[Daughtry, pro ami, v. Stewart.] however, it must be shown that the party sought to be estopped had knowledge that his confidence had been abused, or had notice of some suggestive fact, which, if followed up, would have led to such knowledge. Howe v. Ashley, 60 Ala. 496; Burns v. Campbell, 71 Ala. 271; Herring v. Skaggs, 73 Ala. 446. The testimony in this case, if believed, shows that Evans took prompt measures to avert any injury that might result from an improper use of his name. There is no testimony that he even knew that Raney had been appointed guardian, until shortly before the latter was brought to settlement; nor is there proof of fact or circumstance, which made it his duty to inquire. If any such facts existed, they are not proved. Under the facts, as shown in the record. Evans is entitled to have the execution so modified as to strike his name therefrom, and to be discharged from all liability as one of the sureties. Reversed and remanded. Daughtry, pro ami, v. Stewart. Petition by Surety on Guardian's Bond for Supersedeas of Execution and Discharge from Decree on Final Settlement. 1. Affirmed on authority of preceding case of Evans v. Daughtry. APPEAL from Bullock Probate Court. Heard before Hon. S. F. FRAZER. NORMAN & SON, and ABERCROMBIE & BILBRO, for appellant. W. F. FOSTER, contra. CLOPTON, J.-Affirmed on authority of Evans v. Daughtry, 84 Ala. 68. [Ballard v. Johns.] Ballard v. Johns. Petition in Probate Court, by Tenant in Common, for Sale of Land for Partition. 1. Adverse possession as defense.-The Probate Court has no jurisdiction to make partition of lands among several joint owners or tenants in common, or to order a sale for equitable partition (Code, 1876, § 3512), when an adverse claim or title is asserted in good faith by any one, and brought to the knowledge of the court; as where it is shown that one of the joint owners, or tenants in common, since deceased, was in adverse possession continuously for more than ten years, under a deed from a purchaser at sheriff's sale under execution against the common ancestor. APPEAL from Montgomery Probate Court. MOORE & FINLEY, for appellant. WATTS & SON, contra. CLOPTON, J.-Section 3512 of the Code of 1876, being a section of the chapter relating to the partition of property held by joint owners, declares: "No division or allotment can be made under this chapter, where an adverse claim or title is asserted by any one, or brought to the knowledge of the commissioners, or Judge of Probate." Under the statute, as construed when this case was before us on a former appeal, the assertion of an adverse claim or possession must be bona fide, and a false or unsupported assertion is not sufficient to oust the jurisdiction of the probate court. It was held that the Probate Court did not err in holding that there had been no sufficient adverse possession by Ballard, who set up a claim to a part of the land.-Ballard v. Johns, 80 Ala. 32. On the remandment of the cause, the adverse possession of Ballard was not set up in the answer to the petition as amended, but the adverse claim and possession of Ellen Johns was duly pleaded. The petition, as amended, seeks the sale for partition of the east half of the north-east quarter of section 17, township 13, range 18, and five acres [Ballard v. Johns.] adjoining on the west. The record discloses, that the land set forth in the amended petition was sold by the sheriff in September, 1848, under a venditioni exponas, as the property of Zephaniah Johns and E. M. Bussey, and was purchased by John W. Hughes. In 1851, Hughes conveyed to W. A. Johns the north-west quarter of the quarter section mentioned in the petition, and in December, 1870, W. A. Johns conveyed to Ellen Johns forty acres of the land described in the amended petition, who continued in possession, claiming the land as her own, and exercising acts of ownership, until her death, which occurred in September, 1884. The petition alleges, that the petitioner and the defendants therein, the estate of Ellen Johns being one of them, are tenants in common by inheritance from Zephaniah Johns and his other children who died without issue since his death. The statute in terms denies to the probate court the power and jurisdiction to adjudicate, on a petition for the partition of lands, adverse claims and titles. It is immaterial by whom the adverse claim or title is asserted, so it is brought to the knowledge of the judge of probate. If during the pendency or trial of the petition, it is made known to him that there is a substantial adverse claim asserted by any one, the statute makes it obligatory upon him to decline further jurisdiction of the matter. In order to ascertain whether the assertion is substantial and bona fide, he must necessarily investigate, not the validity of either of the opposing claims or titles, but the grounds on which they are based; and, as was said on the former appeal, "If it is clear that there has been in reality no such adverse possession, as to have constituted a disseizen or ouster of the petitioner-destroying the holding together of the joint owners-and that the complainant's title is good, or that the court can entertain, on the facts presented, no serious doubts as to such title, it may proceed to hear the application." But, when it does not clearly appear that there has been no such adverse possession, or if the court entertains serious doubt as to the title, it can proceed no further. If there was in fact, a sale of the land in 1848 under a valid order of the Circuit Court as the property of Zephaniah Johns the title to the land passed out of him and was vested in the purchaser. It is true, no order of the court is shown by the record, on which the venditioni exponas was issued; but after the lapse of twenty years, such order may be presumed for the purpose of determining whether there [Long et al. v. Walker, Guardian.] is a bona fide assertion of a hostile title. The conveyance of Hughes describes other lands, which, as may be reasonably inferred, is a misdescription, such as a court of equity would correct. Whether this be so or not, Ellen Johns was in possession of the land continuously for nearly fourteen years, claiming it openly and notoriously adversely, during all of which time the petitioner was out of possession. She was in possession of a part under color of title made by W. A. Johns, who evidently believed he had a right to convey the land. Such adverse possession, under claim of title for such period of time, is sufficient to vest in her an indefeasible estate. On these facts presented by the record, it can not be said, that there are no serious doubts as to the title of the petitioner, as claimed and set forth in the petition. The order of sale for partition is the equivalent of an adjudication that she had only a one-third interest. The Probate Court should have declined to entertain jurisdiction of the petition. Reversed and remanded. Long et al. v. Walker, Guardian. Garnishment on Chancery Decree. 1. Garnishment on chancery decree, to subject statutory estate of married woman.-A decree in chancery having been obtained, in favor of an infant daughter, and dividing the amount found due among the other heirs and distributees, in proportion to the amount received by each from the father's estate; if a garnishment will lie on the decree against a granddaughter, whose mother died before receiving anything from the father's estate, to enforce payment out of moneys belonging to her statutory estate in the hands of her husband (as to which quære), it certainly can not reach moneys in his hands as administrator of her father's estate, which is outside of the subject-matter of the suit. APPEAL from Barbour Chancery Court. G. L. COMER, for appellant. H. D. CLAYTON, Jr., contra. [Long et al. v. Walker, Guardian.] STONE, C. J.-This case was before us at a former term, reported as Walker v. Crews, 73 Ala. 412. After the case returned to the Chancery Court, an account was taken, and in April, 1883, it was ascertained and decreed that Nancy J. Long, a married woman, granddaughter of Arthur Crews, and one of the distributees of his estate, should pay to Ella Corinne Crews, of the debt due from Arthur Crews' estate, the sum of two hundred and six 26-100 dollars. The decree not being paid, a garnishment was sued out against Mrs. Long's husband, J. H. Long, both as an individual, and as administrator of Wesley Bishop (Mrs. Long's father), requiring him to answer as to indebtedness, effects, &c., to, and property of Mrs. Long, his wife. This proceeding was under the Code of 1876, § 3854, 3855, 3856, and 3218 et seq.; Code of 1886, § 3508 et seq.; § 2967 et seq. Mrs. Bishop, mother of Mrs. Nancy J. Long, was a daughter of Arthur Crews, but died before receiving anything of her father's estate. Her children, of whom Nancy J. was one, succeeded directly to the interest which would have fallen to her. Wesley Bishop also died in 1884, and J. H. Long became one of his administrators. The garnishee, J. H. Long, answered, disclosing nothing in his hands, as having come to his wife from the estate of her grandfather, Arthur Crews. He said: "The money she received from the Crews' estate has been expended in clothing and vehicles." He made no further answer as to this. He further answered, "that he received from the estate of her father, Wesley Bishop, the sum of seven thousand dollars," which "he has in money and notes; that at least one thousand dollars is now in money." He had stated, in a previous part of his answer, that individually he was not indebted to the said Nancy J. Long. The foregoing are all the material facts of this case. A married woman's statutory separate estate, as it existed before our recent statute, was very peculiar. Except as the law made it chargeable for articles of comfort and support of the household, she had no power to bind it by any contract she could make; with the single further exception, that she and her husband could make sale of it by conforming to the statute.-3 Brick. Dig. 545, §§ 52, 53; Wilburn v. McCalley, 63 Ala. 436; Pollak v. Graves, 72 Ala. 347; Lee v. Tannenbaum, 62 Ala. 501; Callen v. Rottenberry, 76 Ala. 169. True, we have held, that by bringing suit herself, and bring |