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ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES.
SALE OF LAND TO PAY DEBTS. Continued.
ment of dower to the widow of the intestate, and may properly direct the
sale of the portion set off as dower, subject to the widow's life estate.
Kenley et al. v. Bryan, 652.
3. Sale to widow in payment of her specific allowance, not fraudu. lent. The sale of land assigned to the widow of an intestate by an ad. ministrator, to her, subject to the dower and homestead estate, she being the highest bidder, can not be impeached for fraud merely from the fact that she paid no cash, but gave her receipt to the administrator for the amount of her bid, against her specific allowance. Her receipt operated to release the estate of so much indebtedness. Ibid. 652.
4. Whether a fraudulent combination. At an administrator's sale of lands an eighty-acre tract was struck off to a bidder for $250, subject to a mortgage and taxes, amounting to $350, the land not being worth more than from $600 to $800. The purchaser failing to take the land, the husband of the widow of the intestate agreed to take the land at the bid, when the adıninistrator conveyed to the bidder, and he quitclaimed to the other party, who paid the bid and discharged the incumbrances: Held, that these facts did not even tend to show a fraudulent combination to obtain the property at a sacrifice. Ibid. 652.
5. Sale of lands en masse-remedy. If two separate and distinct tracts of land are sold by an administrator as a whole, without first offering them separately, such fact affords a ground of exception to the report of sale, but not for impeaching the sale years afterwards by a bill in chancery. The remedy in such case is by motion to set aside the sale before its confirmation. Ibid. 652.
IN RESPECT TO JOINT AND SEPARATE INTERESTS.
Whether the admissions or declarations of one are binding on all.
See EVIDENCE, 7.
WHAT SO REGARDED. See LIMITATIONS, 5, 6.
BY WHOM IT MAY BE ACQUIRED. See LIMITATIONS, 7.
1. What constitutes. A general agent is one authorized to tmnsact all the business of his principal, or all his business of some particular kind. National Furnace Co. v. Keystone Manf. Co. 427.
EXTENT OF AGENT'S AUTHORITY.
2. Proof of usage, in ascertaining the powers of an agent. In the
case of a general agent the law permits usage to enter into and enlarge
the liability of the principal, in respect to contracts made by the agent;
and it has been held that the usages of a particular trade or business are
admissible for the purpose of interpreting the powers given to an agent
or factor. National Furnace Co. v. Keystone Manf. Co. 427.
3. E.xtent of the powers of an agent in the particular case.
poration engaged in the manufacture of pig iron, adopted, through its
directory, a resolution, as follows: “Resolved, that A B, of Chicago, be
and is hereby appointed and employed by this company as its sole agent
for the consignment and sale of its entire product, he to receive a com-
mission,” etc. This agent assumed to authorize another to make con-
tracts in respect to the subject matter of the agency, and the latter did
contract, on behalf of the corporation, with another manufacturing com-
pany, to supply the latter with all the pig iron they should need, use or
consume in their business during the then ensuing season of such busi-
It was shown to have been the custom in Chicago for iron brokers
to employ salesmen to make contracts with manufacturers of like kind
for the year's supply of iron, to be delivered as ordered. On the ques-
tion as to the authority of the agent, it was held, that under the resolu-
tion appointing him, in connection with the usage of trade in Chicago
among this class of dealers, he had authority, as the general agent of his
principal, to contract, through the instrumentality employed, for the sale
of iron thereafter to be produced, and to be delivered in the future as
ordered. His authority was not limited merely to the sale of the iron
when it was ready for the market. Ibid. 427.
4. And aside from any usage or custom among dealers, the resolution
of appointment itself was broad enough in its terms to constitute the
person appointed the general agent of the principal, in respect to the
business to which it related, and authorized him to contract for the future
delivery of iron, as was done. Ibid. 427.
5. Of facts from which it may be inferred. A debtor applied to an
agent of his creditor for an extension of the time of payment or a renewal
of the loan, the creditor being a non-resident corporation, and the agent
a resident of the State, acting generally for the creditor as to loans in
this State. At the first interview the agent stated to the debtor that he
would communicate with the home office in regard to the proposition
made, and afterward such agent, in another interview, said he was ready
to enter into the arrangement that was thereupon made: Held, that from
these facts the debtor might properly infer that the agent received the
principal's sanction for entering into the arrangement he made, and that
the debtor was justified in his reliance upon the agent's authority to
make it. Union Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Slee, 35.
6. In whose behalf to be considered as acting. See INSURANCE, 12.
REORGANIZATION-UPON THE STOCK PLAN.
1. Effect upon property rights, and the rights of creditors. The
constitution of an agricultural society declared that the object of the
society should be “to improve the condition of agriculture, horticulture,
and the mechanic and household arts,” and provided for holding annual
fairs. On a reorganization as a joint stock company, the new constitu-
tion then adopted declared the object of the society should be “to im-
prove the condition of agriculture, horticulture, floriculture, mechanie
and household arts,” and also provided for holding annual fairs and
exhibitions. The name was changed by substituting the word “board" in
place of the word “society.” The board, as reorganized, took possession
of all the property of the old society: Held, that there was no essential
change in the object of the society resulting from its reorganization, and
that the new board was not a separate and independent society from the
old one, but the same, under a slight change in name. Livingston
County Agricultural Society et al. v. Hunter et al. 155.
2. Upon the reorganization of a county fair society, under section 9,
chapter 5, of the Revised Statutes of 1874, the corporation, as reorgan-
ized, will succeed to all the rights and liabilities of the society as they
existed at the time of the change, and the old creditors of the same will
have the same right to sue the company under its new name and organi.
zation that they had to sue the company as originally organized. Ibid.
3. Creditors of an agricultural society, whether their claims accrued
before or after the reorganization of the institution, stand upon the same
footing, and the only way by which one may gain an advantage over
another is by the exercise of superior diligence in prosecuting his claim
to judgment, and thereby obtaining a judgment or execution lien upon
the company's property. Ibid. 155.
4. The reorganization of an agricultural society under the statute
mentioned, on the stock plan, does not render the corporation one for
private gain or profit, or change the public character of the institution.
Its property still can only be applied to the payment of its debts, and to
the promotion of the general objects of the association, as expressed in
its constitution. Ibid. 155.
ALLEGATIONS AND PROOFS. See PLEADING AND EVIDENCE.
ALIMONY. See DIVORCE AND ALIMONY, 1.
APPEALS AND WRITS OF ERROR.
RETURN TO WRIT OF ERROR.
1. Within what time to be made. The statute has prescribed no time within which a return to a writ of error shall be made by the clerk of the court to whom it is directed. The practice in that regard is regulated alone by the rules or practice of the court from which the writ issues. Challenor v. Mulligan, 666.
2. Effect of neglect to have record sent up. Under a rule of the Appellate Court requiring a plaintiff in error or appellant to file abstracts and briefs on or before the second day of the term unless the time is extended, and that on failure to do so the judgment or decree of the court below shall be affirmed, on a writ of error to the circuit court, when no return to the writ had been returned by the clerk by sending up the record at the second term of the Appellate Court, though service had been made on the defendant in error before the first term, an order of continuance at the second term of the Appellate Court was set aside and the decree below afirmed, without any rule having first been taken to bring up the record: Held, no error in affirming the decree com
plained of. Ibid. 666. WHETHER FREEHOLD INVOLVED.
3. In partition. A freehold is involved in a proceeding for the partition of land, and the Appellate Court has no jurisdiction of an appeal taken from a decree in such a proceeding. Bangs et al. v. Brown
et al. 96. REVIEWING FACTS.
4. In suit on insurance policy. The judgment of the Appellate Court upon all controverted questions of fact in an ordinary action, as, upon an insurance policy for a loss, is final, and not subject to review in this court. Newark Fire Ins. Co. v. Sammons et al. 166.
5. In trespass against a sheriff for levying upon and carrying away goods under an execution, it is a question of fact depending upon evidence whether a sale of the goods by the defendant in the execution, to the plaintiff, was made in good faith and for a valuable consideration, or was made with intent to hinder and delay the vendor's creditors; and so as to the value of the goods, and whether the damages are excessive. The finding of the Appellate Court the same as in the trial court is conclusive, and this court can not consider whether the verdict is contrary to the evidence, or the damages are excessive. Mann et al. v. Jckier
THE QUESTION OF EXCESSIVE DAMAGES.
6. Decision of Appellate Court-whether revievable. On an appeal from a judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the judgment of the trial court in favor of the plaintiff in an action to recover damages for a personal injury occasioned by the alleged negligence of the defendant, it
APPEALS AND WRITS OF ERROR.
THE QUESTION OF EXCESSIVE DAMAGES. Continued.
was assigned for error that the damages were excessive; but it was held,
that was a question for the Appellate Court,—not this. Illinois Central
Railroad Co. v. Frelka, 498.
7. Effect of affirmance by Appellate Court. Where a judgment of
the trial court, in an action of assumpsit upon a policy of life insurance,
for the defendant, is affirmed by the Appellate Court, this will settle all
controverted questions of fact against the plaintiff, and this court, on
appeal, can not assume that any agent of the defendant was authorized
either to waive a forfeiture already accrued, or to make a renewal contract
of insurance. Miller v. Union Central Life Ins. Co. 102.
8. In favor of action of lower court. Where the Appellate Court
affirms a decree sought to be reversed on writ of error, on the ground of
a neglect of the plaintiff in error to have a transcript of the record sent
up at the second term after service of the scire facias, unless it is made
to appear to this court that the Appellate Court has thereby violated some
rule of practice, it will be presumed that court has acted properly, and
its judgment will be affirmed. Challenor v. Mulligan, 666.
DAMAGES-APPEALS FOR DELAY, ETC.
9. Section 23, chapter 33, relating to costs, which authorizes ten per
cent damages when the Supreme Court shall be of opinion that an appeal
is prosecuted for delay, has no application to a case which is contested
in good faith in that court. It applies only to cases appealed and not
prosecuted, or such as are not prosecuted in good faith. This rule also
applies to the Appellate Court. Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Rail-
road Co. v. Dougherty, 521.
10. Not affected by an appeal. See LIENS, 2.
EXECUTION-PENDING AN APPEAL.
11. Not void, but voidable. See SALES, 3.
RULES OF PRACTICE.
12. In Appellate Court. See RULES OF PRACTICE, 1, 2.
PRESUMPTION OF NOTICE.
1. As to all that is in the record. One who, in the absence of fraud
or imposition, by a voluntary appearance makes himself a party to a
cause, is conclusively presumed to have notice of everything that appears
of record in such suit. Austin v. Dufour et al. 85.
RULES OF PRACTICE.
Power of that court to prescribe such rules. See RULES OF PRAC-
TICE, 1, 2.