I want to urge those attending here today, and urge all of my colleagues, to give us their best thinking on this proposal. It certainly is not the last word. The bill we have introduced can be improved. Already, I know I have personally had a number of suggestions from colleagues who reviewed the proposed legislation.

And as these hearings progress, we will welcome all kinds of advice. and counsel from those who are involved with the subject matter. Before we go to the witnesses scheduled this morning, does my colleague, the vice chairman of the full committee, have a comment to make?

Mr. HENDERSON. Just briefly to commend you, Mr. Chairman, on your leadership in this area, because I think this is a problem not only vitally affecting the Members-each and every Member of Congress but I think it affects our constituents as well.

I think that we should arrive at an early decision on this, and I believe that the general framework of the bill you have referred to would bring about resolution. And I assure you of my untiring interest in this regard to help move this to the House for its decision.

Mr. UDALL. The distinguished gentleman from Illinois?

Mr. DERWINSKI. I concur in the comments made by Mr. Henderson. I think there have been too many irrelevant charges in recent campaigns that tend to cloud this entire issue of the franking privilege, and I believe we'd be performing a major public service if we clarify the situation, as the basic intent of your bill would do.

I think we should move along as promptly as practicable, and it will be in the public interest as well as the interest of the Members of Congress that we establish certain congressional jurisdiction and clarify any questions so that we won't have the courts being used for political purposes every 2 years during congressional campaigns.

Mr. UDALL. Our first witness this morning can speak with some feeling and vigor on the subject, having had some experience, personal experience, in this area, and he is the Honorable Frank Annunzio, distinguished Member from Illionis, and he is accompanied by his attorney, the distinguished member of the Illinois bar, Mr. James Dooley.

Frank, we are happy to have you here this morning, and you and Mr. Dooley may proceed in whatever manner you feel would be best. STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK ANNUNZIO, MEMBER OF CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ACCOMPANIED BY JAMES DOOLEY, ATTORNEY AT LAW

Mr. ANNUNZIO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I want to commend Mr. Henderson and my distinguished colleague from Illinois, Mr. Derwinski-in fact, the entire committee-for the dispatch in bringing to the attention of the Congress legislation, H.R. 3180, which affects the franking privilege of the Congress.

I feel keenly that when we talk about the franking privilege for Congressmen, that we are really talking about the right of the public to know, the right of the public to hear from their elected Representatives, and the right of the public to write to their elected Representatives.

Mr. Chairman, you made a statement about the Continental Congress, and if our democracy is to live, then this communication

must not be curtailed, but in my opinion it should be increased to the constituencies that we are privileged to represent, because this is the only way that we can know the true feeling of the people in our areas as to the important decisions that Members of Congress are called upon to make.

I have a statement this morning, Mr. Chairman, but in the interest of time, because my attorney is here, I am going to ask that this statement be included in total for the record, so that the distinguished members of this committee can read it, and I want to also ask that the writ of certiorari, which has been presented by my attorney to the Supreme Court of the United States, be made a permanent part of your records.

And I will be happy, when Mr. Dooley concludes, to answer any questions.

So, with the permission of the Chair, it gives me great pleasure to introduce James A. Dooley, who is one of the most distinguished and eminent trial attorneys in Chicago, and indeed, in the Midwest.

Mr. Dooley, who received his legal education at Loyola University, holds an honorary doctor of laws degree from Clarke College, and received a medal of excellence from the Loyola University School of Law in 1967.

He is a member of the American Bar Association, the Illinois Bar Association, and the Chicago Bar Association. He has served as a delegate to the International Congress of Comparative Law, and as president of the International Academy of Trial Lawyers, the American Trial Lawyers Association, the Association of Plaintiffs' Lawyers of Illinois, and the Law Science Academy.

He is an outstanding lecturer and frequent contributor to various law reviews. The universities where he has spoken include the University of Chicago Law School, the Northwestern University Law School, the Loyola University Law School, and the DePaul University Law School.

His academic credentials are long and impressive, but the limitation of time does not permit mentioning them all. Suffice it to say that his legal opinions and astute advice are much sought after in Chicago, in Illinois, ard in the Midwest.

In addition, Mr. Dooley has served as the attorney in my franking privilege court case, and is thoroughly familiar with the history of the franking privilege as well as recently rendered court opinions regarding the use of the frank by Members of Congress.

I know that Mr. Dooley will this morining make a valuable contribution, and I am pleased to introduce him to the members of this panel, and to welcome him to this meeting on my behalf.

Mr. UDALL. Mr. Dooley, we are privileged to have you before us, and before you proceed, without cbjection the full statement of our colleague, Mr. Annunzio, will appear in the printed record as though it had been read word for word in full, and we are happy to have the writ of certiorari for our records and guidance in connection with this

case.

Mr. ANNUNZIO. Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, I appreciate this opportunity to testify on the bill, H.R. 3180, relating to the franking privilege of Members of Congress, especially as it relates to Members of the House.

What Members of Congress may legally send under their frank, and where they may send it, is certainly not clear under the existing law. The ambiguities of the existing franking laws are matters of concern for all Members of Congress. However, they are of special concern for me and several other of my colleagues who have had to endure court actions charging misuse of the franking privilege.

In my own particular case, had I simply proceeded to mail out questionnaires on legislative issues under my frank without consulting anyone, I might have expected to get myself into difficulties, but in fact, I did seek out the best advice that was available to me from members of the Post Office and Civil Service Committee and the House leadership, and I acted in absolute good faith that the mailing of my questionnaire on legislative business before the Congress could legally be made under my frank.

In the action against me, the court examined my motives in sending the same type of questionnaire which hundreds of Members of Congress have mailed out under their frank for years without anyone challenging their right to do so. What right has a court to examine the motives of a Member of the House of Representatives when he sends out mail under his frank? When a court examines and attempts to interpret the motives of a Member of Congress in the performance of his duties, then the court is intruding in the functions of our legislative branch of Government.

The three branches of Government the legislative, judicial, and executive under our Constitution are coequal, and one branch does not have the right to interfere with the internal structure of any of the others. Of course, those matters which inevitably overlap or which affect the other branches, obviously, should be subject to review. There can be no doubt in anyone's mind that purely internal mattersand there is no question in my mind, at least, that the frank is purely an internal matter for the Congress-should not be interfered with by either the executive or judicial branch.

A series of conflicting opinions rendered by the courts during 1972 have eliminated recognizable boundaries for the franking privilege. Under these opinions, that which can be mailed legally under the frank in a congressional district in one part of our country cannot be mailed legally under the frank in a congressional district in another part of our country.

Thus, a crisis is before us, and unless an equitable solution is achieved, the ultimate losers will not be the Congressmen who enjoy the privilege, but out constituents. For they will certainly be deprived of that precious right to know what we, their elected representatives, are doing in Congress to keep their continued trust.

Every citizen in this country is entitled not only to the same representation in Congress, but to the same kind of representation. The latter would be unattainable for all if the courts hampered the use of the frank in one area and not another.

The franking privilege, as the Washington Post commented editorially recently, "is rooted in the democratic doctrine that favors communication between the people and their elected representatives. Such things as informational newsletters, questionnaires and pamphlets-whether publicly or privately printed-can serve the public business, and are not only proper but desirable."

I don't doubt that certain Members abuse their frank from time to time, but the incidence of such abuse is minimal in light of the benefits that our constituents derive from the proper use of our-it really is THEIR—franking privilege. These abuses must be stopped, but at the same time the right to the proper use of the frank which insures communication between Members of Congress and their constituents, must not be endangered in any way.

The current danger to the frank is not one of a passing nature. Unless stopped now, it is one that will continue to grow as the years pass, resulting in death by strangulation perpetrated by the courts of this land. Prior to 1968, there were no known court decisions in this area. However, since that time, one decision was rendered in 1968, another in 1970, and more than a dozen separate court actions were initiated in 1972 resulting in conflicting court opinions.

Hopefully, if H.R. 3180 or similar legislation is enacted, the danger I speak of will disappear, resulting in full and legitimate use of the frank-free of abuses-so that its ultimate purpose will be fulfilled to the benefit of each and every constituent of all Members of Congress. I would like to address myself to the bill at this time. Although the action you have taken to date is a fine beginning, the bill is in need of some refinement.

I am pleased that your bill takes away from the courts the jurisdiction to sit in judgment of Members of Congress in franking matters and places the determination of whether the frank has been properly used in the right place-in the hands of a committee of the House.

I also approve of the fact that the committee is to be structured in such a way that it will be nonpartisan in its examination and its judgment over alleged misuses of the frank. I agree that some watchdog supervision over the use of the frank is probably desirable to prevent possible abuse or misunderstanding as to the proper use of the frank, but it is much wiser in my opinion to place this supervision in a nonpartisan committee of the House than to leave it to the courts where the judge hearing the case could possibly be identified with a political party whose interests may be contrary to the interests of the Member of Congress who has been charged with misuse of the frank by his political opponent.

I also support the provisions of the bill which spell out in some detail the type of matter which may, and may not, properly be sent under the frank. To put these guidelines in the statute itself seems to me to be very wise and minimizes the area where judgment will have to be used to decide when certain matter may properly be mailed under the frank, and when it may not.

As we all know, our friend, the Member from New Jersey (Mr. Helstoski), was also recently involved in a franking case, and the court in his case went so far as to rule that no Member of Congress can mail questionnaires even to constituents in his own district unless the constituents first send the Member a request for such a questionnaire. The court in the Helstoski case also held that Members of Congress cannot send their constituents in their own districts copies of Government documents; they can only send the documents themselves.

Mr. Chairman, the mail matter involved in my court case-as you may know-was a questionnaire, a copy of which I have attached to, and made a part of, my statement. It is the same used by hundreds

of Congressmen in order to analyze citizen sentiment on certain pertinent Federal questions.

Six months before the 1972 election, I mailed 134,000 individually addressed questionnaires: Approximately 34,000 to the district from which I had been elected in 1970, and the remainder within an area to which I had been redistricted. My opponent commenced a lawsuit, seeking damages and an injunction. The court ruled that the 34,000 questionnaires mailed to the district I then represented were within the definition of official business under section 3210 of title 39, United States Code, but that the very same questionnaires mailed simultaneously to the new district were not official business.

It issued an order enjoining me from future such mailings within the new district. The ridiculous conclusion reached is that I could send the questionnaire anywhere in the country except to the new district.

Let's carry it one step further. Assume for the moment that in 1974 I will be running in this very same district, no redistricting involved, and I send an identical nonpolitical questionnaire to everyone therein within the same time frame. The courts-based on this decision could rule that my motives are political, and prevent me from gaining the benefit of my constituents' views. Yet another Congressman from a different political district would be free to do those very same things. Is such a situation fair and just?

I am pressing my appeal in the courts until this matter is satisfactorily resolved; and I might add at considerable personal expense and valuable time. I am following this course of action because I believe that the franking privilege must remain unfettered by inconsistent, illogical, and illegal decisions, handed down by the courts. in my case and in other cases.

Certainly no one I know of has interpreted the franking laws as they were in the Helstoski case, and your bill clears up many of the questions that may arise as to whether a questionnaire, newsletter, or other material can be sent by a Member under his frank.

In view of the fact that the destination and the type of recipient of my questionnaire were used as guidelines for the decision in my own court case, I would like to suggest that the bill be amended to make it absolutely clear that a Member of Congress may properly send material under his frank anywhere in the United States and not just to constituents in his own congressional district.

The bill does contain provisions limiting the mailings into the Member's own congressional district when he uses a simplified form of address and I have no quarrel with that, but where mail is addressed to a particular individual then I think it should be made clear that the Member may send it anywhere in the country under his frank. I think that this could be handled in the bill by adding to the various subsections of the amendments to section 3210 of title 39 of the United States Code a clause which makes it clear that franked mail may be sent anywhere. There are a number of sections on pages 2 and 3 of the bill where such a clause might be added. Or, in the alternative, a general statement to that effect might be added to section 3210 which would make it clear that for the purposes of all mail which may be properly sent under the frank, that if the mail is addressed to a specific person and the simplified form of address is not used, then it may