Opinion of the Court. the scope of that general jurisdiction. It is not necessary now to consider whether the probate court proceeded irregularly in making the order complained of, as that question can not be adjudicated in this proceeding. The law is, a common law writ of certiorari will only lie to inferior tribunals or jurisdictions in cases where they proceed illegally, as it is alleged the probate court did in this instance, where no appeal or other mode of directly reviewing their proceedings is provided or exists under the law. (Miller v. Trustees of Schools, 88 Ill. 26.) In cases like the one being considered, the statute has expressly given a remedy for any error committed by the probate court, by an appeal to the circuit court, as this court has decided in Ennis v. Ennis, 103 Ill. 95. The writ of certiorari was therefore properly quashed, as was done by the circuit court. The errors assigned in this court only call in question the decision of the Appellate Court in affirming the "final order and judgment of the said circuit court * quashing the common law writ of certiorari issued, and dismissing said appellant's petition therefor." It will be perceived the errors assigned are not broad enough to embrace the question whether the circuit court erred in awarding costs against petitioner, and in favor of Lawrence M. Ennis, on the dismissal of her petition, and the correctness of that order will not be considered in this court. Petitioner not having assigned it as error in this court, the point made in the Appellate Court as to costs may be deemed to have been waived in this court. The judgment of the Appellate Court will be affirmed. Syllabus. Opinion of the Court. OTTO YOUNG v. CHARLES H. McCONNELL. Filed at Ottawa May 19, 1884. 1. ERROR WILL NOT ALWAYS REVERSE-as to giving and refusing instructions. The refusal of a proper instruction relating to a collateral issue, which, if given, would not probably have induced a different verdict, affords no ground of reversal, as such error works no prejudice. 2. This court will not reverse, in every case of conflict in the evidence, because of some slight error in giving or refusing an instruction. When the evidence clearly sustains the verdict, this court never reverses for error in instructions. APPEAL from the Appellate Court for the First District;heard in that court on appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. JOSEPH E. GARY, Judge, presiding. Messrs. GOUDY & CHANDLER, for the appellant. • Mr. A. B. JENKS, and Mr. A. S. TRUDE, for the appellee. Mr. JUSTICE WALKER delivered the opinion of the Court: We regard it as unnecessary to consider more than one assignment of error in this case, and that is, whether the court below should have given defendant's seventh instruction. It is this: "If the jury believe, from the evidence, that either the witness McConnell or the witness Clapp has willfully testified falsely as to any material fact, then they may disregard his evidence entirely, except when it is corroborated by other testimony." It is urged that it is correct, and it was error to refuse it. It related to a collateral and not to the main issue in the 110 83 77a 608 Opinion of the Court. case. The question then arises, whether its refusal was calculated to have injured appellant. If it is not apparent that the jury, had the instruction been given, would have reached a different verdict, or we can see they probably would have done so, we are unable to say the error prejudiced appellant. On examining the evidence, we are unable to believe that the result would have been different had it been given. All persons know, without being instructed, that a person who testifies falsely to a material fact in a case is unworthy of belief. The jury would know that any portion of the evidence which was corroborated should have been considered. The Appellate Court has found the facts, and if they are true as found, (and we must so receive them,) the jury have reached a correct conclusion, independent of the instruction. Had the Appellate Court believed there was doubt as to the facts, or that the witnesses named had not made false statements, the judgment would no doubt have been reversed. We can not consider the weight of the evidence. That is for the jury and the Appellate Court. We are not prepared to adopt a rule that we will reverse in every case of conflict in the evidence because of some slight error in giving or refusing an instruction. When the evidence clearly sustains a verdict, this court never reverses because of error in instructions, and the Appellate Court is doubtless governed by the same rule, as it is required by the law. We can not say that court did not so act in this case. The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed. Judgment affirmed. Syllabus. Brief for the Appellant. HENRY S. AUSTIN v. HILLERY DUFOUR et al. Filed at Ottawa May 19, 1884. 1. PRACTICE—after reversal and remanding order. If either party desires to prosecute a case further, when there has been a reversal and remanding order by an appellate court, he must file a transcript of the reversal and remanding order in the trial court within two years from the date of such remanding order. If this is not done the cause will be deemed as abandoned. 2. SAME--jurisdiction, how acquired after reversal. By the filing of the transcript of the reversal of a judgment and remanding order in the trial court, that court obtains jurisdiction of the subject matter of the suit. But before any steps can be taken in the cause, the court must also obtain jurisdiction over the person of the adverse party, and this, in the absence of a voluntary appearance, can only be done by giving the notice required by section 84 of the Practice act. 3. If, on the filing of such transcript in the trial court, the adverse party appears voluntarily, and submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court, this will obviate the necessity of notice to him, and it will be too late after such appearance to object to the want of service. Neither will such party so appearing be allowed to say that in appearing he supposed it was to a new suit. 4. APPEARANCE-binds party to notice of all that is in the record. One who, in the absence of fraud or imposition, by a voluntary appearance makes himself a party to a cause, is conclusively presumed to have notice of everything that appears of record in such suit. APPEAL from the Appellate Court for the First District;— heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. WILLIAM W. FARWELL, Judge, presiding. Mr. EDWARD J. HILL, for the appellant: The cause, as it came back from the Appellate Court on the former appeal, has not been reinstated. It has been abandoned. Haywood v. Collins, 60 Ill. 340. Under the decisions it was formerly not necessary to reinstatement that notice should be given. Murray v. Whittaker, 17 Ill. 230; Reaugh v. McConnell, 36 id. 375. Brief for the Appellees. Opinion of the Court. It was the purpose of the legislature to change the rule, hence sections 84 and 85, chapter 110, of the Revised Statutes of 1874, were adopted. The notice is now a necessary step to reinstatement. The giving of the notice without filing the transcript is nugatory. Heath v. Jones, 12 Bradw. 493. The failure to give such notice within the two years, as required by section 85, brings the case within the limitation,that is to say, the two sections must be construed in pari materia. Messrs. BISBEE, AHRENS & DECKER, for the appellees: The reinstatement of a case in the court below, after a reversal, is not the exercise of a special statutory power. It falls within the scope of the ordinary powers of a court of general jurisdiction, and as the court below found in its decree that the court had jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties, the ten days' notice required by the statute must be presumed to have been given. Best on Presumptions, 47; Law Lib. secs. 52, 57. Mr. JUSTICE MULKEY delivered the opinion of the Court: The facts material to an understanding of the legal questions involved in this case, so far as they affect the parties now before the court, are as follows: In 1879 Peter Whaler filed an original petition, in the circuit court of Cook county, to enforce a mechanic's lien against certain improved lots in Chicago, making Henry S. Austin and others, parties. Hillery and Peter Dufour, and Ebenezer B. Rowe, filed in that proceeding an intervening petition. There was a decree in favor of both the original and intervening petitioners. On appeal to the Appellate Court, the decree as to the intervening petitioners was reversed, on the ground the petition and proofs, in a certain respect, were insufficient, and the cause remanded for further proceedings in conformity with the opinion of that |