[Powell v. The State.] Powell v. The State. Indictment for Removing or Selling Cotton upon which Another had a Claim or Lien. 1. Statutory lien of landlord.-The statute giving the landlord a lien on his tenant's crop, for advances as well as rent (Code of 1886, §§ 305658), only applies to advances of one or more of the articles enumerated, made for one or more of the purposes specified; and it does not extend to advances made to a hired laborer, which were to be paid for by his labor. 2. Account book; proof of.-An account book of a party is not admissible as evidence for him, without proof of its correctness. 3. Construction of writing; to what witness may testify.-It is for the court to construe and determine the meaning of a written instrument from the language used; and a party can not be permitted to testify, as a witness, what was meant by it. APPEAL from Macon County Court. 2. ABERCROMBIE & BILBRO, and P. S. HOLT, for appellant. 1. Letcher had no right to explain the written contract. It was clearly incompetent and illegal to admit Letcher's account book without proof of its genuineness and correctness. 1 Greenl. Ev. § 657. 3. Letcher had no lien for advances. The advances made to defendant, were made to him not as tenant, but as a wage-laborer. 4. It is not known where the offense was committed. The value of the cotton was matter of proof, not of judicial knowledge. THOS. N. MCCLELLAN, Attorney-General, contra. STONE,. C. J.-The judgment of conviction in this case must be reversed for several reasons. The defendant was indicted for selling or removing seed cotton, to which Letcher "had a lawful and valid claim under a written instrument, lien created by law for rent and advances, or other lawful and valid claim, verbal or written." Code of 1886, §3835. The indictment follows the form and is sufficient.-Form 77. In Smith v. State, 84 Ala. 438, we reviewed Ellerson v. State, 69 Ala. 1, and qualified it in part. [Powell v. The State. ] The lien attempted to be established by the testimony in this case, was asserted in three forms: First, a claim for rent of land in 1886-the land on which the cotton was said to have been grown, which defendant was charged with removing. The testimony shows this lien existed to the extent of twenty dollars. Second, it was attempted to be shown that Letcher had made advances to defendant in 1886, and third that defendant was indebted to him for unpaid rent and advances made to him in 1885. On these several accounts it was claimed that defendant was indebted to Letcher in the sum of about one hundred dollars. The statutes, on which the validity of Letcher's alleged lien must depend, are the following sections of the Code of 1886, 3056: "A landlord has a lien § on the crop grown on rented lands for the current year, and for advances made in money or other thing of value, . for the sustenance or well being of the tenant or his family, or for preparing the ground for cultivation, or for cultivating, gathering, saving, handling, or preparing the crop for market," &c. In Cockburn v. Watkins, 76 Ala. 486; Thompson v. Powell, 77 Ala. 391, and Mooney v. Hough, 84 Ala. 80, we interpreted the foregoing section of the Code, § 3058. "When the tenant fails to pay any part of such rent or advances, and continues his tenancy under the same landlord, on the same or other lands, the balance due therefor shall be held and treated as advances to him by the landlord for the next succeeding year, for which a lien shall attach to the crop of such succeeding year." This statute we have also construed in some of its bearings.-Cockburn v. Watkins, 76 Ala. 486; Gunter v. Dubose, 77 Ala. 326; Thompson v. Powell, 77 Ala. 391. It is not every advance a landlord may make, even to his tenant, that comes within the statute. It must be of some one or more of the articles enumerated, and for some one or more of the purposes mentioned in the statute. Without this there is no lien. The testimony tends to show that the advances made to the defendant in 1886 were made to him as a hired laborer, to be paid for by his labor. For this the statute gives no lien. As for the alleged balance for advances in 1885, the testimony does not enable us to affirm there was any lien for them. The only lien proved in this case was for rent, and the cotton delivered must be applied to it. As the testimony appears in this record, there is no sufficient proof of any [Page v. The State.] other lien, and the cotton delivered more than paid the rent. These 848 446 125 103 Sam Morris v. The State. Indictment for Larceny of Outstanding Crop. 1. Possession of personal property evidence of ownership. The possession of personal property is primary evidence of ownership, notwithstanding the fact that title to it was acquired by a written instrument. (Affirming Patterson v. Kicker, 72 Ala. 406, on this point.) APPEAL from Hale Circuit Court. THOS. R. ROULHAC, for appellant. THOS. N. MCCLELLAN, Attorney-General, contra. SOMERVILLE, J.-Affirmed on authority of Patterson v. Kicker, 72 Ala. 406. Page v. The State. Indictment for Selling or Giving Liquor to a Minor. 1. Constituents of offense --A conviction may be had for selling or giving liquor to a minor (Code of 1876, § 4205; Code of 1886, § 4038), on proof that the minor and his uncle came into the defendant's sa [Page v. The State.] loon, and the uncle called for two drinks; that the defendant set out a bottle of whisky, with two glasses; that two drinks were poured out, for which the uncle paid, and gave one of them to the minor, who thereupon drank it in the defendant's presence. On these facts, although the defendant may not (or could not) have known when he furnished the liquor, that one of the drinks was intended for the minor, he must reasonably have understood that such was the intention, and that was sufficient to charge him, with notice. 2. Sufficiency of indictment.--An indictment for selling or giving liquor to a minor, under the Code of 1876 (§ 4205), was required to negative the requisition of a physician for medical purposes; but, under the act approved February 26th, 1881, it was required to negative also the consent of the parent, guardian, or person having the management and control of the minor. APPEAL from Jackson Circuit Court. BROWN & KIRK, for appellant. THOS. N. MCCLELLAN, Attorney-General, for the State. There is but one point in this case, and that was decided against appellant in Walton v. State, 62 Ala. 197. STONE, C. J.-The defendant was indicted under § 4205 of the Code of 1876, charging that he sold or gave away "spirituous, vinous or malt liquors to Forest Driver, a minor, without the requisition of a physician for medical purposes." Forest Driver's minority was clearly proved, and it was both proved and admitted that Page, a saloon keeper, sold the spirituous liquor, and that it was drunk at the counter of the saloon in Page's presence. The case is not distinguishable from Walton v. State, 62 Ala. 197, save in a single particular, presently to be pointed out. The testimony most favorable to the accused was that of the defendant himself. He testified that "on one occasion last fall, Driver's uncle, Dave Driver, came into my saloon and called for two drinks of liquor and paid for them. He drank one, and handed the other to his nephew, who was standing near by, and he, Driver drank it. I saw him when he took the liquor, and drank it. I did not say any thing or do any thing to prevent his taking the drink, but I did not know at the time he got the liquor that he intended one of the drinks for his nephew, Driver." This alleged want of knowledge on Page's part that one of the drinks bought and paid for by Dave Driver was intended for Forest Driver, the minor, is the difference between this case and that of Walton supra. [Page v. The State.] Forest Driver, the minor, testified that " on one occasion in the fall ot 1887, his uncle Dave Driver, took him, witness, into the defendant's saloon, where the defendant was at the time behind the counter waiting upon customers, and called for whiskey. The defendant set out two bar glasses and a bottle of whiskey upon the counter, and he, witness, and his uncle poured out a drink each and drank it, and his uncle paid for the two drinks." Hunbree, Page's clerk, testified that "on two or more oceasions he had seen the witness, Forest Driver, come into the defendant's saloon with other persons, who would buy whiskey at defendant's bar, sometimes from the defendant, and sometimes from this witness, and they would drink it at the bar, the person treating young Forest Driver paying for it. He thinks he saw young Driver's uncle, Dave Driver, do this on one occasion." The defendant requested the court to charge the jury, that "unless the defendant knew at the time he sold the liquor, or received the money, that the minor was going to drink, the jury should find the defendant not guilty." This laid down too exacting a standard. Dave Driver and his nephew approached the counter together; the uncle called for drinks and paid for them; the defendant understood the number of drinks wanted, for he set before them a bottle and two glasses, and the two drank together. Now, although defendant could not know as fact that the uncle intended one of the drinks for his nephew, his conduct showed that he understood such was the intention. Men act in the gravest matters on appearances no stronger than were shown in this case. Even jurors who impose the heaviest penalties known to the criminal code, do not know the defendant is guilty. They act on conviction-not knowledge. Although Page did not know one of the drinks was intended for the minor, the circumstances were such as reasonably to convince him of what was intended. Our statute, as formerly existing, Code of 1876, § 4205, forbade the sale or gift of intoxicants to a minor, without the requisite certificate of a physician. In Walton's Case. we declared the purpose of the statute, and we gave full effect to it. We upheld his conviction, because he had aided and participated in the gift of an intoxicating drink to one of the interdicted classes. Less than the rule then declared would have made the statute so easy of evasion, as to leave it practically worthless. We adhere to the rule then |