Briefs of Counsel. sentatives, the defendant proved by a witness that he, the witness, paid the attorney his fee in a certain suit, brought in the name of the defendant. The plaintiffs then introduced in evidence an entry in the deceased attorney's books, in his handwriting, showing that such fee was paid by the defendant: Held, that there was no error in the admission of such entry, as it tended to contradict the witness' statement that he paid the fee. APPEAL from the Appellate Court for the Second District;— heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Knox county; the Hon. GEO. W. PLEASANTS, Judge, presiding. Messrs. SANFORD & CARNEY, for the appellant: A party is presumed to have contracted with those who, at the time of the contracting, were openly and publicly members of the firm. Page v. Brant, 18 Ill. 37; Story on Partnership, sec. 241; 1 Chitty's Pleading, 9, 11, 12. A person suffering his name to be used in business is to be treated as a partner, whatever may be the agreement between himself and the other co-partners. Fisher v. Bowles, 20 Ill. 396; 3 Kent's Com. 52; Collyer on Partnership, 75; Stearns v. Haven, 14 Vt. 540; Guidon v. Robson, 2 Camp. 802. If attorneys who are co-partners accept a retainer, the contract is joint, and continues to the end of the suit. v. Goodrich, 16 Ill. 341. Walker For a demand due a firm, upon the death of one, the suit must be brought in the name of the survivor or survivors. 1 Chitty's Pleading, 19; Peters v. Davis, 7 Mass. 257. There is no estoppel, because there is no element of fraud, and there was no misrepresentation of the facts. Davidson v. Young et al. 38 Ill. 152; The People v. Brown, 67 id. 435; Powell et al. v. Rogers, 105 id. 318; Bigelow on Estoppel, 480, p. 60; Mills v. Graves, 38 Ill. 455. Messrs. WILLIAMS & LAWRENCE, for the appellees: Tunnicliffe, as to all matters outside of Knox county, was not an actual but only a nominal partner. Moshier was so notified while the services were being performed. This being Opinion of the Court. so, Frost might have sued for his services in his name, alone. 1 Saunders' Pleading, p. 18, sec. 16. A mere nominal partner, having no interest in the firm, need not be joined. 2 Saunders' Pleading, (2d Am. ed.) sec. 701; 1 Chitty's Pleading, 12; Gow on Partnership, (3d Am. ed.) 128, sec. 129; 2 Greenleaf on Evidence, sec. 478; Story on Partnership, (5th ed.) sec. 241; Collyer on Partnership, (2d Am. ed.) sec. 394, or sec. 662 of Perkins' ed. The entries in Frost's book, being in his handwriting, were most clearly admissible. 1 Greenleaf on Evidence, sec. 147. Mr. JUSTICE WALKER delivered the opinion of the Court: This was an action of assumpsit, brought in the Knox circuit court, by the representatives of T. G. Frost, deceased, against Timothy Moshier. The declaration contained but one count, being a common count for work and labor, and for services rendered. To it was filed the plea of the general issue. A trial was had by the court and a jury, resulting in a verdict in favor of plaintiff, for $1100. A motion for a new trial was overruled, and judgment was rendered for that amount. Defendant appealed to the Appellate Court for the Second District, where the judgment of the circuit court was affirmed, and he appeals to this court and asks a reversal. The facts have been conclusively found by the lower courts. It was insisted that the retainer for a part of the services was with the firm of Frost & Tunnicliffe, and the survivor should sue in his own name. To this claim it is answered that the firm only extended to Knox county, whilst the services were rendered in the courts of other counties. This is a question of fact, and the jury found for appellees, and the Appellate Court, by affirming the judgment, found the facts the same way. Appellant claimed that the services rendered by Frost, after he moved to Chicago and formed a partnership with Miller, Opinion of the Court. were by that firm, and the latter could alone sue as surviving partner. On the other side, it was contended that Frost was retained before he went to Chicago, and that Miller had no connection with or interest in the management of the litigation, that appellant only retained Frost, and did not know Miller in the transaction. On this issue the jury heard the evidence, and found for appellees, and the Appellate Court found the same way by affirming the judgment. That court, in fact, has found all the controverted facts for appellees. There is some complaint made of the instructions given for appellees, on the trial in the circuit court. The fifth and sixth of appellees' instructions are criticised. They inform the jury that if they believe, from the evidence, that after Frost's death appellant refused to recognize Miller as having any interest in the claim, and insisted that he employed Frost alone, he was thereby precluded from insisting that he retained the firm. In this we perceive no error. Parties are precluded from contradicting their solemn admissions or statements, deliberately made. The law will not permit a party to make statements that induce the other party to act upon them as true, and then prove his statements were untrue. Here, by his statements, he induced Frost's representatives to sue in their names, and now he insists that he may contradict his statements, and defeat a recovery. It is urged that the court erred in permitting appellees to read in evidence entries in Frost's books. We are unable to perceive that there was any error in this. Claycomb had testified he paid Frost his fee in the case of Moshier v. Claycomb et al., and the entry in Frost's books, read in evidence, showed that it was paid by Moshier. The entry was proper evidence, as tending to contradict Claycomb's statement that he had paid the fee to Frost. Perceiving no error in this record, the judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed. 14-110 ILL. Judgment affirmed. Syllabus. 110 210 130 641 110 210 132 320 110 210 76a 461 110 210 181 473 110 210 209 $479 HARVEY A. FERBRACHE et al. v. PETER A. FERBRACHE. Filed at Ottawa May 19, 1884. 1. WITNESS-competency-as against persons defending as heirs. A mother who has made a warranty deed for a tract of land to her son, is not a competent witness for such son on a bill by him against the heirs of another son, to set aside a prior deed made by her to the deceased son, as a cloud upon the title of the complainant, in respect to facts which occurred in the lifetime of the deceased son, she having a direct interest in the result of the litigation. Nor is the complainant competent. 2. WARRANTY OF TITLE-whether a protection as against subsequent acts of grantee. Where the owner of a tract of land has made two warranty deeds for the same, to different persons, the first of which is attacked and sought to be avoided by the second grantee on the ground that the first grantee had rescinded the contract, or reconveyed whatever interest he had, the grantor's interest is not equally balanced, for the reason that the covenants in the prior deed would not extend to a consequence of any act of the prior grantee, and embrace the case of any future defect of title in him, caused by a subsequent conveyance of the land made by himself. 3. STATUTE OF FRAUDS-verbal contract to convey land-part performance. By the Statute of Frauds all contracts for the transfer of title to land must be in writing, and to take a case out of the statute on the ground of part performance, it is indispensable that the contract shall be established by competent proofs to be clear, definite and unequivocal in all its terms, and that possession shall have been taken of the land under the contract, and payment of the purchase money made. 4. Where the evidence, on a bill to enforce a verbal contract for the transfer of land, is of a loose and vague character, lacking in definiteness as to the interest surrendered,-whether a voluntary gift or not, and what were the terms, and it is not shown that any consideration has been paid, or there was any to be paid, the contract will not be specifically enforced. 5. LIMITATION-as to who may acquire an adverse title. Where a person having title to land leaves another in possession under him, the person so left in possession can not, while holding possession under the owner, acquire an adverse title against him or his heirs by reason of his actual possession and payment of taxes, under the Limitation law. WRIT OF ERROR to the Circuit Court of Stark county; the Hon. N. M. LAWS, Judge, presiding. Statement of the case. On the 2d day of September, 1855, one Peter Ferbrache died intestate, seized of the land in controversy in this case,a certain described sixty acres of land in Stark county,leaving surviving him his widow, Elizabeth Ferbrache, and several children, his heirs at law. Soon afterward, Peter A. Ferbrache, one of said children and heirs, filed a petition for partition and assignment of dower as to said land, and other lands of which his father died seized, which resulted in the assignment of the said sixty acres of land to the widow, Elizabeth Ferbrache, as her dower, and an order of sale of all the lands, including the reversion of said sixty acres so assigned as dower. Upon sale being made, the widow became the purchaser of the reversion of said sixty acres, and a commissioner's deed was made to her for the same. The widow thenceforward continued to occupy the land until the 3d day of November, 1856, when she made a warranty deed of the same to her son Daniel D. Ferbrache. Upon receipt of this deed, Daniel D. went into possession of the land, and for some time lived in the same house upon it with his mother, the said Elizabeth. In the course of about a year, however, he removed some five miles distant, to a farm at Lawn Ridge, in Peoria county, leaving his mother in the possession and occupancy of the land. In the year 1865 or 1866 said Daniel D. Ferbrache died, leaving surviving him five minor children, his heirs at law. Some time in the year 1866, the administrator of the estate of Daniel D. Ferbrache, and guardian of some of his children, finding among his papers the unrecorded deed of Elizabeth Ferbrache to said Daniel D., caused the same to be duly recorded in the recorder's office of Stark county. On the 9th day of January, 1874, the said Elizabeth Ferbrache made a warranty deed of the same land to her son Peter A. Ferbrache, who then resided in El Paso, Woodford county. Said Elizabeth continued to reside upon the land with her son Peter A., up to the time of her death, which occurred |