NOLDE & HORST COMPANY vs. KRUGER ET AL. Equity - Injunction-Invasion of Civil Rights - Strikes-PicketsUnlawful Acts-Intimidation and Riot. 1. An unlawful invasion of the rights of a person is a proper subject of equitable interference by injunction. 2. Where an employer seeks an injunction against unlawful acts of strike pickets, the fact that the strike was brought about by no unlawful conduct on the part of the employer is of importance as showing that it has come into court with clean hands. 3. Equity will permanently enjoin strike pickets from committing acts which lead to intimidation and riot. In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County, in Equity. No. 1123 Equity Docket, 1914. Upon trial and final hearing. H. P. Keiser and A. B. Rieser for Plaintiff. Opinion by Endlich, P. J., February 20, 1915. 1. The Nolde & Horst Company, plaintiff, is a corporation of the State of Pennsylvania, owning and operating a hosiery mill in the city of Reading, employing about 1,500 persons, and manufacturing what is termed in the trade "Full-fashioned hosiery," in addition to other hosiery. 2. On or about February 8, 1914, there was organized, in connection with the American Federation of Fullfashioned Hosiery Workers and the United Textile Workers of America, the Full-fashioned Union, No. 900, of Reading, Pa., and vicinity, of which the defendants and others, employees of the plaintiff, became members. 3. Shortly thereafter at an interview sought by George D. Horst, secretary and treasurer of plaintiff company, the president of the local union, organized as above stated, informed said George D. Horst that they intended to get all the knitters in the full-fashioned department to join the union and to make the mill a union shop, involving the exclusion of all non-union employees, restriction upon the number of apprentices to be taken on, etc. He was told that there was no objection on the part of the company to its employees belonging to the union, nor would it discriminate against any on that ground, but that it would neither allow the mill to become a union shop nor deal with a union. The determination of the employees and of the company, respectively, as above stated, was repeated at another interview on March 10, 1914. 4. Although there was no difference between the employees and the company on the subject of wages or other conditions, on March 13, 1914, about 60 members of the local union quit the service of the company; and whilst some of them subsequently returned to work and are still in the company's employ, the remainder continue on strike down to the present time. 5. With a view to inducing other employees of plaintiff to join the strike and render it effective, those who had left work made a practice of gathering in greater or less numbers near and about the office and entrances of the plaintiff's mill, following and calling to the remaining employees when going to or leaving the mill, shouting to them while at work, applying contemptuous and deriding epithets to them accompanied with offensive gestures, occasionally uttering threats, and the like. This process of "picketing" was engaged in by the entire number of striking employees, as high as 40 being gathered together at once, and at least on one occasion resulted in what may be termed a riot. The effect was to annoy the management of the mill, to hinder, vex and intimidate the employees desirous of continuing at work, to render them nervous and impair their efficiency, and generally to interfere in an appreciable degree with the orderly and peaceable pursuit of their business as well as of that of the plaintiff company, and to invite breaches of the peace and violence. II. DISCUSSION. There is hardly any room, under the evidence in this case, for a doubt upon the facts as stated in the foregoing findings. There is, of course, some contrariety of testimony as to details of action and expression and the identification of individuals connected with the one or the other. But it is plain that the attitude and conduct of the defendants and their associates, as a whole, was the moving cause of all the trouble that occurred as its natural and inevitable result. It is idle to talk of "peaceful picketing," when picketing parties assume dimensions in themselves terrorizing: see M. R. Coal Co. vs. Barclay Coal Co., 68 Pa. 173, 187, such as they did in this case, and their activities lead to intimidation and riot. It is not of much consequence from which side came the first blow. We are not dealing here with any question of criminality under certain acts of assembly: see Bausbach vs. Reiff, 237 Pa. 482, 491, but with civil rights and responsibilities as recognized and enforced in a court of equity. The important fact is that, as long as human nature remains as it is, the things that were done by and among the defendants are calculated to bring about unlawful results, and are therefore, under the law of Pennsylvania as the Supreme Court has laid it down and as this Court is bound to accept and administer it, themselves unlawful. It is not necessary, in order to demonstrate this, to go into an analysis of the authoritative decisions. It is enough to mention those in Murdock vs. Walker, 152 Pa. 595; China Co. vs. Brown, 164 id. 449; O'Neil vs. Behanna, 182 id. 236; Erdman vs. Mitchell, 207 id. 79; Purvis vs. United Brotherhood, 214 id. 348. It may be noted, however, that under the last cited decision, in principle apparently in entire accord with the very recent one of the Supreme Court of the United States, in Coppage vs. Kansas (in part reprinted in the Editorial Department of the District Reports of February 9, 1915), the plaintiff was in the exercise of its constitutional rights in refusing the demands of the local union, upon which followed the strike. Of course this circumstance does not characterize the strike as an unlawful procedure. The defendants had the right, with or without cause, to refuse individually or collectively to work for the plaintiff and by fair and peaceable means to persuade others to join them. But the fact that a strike was brought about by no unlawful conduct on the part of the employer is of importance in a case of this kind as showing that it has come into court with clean hands. No stress has been laid or is considered due to the fact that, after the issuance of the preliminary injunction, the defendants, or some of them, continued to congregate around the plaintiff's works, etc. With accustomed frankness their counsel has assumed the responsibility for what occurred in this respect as done in pursuance of an instruction given by him under a misapprehension concerning the terms of the injunction issued. More over, the practice referred to was promptly discontinued, and it is not contended that the defendants have since evinced a disposition to disregard the order of the Court heretofore made or still to be made. That the latter, in view of the fact that the strike is still on, will have to be one making permanent the preliminary injunction, at the costs of the defendants, is a conclusion from which there seems to be no escape. - III. CONCLUSIONS. A. The actions of the defendants and their associates stated in the Findings of Fact, and more particularly in the 5th finding, were in excess of their lawful rights and constituted an unlawful invasion of the rights of the plaintiff, which is the proper subject of equitable interference by injunction. B. The strike being still on, the plaintiff is entitled to a decree making permanent the preliminary injunction heretofore issued. C. The costs of this litigation are to be paid by defendants. And now, Feb. 20, 1915, the Prothonotary is directed to enter a decree nisi in the above-entitled cause in accordance with the foregoing decision, and forthwith to give notice thereof to the parties or their counsel of record, sec. reg. M. FRANK, TRADING AS THE FASHION, vs. HARRY CONTOR. Bankruptcy-New Promise by Discharged Debtor. A part payment and promise to pay the balance of a claim barred by bankruptcy proceedings on receiving a statement of the same, will sustain a suit and recovery against the bankrupt debtor. Rule. Rule for judgment for defendant n. o. v. Geisenberger & Rosenthal and John E. Malone for S. V. Hosterman, Contra. March 27, 1915. Opinion by Hassler, J. The defend ant was discharged as a bankrupt in the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on March 17, 1908. Prior to his discharge he was indebted to the plaintiff on a book account for $75.82. On May 25, 1908, he paid to the plaintiff $10 on account of this indebtedness, and promised to pay the balance of it, upon which promise the plaintiff brought this suit. The trial resulted in a verdict in his favor, and we are now asked to enter judgment for the defendant non obstante veredicto. In Murphy vs. Crawford, 114 Pa., 496, the law applicable to cases of this kind is stated as follows: "In a suit brought to recover a claim which had been barred by a discharge in bankruptcy, the following distinct principles may certainly be considered as settled by the decision of the Court: First, the effect of the certificate in bankruptcy is to extinguish the debt, not merely to bar the remedy for its recovery; second, the prior legal obligation is sufficient consideration for a new promise to pay it; third, the promise to be effective must be clear, distinct, and unequivocal without qualification or condition; and fourth, in an action upon such claim, the declaration must be upon the new promise and not upon the original obligation." The defendant does not question the correctness of any of the principles stated above, but he argues that the indebtedness was not sufficiently identified, so as to make the promise to pay it clear, distinct and unequivocal. We do not think this objection is well founded. The identification of a debt is the same as is involved in cases where the statute of limitations is barred by a new promise: Hobough vs. Murphy, 114 Pa. 358. In Peter's Estate, 20 Sup. 223, it is decided that the settlement of an account and the striking of a balance is a clear admission of an indebtedness, and was a clear unequivocal identification of the debt. Judge Porter in delivering the opinion of the Court says, "The settlement of an account and striking of a balance is a clear admission of a precise indebtedness, the balance so ascertained becomes a new principal; it cannot be reexamined to ascertain the items or their character, except upon proof of fraud or mistake. An account stated is an answer to the plea of the statute of limitations as to the |