A factor has a general lien, dependent on possession, for all that is due to him as such, upon all articles of commercial value that are intrusted to him by the same principal.1

A factor's lien may be transferred by a written assignment of the lien coupled with a transfer of the liened property to the assignee. The assignment of the lien necessarily involves a delivery of the possession of the liened property.2

1 Civil Code, section 3053, as enacted 1872.

2 Assignable under Conditions Stated.-Davis, Belau & Co. v. National Surety Co., Cal., June 4, 1903.

Averment.—But conceding that a transfer of the liened property is essential to an assignment of the lien, it does not follow that it is necessary to aver the delivery of the possession of the property, for the ultimate fact is the assignment of the lien, and while the delivery of the possession must be proved in order to establish the assignment, the pleading is complete without an averment of delivery; and no finding on such fact is necessary although the issue is raised by the pleadings: Davis, Belau & Co. v. National Surety Co., Cal., June 4, 1903.

A factor, forbidden by his principal to sell at the market price, may nevertheless sell for his reimbursement, after giving to his principal reasonable notice of his intention to do so, and of the time and place of sale, and proceeding in all respects as a pledgee.3

3 Civil Code, section 2027, latter clause, as enacted 1872, reads substantially as above.

As to sale by pledgee see sections 232 through 240, above.

CHAPTER 3.

LAUNDRYMAN'S LIEN.

446. Nature of laundryman's lien.

446. Nature of Laundryman's Lien.

Laundry proprietors and persons conducting a laundry business have a general lien, dependent on possession, upon all movable property in their hands belonging to a customer, for the balance due them from such customer for laundry work.1

1 Civil Code, section 3051, last clause; new provision, in effect March 12, 1901.

Liens-44

1

CHAPTER 4.

LIENS OF VARIOUS TRUSTEES.

447. Lien exists for compensation and reimburse

ment.

448. Executor has lien for advances.

447. Lien Exists for Compensation and Reimbursement.1

Any person holding property in a fiduciary

V.

1 Various Trustees Have Lien.-In McLane Placerville etc. R. R. Co., 66 Cal. 606, 622, 623, 6 Pac. 748, the court says:

"It is objected that the expenses of the trustee and receiver mentioned in the findings and decree are not a lien upon the road and property conveyed. If the expenses were reasonably incurred in the discharge of the trust, we see no reason why they should not be a lien. Trustees are entitled to a lien on the corpus of the trust property for all such disburse

ments.

"The law on this subject is so clearly laid down in Rensselaer and Saratoga R. Co. v. Miller, 47 Vt. 152, that we insert here what is said in that case on the point:

"The expenses of a trustee in the execution of the trust are a lien upon the estate, and he will not be compelled to part with the property until his disbursements are paid. . . . . If the trust fund is insufficient for such reimbursement, he may call upon the cestui que trust, in whose behalf and at whose request he acted, and recover from him personally

reasonable compensation for the time, and trouble, and money expended. . . . . Trustees have an inherent and equitable right to be reimbursed all expenses which they reasonably incur in the execution of the trust, and it is immaterial that there is no provision for such expenses in the instrument of trust. If a person undertakes an office for another in relation to property, he has a natural right to be reimbursed for all money necessarily expended in the performance of the duty. . . . . The cost of winding up a trust and distributing the money, and all expenses for documents, deeds and other papers, must be paid from the trust fund. . . . . The trustee's lien cannot be allowed to control the estate in such a manner as to destroy the trust; but no conveyance will be ordered or allowed until he is repaid.'"'

In Glide v. Dwyer, 83 Cal. 477, 488, 23 Pac. 706, where a trustee of certain mortgaged property held in trust for the benefit of the holders of the secured notes had expended certain moneys in order to discharge a prior encumbrance upon the property, the court said:

"For the moneys so expended, the party was entitled to a return, with interest and costs necessarily incurred in that behalf, and to have the same returned out of the whole trust fund. It was as much a first lien on that trust property as any other expense legitimately incurred by the trustees, and could not, in law or in equity, be so limited as to be a lien upon a moiety only of the trust property. The amount to be allowed on account of that expenditure was for the court to determine."

In Adams v. Haskell, 6 Cal. 475, the court said that receivers are entitled to the protection of the court against all loss for disbursements which were necessary and proper, and such as a reasonable and prudent man, acting as receiver, would have been justified and sustained in expending."

That a receiver has a lien, see Garniss v. Superior Court, 88 Cal. 413, 418, 26 Pac. 351; Ephraim v. Pacific Bank, 129 Cal. 589, 592, 62 Pac. 177. Thus the certificates of a receiver are a first lien upon the property of a street railway company operated by