traffic affected by the provisions of this Act to which it may be a party. The section referred to further provides: "That no carrier shall engage or participate in transportation without filing schedules of rates." The section also provides: "Nor shall any carrier charge or demand or collect or receive a greater or less or different compensation for such transportation of passengers or property, or for any service in connection therewith, between the points named in such tariffs than the rates, fares and charges which are specified in the tariff filed and in effect at the time." The contention of defendant company that the relations between common and connecting carriers may be governed by contract or agreement and not by tariff publication cannot be sustained, unless the defendant filed such agreement or contract as provided for by the Interstate Commerce Act; the further contention that an agreement made between two common carriers cannot be cancelled by one of the agreeing parties, by the publication of an alleged tariff, cannot be sustained because the agreement was not made by the railroad company but by persons or corporators other than the plaintiff corporation, and for the further reason that such agreement was not filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission as required by the Act. In A. J. Poor Grain Company vs. C. B. and Q. Railroad Company et al., 12 I. C. C., 418, it was held, "The published rate governing transportation between two given points, so long as it remains uncancelled, is as fixed and unalterable either by the shipper or by the carrier as if that particular rate had been established by a special Act of Congress. When regularly published it is no longer the rate imposed by the carrier, but the rate imposed by the law." "Regardless of the rate quoted or inserted in the bill of lading, the published rate must be paid by the shipper and actually collected by the carrier. The failure on the part of the shipper to pay or of the carrier to collect the full freight charges, based upon the lawfully published rate for the particular movement between two given points, constitutes a breach of the law and will subject either one or the other, and sometimes both, to its penalties. Not even a Court may interfere with a published rate or authorize a departure from it when it has voluntarily been established by the carrier." The Supreme Court of the State of Pennsylvania in Central Railroad of New Jersey vs. Mauser, 241 Pa. St., Page 603, held that: "Both parties are alike charged with full knowledge of the prescribed rates; and if either comes short in this it is his own fault through negligence, or what is worse, and neither may excuse himself by showing reliance upon representations as to prescribed rates other than those appearing in the printed and published schedule. No agreement for a rate other than that prescribed for the particular service can have any binding force. No matter how induced, the law will refuse to recognize in it any of the characteristics of a contract. In the estimation of the law such agreement is not a voidable contract which when once executed the law will not disturb what has been done thereunder, as where agreement is contra bonos mores; but it is an absolute nullity, because, being prohibited by statute, it is impossible for parties to contract with reference to the particular subject. Strictly speaking, there can be no such thing as a void contract; there may be an agreement to do something violative of positive law, but such agreement can never become a contract. We define a contract to be an agreement upon sufficient consideration to do or not to do a particular thing; but it is here implied that the particular thing is to be a legal and competent matter. It follows necessarily that when these defendants accepted the services of the plaintiff as carrier, the only contract under which the service was rendered was the implied one that they would pay for the services at the rate prescribed by law, seeing that that was the only rate by which the carrier was allowed to render the service." In Crane Railroad Company vs. Central Railroad of New Jersey, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania lately decided but not yet reported, the facts were very similar to the facts in this case. Judgment was entered by the lower Court because the affidavit of defense was insufficient to prevent judgment; the Supreme Court sustained the lower Court and held that plaintiff was a common carrier in interstate commerce; and that "the rates fixed by appellee and filed with the Interstate Commerce Court are absolutely binding upon all parties, including other carriers over whose lines the traffic passes as well as appellee." Now April 5, 1915, for reasons hereinbefore set forth rule for judgment for want of a sufficient affidavit of defense made absolute; judgment to be entered for the sum of $19,319.32 with interest at six per cent. from December 31, 1912, added thereto, or a total sum of $21,940.30. KOEHLER vs. KOEHLER. Divorce-Service Subpoena on Respondent in Jail. A divorce was refused when it appeared as if the respondent was in jail at the time the action was instituted, and during the subsequent proceedings, without an order of court allowing the service of the subpoena or other notices on respondent while in jail, with leave, however, to proceed on an alias subpoena. In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County, No. 41 April Term, 1915. Cora P. Koehler vs. John C. Koehler. Divorce. Thomas F. Diefenderfer, for Libellant. Groman, P. J., July 1, 1915. The evidence in this case would warrant the granting of the decree recommended by the master, but the master in his findings of fact sets forth that the respondent is now serving a sentence in the Lehigh County Jail; whether or not the respondent was serving this sentence at the time this proceding was instituted and the subpoena served is not quite clear, but from the master's report, the Court so infers. The subpoena was awarded January 28th, 1915, served personally on the respondent March 1st, 1915; in fact it appears all of the proceedings were had while the respondent was in jail serving a sentence imposed by this Court. The record nowhere shows an order of court allowing the service of the subpoena or other notices on the respondent while in jail. The respondent has not had his day in court. Now July 1st, 1915, for the foregoing reason, divorce refused; the libellant, however, is allowed to ask for an alias subpoena in divorce at the next regular term of this court, with other proceedings to follow. COMMONWEALTH vs. ROTH. Summary Conviction-Appeal. Where the court is not convinced that the testimony submitted did not warrant the conviction before the magistrate, nor that there was a disregard of the law on the part of the magistrate, or doubt as to the right of the magistrate to entertain jurisdiction of the prosecution, it will refuse a special allocatur to appeal. In the Court of Quarter Sessions of Lehigh County. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania vs. R. W. Roth. Summary conviction. Petition for Special Allocatur. Lawrence H. Rupp, District Attorney, for Common wealth. Dallas Dillinger, for Defendant. Groman, P. J., June 28, 1915. The defendant, R. W. Roth, was charged before Alderman Gotthardt with having violated the Act of May 1st, 1909, Section 16, by polluting a stream of water located near the City of Allentown, Pennsylvania. After his conviction a petition was presented praying for a rule to show cause why an appeal should not be allowed; a copy of the alderman's record was attached to the petition. The procedings follow closely the rule as laid down in Commonwealth of Pennsylvania vs. James H. Maurer lately decided by this Court. Upon an examination of the record we find that the petition sets forth sufficient facts without requiring the Court to go outside of the same. Commonwealth vs. Menjou, 174 Pa. St., Page 25. The matter of an allowance of an appeal in such cases rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Commonwealth vs. Hendley, 7 Pa. Sup. Ct., Page 356. As indicated, in proceedings of this kind the courts are not inclined to encourage appeals and will not allow the same save for cause shown. McGuire vs. Shenandoah, 109 Pa. St., Page 613; Commonwealth vs. Eichenberg, 140 Pa. St., Page 158; Commonwealth vs. Yocum, 29 Pa. Sup. Ct., Page 428; Wickam, J., in Thompson vs. Preston, 5 Sup. Ct., Page 154 states the rule as follows: "Ordinarily an appeal should not be permitted, if the party desiring it has had an opportunity to fully and fairly present his case before the magistrate, unless a doubtful legal question is involved, or there is something to indicate oppression, corruption or disregard of law on the part of the magistrate, or after-discovered evidence which would justify a new trial, under the well known rules relating to new trials for that cause. Neither Article V, Section 14 of the Constitution, nor the Act of 1876, which was passed to carry it into effect, contemplates that an appeal shall be allowed merely because the party desiring it is dissatisfied with the result of the trial before the magistrate, as is the case with most defeated litigants, and cheers himself with hopes of better success in the next encounter." The Court is not convinced that the testimony submitted did not warrant the conviction before the alderman, nor that there was disregard of the law on the part of the magistrate, or doubt as to the right of the magistrate to entertain jurisdiction of this prosecution. Now, June 28, 1915, rule for special allocatur discharged. CLADER vs. GANGEWERE. Judgment on Verdict-Prothonotary-Mistake-Entry by Court. Where a verdict was rendered against a defendant, the jury fee paid, and the receipt of the sheriff given to the prothonotary, it was the duty of the prothonotary to enter judgment. Where, however, the judgment was not entered, and the case was put on the argument list under the misapprehension that there was a rule for a new trial or for judgment, n. o. v., the court will not enter judgment nunc pro tunc, so as not to deprive the defendant of a supersedeas on appeal. In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County. A. G. Dewalt, for Plaintiff. Thomas F. Diefenderfer, for Defendant. Staples, P. J., Forty-third Judicial District, specially presiding. May 27, 1915. The defendant was under the impression that he had moved the Court for a new trial |