into partnership with him, evidently for the purpose of continuing the business and keeping it together, his own son, Byron, and his two nephews, Amasa and William, the sons of his deceased brother Amasa. The terms of this partnership, or the interest which the young men were to have in it, do not appear. They continued, after William Sprague, senior's, death, to carry on the business, as it had previously been carried on, under the name of A. & W. Sprague, without making a settlement with the representatives or beneficiaries of either Amasa Sprague's or William Sprague's estate. William Sprague, senior, left no will; and his widow, Mary Sprague, took out letters of administration on his estate. Whilst, therefore, the three young men, Byron Sprague, Amasa Sprague and William Sprague, as surviving partners of William Sprague, senior, carried on the business of the firm of A. & W. Sprague, the persons really interested were, first, the two widows and administratrices, Fanny Sprague and Mary Sprague, who were legally entitled respectively, by right of administration, to the several interests of Amasa Sprague, senior, and William Sprague, senior; and secondly, the beneficiaries, or distributees of the estates of Amasa and William respectively, namely: the widow and four children of Amasa Sprague, senior, and the widow and two children of William Sprague, senior, one of the latter, Mrs. Hoyt, being deceased, and being represented by her four children. One of the daughters of Amasa Sprague had been settled with before William's death, and the other shortly afterwards, by her brothers purchasing her interest. This left the beneficial interest of the property divisible into six equal parts, belonging respectively to Fanny Sprague, widow of Amasa, and her two sons, Amasa and William,and Mary Sprague, widow of William, her son Byron, and the children of her daughter, Susan Hoyt. These persons were all of age, and otherwise sui juris, except the Hoyt children, and were all able to consent, and did consent, that the entire partnership estate should be continued in the business of the firm as it had been before. The Hoyt children, of course, could not give any such consent. They resided with their father, Edwin Hoyt, in New York, who was at the head of a commission house in that city by the name of Hoyt, Spragues & Co., which sold on commission a large portion of the goods manufactured by A. & W. Sprague. The partners of the firm were associated with him. course he must have been well acquainted with Of the business of the manufacturing establishment, and the large interest which his children had in the concern must have insured his attention to its management. Mr. Hoyt consented to and approved of the continuance of his children's portion in the business of the partnership; and his natural regard for their interests, in connection with his opportunities for observation, preclude the presumption that such continuance was the result of any fraudulent scheme. Had any such scheme been in contemplation he must have detected and would have thwarted it. In addition to the consent and acquiescence of their father, was that of their property guardian in Rhode Island. On the 9th of February, 1857, shortly after William Sprague, senior's, decease, letters of guardianship were issued by the Probate Court of the Town of Warwick, R. I., to Mary Sprague, grandmother of the Hoyt children, on the property of said children. Mrs. Sprague consented that both her own interest in the estate and that of her grandchildren and wards should be continued in the partnership business. At that time (1857) this business was no doubt regarded by most persons who had any acquaintance with it, as highly prosperous, and an investment in it advantageous and safe. And whilst, according to the strict rules of law, Mary Sprague should have drawn out the children's share, and should not have left it to the hazards of trade, it may be said in her excuse that she was following out the plan of her husband, who had for thirteen years induced his brother's widow to continue the interest of her children in the concern, and had thereby greatly increased their inheritance. At all events, we have no evidence that Mary Sprague was actuated by any other than the most worthy motives in permitting everything to remain in the business. Any charge of fraud against her cannot be entertained for a moment. The business was conducted without change until 1862, when Byron Sprague sold out his interest to Amasa and William, and upon an account taken at that time said interest was valued at $605,722.78, which amount was accordingly paid to him. No other change in the situation of the parties interested took place until 1865, when it was proposed to place the property of A. & W. Sprague in a corporation, or corporations, charters having been obtained from the Legislature of Rhode Island for that purpose. One of these charters was passed in May, 1862, and constituted Byron Sprague, William Sprague and Amasa Sprague and their associates, successors and assigns, a body corporate and politic by the name of A. & W. Sprague Manufacturing Company, with a capital stock of $1,000,000 to be divided into shares of $100 each. ance as would be necessary to that end. On the 9th of March, 1863, a Joint Resolution of the Legislature was passed, granting said petition, which resolution was in the following terms: "Resolution authorizing Mary Sprague, of Warwick, guardian, to make conveyance of the interest of minors in and to the property of the firm of A. & W. Sprague. Upon the petition of Mary Sprague, of Warwick, widow of William Sprague, late of Warwick, deceased, and of Edwin Hoyt, of the City and State of New York, representing that the said Mary is guardian of the estates; and the said Edwin, father of Edwin Hoyt, Jr., Susan S. Hoyt, Sarah Hoyt, and William S. Hoyt, minor children and heirs-at-law of Susan Hoyt, deceased, and praying, for certain reasons, that the said Mary may be authorized and empow ered to make conveyance in her said capacity, of all the right, title and interest of said minor children, as heirs-at-law of their said mother,in and to all the estate and property, real, personal and mixed, now held, owned and managed by the firm of A. & W. Sprague, of Providence; Voted and resolved; that the prayer of said petition be and the same is hereby granted; and the said Mary Sprague, in her capacity as guardian of the estate of Edwin Hoyt, Jr., Susan S. Hoyt, Sarah Hoyt and Wm. S. Hoyt, is hereby authorized and fully empowered, whenever any corporation or corporations shall be organized under either or any of the charters heretofore granted by the General Assembly of this State, and conveyance or conveyances shall become necessary to vest the title of the parties interested in any of said property so held, owned or managed by the firm of A. & W. Sprague, in any such corporation or corporations, to make, execute, seal, acknowledge, stamp and deliver all and any such conveyance and conveyances to any such corporation or corporations as shall be necessary to vest the right, title and interest of the said minors in and to said property, or any portion thereof, in any such corporation or corporations; and that any such conveyance or conveyances so executed, acknowledged, stamped and delivered, shall be deemed and held as valid and effectual in law and in equity to vest the title of said minors in any such corporation or corporations as though the same were executed, acknowledged, stamped and delivered by said minors after attaining their majority. Provided, That before the delivery of any such conveyance or conveyances, the said Mary shall have executed and delivered to the Court of Probate of Warwick every such bond or bonds, with herself in her said capacity, and said Edwin Hoyt, as principals, in such penal sum or sums and with such sureties as said probate court shall require, conditioned for the investment of the amount of the full value of the interests of said minors, which she shall then be about to convey in the capital stock of any such corporation or corporations to which the same shall be conveyed, in the names and for the use and benefit of said minors." In view of such proposed corporate organization, Mary Sprague, as guardian of her grandchildren, and Edwin Hoyt, their father, in January, 1863, presented a petition to the Legislature of Rhode Island, in which, after stating the appointment of Mary Sprague as the guardian of the estate of said minors, and their interest in the property of A. & W. Sprague, they Further, in view of the proposed corporate stated that they deemed it advisable to invest organization, steps were taken by the parties in the same in such corporations as should be or- interest to ascertain the value of the partnership ganized under the charters previously granted; assets, and the relative interest of each shareand they asked that the said Mary, as such guard- holder. For this purpose an agreement was ian, might be authorized to make such convey-entered into on the first day of April, 1865, be tween all the parties, Fanny Sprague signing A decree was made granting the prayers of individually and as administratrix of Amasa the petition and conferring the powers desired. Sprague; Mary Sprague signing individually Thereupon, on the 9th day of August, 1865, and as administratrix of William Sprague and all the parties in interest joined in a convey ance as guardian of her grandchildren; and the other of the entire partnership property of the firm of parties signing in their own behalf: by which A. & W. Sprague to the A. & W. Sprague Manit was agreed that John A. Gardner and Benja- ufacturing Company; and the property of the min F. Thurston, the former of whom had Quidnick firm to the Quidnick Manufacturing been counsel for Amasa Sprague and William Company; and each party became entitled to Sprague, and the latter counsel of Mary and their several proportions of the shares of capital Byron Sprague, should be and they were, ap- stock in those companies respectively. In exepointed referees to examine into the entire assets cuting the deed of conveyance Mary Sprague and property of the firm, and to ascertain the signed in her individual capacity, as adminisvalue thereof, and each party's interest therein, tratrix of her husband's estate, and as guardian and should make report of the result. The ref- of the Hoyt children. erees accordingly made such examination and made their report on the 1st day of July, 1865, by which they reported and found, that the cash value of the entire estate, exclusive of the Quidnick factory (which was estimated by itself, and was transferred to a separate corporation)-was.. . . . . $6,732,906 69 That there were liabilities to 2,871,921 79 3,860,984 90 In the August Term, 1866, of the Probate Court of Warwick, appraisers were appointed to take an inventory and appraisement of the property of the several wards of Mary Sprague in her hands, and they performed their duty, and said inventories, verified by the oath of Mary Sprague, were filed and recorded, after being passed upon by the court. They amounted to the sum of $251,447.08 each. That of William S. Hoyt was composed of the following items, namely: 122 shares Nat. B'k of Commerce.. $6,222 00 1 U. S. 6-per-cent bond 2 N. Y., Prov. & Boston R. R. Bond, shares A. & W. Sprague M'f' 108 09 624,984 69 625,511 69 $950... 1,900 00 176,707 82 Mary Sprague, guardian of the children of Susan Hoyt... 19,091 20 Cash.. 164,250 26 334 23 $204,363 75 Due to Mary Sprague, as administratrix of her husband, on account of a dividend.. Making a total of........ $4,025,235 16 This amount formed the capital stock of the corporation subsequently organized, and was represented by the nominal capital of $1,000,000 making each share equal to over $402. The proportions of William and Amasa were larger than the others, because they had purchased the share of Byron. The referees also found due from the firm to Mary Sprague, as guardian of the Hoyt children, the sum of $188,333.33, explained to have been a balance credited to them to equal what the two families in Rhode Island had drawn out of the concern for current expenses. The Quidnick property, which, as before stated, was kept separate from the rest on account of other persons being interested therein, was appraised in the same way as the A. & W. Sprague property, for the purpose of being transferred to a distinct corporation. The interest of the Hoyt children therein was appraised at $63,353.23. The appraisement having been completed, Mary Sprague, as guardian of the Hoyt children, on the 5th of August, 1865, after advertising her intent so to do, presented her bond to the Probate Court of Warwick for approval, as required by the Joint Resolution of March 9, 1863, and prayed authority from the court to transfer the interest of her wards to the A. & W. Sprague Manufacturing Company, as authorized by said Resolution; and also prayed like authority to transfer the interest of the minors in the Quidnick property to the Quidnick Manufacturing Company. Dividend due from A.&W. Sprague 47,083 33 251,447 08 The others were nearly identical with this. The dividend of $47,083.33 was William S. Hoyt's one-fourth part of the sum of $188,333.33, awarded to the Hoyt children as an offset to the sums drawn out by the Rhode Island families for current expenses. At the same term Mary Sprague presented an account as guardian of each ward, which being verified, and due notice having been published, was received and allowed by the court, and ordered to be recorded. Sarah Hoyt having now arrived at full age, received the amount of her interest and gave an acquittance for the same. At the same term of the court, on the petition of Mary Sprague, and her resignation of the guardianship of the three remaining minors, and on the written application of Edwin Hoyt, and due notice given, Mary Sprague was discharged from the guardianship, and William Sprague was appointed guardian in her stead. The same appraisers were appointed to make an inventory and appraisement of the property of each ward in the hands of William Sprague, guardian; and such inventory and appraisement were duly made, filed and recorded; showing that the estate of William S. Hoyt amounted, on the first day of September, 1866, to the sum of $255,885.04, consisting of the items before mentioned, with the addition of another dividend of the companies. |